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I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. Judicial Standards Commission
In 1975 the North Carolina Supreme Court decided the first case
to come before it from the Judicial Standards Commission.1 In In re
Crutchfield2 the court affirmed the Commission's recommendation,
made after full adversary hearing, that Judge E.E. Crutchfield 3 be
censured for wilful misconduct "prejudicial to the administration of
justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute."4
The complaint against Judge Crutchfield alleged (and his veri-
fied answers admitted) that he had signed judgments allowing limited
driving privileges for two individuals5 who had been arrested while
driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor and who had refused
to take the breathalyzer test.6 Crutchfield was not the trial judge for
either defendant' and knew that his action in signing the judgments
was in contravention of certain provisions of the motor vehicle statutes.8
The court, affirming the order of censure, found both Crutchfield's
motive in signing the judgments and the fact that he received no personal
benefit from signing irrelevant to the inquiry. His conduct itself-
signing the judgments without making any effort to ascertain whether
they were supported in law and in fact-was of the type that brings
the judicial office into disrepute in the eyes of any knowledgeable
observer. 10
1. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-375 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
2. 289 N.C. 597, 223 S.E.2d 822 (1975).
3. Respondent Crutchfield is a judge of the General Court of Justice, District
Court Division, Twentieth Judicial District. Id. at 598, 223 S.E.2d at 823.
4. Id.; see N.C. CONST. are. IV, § 17(2); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-376 (Cum.
Supp. 1975).
5. The judgments were signed in the law offices of the attorney in each case.
289 N.C. at 600-01, 223 S.E.2d at 824-25.
6. Id. at 598, 223 S.E.2d at 823.
7. Each judgment recited that the defendant had been convicted of the offense
charged; yet one defendant had not at the time even been tried. Neither judgment
was filed with the clerk of the court or forwarded to the Department of Motor
Vehicles. Id. at 599-601, 223 S.E.2d at 824.
8. See N.C. GEN. STAT. H9 20-16.2(c), -179(b) (Supp. 1975). Crutchfield
knew that under the statutes only the trial judge could allow limited driving privileges
to the person convicted and that a person who refused to take the breathalyzer test
was not entitled to receive driving privileges after revocation of his license. 289 N.C.
at 601, 223 S.E.2d at 824.
9. 289 N.C. at 603, 223 S.E.2d at 826.
10. Id. Crutchfield's execution of the judgments without due inquiry into the
facts and law, on mere ex parte application of counsel for defendants, also violated
Canon 3(A)(4) of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct, reprinted in 283
N.C. 771, 772 (1973).
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Justice Lake, in a dissenting opinion, maintained that while Crutch-
field's conduct was worthy of censure, the statutes creating and em-
powering the Commission are constitutionally deficient." In Lake's
view, censure is a form of punishment, and to allow the Commission
to serve as "the investigator, the accuser, the prosecutor, the jury to
find the facts, and the determiner of the sentence to be recommended"' 2
violates the due process right to be heard before a fair and impartial
tribunal.3
B. Employment Security Commission
Claimant in In re Usery' 4 applied for unemployment insurance
benefits when, due to the failure of his union and the Beaunit Corpora-
tion management to reach a new collective bargaining agreement,
Beaunit shut down all operations of the trucking division where he was
employed.' 5 After a hearing, the Employment Security Commission
disqualified claimant from receiving any benefits on the ground that
his unemployment was "caused by a labor dispute in active progress."'"
Claimant appealed from the order, urging that general public policy
as expressed by the legislature" compelled the award of benefits to
those persons unemployed through no fault of their own. 8
The court of appeals for the first time clarified the scope of the
disqualification provision' 9 and aligned North Carolina with the
majority view20 that a "lockout" by management that results in work
stoppage is a labor dispute within the meaning of the statute.21 Con-
sequently, employees involved in such a dispute are disqualified for
11. 289 N.C. at 605, 223 S.E.2d at 827 (Lake, J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 610, 223 S.E.2d at 830.
13. Id.
14. 31 N.C. App. 703, 230 S.E.2d 585 (1976).
15. Beaunit admitted that the employees were locked out and would not be
recalled until a new agreement was reached. Id. at 704, 230 S.E.2d at 586.
16. Id. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(5) (1975) provides in pertinent part that "An
individual shall be disqualified for benefits: . . . (5) For any week with respect to
which the Commission finds that his total or partial unemployment is caused by a
labor dispute in active progress . . . at the . . . premises at which he is or was
last employed . .. .
17. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-2 (1975).
18. The court noted, however, that "'our Supreme Court has held that the section
of Chapter 96 which sets out the specific grounds for disqualification of benefits will
prevail over the general policy provisions of G.S. 96-2." 31 N.C. App. at 706, 230
S.E.2d at 587; see In re Steelman, 219 N.C. 306, 13 S.E.2d 544 (1941).
19. "Labor dispute" is nowhere precisely defined in Chapter 96 of the General
Statutes. 31 N.C. App. at 705, 230 S.E.2d at 587.
20. Id. at 706-07, 230 S.E.2d at 587-88.
21. Id. at 707, 230 S.E.2d at 588.
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its duration from receiving unemployment benefits, despite the fact that
their unemployment is involuntary. 22  The court held that the neutral-
ity of the statute expresses the policy of the State in regard to labor




In 1976 the courts reviewed several orders of the Utilities Com-
mission affecting the rates payable for electricity by the North Carolina
consumer. In State ex rel. Utilities Commission v. Edmisten,24 Carolina
Power & Light Company (CP&L) applied to the Commission for au-
thority to increase its retail rates for electricity sold in North Carolina
by twenty-one percent25 and to reclassify certain users of electricity.20
After public hearings the Commission entered a final order approving
both the rate increase and the reclassification plan. The court of
appeals affirmed the order2" over the exceptions of intervening custom-
ers whose rate increases, because of the reclassification, were greater
than the twenty-one percent overall increase.
2 9
On appeal the supreme court affirmed on the ground that appel-
lant 0 had not met the burden of showing it was presently aggrieved by
unreasonable discrimination in rates between appellant and other
customers receiving the same kind and degree of service.8' In devising
22. Id.
23. Id. The court found persuasive the Illinois Supreme Court's examination of the
same question under a similar unemployment compensation act, and its decision that
a lockout is a labor dispute:
[B]y this [disqualification] provision the Illinois legislature adopted the policy
that the State shall not, by payment of unemployment compensation, assist
one party to a labor dispute, regardless of fault; and that the State in cases
of industrial strife ought not to take sides and place blame. This provision
was designed to maintain the neutrality of the State in labor disputes.
Buchholz v. Cummings, 6 Ill. 2d 382, 386, 128 N.E.2d 900, 902-03 (1955).
24. 291 N.C. 424, 230 S.E.2d 647 (1976).
25. The proposed increases were not across-the-board but varied among customer
classes. Id. at 425, 230 S.E.2d at 648.
26. CP&L wished to eliminate the Textile Mill Schedule, the High Load Factor
Schedule and the Military Service Schedule, and to place the customers formerly in
these schedules in a new general service classification, Schedule G-3. Id. at 425-26,
230 S.E.2d at 648.
27. Id. at 426, 230 S.E.2d at 648.
28. State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Edmisten, 29 N.C. App. 428, 225 S.E.2d 101
(1976).
29. 291 N.C. at 426, 230 S.E.2d at 648.
30. Of the original intervenors only Executive Agencies of the United States of
America appealed to the supreme court. Id. at 426, 230 S.E.2d at 649.
31. Appellant maintained that it should not be combined with other groups in
the new G-3 classification because it had use characteristics incompatible with those
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the rate structure the Commission was faced with the conflicting goals
of elimination of all cross-subsidization"2 and the simplification of the
rate structure.33  In the court's view the order struck a reasonable
balance between the two.
3 4
In other important decisions the North Carolina Supreme Court
aligned itself with the decisions of forty-two other states by holding
that it was within the statutory ratemaking powers of the State Utilities
Commission to allow the use of a fossil fuel adjustment clause in
utility companies' retail charges for electricity. 5 In one of the cases,
CP&L, in conjunction with an application for a general rate increase,
requested approval of the use of a fuel adjustment clause as a rider
to its regular rate schedule.36  By use of the clause the utility could
add to its regular charges an amount representing each customer's
share of the amount by which costs for the coal, oil and gas used to
generate electricity exceeded its pre-established cost for an historical
base period. If current costs for fuel fell below base period costs,
the utility, under the terms of the clause, would give a corresponding
credit to its customers.3 7
groups: a different average load factor, minimum demand and service voltage. As a
result, "it may, in the future, bear a disproportionate share of the costs within the G-3
classification." Id. at 427, 230 S.E.2d at 649 (emphasis in original). As to the power
of the Commission see N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 62-2 to -326 (1975 & Supp. 1975). The
rates set by the Commission are deemed prima facie just and reasonable. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 62-132 (1975).
32. 291 N.C. at 429, 230 S.E.2d at 650. The court admitted that under the new
combined class schedule, some intra-class cross subsidization may occur. Yet the
scheme that would most accurately allocate costs-placing each customer in a class by
itself and basing rates on the cost of services to that customer-is patently unworkable
at present. This is especially true in light of the second ratemaking goal of simplifi-
cation of the rate structure. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. The court also rejected the contention that the Cost-of-Service study upon
which the Commission based its order was incompetent evidence. The system-wide
study was adequately representative of CP&L's operating conditions in the areas of
North Carolina where the new schedule was to apply and did not vary significantly
from results that would have been produced by a study based solely on North Caro-
lina data. Id. at 430, 230 S.E.2d at 651.
35. State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Edmisten, 291 N.C. 327, 230 S.E.2d 651
(1976) (the CP&L case). In another case with the same style, State ex reL Utilities
Comm'n v. Edmisten, 291 N.C. 361, 230 S.E.2d 671 (1976), the court affirmed an
order allowing Duke Power Company to utilize a fuel adjustment clause.
36. 291 N.C. at 330, 230 S.E.2d at 653.
37. Id. at 330-31, 230 S.E.2d at 653. The clause is a mathematical formula
by which the utility computes the additional charges or credits.
Under the formula in question . . . the utility figures its total cost for
fossil fuel actually burned for one month. The month used is the second
preceding month to that for which the customer is being billed. The utility
then figures what its cost for fossil fuel actually burned would have been
during this second preceding month had it paid for the fuel at base period
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On the basis of the application the Commission entered an ex
parte order allowing use of the clause on an interim basis pending
hearings. Then, after full hearing, a final order approving in principle
the use of the adjustment clause was entered.38 The Commission found
that the fuel market was unstable and likely to remain so; that the
utility could not absorb the rising fuel costs and still continue to provide
adequate and reasonably priced service; 39 and that allowance of the fuel
adjustment clause would not increase the company's overall authorized
rate of return.40
On appeal to the supreme court the Attorney General41 essen-
tially contended that despite the economic advisability of the fuel ad-
justment clause, "the Commission simply had no statutory authority to
use the clause as a rate making device . . . ,",42 either on an interim
or on a permanent basis. The court, apparently influenced by the exi-
gencies of the factual circumstances and the resolution of the question
in other states, affirmed, maintaining that nothing in the Public Utilities
Act prohibited use of the clause and that certain provisions "when
properly interpreted, authorize, at least by implication and analogy,
such a device."43
The court held that no monthly change in published rates was
effected without proper notice and hearing since the fuel clause formula
itself, not varying monthly charges to each consumer, became part of
the utility's published schedule." Nor was the clause unfairly approved
as an isolated event, since it was presented as a rider to general rate
schedules in which all elements of cost were duly considered.4" Further,
prices by multiplying the pre-determined base cost stated in terms of dollars
per kilowatt hour by the total kilowatt hours generated by its fossil fuel
plants during this second preceding month. The second figure is subtracted
from the first and the difference is divided by the utility's total kilowatt hour
sales in the second preceding month. The result, after an adjustment for
applicable state gross receipts taxes, is a factor stated in terms of dollars per
kilowatt hour. This factor is then applied to each customer's bill by multi-
plying it by the number of kilowatt hours used by that customer in the month
for which he is being billed. The result is either an added charge or a credit
to that customer's bill.
Id. at 331, 230 S.E.2d at 654 (emphasis in original).
38. Id. at 330, 230 S.E.2d at 653.
39. Id. at 333, 230 S.E.2d at 655.
40. Id. The court of appeals affirmed the Commission's order in State ex rel.
Utilities Comm'n v. Edmisten, 29 N.C. App. 258, 224 S.E.2d 219 (1976).
41. The Attorney General intervened on behalf of the consuming public of the
State. 291 N.C. at 330, 230 S.E.2d at 653.
42. Id. at 339, 230 S.E.2d at 658.
43. Id. at 339, 230 S.E.2d at 659.




the court found that the Commission had not abdicated its ratemaking
powers by permitting use of the clause because the terms of its order
approving the clause in principle provided for the continued monitoring
and investigation of its operation.4" Clearly, in the court's view, the
provisions of the Public Utilities Act empowering the Commission to
fix "just and reasonable rates"47 are broad enough to encompass the
allowance of the fuel adjustment clause.48
In State ex rel. Utilities Commission v. Transylvania Utility Co.
49
the court of appeals dealt with the relatively new concept of "avail-
ability" charges of water and sewer companies. According to pre-
vailing practice, developers and purchasers of recreational homesites
agree, by uniform contracts, that lot owners will pay a fixed monthly
sum (availability charge) prior to the time they desire a connection
with the waterwork system. Thereafter, the owners become regular
customers of the utility and are required to pay the lawfully established
rates.50
Applying G.S. 62-133.1(b),5 ' the court reversed and remanded an
order of the Commission approving applicant Transylvania's rate sched-
ule including a three dollar per month availability charge each for water
and sewer services. 52  Since the company had previously entered uni-
form contracts establishing minimum monthly availability charges of
five dollars for each service, 53 the Commission, under the statute, was
without power to disapprove the contract rates so long as they did not
exceed the maximum allowed by the statute.54
Applying principles previously set forth by the supreme court,55
the court of appeals in State ex rel. Utilities Commission v. County of
46. Id. at 344, 230 S.E.2d at 661-62.
47. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 62-130, -133(d) (1975).
48. 291 N.C. at 345, 230 S.E.2d at 662.
49. 30 N.C. App. 336, 226 S.E.2d 824 (1976).
50. Id. at 337, 226 S.E.2d at 825. Prior to the enactment of applicable legislation,
the Commission's position was that its power to fix just and reasonable rates for "con-
sumers" impliedly prohibited it from fixing rates for anyone else: for example, non-
users of a commodity or service. Id. at 338, 226 S.E.2d at 825.
51. "The maximum nonuser rate shall be as established by contract, except that
the contractual charge to nonusers . . . can never exceed the lawfully established
minimum rate charged user customers: in this case, five dollars per month. Id.
(1975) (emphasis added).
52. 30 N.C. App. at 337, 226 S.E.2d at 824.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 341, 226 S.E.2d at 827. The maximum chargeable to nonusers is the
minimum rate charged user customers: in this case, five dollars per month. Id.
55. See State ex rel. Utilities Comnm'n v. General Telephone Co., 281 N.C. 318,
189 S.E,2d 705 (1972).
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Harnett" held that the Commission was not required in a general rate
case57 to consider the county's claim that it was entitled to have ex-
tended area telephone service. 58  Since the rights asserted and the relief
sought were peculiar to the residents of the county, the proper remedy
was by means of a complaint case, as authorized by statute."0
D. Open Meetings Law
With its decision in News & Observer Publishing Co. v. Interim
Board of Education0 the court of appeals added to the growing body
of case law construing the provisions of the North Carolina "Open
Meetings Law.""1  The law requires that official meetings of govern-
mental bodies be open to the public and creates a right of the public
to be given reasonable prior notice of the time and place of every such
meeting and a reasonable opportunity to attend.
6 2
On December 16, 1975, individual plaintiffs, citizens of Wake
County, sought to attend a special meeting of the Board (called for
the purpose of filling a vacancy created by the resignation of a member)
and to report the deliberations for plaintiff News & Observer.8  The
only advance public notice given of the meeting was in the form of a
telephone call to the newspaper office one hour before the meeting was
scheduled to begin.0 4
After the names of eight potential candidates for the vacant posi-
tion were placed in nomination, the Board chairman, pursuant to a
motion, named the entire Board "a committee of the whole" to study
and investigate the nominees. The committee then adjourned into an
56. 30 N.C. App. 24, 226 S.E.2d 515 (1976).
57. Carolina Telephone & Telegraph was seeking approval of increases in its
rates and charges for intrastate telephone services. Id. at 25, 226 S.E.2d at 515. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-133 (Supp. 1975).
58. 30 N.C. App. at 28, 226 S.E.2d at 517. None of the six exchanges furnishing
telephone service to the county is connected with any of the others by extended area
service. A customer of one exchange can call another exchange only by paying a toll
for each call. Id. at 26, 226 S.E.2d at 515-16.
59. Id. at 28, 226 S.E.2d at 517. See State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Tidewater
Natural Gas Co., 259 N.C. 558, 131 S.E.2d 303 (1963); N.C. GEnt. STAT. § 62-73
(1975).
60. 29 N.C. App. 37, 223 S.E.2d 580 (1976).
61. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-318.1 to -318.7 (1974).
62. 29 N.C. App. at 42, 223 S.E.2d at 583.
63. Id. at 39, 223 S.E.2d at 582. It was not contended that the Board was not
within the general coverage of the Open Meetings Law. The lower court concluded as
a matter of law that the Board is a governmental body politic, which has or claims
authority to conduct hearings and to deliberate in the public interest, and that the meet-
ing in question was an official meeting called for the purpose of transacting the public
business. Id. at 41, 223 S.E.2d at 583.
64. Id. at 39, 223 S.E.2d at 582.
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executive session, closed to the public and press. Later, at the resumed
meeting following the closed session, the Board voted on the candidates
for the vacancy by secret ballot. 65 Plaintiffs, alleging that they and
other members of the public similarly situated would suffer immediate
and irreparable injury if further closed meetings were allowed, sought
and obtained an order granting them temporary injunctive relief pend-
ing defendants' appeal."6
The court of appeals, adopting for the first time in North Carolina
a policy of strict construction of the exceptions to the open meetings
law, denied the Board's contention that the executive session com-
plained of was authorized by G.S. 143-318.3(b). 67 The court further
held that although there might be times when a board of education could
validly meet as an investigative committee of the whole, the Board had
not on this occasion met the burden of justifying its closed session under
the exception provided by G.S. 143-318.4(7) for "study, research
and investigative . . . committees .. ".. ,68
As to the adequacy of notice of meetings required by law to be
public, the court held that although one hour is insufficient, forty-eight
hours advance notice of every meeting is "unreasonably long." Rather,
in the absence of explicit statutory provisions for notice, "defendant
Board should give reasonable notice of its meetings, taking into con-
sideration the urgency of the matter necessitating the meeting." 69
E. Sovereign Immunity
With its decision in Smith v. State7° the Supreme Court of North
Carolina established new law by abolishing the long-standing doctrine
65. Id. at 40, 223 S.E.2d at 582.
66. Id. at 44, 223 S.E.2d at 584-85. The lower court ordered that the Board be
restrained from further meeting for the purpose of transacting the public business
except in conformity with the statute; from voting by secret ballot, unless after every
such vote the ballots showing how each member voted were open to inspection by the
public; and from designating itself as a Committee of the Whole to research and investi-
gate nominees for the vacant position. The court also required that the Board give public
notice at least 48 hours in advance of every official meeting by posting written notice
of the time and place of such meeting outside the door of defendant's principal office.
Id. at 44-45, 223 S.E.2d at 584-85.
67. Id. at 47, 223 S.E.2d at 586. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.3.(b) (1974) provides:
'This Article shall not be construed to prevent any governing or governmental body
• ..from holding closed sessions to consider information regarding the appointment
... [or] employment ... of an employee or officer under the jurisdiction of such
body . . . ." The court held that a co-equal "member" of the Board is not an officer
subordinate to the Board. 29 N.C. App. at 47, 223 S.E.2d at 587.
68. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.4(7) (1974).
69. 29 N.C. App. at 51, 223 S.E.2d at 589.
70. 289 N.C. 303, 222 S.E.2d 412 (1976).
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of sovereign immunity as a defense to valid contract actions against
the State that arise after March 2, 1976.71 The issue arose when
plaintiff Smith, a medical doctor, brought an action against the State
and various state officials to recover damages72 for his allegedly wrong-
ful discharge as Superintendent of Broughton Hospital before the expira-
tion of his six-year term.73 Defendants moved to dismiss the action
on the ground that sovereign immunity barred suit against both the State
and its individual officers acting in their official capacities, within the
scope of their discretion.74
The court, affirming the denial of defendants' motion to dismiss,"
held that plaintiff's claim against the State for salary due was tenable
because it was based on his status as a state employee under a valid
contract of employment. Since plaintiff was appointed for a term of
six years, termination at an earlier date, in the absence of a showing
of cause, would constitute a breach of his contract. 76 Noting "'the cur-
rent trend of legislative policy and of judicial thought . . . toward the
abandonment of the monarchistic doctrine of governmental immu-
nity' ,,77 the court then held that
[w]henever the State of North Carolina, through its authorized
officers and agencies, enters into a valid contract, the State implic-
itly consents to be sued for damages on the contract in the event it
breaches the contract. Thus ... the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity will not be a defense to the State. The State will occupy the
same position as any other litigant. 78
The court adopted the reasoning of other jurisdictions that had
earlier abrogated the doctrine and allowed the state to be sued on valid
contracts: to deny the performing party the right to sue the state
when it is the defaulting party is to take his property without adequate
71. Id. at 320, 222 S.E.2d at 423-24.
72. Plaintiff sought $250,000 in severance pay.
73. Plaintiff was appointed to his position on October 1, 1970. On April 18,
1973, he was summarily discharged by the Western Regional Commissioner of Mental
Health after a dispute over cassette tapes of a credentials committee meeting at the
hospital. 289 N.C. at 305, 222 S.E.2d at 414-15.
74. Id. at 306, 222 S.E.2d at 415.
75. See Smith v. State, 23 N.C. App. 423, 209 S.E.2d 336 (1974).
76. 289 N.C. at 308-09, 222 S.E.2d at 416-17.
77. Id. at 311, 222 S.E.2d at 418 (quoting Lyons & Sons, Inc. v. Board of Educ.,
238 N.C. 24, 27, 76 S.E.2d 553, 555 (1953)).
78. Id. at 320, 222 S.E.2d at 423-24. Although plaintiff may now prosecute his
claim, if he prevails against the State he cannot obtain execution to enforce the judg-
ment. "The validity of his claim, however, will have been judicially ascertained. The
judiciary will have performed its function to the limit of its constitutional powers.
Satisfaction will depend upon the manner in which the General Assembly discharges its
constitutional duties." Id. at 321, 222 S.E.2d at 424.
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compensation and thus to deny him due process of law; to allow a
state arbitrarily to avoid its binding obligations is to give judicial sanc-
tion to government tyranny; and to attribute to the legislature an intent
to allow the state to breach its contracts at the expense of citizens who
have no adequate remedy is to impute to it bad faith foreign to a demo-
cratic government.79
The supreme court in Smith was careful to point out that its de-
cision did not apply to the doctrine in relation to state liability for
torts.80 Thus, the court of appeals in Mazzucco v. North Carolina Board
of Medical Examiners81 affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' defamation
action on the ground of sovereign immunity.82
Plaintiffs alleged that they were maliciously and intentionally
defamed by a notice of charges defendant Board mailed to Doctor
Harold Hoke, plaintiffs' employer, on September 20, 1974. The charges
were to the effect that Hoke had conspired with and suborned the
perjury of two female employees83 to support his false complaint to the
Charlotte police that he was being blackmailed by a reporter for the
Charlotte Observer."4
The court held that a tort action against a state board was in
fact an action against the State, which cannot be sued without its per-
mission because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Although the
General Assembly has consented by means of the Tort Claims Act",
to suits against the State for the negligent acts of its employees and
other agents, an action against the Board for intentional defamation
is not within the scope of the Act.88 Although this immunity does
not extend to individual board members who abuse their lawful au-
thority by acting maliciously and wantonly in derogation of the rights
of others, the court held that the individual defendants enjoyed an
absolute judicial immunity from prosecution for defamatory statements
made in the performance of their quasi-judicial statutory duties.8 7
79. Id. at 320, 222 S.E.2d at 423.
80. Id. at 322, 222 S.E.2d at 424.
81. 31 N.C. App. 47, 228 S.E.2d 529 (1976). See this Survey, Torts: Defama-
tion.
82. Id. at 49, 228 S.E.2d at 531.
83. Although plaintiffs were not named in the charges, they alleged that their
identity was known because of a 1974 news story. Id. at 48, 228 S.E.2d at 531.
84. Id.
85. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
86. 31 N.C. App. at 49, 228 S.E.2d at 531.
87. Id. at 51, 228 S.E.2d at 532. When bringing an action against a licensee.
doctor for unprofessional or dishonorable conduct, the Board of Medical Examiners is
required to give written notice of charges before taking any disciplinary action. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 90-14.2 (Supp. 1975).
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F. Government Employee Dismissals
1. Constitutional Right to a Hearing
Absent a statute, regulation or contract to the contrary, employees
of state and local governments in North Carolina are "employees at will"
and can be dismissed for almost any reason. 8a The employee is pro-
tected from unfair dismissal procedures by the federal8 and state 0
constitutions only if he can prove his job loss will deprive him of a
"liberty" or "property" interest 1 If such an interest is found, the
employer is required to give the employee notice and a hearing on
the reasons for his dismissal."2
A major 1976 United States Supreme Court decision, Bishop v.
Wood, 3 involved the dismissal of a North Carolina policeman (Bishop)
who alleged that his termination without a hearing deprived him of both
"property" and "liberty" interests. Since the determination of whether
a government employee has a claim of entitlement in his job must be
made with reference to state law, the Court was required to interpret
North Carolina law on this issue.0 4 The Court found that North Caro-
lina requires an employer, by statute -or contract, actually to grant
some form of guarantee of continued public employment in order for
an employee to have a property right in his job.9 Finding no express
or implied contract conferring such a property right on Bishop, 0 the
Court examined the city ordinance governing the dismissal of police-
men. 7  The ordinance specified that permanent employees such as
88. The only impermissible reason is one involving the employee's right to exer-
cise a constitutional freedom. See, e.g., Still v. Lance, 279 N.C. 254, 259, 182 S.E.2d
403, 406 (1971).
89. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law. . . ." U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
90. "No person shall be . . . in any manner deprived of his life, liberty, or
property, but by the law of the land." N.C. CONST, art. I, § 19.
91. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-72 (1972). See also Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
92. See B. ScHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATrVE LAW § 67 (1976).
93. 96 S. Ct. 2074 (1976). The case is noted in an earlier issue of this volume.
Note, Constitutional Law-Property and Liberty Interests in Public Employment, 55
N.C.L. REV. 242 (1977). See also Lowy, Constitutional Limitations on the Dismissal
of Public Employees, 43 BROO.LYN L. REv. 1 (1976).
94. 96 S. Ct. at 2077-78 (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577
(1972)).
95. Id. at 2078 (citing Still v. Lance, 279 N.C. 254, 182 S.E.2d 403 (1971)).
96. Id. at 2078.
97. The personnel ordinance applicable to Bishop's dismissal provides:
If a permanent employee fails to perform work up to the standard of the
classification held, or continues to be negligent, inefficient, or unfit to perform
his duties, he may be dismissed by the City Manager. Any discharged em-
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Bishop could be dismissed for certain enumerated reasons and pro-
vided for notice of the reasons for discharge, but no hearing. The
Court admitted that this ordinance could be read as conferring a guar-
antee of continued employment to permanent city employees. The
Court decided, however, to apply a very narrow scope of review and
accepted the district court's "tenable" interpretation that the ordinance
merely gave Bishop certain procedural rights, not a property interest
in his job.9s
In its interpretation of North Carolina law on the constitutional
rights of government employees, the Supreme Court relied on only one
marginally relevant North Carolina case.99 The North Carolina Su-
preme Court subsequently added credibility to the Court's interpreta-
tion of North Carolina law on this issue with its opinion in Nantz v.
North Carolina Employment Security Commission.100 Nantz, a former
Employment Security Commission employee, 10 sought review of a
State Personnel Board hearing affirming her dismissal. 02 Because judi-
ployee shall be given written notice of his discharge setting forth the effective
date and reasons for his discharge if he shall request such notice.
Id. at 2077 n. 5 (quoting art. II, § 6 of the Marion, N.C., Personnel Ordinance).
98. Id. at 2078. The dissenters pointed out that this interpretation of the ordinance
conflicts with the interpretation of a similar regulation accepted by six members of the
Court in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974). Id. at 2083. The federal regula-
tion in Arnett provided that federal employees could be discharged "for cause." Three
Justices would have interpreted this regulation as granting only procedural protections,
not a constitutional property right. The other Justices rejected such an interpretation
and found that the employee did have a constitutional right to some sort of hearing.
See Note, supra note 93, at 248-49, for a criticism of the majority interpretation of the
ordinance in Bishop.
The United States Supreme Court has held that a government employee's "liberty"
rights are impaired to the extent that a hearing is constitutionally required in only two
situations: (1) when the dismissal imposes social stigma on the employee and (2)
when the dismissal forecloses the employee's freedom to take advantage of future
employment opportunities. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572-75 (1972).
The Court in Bishop, without considering what effect the dismissal would have on
future employment, found that Bishop suffered no deprivation of liberty since the
reasons for dismissal were not made public. 96 S. Ct. at 2079.
99. 96 S. Ct. at 2078-79 (citing Still v. Lance, 279 N.C. 254, 182 S.E.2d 403
(1971)). Still does not state the North Carolina law on the issue decided in Bishop,
since the statute analyzed in Still contained no "for cause" standard as did the ordinance
in Bishop. This misplaced reliance by the majority was pointed out in Justice Black-
mun's dissent. Id. at 2086.
100. 290 N.C. 473, 226 S.E.2d 340 (1976).
101. Plaintiff was dismissed for failing to cooperate with the Security Commis-
sion's investigation of demoralizing anonymous letters mailed to the Director of the
Commission. Id. at 475, 226 S.E.2d at 342.
102. The State Personnel Board gave plaintiff a hearing in accordance with its
statutory responsibility under Law of July 1, 1965, ch. 640, § 12, [1965] N.C. Sess. Laws
708 (formerly codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-4 (1974)). On appeal the court
rejected plaintiff's contention that her constitutional right of protection against self-
incrimination was impaired by the Board's inference of guilt from her refusal to
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cial review of the hearing could be obtained only if the hearing were
constitutionally required,10 3 the court had to make an initial determina-
tion on the validity of the plaintiffs claim of a liberty and property
interest. The court could easily have held that the statute establish-
ing a hearing before the Personnel Board gave the employee a property
right in her job. Because the Personnel Board could only make ad-
visory recommendations, however, the court followed the lead of Bishop
v. Wood and held the statute created no constitutional right.104
State employees dismissed after February 1, 1976, may have a
better chance of arguing that they have a constitutional right to a
hearing than did plaintiff in Nantz because of statutory changes that
became effective on that date.'0 5 Under the North Carolina Adminis-
testify. Quoting Baxter v. Palmigiano, 96 S. Ct. 1551 (1976), the court held that the
fifth amendment did not forbid adverse inferences from silence in civil actions. 290
N.C. at 478, 226 S.E.2d at 343. For a discussion of the subsequent changes to the
personnel statute, see note 105 infra.
103. "Any person who is aggrieved by a final administrative decision, and who has
exhausted all administrative remedies made available to him by statute or agency rule,
is entitled to judicial review of such decision under this Article . . . ." Law of April
28, 1953, ch. 1094, § 2, [1953] N.C. Sess. Laws 1005 (formerly codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 143-307 (1974)). "Administrative decision" is defined as "any decision, order,
or determination rendered by an administrative agency in a proceeding in which the legal
rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties are required by law or constitutional right
to be determined after an opportunity for agency hearing." Law of April 28, 1953, ch.
1094, § 2, [1953] N.C. Sess. Laws 1005 (formerly codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §
143-306(2) (1974)). For a discussion of the subsequent repeal of these statutes, sce
note 105 and accompanying text infra. The court of appeals applied these statutes this
past year in Darnell v. North Carolina Dep't of Transp. & Highway Safety, 30 N.C.
App. 328, 226 S.E.2d 879 (1976), a case involving the dismissal of a highway patrol-
man. The court dismissed the appeal, holding that plaintiff had no constitutional right
to a hearing and therefore no right to judicial review under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-307
(1974). 30 N.C. App. at 332, 226 S.E.2d at 881.
104. 290 N.C. at 480-81, 226 S.E.2d at 345. The court also rejected plaintiff's
claim of deprivation of liberty without due process by finding that since the Com-
mission had offered to give her a job in another office, the action was not such as
would damage plaintiff's good name in the community or bar her from other employ-
ment. Id. at 483, 226 S.E.2d at 346.
Nantz and Bishop may invalidate an interpretation of a North Carolina personnel
rule by the district court judge in Bean v. Taylor, 408 F. Supp. 614 (M.D.N.C.), aft'd
mem., 534 F.2d 328 (4th Cir. 1976). The rule provided that permanent employees
should be tenured and only be dismissed for cause. The district court judge stated that
this rule created a property right in permanent employees, but found that plaintiff had
no property right in his job since he was not a permanent employee. Id. at 618-20.
The court in Bean also rejected plaintiffs contention that there was a binding implied
agreement giving him a property right on the basis that any such agreement would
violate public policy and legislative intent. Id. at 621.
105. The following new statutes may help the court find that state employees do
have a property right in their jobs: (1) N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-35 (Cum. Supp. 1975)
requires that no permanent employee be dismissed after February 1, 1976 except for
"just cause" and sets up a procedure of appeal to the State Personnel Commission; (2)
N.C. GEN, STAT. § 126-4 (Interim Supp. 1976) replaces the State Personnel Board with
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trative Procedure Act, now applicable to state employee dismissals, all
parties in a contested case have a right to a hearing.' 0 6  A "contested
case" is defined as any type of agency proceeding "wherein the legal
rights, duties or privileges of specific parties are to be determined."'
07
The drafters of the Administrative Procedure Act intend for this defini-
tion of contested case to give the parties an independent right to invoke
adjudication procedures without reference to other laws or the Con-
stitution.'
08
2. Type of Hearing Constitutionally Required
Once a court decides that an employee has a liberty or property
interest in his job, the next issue that must be decided is the type of
hearing that is constitutionally required. The North Carolina Court
of Appeals faced this issue this past year in Thompson v. Wake County
Board of Education.0 9 As a tenured public school teacher, Thompson
had a property right in his job and received a hearing on the cause of
his dismissal."10 He contended, however, that the hearing he was
afforded after his dismissal did not meet the constitutional requirements
of due process because the School Board conducting the hearing was
not an impartial decisionmaker. 11 Thompson did not allege facts that
would show actual prejudice on the part of the Board, but contended
that bias resulted from the statutory requirement that the Board serve
two functions in the dismissal process. The Board was required to
make the initial determination that cause existed for Thompson's im-
mediate suspension and the final decision on his permanent dismissal.
1 2
The court of appeals found the case analogous to a recent United States
Supreme Court case, Hortonville Joint School District v. Hortonville
a commission and authorizes that commission to hold hearings and issue binding orders;
(3) id. § 126-43 (Cum Supp. 1975) makes the North Carolina Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, id. H9 150A-1 to -64, applicable to the state personnel system.
106. Id. § 150A-23(a).
107. Id. § 105A-2(2).
108. See Daye, North Carolina's New Administrative Procedure Act: An Inter-
pretive Analysis, 53 N.C.L REV. 833, 869 (1975). The court in Nantz refused to
express an opinion on the effect of these new statutes on employee dismissal proceed-
ings. 290 N.C. at 477, 226 S.E.2d at 342-43.
109. 31 N.C. App. 401, 230 S.E.2d 164 (1976).
110. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-142 (1975) sets out the requirements of tenure and
the procedures for dismissal of a tenured teacher.
111. 31 N.C. App. at 406, 230 S.E.2d at 167. For a discussion of the impartial
adjudicator problem, see B. SCH-WARTZ, supra note 92, § 106-109.
112. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-142(f) to (h) (1975). A pre-termination hear-
ing is not constitutionally required if there will be a hearing soon after dismissal,
especially if the dismissal is considered an emergency. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134 (1974) (plurality and concurring opinions); B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 92, § 73;
Lowy, supra note 93, at 20.
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Education Association,113 in which the Court held that a school board's
dual role as labor negotiator and adjudicator at striking teachers' dis-
missal hearings did not violate due process." 4  The balancing process
used by courts to determine the type of hearing necessary requires that
the individual's interest in the decision be balanced against the state's
interest in using a particular procedure. 115 The court in Thompson,
by relying on the results of the balancing process used in Hortonville
instead of applying the test to the facts of the case before it, found
that the hearing afforded plaintiff did not violate due process.1 '6
G. Judicial Review
To obtain judicial review under the new North Carolina Adminis-
trative Procedure Act"17 a petitioner must satisfy the requirements
specified in section 150A-43 of the Act:"" (1) the petitioner must
be a "person aggrieved"; (2) the decision of which review is sought
must be a "final agency decision"; (3) the decision must have been
made "in a contested case"; (4) the petitioner must have "exhausted
all administrative remedies made available to him by statute or agency
rule"; and (5) there must not be "adequate" judicial review provided
113. 96 S. Ct. 2308 (1976).
114. Thompson seems to go a step further than did the majority opinion in Horton-
ville. In Hortonville the Court found that under state law the School Board was not
required to review its own past decisions. Id. at 2313 n.3. The dissenters in Horton-
ville, citing language in Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 58 n.25 (1975), and Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 486 (1975), stated that such self-review would be unconstitu-
tional. Id. at 2317. Thompson, however, was probably correctly decided since there
seems to be less danger of actual prejudice in having a board make the same finding
twice than in having a board act as both labor negotiator and judge. The Board's actions
in Thompson seem more analogous to the situation in which a judge makes a finding of
probable cause in a criminal case or modifies his own prior decision after remand from
appeal.
115. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 (1972).
116. 31 N.C. App. at 414, 230 S.E.2d at 171. This reliance may have been mis-
placed since several factors mitigating the effects of any possible bias were present in
Hortonville but not in Thompson. The Hortonville teachers had admitted they know-
ingly went on strike in violation of state law, 96 S. Ct. at 2315, whereas Thompson
denied the allegations against him. 31 N.C. App. at 430, 230 S.E.2d at 181 (dissent).
A second issue discussed in Thompson was the scope of review that the court was
required to use under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-315 (1974) in evaluating the findings of
the Board. The court defined the scope of review as an inquiry into whether the find-
ing was "supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in view of the
record as submitted." 31 N.C. App. at 415, 230 S.E.2d at 172. The court found that
the School Board, unlike most other agencies, was not strictly bound by the rules of
evidence in deciding what was competent evidence and upheld Thompson's dismissal.
Id. at 416, 426, 230 S.E.2d at 178. For a criticism of the majority approach see the
dissent, id. at 427-28, 230 S.E.2d at 179-80.
117. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 150A-1 to -64 (Cum. Supp. 1975 & Interim Supp. 1976)
(effective February 1, 1976).
118. Id. § 150A-43.
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by "some other statute."' 19  To avoid injustice, the courts may on
occasion grant exceptions to the requirement of exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies, and whether an exception will be made appears to
depend to a great extent upon the facts of the particular case. In
Grissom v. North Carolina Department of Revenue120 petitioner, who
alleged that he had been fired from his position as Personnel Officer
because of his political views, sought reinstatement and review of the
Department's decision to dismiss him.121  The Department of Revenue
maintained that review was not available since petitioner could further
appeal his dismissal to the State Personnel Board and thus had failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies.'
22
The court, noting that the primary purpose of Chapter 143 (now
150A) is to confer the right of review, 2 3 held that petitioner was not
compelled to spend time and money on an appeal to a purely advisory
board, without the power to grant the relief sought, in order to exhaust
all administrative remedies and obtain judicial review.'2
H. Miscellaneous
In In re Arcadia Dairy Farms, Inc.,'25 the supreme court voided
amendment number 27 to a Milk Commission regulation 2 8 that re-
quired producers of reconstituted milk to make payments into an
equalization fund for the benefit of area producers of Class I whole
milk.' 27 The effect of the amendment was to require producers who
bought powdered milk from outside the state (instead of whole milk
from within the state) for use in their reconstituting process to pay
the difference in prices to producers with whom they had never dealt.'
28
119. Daye, supra note 108, at 898-99.
120. 28 N.C. App. 277, 220 S.E.2d 872, cert. denied, 289 N.C. 613, 223 S.E.2d 391
(1976).
121. Id. at 277-78, 220 S.E.2d at 873.
122. Id. at 278, 220 S.E.2d at 874. The State Personnel Board has the power to
hear appeals of employees and to issue advisory recommendations. According to Board
rules, a suspended or dismissed employee may make a final appeal to the Board in
writing, within 30 days after the effective date of the suspension or dismissal. Id. at
279, 220 S.E.2d at 874.
123. Id. at 281, 220 S.E.2d at 875.
124. Id.; cf. Stevenson v. North Carolina Dep't of Ins., 31 N.C. App. 299, 229
S.E.2d 209 (1976) (petitioner could seek a court order compelling action by State
Personnel Board on the appeal of his dismissal, but the court was without authority to
stay dismissal before the exhaustion of employee's administrative remedies).
125. 289 N.C. 456, 223 S.E.2d 323 (1976). See also the companion case Arcadia
Dairy Farms, Inc. v. North Carolina Milk Conm'n, 289 N.C. 472, 223 S.E.2d 333
(1976); this Survey, Constitutional Law: Commerce Clause.
126. Milk Marketing Order No. 2. 289 N.C. at 457, 223 S.E.2d at 323.
127. Id. at 459-60, 223 S.E.2d at 325-26.
128. Id. at 465, 223 S.E.2d at 328.
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The court ordered the money already paid to be refunded and held
that promulgation of the amendment by the Commission was beyond
its statutory authority to reasonably regulate the industry and to fix
1)"129"prices.
In Fay v. North Carolina Board of Alcoholic Control130 the court
affirmed the Board's order suspending petitioner's retail beer permit
for violation of a statute prohibiting "lewd, immoral, or improper
entertainment"'' and a regulation prohibiting "the displaying of the
pubic hair"'132 on licensed premises. The court found unpersuasive
the argument that no violation occurred when a waitress in licensee's
club merely exposed her shaved pubic area: regulations are not sub-
ject to the strict construction applied to criminal statutes, but are to
be reasonably construed to accomplish their intended purpose.
13
1
In Inland Bridge Co. v. North Carolina Highway Commission'34
the court, following earlier interpretations of relevant statutes, 135 affirmed
the dismissal of plaintiff's suit against the Highway Commission. The
court held that since plaintiff (who had contracted to do road grading
and construction work) was given an opportunity to inspect the con-
struction site and some notice as to its unusual soil conditions, there
was sufficient evidence to support the finding that he was not misled
by the State's description of the area. Having proceeded solely on
a misrepresentation claim before the Commission, plaintiff was estopped
from developing additional theories in the superior court.'30
I1. CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. Notice And Service Of Process
In McCoy v. McCoy' the court of appeals held that issuance of
a summons is not essential to the validity of service of process by publi-
cation made pursuant to rule 4(j)(9)(c) of the North Carolina Rules
of Civil Procedure.2  Rule 4(j)(9)(c) permits service of process by
129. Id. at 472, 223 S.E.2d at 332.
130. 30 N.C. App. 492, 227 S.E.2d 298 (1976).
131. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18A-34(a)(4) (1975).
132. Malt Beverage Regulation VIII D.0116.
133. 30 N.C. App. at 496, 227 S.E.2d at 300.
134. 30 N.C. App. 535, 227 S.E.2d 648 (1976).
135. See Nello L. Teer Co. v. North Carolina Highway Comm'n, 265 N.C. 1, 143
S.E.2d 247 (1965); Blankenship Construction Co. v. North Carolina Highway Comm'n,
28 N.C. App. 593, 222 S.E.2d 452 (1976).
136. 30 N.C. App. at 547, 227 S.E.2d at 655.
1. 29 N.C. App. 109, 223 S.E.2d 513 (1976).
2. N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(j)(9)(c).
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publication "whenever the party's address, whereabouts, dwelling
house or usual place of abode is unknown and cannot with due dili-
gence be ascertained .. ."I In a well reasoned opinion the court
cited a number of reasons for not requiring a summons. First, unlike
the period prior to adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure, civil
actions now may be initiated by filing a complaint with the court as op-
posed to issuance of a summons. 4 Second, even during the period prior
to adoption of the Rules, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that
a summons was not necessary in cases in which "the defendant is not
within reach of the process of the court and cannot be personally
served." 5 The summons was termed a "useless formality" in pre-Rules
cases,' and the court did not feel that adoption of the Rules called for
a change. Finally, the court noted that all of the subsections and sub-
paragraphs of rule 4(j) expressly mention the delivery of a copy of the
summons and complaint except 4(j) (9) (c), in which the requirement
is conspicuously absent.'
The court did not apply McCoy, however, in a subsequent case
in which service by publication was employed. In Byrd v. Trustees of
Watts Hospital, Inc.,8 an action was initiated in February 1969. In
1969 and in 1973 summonses were issued but attempts at service were
unsuccessful. In October 1975, service of process by publication was
attempted and, eventually, a default judgment was entered. Subse-
quently defendant's motions to dismiss or to quash the service of
process by publication were denied.9 The court of appeals reversed
on the bases of rules 4(d) and (e) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provide that when a party is not served within the
time allowed for service the action is discontinued unless it has been
continued by endorsement of the original summons or issuance of an
alias or pluries summons.10
The court's refusal to apply McCoy and permit service by publica-
tion was based on the fact that service in McCoy took place immediately
after the action was initiated." In Byrd, not only had the action abated
3. Id.
4. 29 N.C. App. at 110, 223 S.E.2d at 515.
5. Id. (quoting Grocery Co. v. Bag Co., 142 N.C. 174, 179, 55 S.E. 90, 92
(1906) ).
6. Id. at 111, 223 S.E.2d at 515.
7. id.
8. 29 N.C. App. 564, 225 S.E.2d 329 (1976).
9. Id. at 567, 225 S.E.2d at 330.
10. N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(d), (e).
11. 29 N.C. App. at 569, 225 S.E.2d at 331.
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but there had been no attempt to revive the action as provided by rule
4(e).12 It should be noted that revival under 4(e) is accomplished
by issuance of an alias or pluries summons or by endorsement of the
original summons.' 3 Yet, according to McCoy, no summons is neces-
sary for service of process by publication. Taken together, the cases
permit service of process by publication without a summons, but if a
summons is issued and the action is subsequently discontinued, even
an attempt at service by publication will not be successful unless the
action has been revived by issuance of an alias or pluries summons or
extension of the original summons.
In Quaker Furniture House, Inc. v. Ball,14 the court of appeals
affirmed the order of the trial court setting aside a default judgment
that had been entered one day after the expiration of the thirty day
limit for service of an answer under rule 12(a) (1). 1r, The answer
had been mailed on the thirtieth day but was not received until three
days later. During the interim the judgment was entered. The court
of appeals noted that "service" took place when the answer was mailed
and was within the thirty day period.' The court rejected the con-
tention that the thirty day requirement for 12(a) (1) also applies to
the rule 5(d) 1 requirement for filing with the court, noting that 5(d)
does not provide for a period in which filing must take place.18
B. Pleadings and Motions
The North Carolina Supreme Court faced a complicated situation
in a divorce action, McCarley v. McCarley.19 After plaintiff wife had
claimed sufficient grounds and prayed for divorce, and after the hus-
band had answered, admitting the grounds for divorce and joining in
the prayer for relief, the wife attempted to dismiss her claim pursuant
to rule 41(a)(1)2" of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure so
that she could bring another action for alimony. The wife's notice of
dismissal was declared void by the trial judge. Although the wife's ap-
12. Id. at 569, 225 S.E.2d at 331-32.
13. Id.; N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(e).
14. 31 N.C. App. 140, 228 S.E.2d 475 (1976).
15. N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1).
16. 31 N.C. App. at 141-42, 228 S.E.2d at 475-76.
17. N.C.R. Civ. P. 5(d).
18. 31 N.C. App. at 141-42, 228 S.E.2d at 476.
19. 289 N.C. 109, 221 S.E.2d 490 (1976).
20. N.C.R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1).
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plication for alimony was not considered, a judgment of absolute
divorce was entered.21
The practice prior to the adoption of the North Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure precluded a plaintiff from a voluntary nonsuit when the
defendant had asserted grounds for affirmative relief or had set up a
counterclaim arising out of the same transaction as that alleged in the
complaint by the plaintiff. 2-  The McCarley decision held that this
practice carried over to the new Rules.3 Since defendant's answer
sought the affirmative relief of divorce, and because the allegations
would establish an independent claim for divorce by defendant, the
answer was held to constitute a counterclaim. 4
The North Carolina Court of Appeals decided two cases involving
compulsory counterclaims under rule 13.25 In Powell Manufacturing
Co. v. Harrington Manufacturing Co. 26 the court held that a claim of
unfair trade competition by defendant's fraudulent advertising of a
machine similar to plaintiff's tobacco harvesting machine should have
been pleaded as a compulsory counterclaim in an earlier action by de-
fendent against plaintiff for the unfair trade competition in advertising
plaintiffs tobacco harvester. In following related federal precedent,
-2 7
the court of appeals noted that many factors in the two claims were
similar and that a compulsory counterclaim need not be limited to cases
21. 289 N.C. at 110-11, 221 S.E.2d at 492.
22. Griffith v. Griffith, 265 N.C. 521, 144 S.E.2d 589 (1965) (nonsuit was per-
missible in divorce proceedings when the motion for nonsuit preceded a motion to amend
the pleadings to add a counterclaim for alimony); see Scott v. Scott, 259 N.C. 642, 131
S.E.2d 478 (1963).
23. 289 N.C. at 112, 221 S.E.2d at 493. This issue would not have existed under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Unlike N.C.R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1), which allows
voluntary dismissal until plaintiff rests his case, FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1) only allows
voluntary dismissal on demand by plaintiff until defendant has answered the claim.
24. 289 N.C. at 114, 221 S.E.2d at 494. The court applied N.C.R. Civ. P. 8(c),
which allows a counterclaim, mislabeled as a defense, to be treated as a counterclaim.
Further support was found in rule 7(a), which implies that counterclaims may be made
although not classified as a counterclaim. Three members of the court, however, viewed
defendant's answer as an admission of the allegations. They said defendant merely
"joins in the prayer for relief," and they believed that statement "may [not] properly
be classified as a plea for affirmative relief." 289 N.C. at 122, 221 S.E.2d at 499 (dis-
senting opinion). The entire court held that the trial judge improperly failed to consider
the motion for alimony during the divorce proceeding; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.8
(1976) was held to allow an application for alimony to be considered at any time before
the divorce judgment is entered. Id. at 115-16, 122, 226 S.E.2d at 494, 499.
25. N.C.R. Civ. P. 13.
26. 30 N.C. App. 97, 226 S.E.2d 173, appeal dismissed, 290 N.C. 663, 228 S.E.2d
454 (1976).
27. Id. at 100, 226 S.E.2d at 175 (citing Hy-way Heat Sys., Inc. v. Jadair, Inc.,
311 F. Supp. 454 (E.D. Wis. 1970); United Fruit Co. v. Standard Fruit & S.S. Co.,
282 F. Supp. 338 (D. Mass. 1968)).
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in which the facts are the same, but includes claims involving logically
related acts and conduct of the parties.2
The second court of appeals decision required an application of
the rule 13 condition that the pleader know of the compulsory counter-
claim at the time of the pleading. In Driggers v. Commercial Credit
Corp.,30 defendant had previously sought a deficiency judgment follow-
ing repossession and sale of an organ that plaintiff had purchased on
credit. Defendant had acquiesced to a dismissal with prejudice3' in the
deficiency action when it was discovered at trial that defendant, pur-
suant to a court order for production of documents, had provided plain-
tiff with a duplicate of the original purchase money mortgage contract
that had included a determinative provision not present in the origi-
nal.3 2 Plaintiff brought an action for dainages due to defendant's fraud
in obtaining a carbon signature on a contract different from the original
contract. Defendant responded with a motion to dismiss the claim as
a compulsory counterclaim that should have been pleaded in the former
action. The court of appeals held that since a claim for fraud accrues
when the aggrieved party discovers the fraud, the claim did not exist
at the time of the pleading and could not be required under rule 13.
This holding corresponds with the federal standards for a compulsory
counterclaim. 4
28. Id. at 100, 226 S.E.2d at 175. "[T]he allegations relate to and arise out of
the same competitive advertising practices regarding technically sophisticated mechanical
tobacco harvesters. Both parties have packaged sales programs designed to reach the
same markets .... ." Id.
29. Other reasons that N.C.R. Civ. P. 13 may not operate are: (1) A claim exist-
ing at the time of pleading is not required as a compulsory counterclaim if the statute
under which the claim was filed prevents that counterclaim from being filed in the same
proceeding, Chandler v. Cleveland Say. & Loan Ass'n, 24 N.C. App. 455, 211 S.E.2d
484 (1975); (2) If the claim had previously been filed as a crossclaim in another pro-
ceeding, it need not be filed as a compulsory counterclaim, Faggart v. Biggers, 18 N.C.
App. 366, 197 S.E.2d 75 (1973).
30. 31 N.C. App. 561, 230 S.E.2d 201 (1976).
31. Although the decision does not specify the rule, the dismissal would qualify
under N.C.R. Civ. P. 41(b).
32. The original contract that plaintiff Driggers had signed did not provide for a
private sale after repossession, while the duplicate specifically provided for such a sale.
31 N.C. App. at 562, 230 S.E.2d at 202-03.
33. Id. at 562, 230 S.E.2d at 202; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(9) (1969). The
court's finding that the fraud was neither known nor should have been known when the
answer was filed is bolstered by the fact that a court order was required for plaintiff
to obtain the duplicate of the contract. 31 N.C. App. at 562, 230 S.E.2d at 202.
34. See Chapin & Chapin, Inc. v. McShane Contracting Co., 374 F. Supp. 1191
(W.D. Pa. 1974). An otherwise compulsory counterclaim discovered during the pro-
ceeding does not have to be added as an amended pleading in the continuing action,
Id. at 1197-98.
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The supreme court also made its first application of the rule
40(b) s5 provision allowing the trial court to grant a continuance for
good cause shown. The case of Shankle v. Shankle36 involved a situa-
tion in which defendants claimed to have paid two hundred dollars to
retain counsel, only to be informed on the day of the trial that the coun-
sel would not represent them. In denying a motion by defendants for
a continuance to allow them to retain counsel, the trial judge noted that
the counsel defendants had allegedly retained had never appeared
formally in the action nor had the counsel appeared to request a con-
tinuance on behalf of defendants. 1 Although continuances are not
favored and the party seeking a continuance has the burden of showing
sufficient grounds for delay, the supreme court held that a motion
should always be granted when nothing in the record controverts a suf-
ficient showing by the moving party.3 8  Since defendants demonstrated
that they were without counsel through no fault of their own and no
contradictory evidence was presented, the court found the trial judge
to have abused his discretion in refusing the motion for continuance.3 9
35. N.C.R. Civ. P. 40(b).
36. 289 N.C. 473, 223 S.E.2d 380 (1976).
37. Two complicating factors in this case were: (1) defendants alleged that coun-
sel abandoned them "after the judge made strong remarks about the [defendants]"; (2)
defendants' most important evidence was the aborted testimony of a 77 year old man
who was hard of hearing. Id. at 478-79, 223 S.E.2d at 383-84.
38. The statements by the trial judge about the failure of counsel to make an ap-
pearance did not contradict the defendants' statements. Id. at 484, 223 S.E.2d at 386.
39. Id. at 485-86, 223 S.E.2d at 388. Other 1976 cases involving motions and
pleadings are detailed below.
In Caroon v. Eubank, 30 N.C. App. 244, 226 S.E.2d 691 (1976), plaintiff brought
an action for specific enforcement of a foreclosure sale at which he had submitted the
highest bid. To maintain the action, plaintiff deposited with the court the amount of
the bid. When plaintiff sought a voluntary dismissal under N.C.R. Civ. P. 41(a) (1)
before the trial began, the court conditioned withdrawal of the funds on plaintiffs ac-
ceptance of a dismissal with prejudice. The court of appeals found this condition im-
proper because the voluntary dismissal was a matter of right. After the voluntary dis-
missal there is no claim pending, and the funds are rightly the property of the defendant.
Id. at 246-47, 226 S.E.2d at 692-93. In Tifco, Inc. v. Insurance Designers Underwriters
Group, Inc., 30 N.C. App. 641, 228 S.E.2d 60 (1976), a judgment was held to be in
excess of the claim under N.C.R. Civ. P. 54(c). The claim prayed for assignment of
certificates of deposit for presentation by plaintiff to the defendant bank, but the order
required the bank to pay the amount without mentioning return of the certificates. This
order did not protect the bank and was in excess of the requested recovery. Id. at 645-
46, 228 S.E.2d at 62-63. Rule 54(c) did not have an effect, however, when the plead-
ings in Madigan v. Jenkins, 31 N.C. App. 391, 229 S.E.2d 213 (1976), claimed that
defendants had agreed to do certain work on the property sold to plaintiff, "including
but not limited to the following [eight items] ....... The general claim for damages
was held to be specific enough to satisfy the notice pleading standards. See Sutton v.
Duke, 277 N.C. 94, 176 S.E.2d 161 (1970). After a default judgment, damages
for work not completed and not specifically listed in the pleadings were allowed. 31
N.C. App. at 392-93, 229 S.E.2d at 214. In Bowen v. Hodge Motor Co., 29 N.C. App.
463, 224 &E.2d 699 (1976), subsequent to a directed verdict for defendant and the filing
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C. Discovery
The supreme court in Willis v. Duke Power Co.40 gave extensive
directions on the processes of documentary discovery and delivered an
opinion of first impression on the extent of the privilege from discovery
of materials prepared in anticipation of litigation. Plaintiff brought suit
for the wrongful death of plaintiff's intestate, allegedly caused by Duke
Power's negligence in the creation, maintenance, location and condition
of its power line. Through the use of interrogatories, plaintiff at-
tempted to discover all investigations made by defendant into the acci-
dent on which the claim was based and all other investigations made
by defendant into accidents involving an electrical shock or burn from
any of defendant's equipment. In addition, plaintiff also sought discov-
ery of any documents prepared in the investigation of these accidents. 41
Defendant sought a protective order 42 to avoid answering the
interrogatories on the grounds that the production of the requested
documents would cause it unreasonable annoyance, expense and
oppression, and on the further ground that no documents had yet been
designated as required by rule 34.43 The trial court rejected defend-
ant's motion and ordered production of the documents. When defend-
ant again failed to produce or designate documents that it felt to be
privileged from discovery, the trial court issued a contempt order, from
which defendant appealed.44
The supreme court found the contempt order improper because
the trial judge issued the order to produce the documents when there
was insufficient designation of the desired documents. The request by
of an appeal by plaintiff, the trial judge permitted a N.C.R. Civ. P. 41(a) (2) voluntary
dismissal without prejudice. As the supreme court had previously suggested, see King
v. Lee, 279 N.C. 100, 181 S.E.2d 400 (1971); Kelly v. International Harvester Co., 278
N.C. 153, 179 S.E.2d 396 (1971), a motion for a voluntary dismissal may be entertained
in such circumstances on the assumption that the plaintiff abandons his appeal from the
directed verdict.
Despite a previous supreme court holding that a judgment on the pleadings dis-
missing the claim was improper, Dize Awning & Tent Co. v. City of Winston Salem, 271
N.C. 715, 157 S.E.2d 577 (1967), a directed verdict by the trial court was appropriate
when the pleadings were amended to delete an essential element of the pleadings upon
which the supreme court passed. 29 N.C. App. 297, 224 S.E.2d 257 (1976).
40. 291 N.C. 19, 229 S.E.2d 191 (1976).
41. Id. at 22-23, 229 S.E.2d at 193-94.
42. See N.C.R. Civ. P. 30(b) (current version at N.C.R. Civ. P. 26(c) (Cum.
Supp. 1975)).
43. 291 N.C. at 23, 229 S.E.2d at 194; see N.C.R. Civ. P. 34(1).
44. 291 N.C. at 26-27, 229 S.E.2d at 195-96. For a discussion of the right to ap-
peal from a contempt order for failure to comply with a discovery order, see text ac-
companying notes 209-13 infra.
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plaintiff for all the documents in defendant's claim file relating to all
electrical accidents in the company's history was not only insufficiently
specific, but it also did not satisfy the showing of good cause necessary
for production under rule 34.45 Although the new Rules dispensed with
the former North Carolina requirement that an affidavit be filed in
order to obtain production of documents,46 a rule 34 production order
still must be based on a showing that the materials sought are relevant,
or likely to lead to discovery of relevant information.47 This relevancy
requirement obviously could not be satisfied by plaintiff's request for
all of defendant's claim files.
48
The court noted that the information on which to base a request
for specific documents in this situation could only be obtained by re-
quiring defendant through interrogatories to identify the documents it
possessed. Defendant must identify documents, even if they are not
discoverable by reason of the attorney's work product privilege. The
issue of discoverability is ultimately resolved by the trial judge,4 9 and
this determination cannot be made until the documents have been
identified. 0
Even after plaintiff can identify and establish the relevancy of
documents in defendant's claim file, the attorney work product privi-
lege may prevent discovery. In Willis the court decided that not only
should the work product privilege against discovery extend to materials
prepared in anticipation of the litigation for which discovery is sought,
but it should also encompass materials prepared for litigation termi-
nated prior to the pending case.5 Of course, if the party seeking dis-
covery can show a substantial need for the materials and undue hardship
in obtaining the materials elsewhere, documents containing some priv-
45. Id. at 30-33, 229 S.E.2d at 198-200.
46. Compare N.C.R. Civ. P. 34 (as amended Cum. Supp. 1975) with Vaughan v.
Broadfoot, 267 N.C. 691, 697-98, 149 S.E.2d 37, 42-43 (1966).
47. N.C.R. Civ. P. 26(b) (as amended Cum. Supp. 1975).
48. The trial court recognized the problem of relevance and limited the discovery
order to the production of documents dealing with investigations of accidents that had
occurred within three years of the accident on which this claim is based. 291 N.C. at
27, 33, 229 S.E.2d at 196, 200.
49. See N.C.R. Crv. P. 30(b) (current version at N.C.R. Civ. P. 26(c) (Cum.
Supp. 1975)); cf. Vaughan v. Broadfoot, 267 N.C. 691, 149 S.E.2d 37 (1966) (decided
prior to the enactment of the North Carolina Rules).
50. 291 N.C. at 31-33, 229 S.E.2d at 199-200.
51. Id. at 34-36, 229 S.E.2d at 201-02. This decision was based in part on the
philosophy that one should not be able to borrow from the wits of one's adversary.
See Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 487 F.2d 480 (4th Cir.
1973). But see Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 207 F. Supp. 407 (M.
D. Pa. 1962).
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ileged information may be inspected by the trial judge, who would
delete the privileged portions.52
D. Exceptions to Preserve Appeal: Directed Verdicts, Judgments
Notwithstanding the Verdict, and Involuntary Dismissals
The supreme court for the first time resolved a conflict created
by the new Rules of Civil Procedure over the necessity of excepting
findings for appeal from a case tried without a jury. G.S. 1-186'1 re-
quires exceptions to findings to be filed within ten days after judgment
in order to appeal from a case tried before a judge despite the enact-
ment of rule 52(c)54 in direct conflict with G.S. 1-186.1, The supreme
court in Whitaker v. Earnhardt,"' however, interpreted rule 52(c) to
allow the sufficiency of the evidence in a judge-tried action to be chal-
lenged without raising objections in trial court. This holding brings the
North Carolina rule in line with the federal application of the same
rule. 57
In addition to the rule 52(c) issue, Whitaker v. Earnhardt in-
volved motions for a directed verdict and a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict in a judge-tried case. These motions prompted a reiteration
by the court of the standards for objecting to the sufficiency of the
evidence in trials with and without a jury.58 In a trial with a jury, a
motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict may be made after
the jury has returned a verdict, but the motion must have been pre-
ceded by a motion for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence.
Those motions, however, are improper in a trial without a jury. 0 To
test the sufficiency of the evidence in a case tried before a judge, a
52. Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 404 F.2d 1066, 1068
(10th Cir. 1968); Bourget v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 48 F.R.D. 29 (D. Conn.
1969).
53. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-186 (1969).
54. N.C.R. Cxv. P. 52(c).
55. See Whitaker v. Earnhardt, 26 N.C. App. 736, 217 S.E.2d 125 (1975); Salem
v. Flowers, 26 N.C. App. 504, 216 S.E.2d 392 (1975).
56. 289 N.C. 260, 221 S.E.2d 316 (1976).
57. See Monaghan v. Hill, 140 F.2d 31 (9th Cir. 1944). The supreme court did
not address the argument of the court of appeals, which had rejected the application
of N.C.R. Crv. P. 52(c). Whitaker v. Earnhardt, 26 N.C. App. 736, 217 S.E,2d 125
(1975). On the basis of N.C. CONsr. art. 4, § 14, which provides that findings of a
judge after waiver of a jury trial be given the force and effect of jury findings, the court
of appeals inferred that the method for appeal of the two findings must be the same.
26 N.C. App. at 736, 217 S.E.2d at 126.
58. 289 N.C. at 264-65, 221 S.E.2d at 319-20.
59. N.C.R. Cxv. P. 50 allows motions for a directed verdict, judgment notwith-
standing the verdict, and a conditional new trial, but the statute refers only to a jury.
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party may move for an involuntary dismissal under rule 41(b).60 Al-
though this motion may be made at the close of plaintiff's evidence,
the court has repeated its belief that the trial judge, except in the clear-
est of cases, should reserve a decision to dismiss under rule 41(b) until
all the evidence has been presented.6' In any case tried without a jury
the judge must separately state his findings of fact and conclusions of
law.6 2  Such a judicial determination will not be disturbed on appeal
if there is any competent evidence to support the findings.63
E. Summary Judgment
The supreme court decision in Kidd v. Early64 has modified the
impact of Cutts v. Casey,65 a former holding that testimonial evidence
by an interested party as the only support for a directed verdict creates
an issue of credibility for the jury. In Kidd v. Early the court distin-
guished the Cutts decision on the basis that the testimonial evidence
supporting the motion in that case was severely attacked. The court
then held that when only latent doubts exist as to the credibility of an in-
terested party's uncontested testimony, summary judgment can be
proper.6 6  This holding comports generally with the federal interpreta-
tions.
6 7
In North Carolina National Bank v. Gillespie68 the supreme court
dealt with a novel summary judgment issue. Plaintiff's motion for sum-
60. N.C.R. Cxv. P. 41(b).
61. Helms v. Rea, 282 N.C. 610, 619, 194 S.E.2d 1, 7 (1973).
62. N.C.R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1); accord 289 N.C. at 264-65, 221 S.E.2d at 319.
63. See Coggins v. City of Asheville, 278 N.C. 428, 434, 180 S.E.2d 149, 153
(1971). Under the federal rules the findings in a case tried without a jury will not
be reversed unless the judicial determination is "clearly erroneous." FED. R. Civ. P.
52(a). Although some courts maintain that to define such terms is useless, United
States v. ALCOA, 148 F.2d 416, 433 (2d Cir. 1945), other courts have defined "clearly
erroneous" as the situation in which, "although there is evidence to support [the de-
cision], the reviewing court on the entire record is left with a definite and firm convic-
viction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. United States Gypsum
Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948); accord B.H. Bunn Co. v. AAA Replacement Parts Co.,
451 F.2d 1254, 1260 (5th Cir. 1971). The federal standard for review of a judge's find-
ings of fact may be different from the North Carolina standard.
64. 289 N.C. 343, 222 S.E.2d 392 (1976). This case and the North Carolina rule
are discussed more thoroughly in a note published earlier in this volume. See Note,
Kidd v. Early: Summary Judgment on Testimonial Evidence in North Carolina, 55 N.C.
L. REv. 232 (1977). See also Note, Cutts v. Casey Extended to Summary Judgment,
54 N.C.L. Rav. 940 (1976).
65. 278 N.C. 390, 180 S.E.2d 297 (1971).
66. 289 N.C. at 370, 222 S.E.2d at 410.
67. See, e.g., Lundeen v. Cordner, 354 F.2d 401, 407-09 (8th Cir. 1966) and cases
cited therein.
68. 291 N.C. 303, 230 S.E.2d 375 (1976).
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mary judgment on its claim for sums owing on promissory notes
executed by defendant was opposed by evidence of a contemporaneous
oral judgment, a defense not pleaded by defendant in his answer. Fol-
lowing federal precedents that encourage a policy of liberality in the
amendment of pleadings,"" the court allowed summary judgment
motions to be opposed by evidence of unpleaded defenses. If such
a defense is raised, however, a formal amendment to the pleadings
should be made.70
F. Trial Court Review of Judgments
1. Rule 60(b)
In Norton v. Sawyer71 the court of appeals defined the standard
for relief from a default judgment attributable to an attorney's negli-
gence. Defendant, who had hired a lawyer to represent him and who
had continually maintained an active interest in the litigation, could not
69. See Rossiter v. Vogel, 134 F.2d 908, 912 (2d Cir. 1943); Bergren v. Davis,
287 F. Supp. 52, 54 (D. Conn. 1968).
70. Although some suggest that an unpleaded defense in opposition to summary
judgment may be deemed to amend the pleadings, 6 MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTIC- pt. 1,
56.11[3], at 56-252 to -253 (2d ed. 1976), the court expressed a preference that a
formal amendment be made. 291 N.C. at 306, 230 S.E.2d at 377.
There were several other cases decided in 1976 involving summary judgment. In
Siders v. Gibbs, 29 N.C. App. 540, 225 S.E.2d 133 (1976), the court of appeals granted
summary judgment for defendant because the conceded negligence of the driver of the
car, which plaintiff owned and in which plaintiff was a passenger, was imputed to plain-
tiff. On motion for rehearing, the court of appeals considered the allegation by plaintiff
that defendant was willfully and wantonly negligent. 31 N.C. App. 481, 229 S.E.2d 811
(1976). Since simple negligence by the claimant does not prevent recovery against one
who commits willful and wanton negligence, the failure of defendant to offer materials
controverting this allegation by plaintiff partially defeated the motion for summary judg-
ment. Id. at 484-86, 229 S.E.2d at 813-14.
The parties in another case stipulated their willingness to allow the court to hear
the witnesses and determine the case on the merits at a summary judgment hearing. The
court of appeals affirmed the right of the trial court to expedite a proceeding, if the
parties are willing, by allowing a summary judgment proceeding to become binding as
a trial. State v. West, 31 N.C. App. 431, 229 S.E.2d 826 (1976).
Behind Cameron-Brown Capital Corp. v. Spencer, 31 N.C. App. 499, 229 S.E.2d
711 (1976), there was a foreclosure by plaintiff and other creditors of a bankrupt cor-
poration. Since defendant had guaranteed the loan by plaintiff to that corporation,
this action was brought for the deficiency. When plaintiff moved for summary judg-
ment, defendant opposed the motion by declaring that the debt was extinguished by the
payment to all creditors of the bankrupt corporation of a sum of money larger than the
amount owed to plaintiff. Such a "bald assertion" that contradicted facts supporting
plaintiff's motion did not prevent summary judgment for plaintiff. id. at 502-03, 229
S.E.2d at 712-13.
71. 30 N.C. App. 420, 227 S.E.2d 148, cert. denied, 291 N.C. 176, 229 S.E.2d 689
(1976).
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be held responsible under North Carolina precedent72 for his attorney's
failure to file an answer. As a basis for relief of a judgment under
rule 60(b)(1), 73 the attorney's failure to act was held to be excusable
neglect. However, since there may be relief from a judgment under
60(b)(1) for only one year after judgment, the motion for relief made
seventeen months after entry of judgment did not qualify under that
section.
The court examined the question of whether the conduct of
defendant and his attorney was "any other reason justifying relief"
under rule 60(b) (6), 74 which allows a judgment to be set aside
"within a reasonable time" after entry of final judgment. Although it
recognized that errors or omissions by counsel under extraordinary cir-
cumstances may require justice to be served by relief under rule
60(b)(6),75  the court adopted the federal reasoning that rule
60(b)(6) could not be used to avoid the time limitation of rule
60(b)(1), if the excuse given, as in this case, were nothing more than
a reason contained in 60(b)(1). 76
The court of appeals in Bell v. Moore77 allowed a unique use of
rule 60(b)(6) by the trial judge. After a dismissal based on inade-
quate service of process, plaintiff had been charged with the costs of
the action, including the charge for four depositions taken by defendant
at an expense of over four hundred dollars. Pursuant to a rule
60(b)(6) motion, the trial judge stayed the collection of costs because
plaintiff intended to reinstitute the claim and it would work a substan-
tial hardship on plaintiff to require immediate payment. In addition
the judge found that defendants had incurred the costs of the deposition
72. See Beaufort Lumber Co. v. Cottingham, 173 N.C. 323, 328, 92 S.E. 9, 12
(1917); Schiele v. North State Fire Ins. Co., 171 N.C. 426, 431, 88 S.E. 764, 766
(1916).
73. N.C.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1).
74. Id. 60(b)(6).
75. 30 N.C. App. at 426, 227 S.E.2d at 153; cf. Naples v. Maxwell, 368 F.2d 219
(6th Cir. 1966) (per curiam) (in previous decision, assistant to Attorney General of
Ohio without authority recommended that a writ of habeas corpus be granted);
Cavalliotis v. Salomon, 357 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966) (neither plaintiff nor plaintiff's
counsel had received notice of the dismissal).
76. 30 N.C. App. at 426, 227 S.E.2d at 153; see Klapprort v. United States, 335
U.S. 601, 613 (1949); United States v. Karahalias, 205 F.2d 331, 334 (2d Cir. 1953)
(petition for rehearing).
For a case in which attorney's neglect was held excusable under rule 60(b), see
Mayhew Elec. Co. v. Carras, 29 N.C. App. 105, 223 S.E. 2d 536 (1976) (relief from
a default judgment was granted because defendant's attorneys mistakenly believed the fil-
ing deadline was extended to a later date than it actually was.)
77. 31 N.C. App. 386, 229 S.E.2d 235 (1976).
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over one month after taking the affidavit that had revealed the insuffi-
cient process on which the involuntary dismissal was based.7 Under
federal rule 41(d)7 9 judicial discretion has been exercised under
similar circumstances to stay the collection of costs when another suit
is contemplated. 0
Under rule 60(b) there is no limitation on the power of the court
"to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court.""' In Stokley v.
Stokley 82 the court of appeals addressed the meaning of this phrase for
the first time. The court held, as do the federal courts,8 3 that this por-
tion of the rule refers only to cases of extrinsic fraud, fraud that pre-
vents a party from fairly presenting his claims or defenses, or from in-
troducing relevant material. After recognizing that the North Carolina
courts permit such fraud as grounds for relief from a judgment, 4 it was
held that according to North Carolina standards perjured testimony is
not a fraud upon the court so long as the parties have an opportunity
to appear in that proceeding and expose the perjury. 8
2. Rule 60(a)86
Subsequent to a judgment requiring plaintiff to pay court costs and
forfeit bond, the trial judge in Snell v. Washington County Board of
Education 7 noted that the order "differ[ed] materially from the intent
of the court" and reversed the order as a clerical mistake.88 The court
of appeals decided that such a material amendment was a "judicial de-
cision, not a routine clerical error."8 9  Thus when the substance of an
78. Id. at 387-88, 229 S.E.2d at 237.
79. FED. R. Cav. P. 41(d).
80. See Gregory v. Dimock, 286 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1961) (the costs of the pre-
vious litigation may have been increased by an erroneous removal to the federal courts
at the insistence of defendant); Huskey v. United States, 29 F. Supp. 283 (E.D. Tenn.
1939) (per curiam) (plaintiff was without means to pay the costs of the previously dis-
missed suit).
81. N.C.R. Cv. P. 60(b). Rule 60(b)(3) allows relief from a final judgment on
the basis of intrinsic fraud. Unlike the power to set aside a judgment for fraud upoi
the court, this motion must be made within one year of the entry of judgment.
82. 30 N.C. App. 351, 227 S.E.2d 131 (1976).
83. Kenner v. Commissioner, 387 F.2d 689, 691-92 (7th Cir. 1968); Martina
Theatre Corp. v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 278 F.2d 798, 801 (2d Cir. 1960).
84. 30 N.C. App. at 354, 227 S.E.2d at 133-34; see Woodruff v. Woodruff, 215
N.C. 685, 3 S.E.2d 5 (1939); McCoy v. Justice, 196 N.C. 553, 146 S.E. 214 (1929).
85. 30 N.C. App. at 354-55, 227 S.E.2d at 134; see Home v. Edwards, 215 N.C.
622, 3 S.E.2d 1 (1939).
86. N.C.R. Crv. P. 60(a).
87. 29 N.C. App. 31, 222 S.E.2d 756 (1976).




amendment clearly affects the absent party, a mistake will not qualify
as a rule 60(a) clerical mistake.
3. Collateral Estoppel
In Tidwell v. Booker9" plaintiff instituted a civil action for damages
stemming from defendant's failure to support their illegitimate child.
Defendant had been convicted of willful failure to support the same
child9 in a prior criminal prosecution that conclusively established his
paternity of the child. 2 In the subsequent civil action plaintiff con-
tended that collateral estoppel should be applied to bar defendant from
denying paternity and thereby forcing relitigation of that issue. The
court of appeals ruled for plaintiff93 but the North Carolina Supreme
Court reversed, citing the absence of privity between the state and the
mother in the criminal action. 4
In finding the absence of privity, the court viewed the role of the
mother in the criminal action as that of a witness and stressed that the
state was "[iun no sense . . . a mere nominal party"9 5 in that it had
acted to protect interests distinct from those of the mother. The right
of the state to proceed with or without the mother's cooperation
was, according to the court, further evidence of their independence.96
The court also considered the mutuality requirement of collateral
estoppel.97  In short, "estoppel is mutual if the one taking advantage
of the earlier adjudication would have been bound by it had it gone
90. 290 N.C. 98, 225 S.E.2d 816 (1976). See also this Survey, Domestic Rela-
tions: Child Support.
91. Id. at 107, 225 S.E.2d at 818. This is a violation of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-
2 (1969).
92. 290 N.C. at 110, 225 S.E.2d at 822.
93. 27 N.C. App. 435, 219 S.E.2d 648 (1975).
94. 290 N.C. at 113, 225 S.E.2d at 825. See Note, Civil Procedure--Offensive As-
sertion of a Prior Judgment as Collateral Estoppel-A Sword in the Hands of the Plain-
tiff?, 52 N.C.L REv. 836, 841 n.31 (1974), which maintains that the precise boundaries
of privity are not clearly defined but that North Carolina appears to have adopted the
definition of privity as found in RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 84 (1942). The Re-
statement definition is as follows:
A person who is not a party but who controls an action, individually or in co-
operation with others, is bound by the adjudications of litigated matters as if
he were a party if he has a proprietary or financial interest in the judgment
or in the determination of a question of fact or of law with reference to the
same subject matter or transaction, if the other party has notice of his partici-
pation, the other party is equally bound.
The Note discusses the attempts of North Carolina authorities and others to clarify the
privity concept. 52 N.C.L. REv., at 841 n.31.
95. 290 N.C. at 113, 225 S.E.2d at 825.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 114, 225 S.E.2d at 826.
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against him."98a In Booker, however, if the state's criminal action had
failed, the mother, according to the court,99 continued to have the
option of seeking a civil remedy. In view of the lack of privity and
the absence of mutuality the court concluded that defendant should
not be estopped from denying paternity.100
4. Vacation of an Arbitration Award
In a major holding based on the policy of the recently enacted
Uniform Arbitration Act,1 1 the supreme court in Carolina-Virginia
Fashion Exhibitors, Inc. v. Gunter"02 allowed the depositions of arbitra-
tors to be taken to discover misconduct when there is "some objective
basis . . . for a reasonable belief that misconduct has occurred.' 03
The desire to have an abbreviated adjudicative procedure by mutual
consent of the parties supports the general rule that an arbitrator will
not be heard to impeach his own award. 104 Although there is a desire
to prevent fishing expeditions for misconduct, there are several well
established exceptions to the general rule.' Without the testimony
98. Id. (quoting Shaw v. Eaves, 262 N.C. 656, 662, 138 S.E.2d 520, 525 (1964)).
99. See note 100 infra.
100. 290 N.C. at 117, 225 S.E.2d at 827. Justices Exum, Huskins and Moore dis-
sented. They argued that the state had acted in its own interests as well as in behalf
of the mother in the criminal action. In addition, at the time of the earlier trial in
which paternity was established, the mother was without civil remedy and, thus, would
have been effectively barred by the determination made in that action. The dis-
senters believed the necessary degree of privity and mutuality were present. Id. at 118,
225 S.E.2d at 828. In addition, the dissenters viewed the majority as being in conflict
with the court's earlier decision in Taylor v. Taylor, 257 N.C. 130, 135, 125 S.E.2d 373,
376 (1962) (conviction for willful abandonment without adequate support bars a subse-
quent action for absolute divorce on the ground of the separation arising from the aban-
donment). While the only difference between Tidwell and Taylor would seem to be
between an offensive use (in Tidwell) and a defensive use (in Taylor) of the principles
of collateral estoppel, a close examination of Taylor indicates that the holding was
limited to situations "where the plaintiff is seeking to profit from criminal conduct for
which he has been prosecuted and convicted." Id. Thus the conclusion that Taylor was
overruled by the majority in Tidwell is questionable.
101. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-561.1 to -567.20 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (enacted in 1973).
102. 291 N.C. 208, 230 S.E.2d 380 (1976).
103. Id. at 218-19, 230 S.E.2d at 387-88. The court, on the other hand, rigidly
maintained that the arbitration award could not be impeached by the inquiry into the
mental process used by the arbitrators. Id. at 218, 230 S.E.2d at 387.
104. See, e.g., Fukaya Trading Co., S.A. v. Eastern Marine Corp., 322 F. Supp. 278
(E.D. La. 1971); Gramling v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 151 F. Supp. 853, 860-61
(W.D.S.C. 1957).
105. An arbitrator is a competent witness to show the matters submitted to and con-
sidered by the panel. Twin Lakes Reservoir & Canal Co. v. Platt Rogers, Inc., 112
Colo. 155, 170-71, 147 P.2d 828, 836 (1944); Osborne v. Calvert, 83 N.C. 365 (1880).
Testimony of a dissenting arbitrator is admitted to show misconduct on the part of the
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of arbitrators when there is an objective basis to believe misconduct has
occurred, the court felt that the policy of the new act, which provides
several grounds for which arbitration awards may be vacated, would be
frustrated. 100 Such an objective basis was found in Fashion Exhibitors
as the result of an inconsistency between the award and the evidence
presented by either party.10 7  Since the admissible testimony of the
arbitrators indicated that they made individual inspections of the
premises that were the subject matter of the claim, the court vacated
the award on the basis of its construction of G.S. 1-567.6(1), which
provides that the parties shall be notified of any hearings to be held.
Accordingly, arbitrators exceed their authority by any ex parte proceed-
ing to gather evidence.
G. Rule 54(b)
The supreme court, in its initial interpretation of rule 54(b),108 has
given the rule an impact completely different from that of its present
federal counterpart. 09 Rule 54(b) under both the North Carolina and
other arbitrators. Griffith Co. v. San Diego College for Women, 45 Cal. 2d 501, 505,
289 P.2d 476, 478 (1955). Testimony is admitted when it is not objected to and when
the responding party cross-examines the arbitrator. William H. Low Estate Co. v.
Lederer Realty Corp., 35 R.I. 352, 357, 86 A. 881, 882-83 (1913).
106. The grounds upon which a court may vacate an arbitration award are found
in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.13 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
107. The purpose of the arbitration was to determine the proportion of a building
that plaintiff occupied. The proportion occupied would determine the percentage of the
taxes, insurance, and utilities that plaintiff would pay. The court found an inconsistency
because plaintiff's evidence indicated that plaintiff would owe between 47% and 60%,
while defendant's evidence indicated that plaintiff would owe 662/%, and the arbitra-
tion award was 61%. 291 N.C. at 219, 230 S.E.2d at 388.
108. N.C.R. Civ. P. 54(b).
109. Although, as noted in Oestreicher v. American Nat'l Stores, 290 N.C. 118, 128,
225 S.E.2d 797, 804 (1976), the federal courts do not allow FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) to
prohibit otherwise appealable orders, see Redding & Co. v. Russwine Constr. Corp., 417
F.2d 721, 726 n.33 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Chabot v. National Sec. & Research Corp., 290
F.2d 657, 659 (2d Cir. 1961), the ability to appeal under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277
(1969) almost eliminates the trial judge's discretion found under the federal rule. The
right to appeal from a judgment affecting a substantial right is comparable to the initial
version of FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Before the federal rule was amended in 1946, a judg-
ment on one or more claims in a multiple claim action was appealable, if and only if
that judgment were "final." There was no authority by which the trial judge could fix
the appealability of his judgment. The difficulty in differentiating those claims that
were finally determined from those that were not caused some attorneys to fail to appeal
final claims only to discover that the statute of limitations barred the appeal after a de-
termination of the entire action. Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S.
507, 513-16 (1950). To protect clients' rights to appeal, attorneys were required to ap-
peal many nonfinal determinations. This caused the appellate courts to become the
basic forum to determine the appealability of a decision. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 434 (1956); FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b), Notes of Advisory Comm.
on 1946 Amendment.
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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure"10 provides for appeal from the
entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all the
claims or parties upon an express determination by the trial judge that
there is no just reason for delaying entry of judgment. Under the
North Carolina rule, however, certification by the trial judge is un-
necessary to obtain appellate review when a right of appeal is expressly
provided by other statutes."'
The supreme court decision in Oestreicher v. American National
Stores " reversed a two-year interpretation by the court of appeals that
refused to recognize G.S. 1-27711 as a statutory exception to the rule
54(b) certification requirement for appeal from final judgments of
The excessive number of appeals led to the 1946 amendment to FED. R. Civ. P.
54(b). To minimize appeals by assuring the litigant that the right to appeal did not
attach and the statute of limitations did not run until the trial judge certified that he
or she had made a final appealable claim, the 1946 amendment required that, for an
appeal under rule 54(b), the trial judge must expressly determine that there is no just
reason for delay. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. at 435-36. In fact this
rule has evolved so that appeal from a final judgment of one or more but fewer than
all claims may be taken only when the trial judge has found facts indicating that the
situation may be certified for appeal as an "infrequent, harsh case." See, e.g., Allis-
Chalmers Corp. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1975); Panichella v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 252 F.2d 452 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 932 (1960).
In North Carolina a right of appeal under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277 (1965) will
cause N.C.R. Civ. P. 54(b) to operate in a fashion similar to the operation of FED.
R. Civ. P. 54(b) before it was amended in 1946. Whether a determination by the
trial judge affects a substantial right is no simple deduction. For example, in North
Carolina State Hwy. Comm'n v. Nuckles, 271 N.C. 1, 155 S.E.2d 772 (1967), a
determination of what land was condemned affected a substantial right despite the fact
that a final judgment on the damages to be allowed was pending. The failure immedi-
ately to perfect an appeal allowed the statute of limitations completely to bar the appeal
of the determination of what land was condemned. Such possibilities, in combination
with the inclination of the North Carolina Supreme Court to give an opinion on ques-
tions that are prematurely appealed, see Barrier v. Randolph, 260 N.C. 741, 743, 133
S.E.2d 655, 657 (1963) and cases cited therein, should cause appeals to be taken from
most, if not all final determinations of one or more but fewer than all claims, a situation
similar to that in the federal courts prior to the 1946 amendment to FED. R. Civ. P.
54(b). See FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b), Notes of Advisory Comm. on 1946 Amendment.
Just as the federal appellate courts were the forum for the resolution of what judgments
were "final," the North Carolina appellate courts must be the forum for deciding what
judgments "affect a substantial right."
In addition, it is not completely clear, as the Oestreicher decision holds, that the
legislature intended N.C. GErN. STAT. § 1-277 (1965) to operate without regard to N.C.
R. Civ. P. 54(b) certification requirements for final determinations of one or more but
fewer than all claims. See note 118 infra.
110. FED. R. CIv. P. 54(b).
111. Unlike FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b), N.C.R. Civ. P. 54(b) expressly provides that
in the absence of certification by the trial judge, "any order or other form of decision
. . . shall not then be subject to review either by appeal or otherwise except as expressly
provided by these rules or other statutes." (emphasis added).
112. 290 N.C. 118, 225 S.E.2d 797 (1976).
113. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277 (1969).
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fewer than all the claims in the action. 1 4  The section 1-277 right of
appeal from any judicial determination that affects a substantial right
had been conditioned on the trial judge's determination that appeal
should be allowed. The supreme court in a unanimous decision held
that rule 54(b) does not require judicial certification for appeals from
judgments affecting a substantial right, but it does authorize appeals
from a final judgment of fewer than all claims in an action by rule
54(b) certification regardless of whether those judgments affect a sub-
stantial right."'
The court rejected the former position of the court of appeals that
the comment to rule 54(b) expressed an intent that G.S. 1-277 not
be treated as a statutory exception to the rule. In ascertaining the
legislative intent, the court noted that G.S. 7A-27(d),"16 enacted simul-
taneously with, but without reference to, rule 54(b), allowed appeals
from any interlocutory order affecting a substantial right-a provi-
sion quite similar to G.S. 1-277. Although the court of appeals in
Wachovia Realty Investments v. Robinson"17 implied that the refusal
to allow G.S. 1-277 as a basis for appeal without rule 54(b) certifi-
cation meant that G.S. 7A-27(d) should receive similar treatment,
the supreme court took the opposite approach. It inferred that if
the legislature had intended rule 54(b) as a limitation upon G.S.
7A-27(d), the legislature would have explicitly indicated that in-
tent. 18
114. The court of appeals first established its interpretation of N.C.R. Civ. P. 54(b)
in Arnold v. Howard, 24 N.C. App. 255, 210 S.E.2d 492 (1974).
115. 290 N.C. at 131, 144, 225 S.E.2d at 805, 813 (majority opinion by Copeland,
J., and dissenting opinion by Sharp, CJ., concurring on the rule 54(b) issue).
116. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27(d) (1969).
117. 28 N.C. App. 385, 221 S.E.2d 381, cert. granted, 289 N.C. 615. 223 S.E.2d
390 (1976).
118. 290 N.C. at 125-26, 225 S.E.2d at 802-03. The supreme court never directly
addressed the issue of legislative intent as expressed in N.C.R. Civ. P. 54(b), Comment.
The pertinent portion of the comment provides:
[11n the absence of a determination by the trial judge, it is clear that there
can be no appellate review irrespective of the nature of the ruling of the trial
court, unless elsewhere expressly authorized. Section 1-277 is not such an ex-
press authorization. Thus, it will be seen that in the absence of a determina-
tion by the trial judge, a lawyer can safely delay in prosecuting his appeal.
When there is such a determination, the situation will not be as clear. There
must be in addition either a final judgment or a ruling affecting a "substantial
right" for an appeal to lie. When these conditions obtain has not heretofore
been altogether clear, and will not be under these rules. The only course of
safety will be to press for review.
Id. The problem that rule 54(b) was designed to resolve in this manner may be
found in North Carolina State Hwy. Comm'n v. Nuckles, 271 N.C. 1, 155 S.E.2d 772
(1967), discussed in note 109 infra.
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H. Limitations of Actions"9
G.S. 1-21120 permits the tolling of the applicable statute of limita-
tions when the person against whom the action accrues is outside the
state when the action arises and remains outside the state for one year
or longer thereafter. In Duke University v. Chestnut,121 defendant, a
resident of South Carolina, was subject to in personam jurisdiction in
North Carolina under the authority of G.S. 1-75.4(5).122 The court
of appeals considered whether enactment of a long arm statute provid-
ing for the current availability of personal jurisdiction resulted in the
effective repeal of G.S. 1-21 to the extent that G.S. 1-21 would permit
commencement of an action beyond the period provided by the appli-
cable statute of limitations. 2 3  While the court indicated that it be-
lieved the tolling statute to be no longer necessary, it did not regard
the statute as being in "hopeless conflict with the long arm jurisdictional
statute."'1 24  Thus it concluded that the future scope of G.S. 1-21 should
be left to the General Assembly and held that G.S. 1-21 would continue
to be applied.
125
In Ken-Lu Enterprises v. Neal'26 defendant filed a counterclaim
under the Federal Truth in Lending Act'27 (the Act) after the one year
limitation applicable to the Act had run but prior to the expiration of
the ten year limitation period of G.S. 1-47(2) 128 for counterclaims on
sealed instruments. 29 Plaintiff's motion to have the counterclaim dis-
missed was granted by the trial court and defendant appealed. 130 The
119. See also this Survey, Torts: Statute of Limitations.
120. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-21 (1969).
121. 28 N.C. App. 568, 221 S.E.2d 895, cert. denied, 289 N.C. 726, 224 S.E.2d 674
(1976).
122. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4(5) (1969). Section 1-75.4 lists several bases for
the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Subsection (5) deals with actions arising out of
disputes concerning goods, services or contracts. The applicable limitation period was
three years under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52 (1969) and three years had passed since the
cause of action arose. 28 N.C. App. at 569, 221 S.E.2d at 896.
123. Although the case dealt specifically with § 1-75.4(5), the court addressed itself
to this broader question.
124. 28 N.C. App. at 573, 221 S.E.2d at 898.
125. Id.; accord, Travis v. McLaughlin, 29 N.C. App. 389, 224 S.E.2d 243 (1976).
126. 29 N.C. App. 78, 223 S.E.2d 831, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 308, 225 S.E.2d 829
(1976).
127. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1681t (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
128. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-47(2) (1969).
129. The dispute in Ken-Lu arose when plaintiff, Ken-Lu Enterprises, Inc., filed an
action against defendant alleging that defendant was in default on a series of form in-
stallment contracts. 29 N.C. App. at 78, 223 S.E.2d at 831. Defendant counterclaimed
for statutory damages, attorney's fees and costs on the basis of violations of the Federal
Truth in Lending Act. Id. at 79, 223 S.E.2d at 832.
130. Id. at 79, 223 S.E.2d at 832.
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question before the court of appeals was whether the one year limita-
tion applicable to the Act was equally applicable to a counterclaim or
whether the state's ten year provision was controlling. The court noted
the conflict among other jurisdictions as to the issue 3' but upheld the
lower court's dismissal of the counterclaim on the basis of the 1974
amendment to the Act.3 2 The 1974 amendment permits no offset
against a creditor "unless the amount of the creditor's liability to such
person has been determined by judgment of a court of competent juris-
diction in an action to which such person was a party."'" The court
concluded that G.S. 1-47(2), to the extent it would permit a counter-
claim beyond the one year period prescribed by the Act, was now incon-
sistent with the Act and therefore inapplicable." 4
In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc. 3 , the United States
Supreme Court, recognizing that there is no specifically stated federal
statute of limitations for suits under the Civil Rights Act of 1870,136
held that "the controlling period would ordinarily be the most appropri-
ate one provided by state law."' 37 By so holding the Court also indi-
cated that the timely filing of an employment discrimination claim with
the EEOC, pursuant to section 706 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964,138 does not toll the running of the statute applied to section
1981.'11 The Court also announced that in applying the state's statute
of limitations the lower federal courts should follow the state's policy
as to tolling the running of the statute.14
In Camack v. Hardee's Food Systems, Inc.,'4 ' the United States
District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina found it neces-
sary to examine the policy of North Carolina with respect to tolling the
131. Compare Gillis v. Fisher Hardware Co., 289 So. 2d 451 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1974) (not permitting counterclaim made more than one year after alleged violation),
with Wood Acceptance Co. v. King, 18 Ill. App. 3d 149, 309 N.E.2d 403 (1974) (permit-
ting counterclaim after one year).
132. 29 N.C. App. at 84, 223 S.E.2d at 835.
133. Id. at 84, 223 S.E.2d at 834 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1649(b) (Supp. V 1975)).
134. Id. at 84, 223 S.E.2d at 835.
135. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
136. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
137. 421 U.S. at 462.
138. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970).
139. Under Title VII the aggrieved may file a charge with the EEOC. After an
investigation and conciliation effort the Commission may or may not institute a civil
action. Id. § 2000e-5(f) (1). In either case, the claimant may demand a right to sue
after 180 days and institute the Title VII action himself, even if the Commission's at-
tempts at conciliation are not complete. 421 U.S. at 458.
140. 421 U.S. at 462.
141. 410 F. Supp. 469 (M.D.N.C. 1976).
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applicable statute of limitations. In a previous decision the court
had determined that the applicable North Carolina statute was G.S.
1-52(1), which provides for a three year period. 142  In Camack plain-
tiff filed with EEOC but by the time the "notice of a right to sue"
(under Title VII) was received, the three year period for a suit under
section 1981 had lapsed. Thus, while plaintiff could still pursue the
Title VII action, he was precluded from an action under section 1981
unless the running of the statute was tolled. The district court refused
to toll the running of the statute, indicating that the North Carolina doc-
trine of equitable estoppel will only permit the tolling of the statute of
limitations when plaintiff has been misled by defendant in such a manner
as to make application of the statute inequitable. 148  Finding this ele-
ment absent, the court granted summary judgment for defendant with
respect to the section 1981 action. 44
In Taylor v. City of Raleigh,'4 5 plaintiffs instituted an action seek-
ing a declaratory judgment that ordinances adopted by the City Council
of Raleigh, North Carolina, that resulted in the annexation and rezoning
of a noncontiguous parcel of land were "unlawful, invalid and void.'"
Noting that the action was not filed until two years and twenty-two days
after the ordinances were adopted, defendants raised the defense of
laches. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the court of
appeals' finding'4" that the action for judgment declaring the rezoning
ordinance void was barred by laches. 4 8 Chief Justice Sharp, writing
142. Broadnax v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 7 Fair Emp. Prac. Cases 252 (M.D.N.C.
1972). See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(1) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
143. 410 F. Supp. at 472.
144. Id. at 477. The court distinguished Lattimore v. Loews Theatres, Inc., 410 F.
Supp. 1397 (M.D.N.C. 1975) (the running of the statute was tolled by a timely filing
of a complaint with the EEOC). Id. at 472. In Lattimore, however, plaintiff in waiting
to file suit had evidently relied, to some extent, on the advice of an official of the de-
fendant corporation. 410 F. Supp. at 1401.
Frequently, the same actions that give rise to a suit under Title VII are those that
result in a private suit under section 1981. It has been argued that by forcing an in-
dividual to pursue his or her case under 1981 before completion of the investigation and
conciliation efforts of the EEOC is likely to lead to duplication of litigation. See Pitt-
man v. Anaconda Wire & Cable Co., 408 F. Supp. 286, 294 (E.D.N.C. 1974). The
Pittman court permitted tolling on the basis of a timely filing with the EEOC. The case
was decided prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Johnson
v. Railway Express.
145. 290 N.C. 608, 227 S.E.2d 576 (1976).
146. id. at 610, 227 S.E.2d at 577.
147. 22 N.C. App. 259, 206 S.E.2d 401 (1974).
148. The court determined that plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge the an-
nexation ordinance. 290 N.C. at 618, 227 S.E.2d at 582. While expressing doubts
about the standing of plaintiffs to challenge the rezoning ordinance the court did go on
to consider the defense of laches in the context of the challenge to .the rezoning ordi-
nance. Id. at 621, 227 S.E.2d at 584.
934 [Vol. 55
CIVIL PROCEDURE
for the court, recognized that for the defense of laches to be success-
ful the mere passage of time was not sufficient but the delay "must
be shown to be unreasonable and must have worked to the disadvan-
tage, injury or prejudice of the person seeking to invoke it."'
149 Plain-
tiffs admitted that their challenge to ordinances was prompted by their
discovery that an easement across their property was to be condemned
by the City of Raleigh. This factor, according to the Chief Justice, was
hardly an excuse for a delay of over two years. In fact plaintiffs' admis-
sion was a clear indication that their objections were not to the rezon-
ing, as such, but to the threat of condemnation.' 50 In considering
whether the delay had disadvantaged or injured defendants, the court
found that the City Council had engaged in planning activities with the
other defendants in reliance on the validity of the ordinances. In addi-
tion, another defendant had expended considerable sums for archi-
tectural, engineering and legal fees. 5 ' The court found that the delay
had been neither reasonable nor harmless and affirmed the court of
appeals' decision that plaintiffs were barred by laches from challenging
the ordinances.
152
I. Conduct of the Officers of the Court
1. Misconduct of Judges
In a case recommending censure of a judicial officer under the
new Judicial Commission, the supreme court in In re Edens'53 reiter-
ated its strong feeling that "[t]he trial and disposition of criminal cases
. . . ought to be conducted in public .... ,,4 The evidence pre-
sented supported findings that Judge Edens had accepted a guilty plea
after the session of the court had ended and had entered a prayer for
judgment continued without prior notice to the assistant district attor-
ney. This case follows In re Crutchfield,'55 the first censure by the
149. Id. at 622-23, 227 S.E.2d at 584-85 (quoting 22 AM. JuR. 2d Declaratory Judg-
ments § 78 (1965)).
150. Id. at 624, 227 S.E.2d at 585.
151. Id. at 624-25, 227 S.E.2d at 586.
152. Id. at 627, 227 S.E.2d at 587. In Stutts v. Swaim, 30 N.C. App. 611, 228
S.E.2d 750 (1976), the court of appeals refused to reverse the trial court's finding that
plaintiffs were not barred by the doctrine of laches from challenging a rezoning ordi-
nance. Judge Britt discussed Taylor, upon which defendants relied, and found that the
delay of nearly three years was not unreasonable and that defendants had not demon-
strated that they had changed their position in any significant way in reliance on the
ordinance. Id. at 619, 228 S.E.2d at 755.
153. 290 N.C. 299, 226 S.E.2d 5 (1976).
154. Id. at 306, 226 S.E.2d at 9.
155. 289 N.C. 597, 223 S.E.2d 822 (1975).
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Judicial Commission, in noting that the purpose of the Commission's
proceeding is inquiry into the conduct of a judicial officer "'to maintain
due and proper administration of justice . . . public confidence in its
judicial system, and the honor and integrity of its judges,'" not to
punish any individual. 56 In Crutchfield, a judge, without inquiry into
the statutes, had ordered limited driving privileges for defendants who
would not have qualified for such privileges under the statutes. The
Edens case, however, involved a more limited impropriety in that the
judge had granted a prayer for judgment continued for six months in
an out-of-court session with defendant's attorney. Noting that this
action failed to satisfy Canon 3(A)(4) of the Code of Judicial Con-
duct, 57 which requires an opportunity to be heard to all who are legally
interested in a proceeding, the court held that the action constituted
"wilful misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administra-
tion of justice that brings the judicial office in disrepute. .. .
2. Recusation
The supreme court in North Carolina National Bank v. Gillespie'5
considered the power of a trial judge to determine a motion to dis-
qualify himself. Defendant had alleged judicial bias warranting dis-
qualification on the basis of an unfriendly termination of an attorney-
client relationship between the trial judge and defendant's family, a
criminal prosecution of defendant by the judge, and a friendly relation-
ship between the judge and some of plaintiff's employees. Since no
evidence was offered to contradict defendant's claims, the court found
that there was insufficient support for the trial judge's finding that he
was qualified to proceed. The court also implied that when the motion
to disqualify is supported by sufficient evidence to warrant a finding
of facts, the judge should refer the matter to another judge before
whom he could present testimony or other evidence indicating an ab-
sence of bias.16
J. Jurisdiction
In Sherwood v. Sherwood 6' the North Carolina Court of Appeals
156. 290 N.C. at 304-05, 226 S.E.2d at 8 (quoting In re Crutchfield, 289 N.C. at
602, 223 S.E.2d at 825).
157. N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3 (A) (4) (1973).
158. 290 N.C. at 307, 226 S.E.2d at 10. See generally Note, Judicial Discipline-
The North Carolina Commission System, 54 N.C.L. REV. 1074 (1976).
159. 291 N.C. 303, 310-11, 230 S.E.2d 375, 380 (1976).
160. Id.; see Ponder v. Davis, 233 N.C. 699, 65 S.E.2d 356 (1951).
161. 29 N.C. App. 112, 223 S.E.2d 509 (1976).
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interpreted G.S. 1-75.4(3)1 to confer personal jurisdiction over a
Delaware resident in an action for alimony by his North Carolina domi-
ciled wife. Defendant had resided in North Carolina for two years
prior to the abandonment that gave rise to the action. In finding the
statute applicable, the court determined that the claim (1) arose out
of an act that took place in North Carolina (abandonment) and (2)
involved injury to person or property as required by G.S. 1-74.4(3).163
In particular the court recognized a legislative intent not to limit per-
sonal jurisdiction to "traditional" claims for bodily injury and property
damages.'14  The court relied principally on a 1973 case"' in which
an action for alienation of affections was found to involve an injury to
"the person or property." According to the court, both cases involved
"wrong[s] willfully inflicted and the deprivation of marital companion-
ship and cohabitation."'
66
In determining whether the application of this long-arm statute in
the abandonment context was a violation of due process, the court
applied a "minimum contacts" test developed in International Shoe Co.
v. Washington'67 and used in cases concerning non-resident corpora-
tions. The court of appeals viewed the combination of defendant's
residence in the state while with his wife and the abandonment of his
wife while in the state as sufficient to meet "minimum contacts." 68
Judge Clark, writing for the court, recognized the decision as an
expansion of the personal jurisdiction concept and cautioned that the
holding was limited to the particular circumstances of the case.'69 It
is worth noting, however, that in this type of case the "particular cir-
cumstances" may be typical enough to view the decision as more than
an insignificant broadening of the scope of personal jurisdictionY.
7 0
162. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4 (1969) provides in part:
A court. . . has jurisdiction over a person served in an action pursuant to Rule
4 (j) of the Rules of Civil Procedure under any of the following circum-
stances:
(3) Local Act or Omission.-In any action claiming injury to person or prop-
erty. . . arising out of an act or omission within this State by the defendant.
163. 29 N.C. App. at 115-16, 223 S.E.2d at 512.
164. Id.
165. Golding v. Taylor, 19 N.C. App. 245, 198 S.E.2d 478 (1973).
166. 29 N.C. App. at 116, 223 S.E.2d at 512.
167. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
168. 29 N.C. App. at 116, 223 S.E.2d at 512.
169. Id.
170. In Appleyard v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 539 F.2d 1026 (4th Cir. 1976), the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was also called upon to interpret N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-75.4(3). The procedural issue of personal jurisdiction arose in the con-
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In Equity Associates v. Society for Savings171 the North Carolina
Court of Appeals interpreted G.S. 55-145,172 which enumerates the
grounds for exercising personal jurisdiction over corporations that are
not transacting business in North Carolina. Equity and Savings entered
into a contract that was to be performed in North Carolina. The con-
tract breach by Savings occurred in Connecticut. 173  The question be-
fore the court of appeals was whether the trial court had erred in exer-
cising personal jurisdiction on the basis of G.S. 55-145(a)(1) in a case
in which the cause of action arose outside the state.174  In affirming
the decision of the lower court the court of appeals distinguished
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad v. J.B. Hunt & Sons, Inc.,' in which the
North Carolina Supreme Court relied on the language of the drafters
of G.S. 55-145 and stated that that section was not applicable to causes
of action arising outside the state.' 76  The Equity Associates court re-
jected the discussion of G.S. 55-145 in Hunt & Sons as obiter dictum
and called attention to the fact that Hunt & Sons and Marshville
Rendering Corp. v. Gas Heat Engineering Corp., 77 which included the
same analysis of G.S. 55-145, Ts were both actions in tort, consequently,
text of a libel suit by Appleyard against the publisher of the magazine Overdrive. De-
fendant, citing the limited distribution of Overdrive in North Carolina (765 issues per
month), contended that the United States District Court in which the diversity action was
initiated lacked personal jurisdiction. 539 F.2d at 1028-29.
Noting that under North Carolina law a new tortious act occurs upon each reading
of a libelous publication, see Johnston v. Time, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 837 (M.D.N.C. 1970),
modified, 448 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1971), the court had no problem in finding N.C. GVN.
STAT. § 1-75.4(3) applicable. The court's analysis of the due process issue was more
cautious. The court did not rule on the sufficiency of the circulation of Overdrive but
relied on the.findings that the distribution was not random, but "calculated," and that
the articles were aimed at a North Carolina resident with the result that any damage
that might occur could be anticipated to take place in North Carolina. 539 F.2d at
1029.
171. 31 N.C. App. 182, 228 S.E.2d 761 (1976).
172. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145 (1975). The relevant portions of § 55-145 are as
follows:
Jurisdiction over foreign corporations not transacting business in this State.-
(a) Every foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this State . . . on any
cause of action arising as follows:
(1) Out of any contract made in this State or to be performed in this
State... ; or
(4) Out of tortious conduct in this State, whether arising out of repeated
activity or single acts ....
173. 31 N.C. App. at 183, 228 S.E.2d at 761-62.
174. The confusion arising from § 55-145(a)(1) is discussed in Note, Personal
Jurisdiction-Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporation Based Upon Making a Contract in
North Carolina, 49 N.C.L. REv. 838 (1971).
175. 260 N.C. 717, 133 S.E.2d 644 (1963).
176. Id. at 721-22, 133 S.E.2d at 648.
177. 10 N.C. App. 39, 177 S.E.2d 907 (1970).
178. Id. at 42, 177 S.E.2d at 909.
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the applicable subsection of G.S. 55-145 would be (a)(4), which is
express in its requirement that the tortious conduct take place in the
state.179
The court based its decision on the 1965 North Carolina Supreme
Court decision in Byham v. National Cibo House Corp.,180 a case deal-
ing specifically with G.S. 55-145(a)(1). In Byham the contract
breach occurred in Tennessee but the court permitted the exercise of
personal jurisdiction because the contract was executed and was to be
substantially performed in North Carolina. 181  The court of appeals
viewed the facts in the case at bar as sufficiently parallel to those in
Byham to justify reliance on the earlier case.' 82
Unfortunately, the untangling job of the court in Equity was not
complete at this point. The court was still faced with its own statement
made just five months earlier in Dillon v. Numismatic Funding Corp.'8 3
that "General Statute § 55-145 confers in personam jurisdiction over
foreign corporations not transacting business in North Carolina, in
special instances. Like G.S. 55-144, this statute only applies to actions
arising in North Carolina."'184 After reviewing its decision in Dillon,
the court dismissed the "broad assertion" that G.S. 55-145 only applies
to causes of action arising in North Carolina as dictum.185 Thus, in
an opinion that is clearly consistent with Byham, the court rejected the
notion that in personam jurisdiction under G.S. 55-145(a)(1) must be
based on a cause of action arising within the state. In light of the
dictum in Dillon, however, it seems possible that the composition of the
court may play an important role in determining the outcome of this
question in any particular case.' 86
179. See note 172 supra.
180. 265 N.C. 50, 143 S.E.2d 225 (1965).
181. Id. at 58-59, 143 S.E.2d at 232.
182. 31 N.C. App. at 187, 228 S.E.2d at 764.
183. 29 N.C. App. 513, 225 S.E.2d 137 (1976), rev'd on other grounds, 291 N.C.
674, 231 S.E.2d 629 (1977).
184. Id. at 516, 225 S.E.2d at 139.
185. 31 N.C. App. at 185, 228 S.E.2d at 763. The court in Equity Associates did
apply a Byham type analysis to Dillon and concluded that personal jurisdiction was
justifiably denied in Dillon because the contract was neither made nor to be performed
in North Carolina. Id. at 186, 228 S.E.2d at 763. This type of analysis was not applied
in Dillon. In fact, rather than dictum, it appears that the court's decision in Dillon
is based on the belief that § 55-145 is inapplicable unless the cause of action arises in
North Carolina. Thus it appears that rather than dismissing the language in Dillon as
"dictum," a better description might be that Dillon, as far as § 55-145(a)(1) is con-
cerned, is a case of the right decision for the wrong reason.
186. The Dillon court consisted of Judges Brock, Vaughn and Martin, and the
Equity Associates court was composed of Judges Arnold, Morris and Hedrick.
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K. Appeal and Error
Rule 3(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure187
provides that an appeal from an order of a superior or district court
in a civil action may be taken by "(2) filing notice of appeal with the
clerk of superior court and serving copies thereof upon all other par-
ties"' 8  within the ten day period prescribed by rule 3(c). 181 In
Giannitrapani v. Duke University00 plaintiff filed a notice of appeal
from a judgment granting defendant's motion for a rule 12(b)(6) dis-
missal. 19 The filing did take place within ten days of the ruling but
plaintiff failed to serve notice on defendant within that period.19 2  As
a consequence the trial court dismissed the appeal and the court of ap-
peals affirmed, relying on rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure. 3  Rule 27(c) does permit extension of the time periods pre-
scribed by the Rules but indicates that a court "may not extend the time
for taking appeal prescribed by these rules or by law. 10 4  Thus, when
a plaintiff does not meet the ten day requirement, the appeal fails and
the appellate court acquires no jurisdiction nor can it acquire jurisdic-
tion by extending the ten day limit.' 5 Although this was the first time
since adoption of the present Rules of Appellate Procedure (in July
1975) that this specific question had reached the court, the court
relied on pre-Rule precedent,'9 6 noting that the new Rules and statutes
are substantially the same as those in effect prior to July 1975.197
187. N.C.R. App. P. 3(a).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. 30 N.C. App, 667, 228 S.E.2d 46 (1976).
191. Id. at 668, 228 S.E.2d at 47; see N.C.R. Ci. P. 12(b)(6).
192. 30 N.C. App. at 668, 228 S.E.2d at 47.
193. Id. at 670, 228 S.E.2d at 48; see N.C.R. App. P. 27(c).
194. N.C.R. App. P. 27(c).
195. 30 N.C. App. at 670, 228 S.E.2d at 48; accord, Brooks v. Mathews, 29 N.C.
App. 614, 225 S.E.2d 159 (1976); Markham v. Swails, 29 N.C. App. 205, 223 S.E.2d
920 (1976). N.C.R. App. P. 11(e) provides that "[w]ithin 10 days after the record
on appeal has been settled . . . the appellant shall present the items constituting the
record on appeal to the clerk of superior court for certification." The court does have
discretion to extend this time limit under rule 27(c). In two cases, however, the court
of appeals upheld decisions not to do so, indicating the importance of the time limits
to the orderly flow of the appellate process. See Ledwell v. County of Randolph, 31
N.C. App. 522, 229 S.E.2d 836 (1976); State v. Gillespie, 31 N.C. App. 520, 230 S.B.2d
154 (1976).
196. 30 N.C. App. at 670, 228 S.E.2d at 48 (citing, e.g., Teague v. Teague, 266
N.C. 320, 146 S.E.2d 87 (1966); Aycock v. Richardson, 247 N.C. 233, 100 S.E.2d 379
(1957)).
197. Id. The pre-July 1975 statutes were CODE OF C2vL PRoCEnR §§ 300, 301
(1868) (formerly codified as N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-279, -280 (1966)).
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G.S. 1-277(a)198 permits an immediate appeal from any "judicial
order or determination of a judge of a superior court or district
court . . . which affects a substantial right claimed in any action
or proceeding."' 9 9  The court of appeals dismissed an appeal from a
trial court order that the parents and their child submit to a psychiatric
examination prior to a final determination in a child custody case on
the grounds that no substantial right was affected.20 0  The court also
found that no substantial right was affected when the trial court denied
a preliminary injunction sought by plaintiff to prevent violation of the
North Carolina Open Meetings Law.20 '
In Piedmont Equipment Co. v. Weant,2 '2 the court of appeals was
faced for the first time with the question whether appeal lies to review an
order dismissing a charge of indirect civil contempt.20  Plaintiff
alleged that defendant had wilfully violated a prior consent judgment
and should be found in contempt of court.20 4  The issue of appealabil-
ity arose when the trial court concluded that there had been no wilful
or intentional violation by defendant. The court of appeals found that
a substantial right under G.S. 1-277(a) was affected since the appellant
was seeking to have the original judgment enforced. 05 In making this
determination the court recognized the division among other jurisdic-
tions on this point 206 and distinguished Murray v. Berry, °2 7 in which the
court had refused to hear an appeal based on the dismissal of a con-
tempt charge. In Berry the litigants were involved in an action aside
from the appeal that would ultimately determine the rights of the par-
ties. 20 8 In Weant, however, no such action was pending.
In Willis v. Duke Power Co., 209 the North Carolina Supreme Court
upheld the right of immediate appeal by a civil litigant from a contempt
order resulting from a refusal to comply with a discovery order. In so
198. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277(a) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
199. Id.
200. Williams v. Williams, 29 N.C. App. 509, 510, 224 S.E.2d 656, 657 (1976)
(citing Funderburk v. Justice, 25 N.C. App. 655, 214 S.E.2d 310 (1975)).
201. Gunkel v. Kimbrell, 29 N.C. App. 586, 589, 225 S.E.2d 127, 129 (1976)
(citing Pruitt v. Williams, 288 N.C. 368, 218 S.E.2d 348 (1975)).
202. 30 N.C. App. 191, 226 S.E.2d 688 (1976).
203. Id. at 194, 226 S.E.2d at 690.
204. Id. at 192-93, 226 S.E.2d at 689.
205. Id. at 195, 226 S.E.2d at 690.
206. The court cited Annot., 24 A.L.R.3d 650 (1969). 30 N.C. App. at 194, 226
S.E.2d at 690.
207. 113 N.C. 46, 18 S.E. 78 (1893).
208. Id. at 48, 18 S.E. at 79.
209. 291 N.C. 19, 229 S.E.2d 191 (1976).
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doing, the court reversed the court of appeals' determination that the
order was not appealable.2 10 The court of appeals reasoned that since
the defendant was not punished and could avoid punishment by com-
plying with the order, the order was not appealable.211 The supreme
court, however, focused on the quandary facing the litigant when he
is forced to choose between risking a fine or imprisonment or comply-
ing with the order and rendering the issue of the discovery order itself
moot.212 The court held
when a civil litigant is adjudged to be in contempt for failing to
comply with an earlier discovery order, the contempt proceeding
is both civil and criminal in nature and the order is immediately
appealable for the purpose of testing the validity both of the original
discovery order and the contempt order .... 213
L. Judicial Power to Summon Jurors from Another County
In Kinston City Board of Education v. Board of Commissioners
of Lenoir County214 a jury was summoned from Wayne County to de-
termine a claim by the Kinston City Board of Education that the Lenoir
County Board of Commissioners had failed to appropriate the necessary
capital outlay for the school system. The commissioners alleged that
the judicial power to summon jurors from another county violated the
constitutional right of the people of Lenoir County to determine their
own taxation. The court of appeals, in rejecting the commissioners'
claim, noted that it is not the function of a jury to represent the views
of the majority in determining a political issue of taxation.21r In fact,
the politicization of the issue indicated the necessity of the judicial
order to obtain an impartial jury to make a decision based solely on
the facts.
210. Willis v. Duke Power Co., 26 N.C. App. 598, 216 S.E.2d 732 (1975).
211. Id. at 601, 216 S.E.2d at 733.
212. 291 N.C. at 30, 229 S.E.2d at 198.
213. Id.
214. 29 N.C. App. 554, 225 S.E.2d 145 (1976). The jurisdiction of the superior
court to entertain this action is based on Law of May 26, 1955, ch. 1372, § 1, [1955]
N.C. Sess. Laws 1563 (previously codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-87 (1975)).
215. 29 N.C. App. at 556, 225 S.E.2d at 146-47. The judicial power to summon
a jury from an adjoining county is found in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-12 (1969). Such an
order may be reversed only for abuse of discretion. State v. Edwards, 286 N.C. 140,
209 S.E.2d 789 (1974).
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III. 'COMMERCIAL LAW
A. Uniform Commercial Code
1. Farmers as Merchants
The North Carolina Uniform Commercial Code defines a merchant
as
a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his
occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar
to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom
such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of
an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation
holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill.1
The issue whether a farmer is to be charged with the higher stand-
ards of a merchant under the Code is being debated increasingly as
small one-family farms are being replaced by larger agribusiness con-
cerns. The courts of other states that have considered the issue have
split. 2 The issue recently arose in North Carolina in Currituck Grain
Inc. v. Powell.3
In Powell, plaintiff and defendant entered into an alleged oral
agreement whereby defendant agreed to sell and plaintiff agreed to buy
fifteen hundred bushels of corn and fifteen hundred bushels of soy-
beans at a specified price in excess of five hundred dollars,4 with de-
livery to take place in the fall of 1974.1 Upon defendant's failure to
deliver, plaintiff sued for damages.6 Defendant denied the allegations,
pleaded the Statute of Frauds as an affirmative defense, and moved for
summary judgment.7
Responding to defendant's motion for summary judgment, plaintiff
alleged that he sent defendant a confirmatory memorandum within a
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-104(1) (1965).
2. See, e.g., Loeb & Co. v. Schreiner, 294 Ala. 722, 321 So. 2d 199 (1975).
But see Sierens v. Clausen, 60 Ill.2d 585, 328 N.E.2d 559 (1975). Both of these cases
arose in the context of U.C.C. § 2-201. Other recent cases that have considered the
issue include Cook Grains, Inc. v. Fallis, 239 Ark. 962, 395 S.W.2d 555 (1965) (farmer
not a merchant); Campbell v. Yokel, 20 Ill. App. 3d 702, 313 N.E.2d 628 (1974)
(farmers are merchants under U.C.C.); Ohio Grain Co. v. Swisshelm, 40 Ohio App.
2d 203, 318 N.W.2d 428 (1973) (experienced farmer chargeable with the knowledge
or skill of merchants).
3. 28 N.C. App. 563, 222 S.E.2d 1 (1976).
4. id. at 564, 222 S.E.2d at 1. The fact that the agreed upon price exceeded
$500 is important because the statute of frauds.provision contained in N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 25-2-201(1) (1965) only applies when the sale price of the goods is $500 or more.
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reasonable time" and thus the contract was enforceable under G.S. 25-
2-201(2)9 since defendant was a "merchant" within the meaning of
G.S. 25-2-104.10
The question whether defendant was a merchant was important
because "[i]f defendant were not a merchant, as defined, he was en-
titled to the defense of the statute of frauds. If he were a merchant
he would not be entitled to the defense of the statute of frauds."'" The
North Carolina Court of Appeals ruled that there was a genuine issue
of fact as to whether defendant was a merchant and that, therefore,
the superior court erred in granting defendant's motion for summary
judgment.' 2 The court explicitly indicated that it was not holding that
a farmer is a merchant;' 3 but by remanding the case for a determination
on this issue, the court implicitly admitted the possibility that a farmer
may be considered a merchant if the facts so warrant.
Such an approach comports with economic reality and contempo-
rary commercial practices.'" The holding does not mean that every
farmer will be treated as a merchant; rather, that the determination will
be made on a case-by-case basis taking into account such factors as size
of the farming operation, skill and experience of the farmer, number
8. Id.
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-201(2) (1965) provides as follows:
(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confir-
mation of the contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the
party receiving it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies the requirements
of subsection (1) against such party unless written notice of objection to its
contents is given within ten days after it is received.
10. Id. § 25-2-104(1).
11. 28 N.C. App. at 565, 222 S.E.2d at 2.
12. Id. at 568, 222 S.E.2d at 4.
13. Id.
14. It was the intent of the Code drafters that those who deal in goods (and
growing crops are considered to be "goods," see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-105(1) (1965))
be divided into two categories: the casual, inexperienced seller or buyer, and the more
experienced professional seller or buyer. See the official comment following N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 25-2-201 (1965). The latter are to be held to higher standards of conduct
and charged with a duty of greater care in conducting business transactions, not only
with regard to the statute of frauds (as in Powell), but also under other provisions
of the Code as well. See note 16 inlra. In earlier, more idyllic times, there were,
no doubt, good reasons for not holding farmers to the higher standards and responsibili-
ties of the "merchant" because farmers, for the most part, were indeed "casual and
inexperienced" participants in the economic marketplace. Their participation extended
only to carrying their goods to the market at the end of the growing season and then
returning to the farm until the next year's crop was ready for market. See Loeb &
Co. v. Schreiner, 294 Ala. 722, 321 So. 2d 199 (1975). Now, however, farming is
increasingly a large, sophisticated business like any other; economic reality thus suggests
that the test for "merchant" be applied in the same manner to farmers as it is to other
buyers and sellers.
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of employees, etc.' The holding in Powell indicates a willingness to
employ a flexible and realistic approach to the problem and, as such,
should be applauded as a sound decision.' 6
2. Warranties
In 1976 several North Carolina cases dealt with various aspects
of warranties arising under the law of North Carolina. In Griffin v.
Wheeler-Leonard & Co.,"1 the North Carolina Supreme Court reaf-
firmed its earlier holdings that an implied warranty of "livability"
arises by operation of law between a builder-vendor and the purchaser
of a house: that "'the dwelling, together with all its fixtures, is suffi-
ciently free from major structural defects, and is constructed in a
workmanlike manner, so as to meet the standard of workmanlike quality
prevailing at the time and place of the construction.' 18 In Griffin,
the continued presence of puddles of water in the crawl space under-
neath the house caused the condition of the house and the yard to
deteriorate."9
Although the U.C.C. does not apply to the sale of houses 20 pre-
sumably this warranty of "livability" is based by analogy on G.S. 25-
2-31421 (although the court never referred explicitly to this section),
which implies a warranty of merchantability in the sale of goods if the
seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. In order for
15. Thus the "casual and inexperienced" farmer will still be charged only with
the lesser standards of the nonmerchant. See note 14 supra.
16. Numerous provisions of the Code make reference to "merchants" in addition
to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-201 (1965). For example, the implied warranty of mer-
chantability under id. § 25-2-314 arises only if the seller is a "merchant." Other sec-
tions of the Code in which the merchant/non-merchant distinction is important include
id. §§ 25-2-103(1)(b) (definition of good faith), -205 (firm offers), -207(2)
(acceptance of offers), -209(2) (exclusion of modification and recission), -327(1)(c)
(sales on approval), -509(3) (risk of loss), -603 (merchant buyer's duties as to right-
fully rejected goods), -609(2) (right to adequate assurance of performance).
Note that in §§ 25-2-201(2), -207(2), -209(2) and -609(2), the requirement is
that the transaction be "between merchants," i.e., both parties to the transaction must
be merchants. On the other hand, in all of the other' listed sections, only one party
to the transaction need be a "merchant" (sometimes the seller, sometimes the buyer
and sometimes either one).
17. 290 N.C. 185, 225 S.E.2d 557 (1976).
18. Id. at 200, 225 S.E.2d at 566 (quoting former Chief Justice Bobbitt's opinion
in Hartley v. Ballou, 286 N.C. 51, 62, 209 S.E.2d 776, 783 (1974)).
19. Id. at 192, 225 S.E.2d at 562.
20. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-105(1) (1965).
21. Id. § 25-2-314(1) provides in pertinent part: "Unless excluded or modified
(§ 25-2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract
for their sale if a seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind." The rest
of § 25-2-314 defines exactly what is meant by "merchantable."
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goods to be merchantable, they must be, among other things, "fit for
the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used. '' 2- The ordinary
purpose of a house is to be lived in-hence the implied warranty of
livability.
Although the implied warranty of livability arises by operation of
law, such a warranty may be disclaimed, as the court's dictum in Griffin
indicates, if certain requirements similar to those under the U.C.C. in
the sale of goods context under G.S. 25-2-316(2)23 are met. To be
effective, a disclaimer under G.S. 25-2-316(2), whether oral or
written, must mention "merchantability" (or in the case of a house, pre-
sumably "livability"), and must be conspicuous if in writing.24 Applying
G.S. 25-2-316(2) by analogy, the court found that the last paragraph
of the purchase contract, which was executed on a standard contract
form published by the North Carolina Association of Realtors, 20 was
not sufficient to disclaim the implied warranty of livability: "such
an exclusion .. .should be accomplished by clear, unambiguous lan-
guage, reflecting the fact that the parties fully intended such result. '20
In Griffin, plaintiff also asserted that statements by defendant's
agent that the water in the crawl space "should" dry up once everything
was covered constituted an express warranty that the water in the crawl
space would cause no problems. The court did not find that this
language created an express warranty.28
The North Carolina Court of Appeals, in Lyon v. Ward,20 ex-
tended the concept of the implied warranty in the new home situation
to include a warranty that the builder-vendor will provide an adequate
supply of water under normal conditions.30 Rejecting the doctrine of
caveat emptor as a relic of a by-gone era, the court stated that "there
ought to be an implicit understanding of the parties when an agreed
price is paid that the home is reasonably fit for the purposes for which
it is to be used.' In another case, Dawson Industries, Inc. v. Godley
Construction Co.,3 2 the court of appeals limited the applicability of the
22. Id. § 25-2-314(2)(c).
23. Id. § 25-2-316(2).
24. Id.
25. 290 N.C. at 201-02, 225 S.E.2d at 567-68.
26. Id. at 202, 225 S.E.2d at 568 (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 197, 225 S.E.2d at 564-65.
28. Id. at 198, 225 S.E.2d at 565.
29. 28 N.C. App. 446, 221 S.E.2d 727 (1976).
30. Id. at 450, 221 S.E.2d at 729-30.
31. Id. at 450, 221 S.E.2d at 729.
32. 29 N.C. App. 270, 224 S.E.2d 266, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 551, 226 S.E.2d
509 (1976).
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implied warranty of livability to residential dwellings, refusing to ex-
tend this warranty to commercial structures. 8
In addition, the court of appeals was less willing to find warranties
when an older dwelling was involved. The court ruled in Calhoun v.
Dunn14 that language by defendant-seller that the house was in "good
shape" was too vague to constitute an express warranty as to the con-
dition of the painting, carpentry and roofing of the dwelling. 5
In addition to these building cases, two other North Carolina de-
cisions dealt with warranties under the Uniform Commercial Code. In
Robinson v. Branch Moving & Storage Co.,36 the court of appeals found
that an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose does not
arise when plaintiff purchased a used truck from defendant "as is" (in
plaintiff's own language) and refused to inspect the truck prior to buying
it.3 7 Finally, the North Carolina Supreme Court, in Billings v. Joseph
Harris Co.,38 held that a seed merchant may disclaim the implied war-
ranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose as long
as the disclaimer complies with G.S. 25-2-316,19 i.e., mentions mer-
chantability and is conspicuously written.40 The court found that al-
lowing the limitation of liability in this case did not conflict with pro-
visions of the North Carolina Seed Law41 that prohibit a limitation of
liability for falsely labeled seed.42  In Harris, the seed was correctly
labeled but turned out to be diseased.43  The court in Harris left open
the question whether a clause limiting the buyer to recovery of the pur-
chase price of the seed is valid if there is a breach of the warranty of
conformity to label."
3. Security Interests
Nasco Equipment Co. v. Mason45 involved a determination of
priority between competing claims to a piece of heavy equipment. In
33. Id. at 276, 224 S.E.2d at 269.
34. 31 N.C. App. 224, 228 S.E.2d 782 (1976).
35. Id. at 226, 228 S.E.2d at 784.
36. 28 N.C. App. 244, 221 S.E.2d 81 (1976).
37. Id. at 249, 221 S.E.2d at 84.
38. 290 N.C. 502, 226 S.E.2d 321 (1976).
39. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-316 (1965).
40. 290 N.C. at 508, 226 S.E.2d at 324; see text accompanying notes 23-24 supra.
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 106-277 to -277.29 (1975).
42. 290 N.C. at 508, 226 S.E.2d at 324; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-277.11 (1975).
43. 290 N.C. at 505, 226 S.E.2d at 322-23.
44. Id. at 510, 226 S.E.2d at 325.
45. 291 N.C. 145, 229 S.E.2d 278 (1976).
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Mason, defendant, a dealer, took possession of a loadster delivered to
it by plaintiff,4 6 its regular supplier. Subsequently, defendant gave a se-
curity interest to the Bank, which perfected the interest by filing in ac-
cordance with G.S. 25-9-401 .47 After defendant failed to pay his debts
to plaintiff, plaintiff sued for possession of the loadster or its value in
the alternative.4 8 The Bank, impleaded as a third party defendant,
moved for summary judgment on the grounds that its perfected security
interest was superior to plaintiff's interest. 49
The North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the trial court's grant
of summary judgment in favor of the Bank. 50 Pointing out that under
G.S. 25-2-401 title passes to the buyer at the time of delivery unless
otherwise explicitly agreed by the parties, the court rejected plaintiff's
argument that it had retained title to the goods.5' Moreover, the court
found nothing in the record suggesting, as plaintiff argued, that the
transaction was a consignment, and noted that even if it were, the Bank
would still prevail because plaintiff failed to meet the requirements of
G.S. 25-2-326(3) 52-- provisions that give a consignor several alter-
native means to protect his interest in goods that are delivered on con-
signment. The purpose of the consignment section of the Code is to
inform the consignee's potential creditors that he or she is selling the
goods of another. This requisite notice can be accomplished in three
different ways: (1) filing a security interest in the consigned goods;13
(2) posting a sign at the consignee's place of business; 4 or (3)
showing that it is generally known to creditors of the consignee that
he is "substantially engaged in selling the goods of others." Plain-
tiff's failure to offer evidence that it complied with the consign-
ment provisions of the Code, and the court's rejection of plaintiff's
46. Id. at 147, 229 S.E.2d at 280.
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-401 (1965).
48. 291 N.C. at 147, 229 S.E.2d at 280.
49. Id. at 147, 229 S.E.2d at 281.
50. Id. at 156, 229 S.E.2d at 285.
51. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-401(2) (1965) provides:
Unless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to the buyer at the time and
place at which the seller completes his performance with reference to the phys-
ical delivery of the goods, despite any reservation of a security interest and
even though a document of title is to be delivered at a different time and
place. . ..
(emphasis added).
52. 291 N.C. at 153, 229 S.E.2d at 284. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-326 (1965)
sets forth the requirements that must be met before a consignment will be found.
53. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-326(3)(c) (1965).
54. Id. § 25-2-326(3)(a).
55. ld. § 25-2-326(3)(b).
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argument that it retained title 6 to the goods ensured that the Bank's
perfected security interest prevailed.
57
In 1976 the North Carolina Court of Appeals dealt with two cases
concerning security interests. In Little v. County of Orange58 the court
found that no security interest was created when the financing state-
ment contained the name of the corporate debtor but was not signed
by the debtor as required by G.S. 25-9-203(1)(b) 59 and 25-9-105
(d).60 G.S. 55-36(b) requires that some official of the corporation
sign in his or her official capacity. 6 The financing statement in Little
contained no such signature, and thus the security interest failed.6"
In Bank of Virginia-Central v. Taurus Construction Co.6" the court
held that a lender's perfected security interest in collateral continued
despite the borrower's transfer of the collateral to a corporation set up
by the debtor, since the lender did not authorize the debtor's transfer
of the collateral under G.S. 25-9-306(2). 64 Accordingly, the original
lender prevailed over a subsequent creditor who had been given a se-
curity interest in the collateral by the transferee corporation.65
A "waiver of defenses against an assignee" clause in a commercial
sales contract was recently upheld by the North Carolina Court of
Appeals. In ITT-Industrial Credit Co. v. Milo Concrete Co.6 6 plaintiff,
the assignee of Case, who had sold a concrete pump to defendant Milo,
56. Even if the court had found that plaintiff had retained fitle to the goods, it
would still have been necessary to perfect the interest. Under id. § 25-1-201(37) a
retention of title is treated like any other security interest.
57. 291 N.C. at 155-56, 229 S.E.2d at 285. In another case dealing with § 2-
326 of the U.C.C., the North Carolina Court of Appeals ruled that a contract of sale
containing a merger clause was sufficient in conjunction with comment 4 to N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 25-2-326 (1965) to preclude oral testimony that the purported sale was in reality
an "on-return" consignment. Recreatives, Inc. v. Travel-On Motorcycles Co., 29 N.C.
App. 727, 225 S.E.2d 637 (1976).
58. 31 N.C. App. 495, 229 S.E.2d 823 (1976).
59. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-203(1) (b) (1965).
60. Id. § 25-9-105(d).
61. Specifically, the instrument must be signed by the president, vice-president,
secretary, assistant secretary, treasurer or assistant treasurer. Id. § 55-36(b) (1975).
62. Instead, the financing statement contained merely the typed name of the cor-
poration. 31 N.C. App. at 499, 229 S.E.2d at 824.
63. 30 N.C. App. 220, 226 S.E.2d 685, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 659, 228 S.E.2d
450 (1976).
64. Id. at 224, 226 S.E.2d at 688. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-306(2) (1965) reads
as follows: "Except where this article otherwise provides, a security interest continues
in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition thereof by the debtor
unless his action was authorized by the secured party in the security agreement or other-
wise . . . ." (emphasis added).
65. 30 N.C. App. at 224, 226 S.E.2d at 688.
66. 31 N.C. App. 450, 229 S.E.2d 814 (1976).
950 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55
sought to recover the balance due on a retail installment contract exe-
cuted between Case and Milo.67 By way of defense, Milo asserted that
the pump performed unsatisfactorily and that he had sold it.0 8 Neverthe-
less, the court ruled that G.S. 25-9-206(l)0 was controlling and that
the assignee took free of all defenses against the seller as provided for
by the terms of the contract. In so holding, the court rejected defen-
dant's argument that the assignee and the original seller were so closely
related as to make the waiver of defenses unenforceable on grounds
of public policy. 7° The court's opinion implies that the public policy
argument applies only in the consumer setting and that in a commercial
context such a clause will be upheld when the assignee takes the note
in good faith, for value and without notice of any claims or defenses. 71
In addition to discussing the waiver of defenses clause, the court
in ITT-Industrial held that the burden is on the creditor to show that
a public sale of collateral is conducted in a "commercially reasonable
manner" in accordance with G.S. 25-9-504(3).72
In Hodges v. Norton71 the North Carolina Court of Appeals also
considered the issue of commercial reasonableness in the sale of collat-
eral. In Hodges, the court found that posting notice of sale at the court-
house was inadequate notice to the debtor;74 G.S. 25-9-603 (2)7r man-
67. Id. at 452, 229 S.E.2d at 816.
68. Id. at 453, 229 S.E.2d at 817.
69. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-206(1) (1965) provides in pertinent part:
Subject to any statute or decision which establishes a different rule for
buyers or lessees of consumer goods, an agreement by a buyer or lessee that
he will not assert against an assignee any claim or defense which he may have
against the seller or lessor is enforceable by an assignee who takes his assign-
ment for value, in good faith and without notice of a claim or defense, except
as to defenses of a type which may be asserted against a holder in due course
of a negotiable instrument under the article on commercial paper (article 3).
70. Apparently, plaintiff supplied the contract form to Case, approved Case's custo-
mer's credit and financing, and was the assignee of 12 contracts from Case during 1973
and 1974. 31 N.C. App. at 455-56, 229 S.E.2d at 818.
71. Id. at 455, 229 S.E.2d at 819. The court did point out, however, that under
the Retail Installment Sales Act, N.C. GEM. STAT. ch. 25A (Cum. Supp. 1975), the
waiver of defenses clause is treated differently in the consumer setting. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 25A-25 (Cum. Supp. 1975) allows the buyer to assert defenses against the
assignee of the seller.
72. 31 N.C. App. at 458, 229 S.E.2d at 820. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-504(3)
(1965) requires that the sale of collateral be in a "commercially reasonable manner."
If the procedures of N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 25-9-601 to -607 (Cum. Supp. 1975) are fol-
lowed, there is a conclusive presumption of commercial reasonableness. Hodges v. Nor-
ton, 29 N.C. App. 193, 196, 223 S.E.2d 848, 850 (1976), discussed in text accompany-
ing notes 73-77 infra; Graham v. Northwestern Bank, 16 N.C. App. 287, 293, 192 S.E.
2d 109, 113, cert. denied, 282 N.C. 426, 192 S.E.2d 836 (1972).
73. 29 N.C. App. 193, 223 S.E.2d 848 (1976).
74. Id. at 197, 223 S.E.2d at 850-51.
75. N.C. GEM. STAT. § 25-9-603 (Cum. Supp. 1975) requires posting a notice at
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dates that notice be sent to the debtor by certified mail at least five days
before the sale. Failure to comply with this statutory requirement re-
sulted in a holding that the sale was not conducted in a commercially
reasonable manner.76  However, the court refused to follow precedent
from other states and hold that this failure to conduct the sale in a com-
mercially reasonable manner barred a deficiency judgment altogether.
Rather, in North Carolina this failure merely raised a presumption that
the collateral was worth the amount of the debt-a presumption that
can be overcome with appropriate evidence.
77
4. Negotiable Instruments
In Southern National Bank v. Pocock,78 the president and secre-
tary-treasurer of a corporation signed a note executed by the corpo-
ration in favor of the Bank as a guaranty. 79 After the corporation de-
faulted on the note and the Bank sold what collateral it held, the Bank
sought to recover the remaining amount due on the note from the two
officers of the corporation personally.80 Defendants argued that they
signed the guaranty only as representatives of the corporation and should
not be personally liable.81  The court pointed out, however, that G.S.
25-3-403 (2) (a) & (b) 81 make individuals who sign in their representa-
the courthouse, as well as mailing a notice of sale to the debtor at least five days
before the sale and, except when consumer goods are involved, to other parties holding
security interests. Id. § 25-9-604, however, excepts "perishable" collateral from these
requirements.
76. Since following the procedures of id. H9 25-9-601 to -607 creates a conclusive
presumption of commercial reasonableness, see note 72 supra, it seems to follow logically
that a sale of collateral is not reasonable if the procedures are not followed. The court
did not reach this conclusion, however, because compliance with H9 25-9-601 to -607
is not "mandatory." 29 N.C. App. at 196, 223 S.E.2d at 851. Nevertheless, creditors
should be wary of the consequences of not following these procedures, because in the
three cases to date, ITT-Indus. Credit Co. v. Milo Concrete Co., 31 N.C. App. 450,
229 S.E.2d 823 (1976); Hodges v. Norton, 29 N.C. App. 193, 223 S.E.2d 848 (1976);
Graham v. Northwestern Bank, 16 N.C. App. 287, 192 S.E.2d 109, cert. denied, 282
N.C. 426, 192 S.E.2d 836 (1972), the court has found the sale unreasonable.
77. 29 N.C. App. at 199, 223 S.E.2d at 851-52.
78. 29 N.C. App. 52, 223 S.E.2d 518, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 94, 225 S.E.2d 324
(1976).
79. Id. at 53-54, 223 S.E.2d at 519-20.
80. Id. at 54, 223 S.E.2d at 520.
81. Id.
82. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-403 (2)(a), (b) (1965) provides in part:
(2) An authorized representative who signs his own name to an instru-
ment
(a) is personally obligated if the instrument neither names the person rep-
resented nor shows that the representative signed in a representative capa-
city;
(b) except as otherwise established between the immediate parties, is per-
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tive capacities personally liable unless the parties otherwise agree.
Since the jury found that the parties did not otherwise agree and since
there was evidence in the record to support the jury's finding, the court
upheld the trial court's denial of defendants' motion for directed ver-
dict.83
G.S. 25-3-414(2)84 makes indorsers of a note liable in the order
in which they signed the note unless otherwise agreed. In Wilson v.
Turner"5 the court denied plaintiff's request for contribution from de-
fendant after plaintiff paid off a note that both parties had indorsed.
The court found competent evidence to sustain the trial court's finding
that the parties had not agreed to be jointly and severally liable.80
In Reaves v. Jurney,87 plaintiff, a real estate agent, received a
thousand dollar check from defendant toward the purchase of a piece
of land.88 After changing his mind about the transaction, defendant
stopped payment on the check.89 Nevertheless, the court of appeals
ruled that defendant was liable to the payee for the amount of the check
since "'[a] check is a contract within itself. By the act of drawing and
delivering it to the payee, the drawer commits himself to pay the
amount of the check in the event the drawee refuses payment upon
presentment.' "0
B. Real Estate Transactions
The Supreme Court of North Carolina recently considered the
consequences that ensue when the owner of mortgaged land who is pri-
marily liable for a debt becomes the owner of the indebtedness. In
Waff Brothers, Inc. v. Bank of North Carolina"' the court held that the
absolute rule of merger applies in this situation; thus the debt is
sonally obligated if the instrument names the person represented but does not
show that the representative signed in a representative capacity, or if the in-
strument does not name the person represented but does show that the repre-
sentative signed in a representative capacity.
83. 29 N.C. App. at 57-58, 223 S.E.2d at 522.
84. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-414(2) (1965).
85. 29 N.C. App. 101, 223 S.E.2d 539, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 311, 225 S.E.2d
832 (1976).
86. Id. at 104-05, 223 S.E.2d at 542.
87. 29 N.C. App. 739, 225 S.E.2d 615, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 663, 228 S.E.2d
454 (1976).
88. Id. at 739, 225 S.E.2d at 615.
89. Id. at 740, 225 S.E.2d at 615.
90. Id. at 741, 225 S.E.2d at 616 (quoting Diemar & Kirk Co. v. Smart Styles,
Inc., 261 N.C. 156, 159, 134 S.E.2d 134, 136 (1964)).
91. 289 N.C. 198, 221 S.E.2d 273 (1976).
952 [Vol. 55
COMMERCIAL LAW
deemed discharged and the land is freed from the encumbrance.9 2 The
court pointed out, however, that merger will not apply in two situations:
(1) when the owner of the mortgaged property is not personally liable
for the payment of the mortgage debt, and (2) when the application of
the doctrine would be adverse to the interests of the owner even though
the owner is personally liable, as when taking over the debt would
in effect give priority to junior lienholders.93
In Konopisos v. Phillips,94 the court of appeals held that certain
provisions of the federal Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act95
were not applicable to the assignees of purchasers of property subject
to the Act.90 The provisions held inapplicable to assignees allow pur-
chasers to rescind a sale when required disclosures are not made.17 The
court reasoned that assignees of purchasers were not within the purview
of the Act since the assignee never had any dealings with the seller and
therefore was not the logical beneficiary of the disclosure provisions. 8
In Beasley-Kelso Associates, Inc. v. Tenney,9" the court of appeals
ruled that an "Exclusive Listing Agreement" between the parties
created an exclusive right to sell property that defendant (a real estate
broker) had listed with plaintiff brokerage firm.100 This holding en-
titled plaintiff to the ten percent sales commission specified in the
listing agreement even though defendant's property was sold through
the efforts of another broker.10 Argument by defendant that he could
co-broker' 0 2 the sale of the property at no commission to plaintiff was
rejected. 103
Finally, a portion of G.S. 93A-2(a) 04 that defines a real estate
92. Id. at 206, 221 S.E.2d at 278.
93. Id. at 206-07, 221 S.E.2d at 278-79.
94. 30 N.C. App. 209, 226 S.E.2d 522 (1976).
95. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701, 1703, 1709 (1970).
96. 30 N.C. App. at 213, 226 S.E.2d at 524.
97. 15 U.S.C. § 1703 (1970).
98. 30 N.C. App. at 213, 226 S.E.2d at 524.
99. 30 N.C. App. 708, 228 S.E.2d 620 (1976).
100. Id. at 716, 228 S.E.2d at 625.
101. Id. at 719, 228 S.E.2d at 626.
102. Co-brokering, as the term is used in the real estate business, is "the act of
a listing and selling broker sharing a real estate commission, the listing broker having
obtained the listing and the selling broker having found the prospect." Id. at 714, 228
S.E.2d at 624.
103. Id. at 717, 228 S.E.2d at 625. The court found that it was beyond the realm
of practicality that plaintiff would enter into a contract that required him to co-broker
the property, to incur the usual advertising costs and to list the property with the multi-
ple listing service if he could co-broker the sale of the property at no commission to
himself. Id. at 716-17, 228 S.E.2d at 625.
104. N.C. Gw. STAT. § 93A-2(a) (1975).
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broker was held unconstitutional in North Carolina Real Estate Licensing
Board v. Aikens.10 The portion of the statute that the court found
repugnant to Article I, sections 1 and 19 of the North Carolina Consti-
tution states that "a broker shall also be deemed to include a person,
partnership, association, or corporation who for a fee sells or offers to
sell the name or names of persons, partnerships, associations, or corpo-
rations who have real estate for rental, lease, or sale."'100 Defendant,
who engaged in activities proscribed by the statute,10 7 successfully al-
leged that it was an arbitrary and irrational exercise of the police power
of the state to require him to obtain a real estate broker's license when
the knowledge requisite to pass the broker's examination was irrelevant
to his business activity. 10
8
C. Truth-in-Lending
The North Carolina Court of Appeals had occasion to deal with
the Federal Truth-In-Lending Act 0 9 in two cases: Ken-Lu Enterprises,
Inc. v. Neal 10 and Phil Mechanic Construction Co. v. Gibson.1" In
Ken-Lu, plaintiff-creditor sued to recover possession of goods sold to
defendant under four installment contracts after defendant defaulted
on his monthly payments.' By way of a counterclaim, defendant al-
leged that plaintiff failed to make the required disclosures under the
Act and under Regulation Z11 and requested the statutorily allowed
penalties for these alleged violations. 1 4 After stating that the one-year
federal statute of limitations rather than the ten-year state statute ap-
plied," ' the court ruled that a claim for penalties under the Federal
Truth-In-Lending Act may not be raised as a counterclaim in the
creditor's action for the unpaid balance." 0 Thus, timely as well as un-
timely counterclaims are not allowed.
105. 31 N.C. App. 8, 228 S.E.2d 493 (1976).
106. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-2(a) (1975).
107. Defendant sold, for a modest fee, the addresses of property for rent, a descrip-
tion of the properties and the phone numbers of the lessors. 31 N.C. App. at 11,
228 S.E.2d at 495.
108. Id. at 12, 228 S.E.2d at 496.
109. 15 U.S.C. § 1601-81 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
110. 29 N.C. App. 78, 223 S.E.2d 831, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 308, 225 S.E.2d 829
(1976).
111. 30 N.C. App. 385, 226 S.E.2d 837 (1976).
112. 29 N.C. App. at 78-79, 223 S.E.2d at 831-32.
113. 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1974).
114. 29 N.C. App. at 79, 223 S.E.2d at 832.
115. See this Survey, Civil Procedure: Limitations of Actions, for a discussion of
the statute of limitations issue.
116. 29 N.C. App. at 79, 223 S.E.2d at 832.
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This holding was reiterated by the court in Gibson. The court based
its preclusion of a counterclaim for penalties when the creditor sues
on the debt on a 1974 amendment to the Act that provides that a person
may not claim penalties as an offset to what he owes the creditor "un-
less the amount of the creditor's liability to such person has been de-
termined by judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction .... "I"
Therefore, a person who seeks a penalty for Truth-In-Lending viola-
tions must take the initiative and sue for the penalty within one year
of the violation, rather than assert the penalties as a counterclaim to
the creditor's action. This requirement seems a waste of judicial re-
sources since it will require two lawsuits instead of one for claims that
have arisen out of the same loan transaction. The language of the fed-
eral statute, however, is clear on this point,118 and until it is amended
the courts of this state will be forced to deny a defendant the right to
assert a counterclaim for penalties under the Truth-In-Lending Act.
D. Business Associations
In Blount v. Taft,"19 the North Carolina Court of Appeals inter-
preted G.S. 55-73 (b)12 0 of the North Carolina Business Corporation
Act, which allows shareholder agreements. Enacted in 1955, the
North Carolina statute was the first of its kind, and was passed in res-
ponse to a need for close corporations to conduct their affairs like
partnerships.'-
The court in Blount ruled that a by-law, although agreed to unani-
mously by the shareholders of the close corporation, is not the same as
a shareholder agreement. The by-law in question created an executive
committee, composed of members of the board of directors, which
would have the final say in determining who the corporation em-
ployed. As originally provided in the by-law, all decisions by the ex-
ecutive committee had to be unanimous. Soon thereafter, however,
117. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(h) (Supp. V 1975).
118. Section 1640(h) reads as follows:
A person may not take any action to offset any amount for which a cred-
itor is potentially liable (for penalties) ...against any amount owing to
such creditor by such person, unless the amount of the creditor's liability to
such person has been determined by judgment of a court of competent juris-
diction in an action to which such person was a party.
Id. (emphasis added).
119. 29 N.C. App. 626, 225 S.E.2d 583, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 659, 228 S.E.2d
450 (1976).
120. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73(b) (1975).
121. 29 N.C. App. at 630, 225 S.E.2d at 586.
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the directors, pursuant to another by-law that allowed a majority of the
directors to amend or repeal any of the by-laws of the corporation,
voted to amend the by-law in question to no longer require unanimous
consent of the executive committee before employing someone.122
Plaintiffs asserted that the by-law requiring unanimous consent of the
executive committee was in effect a shareholder agreement that could
not be altered under G.S. 55-73(b) by a mere majority vote of the
directors and sought to have the "shareholder agreement" enforced by
having the by-law doing away with the unanimous consent provision
declared null and void.
1 23
G.S. 55-73(b) allows a shareholder agreement to be incorporated
into the by-laws. Mere unanimous adoption of a by-law, however, does
not turn it into a shareholder agreement. In Blount, there was no evi-
dence to support a finding that the by-law was anything but a by-law.
The court indicated that some evidence, e.g., a written agreement by
the shareholders that subsequently became a by-law, is needed before
a shareholder agreement will be found.
1 24
E. Contracts
1. Limitation of Liability Clause
In The Gas House, Inc. v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph
Co.,125 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that a contract provision
limiting liability for errors or omissions in the Yellow Pages advertise-
ment to the price of placing the ad is not unreasonable or contrary to
public policy. Plaintiff had ordered republication of its advertisement
in defendant's 1975 directory. Defendant accepted the order but acci-
dentally placed the advertisement under the wrong classification. 120
There was a limitation of liability clause' 27 in the advertisement con-
122. Id. at 627-28, 225 S.E.2d at 584-85.
123. Id. at 628, 225 S.E.2d at 585.
124. Id. at 633, 225 S.E.2d at 588.
125. 289 N.C. 175, 221 S.E.2d 499 (1976).
126. Plaintiff's advertisement was supposed to be classified under "Gas-Liquefied
Petroleum-Bottled and Bulk," but it was printed under the classification "Gas-Indus-
trial and Medical Cylinder & Bulk." Id. at 176-77, 221 S.E.2d at 500-01.
127. The clause read as follows:
"The Telephone Company's liability on account of errors in or omissions
of such advertising shall in no event exceed the amount of charges for the ad-
vertising which was omitted or in which the error occurred in the then current
directory issue and such liability shall be discharged by an abatement of the
charges for the particular listing or advertising in which the omission oc-
curred."
Id. at 177, 221 S.E.2d at 501.
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tract that restricted the telephone company's liability for errors or omis-
sions in fulfilling the contract. Plaintiff admitted the existence of the
clause in its confirmation copy of the contract, but denied that it was
part of the contract and further asserted that the limitations in the con-
tract were never called to its attention.' 1-8 Defendant moved for sum-
mary judgment, which the trial court granted. The court of appeals
reversed, however, on the ground that the provision of the contract
limiting the liability of defendant was unreasonable in consequence of a
"real disparity in bargaining power" of the parties and should not be
enforced from a public policy standpoint.12 9
The supreme court reversed, reaffirming the general rule that
"'one who signs a paper writing is under a duty to ascertain its con-
tents' "130 and that such a limitation of liability is not void. Justice Lake,
writing for the majority, rejected plaintiff's public policy arguments and
reasoned that the purpose of the clause was "to protect the telephone
company from the danger of verdicts primarily speculative in amount."'131
The court also pointed out that the omission of the advertisement left
the would-be advertiser in the same position he would have occupied
had he made no contract at all. 1 2  North Carolina joins, therefore, a
number of jurisdictions that have come to similar conclusions when
faced with such a limitation of liability clause.' 33
2. Lessor/Lessee Agreements
In Cities Service Oil Co. v. Pochna3 4 the North Carolina Court
of Appeals concluded that an assignment of rights in the taking of oil
and gas for a period of more than three years fell within the purview
of G.S. 47-18 (a),15 which requires recordation of leases. The assignee
in Pochna failed to record the assignment and the court ruled that plain-
tiff, a later purchaser of the lease, should be granted the lease assignment
128. Id. at 177-78, 221 S.E.2d at 501.
129. Gas House, Inc. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 26 N.C. App. 672, 678,
217 S.E.2d 101, 104 (1975).
130. 289 N.C. at 180, 221 S.E.2d at 503 (quoting Williams v. Williams, 220 N.C.
806, 809-10, 18 S.E.2d 364, 366 (1942)); see Harris v. Bingham, 246 N.C. 77, 79, 97
S.E.2d 453, 454 (1957).
131. 289 N.C. at 184, 221 S.E.2d at 505.
132. Id. at 185, 221 S.E.2d at 505. But see Gore v. Ball, 279 N.C. 192, 182 S.E.2d
389 (1971).
133. See McTighe v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 216 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1954);
Robinson Ins. & Real Estate Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 366 F. Supp. 307 (W.D.
Ark. 1973). But see Allen v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 18 Mich. App. 632, 171 N.W.2d
689 (1969).
134. 30 N.C. App. 360, 226 S.E.2d 884 (1976).
135. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-18(a) (1975); 30 N.C. App. at 364, 226 S.E.2d at 886.
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since he had properly recorded after the purchase. 136  Defendants pre-
sented evidence to the effect that the original assignee's failure to record
the assignment was common practice and custom in the oil and gas
business. The court pointed out, however, that "those who engage in
the practice are prepared to accept its inherent risks" and, despite de-
fendants' arguments that such transactions are common in "explorations
of geological prospects for production," ruled that the transaction should
be considered primarily a conveyance of a real estate interest and
invalid against subsequent record purchasers. 13 7
3. Employment Contracts
In Smith v. Ford Motor Co.' 38 the North Carolina Supreme Court
held that a cause of action exists for wrongful interference with an em-
ployment contract that is terminable at will. The court held that the
exertion of economic pressure upon the employer by an actor is a quali-
fied privilege. The actor will be held liable if it exerted such pressure
with malice and for reasons not reasonably related to protecting its
legitimate business interests, and will have the burden of proving that
it was not acting maliciously.'
3 9
4. Vendor/Purchaser-Option Contracts
The North Carolina Supreme Court's landmark decision, Kidd v.
Early,140 had important ramifications in several areas of North Carolina
law.' 41 In the area of commercial law, Kidd construed an option con-
tract and considered whether such options must be exercised in accord-
ance with their terms.'42 The court held initially that "when an option
136. 30 N.C. App. at 364, 226 S.E.2d at 886.
137. Id.
138. 289 N.C. 71, 221 S.E.2d 282 (1976), noted in 54 N.C.L. Ray. 1284 (1976).
139. 289 N.C. at 94, 221 S.E.2d at 296. The North Carolina Court of Appeals
in Tatum v. Brown, 29 N.C. App. 504, 224 S.E.2d 698 (1976), reaffirmed that when
a contract of employment contains no provision concerning the duration or term of
employment or the means by which it may be terminated, it is terminable at the will
of either party. 29 N.C. App. at 505, 224 S.E.2d at 698. In that case plaintiff, in
response to an advertisement, applied for a permanent position and a "long term
career." Plaintiff relied upon defendant's promise of employment and gave notice to
her present employer, only to find that defendant had revoked his offer.
140. 289 N.C. 343, 222 S.E.2d 392 (1976).
141. See also this Survey: Civil Procedure; Property.
142. The defendants in Kidd gave one of the plaintiffs a 30-day option to purchase
a piece of property with "the privilege of renewal for an additional 30 days upon the
payment of an additional $500.00." Plaintiffs executed an "Offer to Purchase" but de-
fendants rejected the offer because of a reluctance to accept cash terms for tile prop-
erty. The following day plaintiffs attempted to exercise the option whereupon defend-
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to purchase real estate neither specifies the method of payment nor
provides that terms are to be fixed by a later agreement, the law implies
that the purchase price will be paid in cash."' 43  The court went on to
hold that the negotiations between the parties including a later offer
to purchase do not constitute a rejection of the option offer since an
option is a binding contract and since inconclusive attempts to vary the
option do not amount to a rejection. 4 '
The court finally concluded that the option required the optionees
to exercise their rights within thirty days, but that the option did not
require a payment of the purchase price before they could be exer-
cised. One of the factors considered important by the court was a pro-
vision in the option providing "a reasonable, additional time" for a title
examination. The court construed this provision to mean that if plain-
tiffs exercised the option within the prescribed time limits, they would
have a reasonable time for title examination before they would be re-
quired to pay. 4 5
5. Cancellation and Breach
The court of appeals in Gunther v. Parker46 concluded that plain-
tiff had a cause of action in fraud when there was evidence (1) that
defendants had deliberately misrepresented to plaintiff, a home pur-
chaser, the true nature of a plumber's trench dug to probe for a sewer
line and (2) that defendants had omitted the name of that plumbing
company from a list of recommended repairmen. In Griffin v. Cana-
da,147 as in Gunther, the court reiterated North Carolina's test for an
action in fraud.'48 Yet in Griffin the court held that even when the
ants still refused to accept the cash terms in the sale. 289 N.C. at 346-51, 222 S.E.2d
at 395-98. The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and entered
summary judgment for defendants. The court of appeals affirmed as to the denial of
plaintiffs' motion, but reversed as to the granting of summary judgment for defendants.
23 N.C. App. 129, 135, 208 S.E.2d 511, 516 (1974).
143. 289 N.C. at 359, 222 S.E.2d at 404.
144. Id. at 360-61, 222 S.E.2d at 404.
145. Id. at 362, 222 S.E.2d at 405. The North Carolina Court of Appeals also
held in Intermodal Transp. Sys., Inc. v. Hucks Piggyback Serv., Inc., 30 N.C. App.
289, 226 S.E.2d 859 (1976), that a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether a letter
from plaintiff giving defendant the right to purchase equipment at the end of the lease
period was intended to be part of the lease.
146. 29 N.C. App. 264, 224 S.E.2d 239 (1976).
147. 29 N.C. App. 226, 223 S.E.2d 911 (1976).
148. The test was articulated in Austin v. Tire Treads, Inc., 21 N.C. App. 737,
739, 205 S.E.2d 615, 616-17 (1974) as follows:
Actionable misrepresentation consists of (1) a representation of a material
fact, (2) which was false, (3) which was either known to be so by the defend-
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builder knowingly signed a false affidavit stating that he had paid all
material and labor costs for plaintiff's new house, the necessary test was
not met since this action did not harm plaintiff. 149
Also in the area of contractual breach, the court of appeals held
in Mosley v. Perpetual Savings & Loan Association'50 that when plain-
tiff and defendant had a construction loan that contained a provision
that obligated defendant to secure a survey of plaintiff's property, the
primary contract was the loan contract and while defendant had agreed
to order a survey, it had not agreed to procure a survey immediately
after being notified by plaintiff.' 5' The two parties entered into a con-
struction loan contract that required a survey of plaintiffs property by
defendant after the footings had been poured. 5 2 Plaintiff notified de-
fendant when this was done but defendant did not complete the survey
until the house was partially constructed. The survey later revealed that
plaintiffs garage extended onto the lot of an adjoining owner and
plaintiff was forced to tear it down.'53
The court reversed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion
for directed verdict and concluded that "the principal contract between
the parties related to the loan from defendant to plaintiffs" and that the
provision of the loan contract that called for a survey by the defendant
did not necessarily call for an immediate survey after being notified by
plaintiff.154
6. Offer and Acceptance
In Executive Leasing Associates v. Rowland,5 " the court of ap-
peals held that although plaintiff had not signed defendant's written of-
fers to lease plaintiff's heavy equipment, the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment for defendant since (1) the date of ap-
proval could be ascertained from the lease forms,5 and (2) the con-
ant when it was made or which was made recklessly without any knowledge
of its truth, (4) which was intended to induce reliance, and (5) which did in-
duce reasonable reliance, (6) reliance which resulted in injury to plaintiff.
149. The court acknowledged that a possibility of harm existed since a material-
man's lien could have been filed. 29 N.C. App. at 228, 223 S.E.2d at 913.
150. 30 N.C. App. 522, 227 S.E.2d 163 (1976).
151. Id. at 523, 227 S.E.2d at 164.
152. Id. at 522, 227 S.E.2d at 163.
153. Id. at 524, 227 S.E.2d at 164.
154. Id. at 526, 227 S.E.2d at 165.
155. 30 N.C. App. 590, 227 S.E.2d 642 (1976).
156. The court indicated that the entry of the approval date by plaintiff could con-
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duct of plaintiff, use of the equipment, amounted to acceptance of the
lease offers. 15 7  The court reiterated the established principle that ac-
ceptance by conduct over an extended period of time manifests an in-
tent to be bound by the offer's terms. 158
The court of appeals' decision in Mozingo v. NCNB 15 9 dispelled
hopes 6 ' that the North Carolina courts' "odd concept of what terms
are contradictory"'' for the purpose of the parol evidence rule would
die an early death. In Mozingo, plaintiffs, mortgagors whose property
had been sold at defendant mortgagee's foreclosure sale, sued for
breach of contract. They claimed that defendant's foreclosure
breached an oral agreement, collateral to the issuance of $600,000 in
demand notes, that defendant would look only to the proceeds of plain-
tiffs' later sale of the property and that defendant would renew the notes
involved until plaintiffs could sell. Reversing the trial court, the court
of appeals panel held that the alleged oral agreement should have been
admitted. The panel, applying the general rule that parol evidence
may be used to show the method of payment of a note, continued the
North Carolina interpretation of that rule-that payment out of a partic-
ular fund is a particular method of payment.'0 2
In J.F. Wilkerson Contracting Co. v. Rowland'68 the court of ap-
peals decided that when plaintiff contractor delayed work under an oral
contract after defendant failed to make periodic payments or execute
a later written contract with his wife, the oral contract was not separate
and independent from the written contract later executed by defen-
dant." The court concluded that plaintiff rightfully could delay but
not abandon its duties under the contract and thus the contract was not
terminated.10 5
stitute an acceptance by signature although such evidence was not presented at trial.
Id. at 592, 227 S.E.2d at 644-45.
157. Id. at 593, 227 S.E.2d at 645.
158. The court was careful to point out that "[w]hile such conduct may not amount
to an acceptance as a matter of law, it is certainly sufficient to make improvident any
ruling that there has been no acceptance as a matter of law." Id.
159. 31 N.C. App. 157, 229 S.E.2d 57 (1976).
160. See 2 D. STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 256, at 252 n.82 (H. Bran-
dis rev. 1973).
161. Dalzell, Twenty-Five Years of Parol Evidence in North Carolina, 33 N.C.L.
REV. 420, 435 (1955).
162. 31 N.C. App. at 163, 229 S.E.2d at 61-62.
163. 29 N.C. App. 722, 225 S.E.2d 840, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 660, 228 S.E.2d
452 (1976).
164. Id. at 723-24, 225 S.E.2d at 842.
165. Id. at 726, 225 S.E.2d at 842.
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F. Real Estate Finance
In SCM v. Federal Construction Co."O the court of appeals in-
cluded housing authorities within the meaning of former G.S. 44-14's
definition of "municipal corporation,"' 67 but dismissed plaintiff's action
against defendant's surety since plaintiff had already filed another suit
in the county where the housing authority was located. The court held,
however, that plaintiff retained a cause of action against defendant con-
tractor since it was a suit on an account and not a bond; thus, former
G.S. 44-14 was inapplicable.'
16 8
The court of appeals also handed down two decisions involving
planning and consulting services as subjects of liens. In both Wilbur
Smith & Associates v. South Mountain Properties'0 and Bryan v. Pro-
jects, Inc.170 the court held that plaintiff's services in planning and con-
sulting prior to July 1, 1975, were not covered by the lien law in force
at that time. 171 The court concluded that the 1975 amendments
created a new right in professional consultants, 172 but since plaintiff's
services were provided prior to this date the amendments were inappli-
cable.
G. Trade Regulations and Unfair Trade Practices
In State ex rel. Edmisten v. J.C. Penney Co. 7 3 the North Caro-
166. 29 N.C. App. 592, 225 S.E.2d 162 (1976).
167. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-14 was repealed by Law of April 8, 1973, ch. 1194,
§ 6, [1973] N.C. Sess. Laws 314-18. The statute did, however, control in SCM, and
it provided in part: "Only one action or suit may be brought upon such bond, which
said suit or action shall be brought in the county in which the building, road or street
is located, and not elsewhere."
168. 29 N.C. App. at 595, 225 S.E.2d at 164.
169. 29 N.C. App. 447, 224 S.E.2d 692, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 552, 226 S.E.2d
514 (1976).
170. 29 N.C. App. 453, 224 S.E.2d 689, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 550, 226 S.E.2d
509 (1976).
171. The amended N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-7(1) (1976) reads as follows:
"Improve" means to build, effect, alter, repair, or demolish any improve-
ment upon, connected with, or on or beneath the surface of any real property,
or to excavate, clear, grade, fill or landscape any real property, or to construct
driveways and private roadways, or to furnish materials, including trees and
shrubbery, for any of such purposes, or to perform any labor upon such im-
provements, and shall also mean and include any design or other professional
or skilled services furnished by architects, engineers, land surveyors and land-
scape architects registered under Chapter 83, 89 or 89A of the General Sta-
tutes.
172. The General Assembly also amended N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-8 by adding
persons who furnish "professional design or surveying services" to those entitled to a
lien. See Law of July 1, 1975, ch. 715, § 2, [1975] N.C. Session Laws 940-41 (amend-
ing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-8).
173. 30 N.C. App. 368, 227 S.E.2d 141 (1976).
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lina Attorney General brought an action against defendant Penney
alleging that it violated G.S. 75-1.1, the North Carolina fair trade prac-
tices statute, which prohibits "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" in
business transactions by its repeated threatening telephone calls to its
delinquent credit customers. 174  A temporary order was entered re-
straining defendant from making such calls,' 75 but the order was later
dissolved. The court of appeals reversed and held that such practices
are within the scope of G.S. 75-1.1. In holding that the statute should
be interpreted to grant broad relief, the court reasoned that it "should
apply to all unfair and deceptive acts in the conduct of trade or busi-
ness, including practices involved in the collection of debts.'
17 6
The court of appeals in Travenol Laboratories v. Turner177 held
that in an action for preliminary injunction to prevent a former em-
ployee's disclosure of trade secrets, the plaintiff carries the burden of
proving a high risk of disclosure. The court considered several factors
to be important in such a determination, including termination of the
employment, the importance of the employee's job, the type of work
performed by the employee, the kind of information that is to be pro-
tected and the need of the competitor for the information. 178  In
Travenol the court concluded that (1) defendant should be allowed to
work for a competitor since he had no specialized training and was em-
ployed in plaintiff's production area rather than its research facility, and
(2) the employee could be prohibited from disclosing any special pro-
duction process of which he had knowledge.'1
7
In Clyde Rudd & Associates v. Taylor' the court of appeals held
that when secret profits are earned by employees in breach of their
174. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 (1975) provides, in part:
(a) Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful.
(b) The purpose of this section is to declare, and to provide civil legal means
to maintain, ethical standards of dealings between persons engaged in business
and between persons engaged in business and the consuming public within this
State, to the end that good faith and fair dealings between buyers and sellers
at all levels of commerce be had in this State.
175. It was alleged that defendant had not only called the credit customers at home
but at their places of employment as well. At the hearing on the request for a pre-
liminary injunction, plaintiff presented affidavits by customers and their employers and
co-workers concerning the debts and threats to garnish the customers' wages. 30 N.C.
App. at 369, 227 S.E.2d at 142.
176. Id. at 371, 227 S.E.2d at 143.
177. 30 N.C. App. 686, 228 S.E.2d 478 (1976).
178. Id. at 692, 228 S.E.2d at 483.
179. Id. at 693-96, 228 S.E.2d at 484-86.
180. 29 N.C. App. 679, 225 S.E.2d 602, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 659, 228 S.E.2d
451 (1976). See also this Survey, Commercial Law: Contracts.
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fiduciary duty to their employer, these profits are recoverable by the em-
ployer. The court went on to hold that the general rule is that the scope
of a covenant not to compete is no greater than is necessary to secure
protection of the business or good will of the employer.'
8 '
The court of appeals in State Wholesale Supply v. Allen18 2 found
that a monthly two percent charge on the unpaid balance of an open
account for plumbing supplies is interest and is usurious because it ex-
ceeds the one and one-half percent allowable under G.S. 24-11.18- The
court also found that a sales receipt or invoice is not sufficient evidence
of indebtedness within the meaning of G.S. 6-21.2184 to allow a pro-
vision for attorney's fees to be valid; rather, such a provision for attor-
ney's fees must be contained in the note or conditional sales contract.'"8
H. Attorney's Fees by Contract
The court of appeals in Yeargin Construction Co. v. Futren Devel-
opment Corp.'88 disallowed as against public policy a provision in a
construction contract for the recovery of attorney's fees if a court pro-
ceeding were necessary to collect any final payment due and payable.
It acknowledged the strong public policy prohibiting attorney's fees
from being recovered by the successful litigants and emphasized that the
only exceptions are express authorizations by statute.187  The court
held that G.S. 6-21.2,' s which allows the enforceability of obligations
181. The court suggested several factors to be weighed in applying such a rule:
(1) the area of restriction; (2) the area assigned to the employee; (3) the area in
which the employee actually worked; (4) the area in which the employer operated;
(5) the nature of the business; and (6) the nature of the employee's duty and knowledge
of employer's operation. 29 N.C. App. at 684, 225 S.E.2d at 605.
182. 30 N.C. App. 272, 227 S.E.2d 120 (1976).
183. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-11 (1969) reads, in part:
On the extension of credit under an open-end credit or similar plan (in-
cluding revolving credit card plans, and revolving charge accounts, but ex-
cluding any loan made directly by a lender under a check loan, check credit
or other such plan) under which no service charge shall be imposed upon the
consumer or creditor if the account is paid within 25 days from the billing
date, there may be charged and collected interest, finance charges or other fees
at a rate in the aggregate not to exceed one and one-half percent (112%)
per month on the unpaid balance of the previous month.
184. Id. § 6-21.2.
185. 30 N.C. App. at 277, 227 S.E.2d at 124.
186. 29 N.G. App. 731, 225 S.E.2d 623, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 660, 228 S.E.2d
459 (1976).
187. Id. at 734, 225 S.E.2d at 625; cf. EAC Credit Corp. v. Wilson, 281 N.C.
140, 187 S.E.2d 752 (1972) (because there was no such provision in the guaranty con-
tract, the guarantors were found not to be liable for attorney's fees required in the
promissory note).
188. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-21.2 (1969).
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to pay attorney's fees upon any note, conditional sales contract, or other
evidence of indebtedness, did not "clearly and unequivocally" encom-
pass a contract for the construction of condominiums."8 9 In applying
its strict construction the court failed to mention the great variance be-
tween its view and that of other jurisdictions. Many jurisdictions ap-
prove agreements in general types of contract for reimbursement of the




In Walters v. The Sanford Herald, Inc.,' the North Carolina Court
of Appeals applied the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc. 2 to libel actions in North Carolina. In Gertz the
Supreme Court sought to ensure that state libel actions would not in-
fringe on first amendment rights of free speech. Under the rule
announced in that decision, a private citizen can recover damages for
libel only if, as a constitutional prerequisite, he proves fault on the part
of the defendant.3 In Walters, plaintiff sued the newspaper for printing
her name in its "Police Blotter" column and for listing the charge
against her as "public nuisance." Plaintiff was in fact arrested for al-
lowing her dog to cause annoyance to the neighborhood by continuous
barking-a violation of section 5-12 of the City Ordinance entitled
"Nuisance."' The Herald refused to retract its statement. 4  The trial
judge dismissed plaintiff's complaint, ruling that she had not alleged
any fault on the part of defendant and, in addition, that the failure to
retract did not constitute the fault required to sustain a verdict in her
favor.5  The court of appeals upheld the dismissal. Prior North Car-
189. 29 N.C. App. at 734, 225 S.E.2d at 625.
190. See, e.g., Holtz v. Zimmerman, 491 P.2d 1405 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971); Cohen
v. Fair Lawn Dairies, Inc., 86 N.J. Super. 206, 206 A.2d 585 (Super. Ct. App. Div.),
aff'd per curiam, 44 N.J. 450, 210 A.2d 73 (1965).
1. 31 N.C. App. 233, 228 S.E.2d 766 (1976). See this Survey, Torts: Defama-
tion for a discussion of other defamation issues.
2. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
3. Id. at 346-47.
4. 31 N.C. App. at 234, 228 S.E.2d at 766-67.
5. Id. at 236, 228 S.E.2d at 768. The fault requirement goes to the time of publi-
cation.
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olina cases6 had held that a publication charging one with having
committed a crime constitutes libel per se. As a result of the Gertz
requirement that plaintiff prove fault or negligence, such a libel per se
rule is no longer constitutional.7
The North Carolina Court of Appeals upheld a Greensboro
ordinance regulating the use of loudspeakers against a challenge that
the statute violated the first amendment. In State v. Smedberg8 the
court said that the ordinance, which prohibited loudspeakers audible
at more than 150 feet from the speaker, was a reasonable police power
regulation, valid under the holding of Kovacs v. Cooper., In Kovacs
the United States Supreme Court upheld a municipal ordinance that
barred vehicles with amplifiers emitting "loud and raucous noises." 10
In re McMillan" involved two children who were found to be
"neglected children" under G.S. 7A-278(4)12 because their parents
kept them from attending public school. The father, an Indian, stated
that he did so because the children were not taught about Indians and
Indian culture.13 The parents sought to identify this belief in Indian
heritage with religious beliefs protected by the first amendment 4 as
articulated in Wisconsin v. Yoder. 5 In Yoder the United States
Supreme Court held that Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law
was unconstitutional as applied to Amish high school students. The
North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the two cases were not alike,
since the McMillans had made no showing that their childrens' culture
or heritage would be endangered by attending public schools, or that
the children were receiving any alternative educational program,'0 two
factors that were crucial to the holding in Wisconsin v. Yoder."7
B. Commerce Clause
The case of In re Arcadia Dairy Farms" required the North Caro-
6. The court cited Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55
(1938), which contains a discussion of the libel per se rule.
7. 31 N.C. App. at 235-36, 228 S.E.2d at 767.
8. 31 N.C. App. 585, 229 S.E.2d 841 (1976).
9. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
10. Id. at 78.
11. 30 N.C. App. 235, 226 S.E.2d 693 (1976). See also this Survey, Domestic
Relations: Child Neglect.
12. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-278(4) (1969).
13. 30 N.C. App. at 236, 226 S.E.2d at 694.
14. Id. at 238, 226 S.E.2d at 695.
15. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
16. 30 N.C. App. at 238, 226 S.E.2d at 695.
17. 406 U.S. at 235-36.




lina Supreme Court to rule on the validity of an order promulgated by
the North Carolina Milk Commission. The court was forced to rule
that the Commission's order went beyond its statutory authority, since
the order would have violated the commerce clause of the United States
Constitution."0 The Commission's order required milk producers who
purchased powdered milk from outside the State for the purpose of pro-
ducing reconstituted milk to pay to other area milk producers an
amount equal to the difference between the cost of the powdered milk
and the cost of a like amount of "surplus" milk that could have been
purchased from area producers.20  The court recognized that the effect
of such an order would be to erect a barrier to trade among the states,
thereby placing an unacceptable burden on interstate commerce.
21
The court quoted Baldwin v. Seelig,22 a United States Supreme Court
decision involving the New York Milk Control Act, to show that the
Commission's order could not be justified by the avowed purpose of
ensuring an adequate supply of wholesome milk: "'This would be to
eat up the rule [against burdens on interstate commerce] under the
guise of an exception.' ",23 The court then construed the Commission's
statutory authority as not allowing the Commission to issue such an
order, since "[i]f a statute is reasonably susceptible of two construc-
tions, one of which will raise a serious question as to its constitutionality
and the other will avoid such question, it is well settled that the courts
should construe the statute so as to avoid the constitutional question. 24
In another commerce clause case, Washington State Apple Adver-
tising Commission v. Holshouser,2 5 a federal district court struck down
a North Carolina statute2 6 forbidding closed containers of apples to dis-
play any grade other than the applicable USDA grade. Washington's
Apple Commission sued since that state has its own grading system,
and producers there display the state grade on containers shipped into
and through North Carolina. 27 The court ruled that the statute discrim-
inated against interstate commerce, 28 and that its purpose of eliminat-
19. Id. at 461-71, 223 S.E.2d at 326-31.
20. Id. at 465, 223 S.E.2d at 328.
21. Id. at 466-69, 223 S.E.2d at 329-31.
22. 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
23. 289 N.C. at 466, 223 S.E.2d at 329 (quoting 294 U.S. at 523).
24. Id. at 465, 223 S.E.2d at 328.
25. 408 F. Supp. 857 (E.D.N.C.), prob. juris. noted, 97 S. Ct. 54 (No. 76-63
1976).
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-189.1 (1975).
27. 408 F. Supp. at 858-59. The court pointed out that the Washington state
grades are equal to or higher than the applicable United States grades. Id. at 861-62.
28. Id. at 860. The court stated in a footnote to its opinion that even if it had
1977]
968 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55
ing confusion in the marketing of apples was not rationally imple-
mented, since closed containers bearing no grade at all were permitted.2t
C. Fourteenth Amendment
In several cases North Carolina courts were called upon to decide
whether statutes violated the requirements of the equal protection and
due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment.30 In the substantive
due process cases the courts inquired whether the statute in question
was a reasonable means of accomplishing a valid police power goal,81
and in equal protection challenges the courts looked for a reasonable
basis for the distinction between two classes.32
found the act to be non-discriminatory against interstate commerce it nevertheless would
have struck it down because the burden on interstate commerce outweighed the benefits
to the state. Id. at 862 n.9.
29. Id. at 861.
30. The North Carolina Constitution also has an equal protection clause and a
"law of the land" clause. N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 19. The "law of the land" clause is
equivalent to the "due process of law" clause of the United States Constitution. Rice v.
Rigsby, 259 N.C. 506, 518, 131 S.E.2d 469, 477 (1963). Plaintiffs may challenge North
Carolina statutes under either the state or federal constitution or both. Although
the equal protection and due process clauses in the two constitutions are conceptually
identical, changing interpretations of the federal constitution by the federal courts and
of the state constitution by the state courts may mean that the identical state and federal
clauses will acquire differing practical meanings. If a state court invalidates a state
statute as violating the state constitution that decision is not susceptible to reversal by
the federal courts, as would be the case if the state court based its holding on the United
States Constitution.
31. In North Carolina Real Estate Licensing Bd. v. Aikens, 31 N.C. App. 8, 228
S.E.2d 493 (1976) the court invalidated a law requiring a person who sells the names of
potential vendors of real estate to obtain a license from the Real Estate Licensing Board.
The statute was found to be repugnant to the "law of the land" clause of the North
Carolina Constitution, N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 19. In Canady v. North Carolina Wildlife
Resources Comm'n, 30 N.C. App. 247, 226 S.E.2d 678 (1976), the court upheld a law
forbidding the caging of black bears.
32. In Canady v. North Carolina Wildlife Resources Comm'n, 30 N.C. App. 247,
226 S.E.2d 678 (1976), discussed in note 31 supra, the court upheld the exemption from
a statute provided to bona fide zoos operated by governmental units. Id. at 250, 226
S.E.2d at 680. In State v. Terry, 30 N.C. App. 372, 226 S.E.2d 846 (1976), the court
upheld a statute with different limits on the amount of alcoholic beverages allowed to
be carried by vehicles-for-hire and other vehicles.
Two federal court cases dealt with equal protection claims arising in North Caro-
lina. In City of Charlotte v. Local 660 Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 96 S. Ct. 2036 (1976),
the United States Supreme Court upheld Charlotte's policy of allowing check-off-deduc-
tions on city paychecks only when the deduction applied to all employees. The policy
had the effect of preventing check-offs for union dues. In Gordon v. Forsyth County
Hosp. Auth., 409 F. Supp. 708 (M.D.N.C. 1976), the court required that a transfer
of patients eligible to receive free health care at one hospital to another hospital where
the free health care was not available could not be done unless there was a reasonable
basis for deciding which patients to transfer.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1. Sex as a Basis of Discrimination
In the case of Homanich v. Miller38 the court of appeals gave
inadequate treatment to a challenge arising under the equal protec-
tion clause. Defendant in that case opposed the operation of G.S.
3 IA-514 as being a denial of equal protection of the laws. That statute
determines the rights of persons in property held as tenants by the en-
tirety in the event one spouse slays the other. If the wife is the slayer,
one half of the property passes upon the husband's death to his estate,
and the other half is held by the wife for life and passes to the hus-
band's estate upon her death. If the husband is the slayer, he holds
all of the property for his life, and the property passes to the wife's
estate upon his death.3 5  The court stated that the disposition of the
property when the husband was the slayer was necessary to prevent the
deprivation of the husband's vested rights in the property, since "North
Carolina [has] retained the common law incident of tenancy by the en-
tirety that 'the husband has the control and use of the property and is
entitled to the possession, income, and usufruct thereof during their joint
lives.' "36 The court then, without discussion, declared that since
tenancy by the entirety was a voluntary method of acquiring property
there was no discriminatory state action. 7
The court's analysis is insufficient. Clearly, a state statute that
treats men and women differently solely because of sex is discrimina-
tory state action.38 The important question is whether the classification
established by the statute bears a rational relationship to the purposes
of the statute.3 9 The court of appeals did not address this question.
If a court were to examine the statute in the manner prescribed by fed-
eral constitutional decisions, the statute's survival would be doubtful.
In recent cases involving gender-based discrimination the United States
Supreme Court, while not yet expressly declaring sex to be a "suspect
classification," has nevertheless appeared to subject gender-based
classifications to a more rigorous examination than a deferential search
33. 28 N.C. App. 451, 221 S.E.2d 739, cert. denied, 289 N.C. 614, 223 S.E.2d
392 (1976).
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-5 (1976).
35. Id.
36. 28 N.C. App. at 453-54, 221 S.E.2d at 740 (quoting Bryant v. Bryant, 193
N.C. 372, 378, 137 S.E. 188, 191 (1927)).
37. Id. at 455, 221 S.E.2d at 741.
38. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971). The Court struck down a
provision of the Idaho probate code that, under certain circumstances, gave preference to
men in obtaining appointment as administrator of a decedent's estate.
39. Id.
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for a rational relationship. ° When given close judicial attention, the
professed justification for the discrimination in the statute-the main-
tenance of the state's common law theory of tenancy by the entirety-
may not provide a sufficient basis on which to uphold the statute.
2. Compulsory Sterilization
The North Carolina Supreme Court sustained the validity of North
Carolina's compulsory sterilization law41 against a broad range of consti-
tutional challenges in the case of In re Moore.42  The statute estab-
lishes a procedure whereby, upon petition of a director of any state in-
stitution or county director of social services, any mentally ill or retarded
person who, because of a "physical, mental, or nervous disease . . .
which is not likely to materially improve . . . , or because the person
would be likely, unless sterilized, to procreate a child or children . . .
which would have serious physical, mental, or nervous diseases or defi-
ciencies . . ." may be sterilized.4 3
The court first noted that the United States Supreme Court upheld
the right of a state to sterilize retarded or insane persons in Buck v.
Bell.4" In In re Moore, the state court held that the North Carolina
statute met substantive due process requirements. The court acknowl-
edged that it was dealing with an area that was arguably within the
"right of privacy emanating from the Fourteenth Amendment's concept
of personal liberty or encompassed within the penumbra of the Bill of
Rights,'14 rights with which the United States Supreme Court dealt in
Roe v. Wade,46 Griswold v. Connecticut4V and Eisenstadt v. Baird.48
The court quoted Justice Blackmun's opinion in Roe, however, as
acknowledging "'that some state regulation in areas protected by that
right [of privacy] is appropriate.' "40 The court felt that the interests
40. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971). The Court in Frontiero struck down statutes providing that, for the purpose of
obtaining increased military service benefits, the spouse of a male officer was presumed
to be his dependent, while a female officer had to prove that her spouse was in fact
dependent on her. 411 U.S. at 678.
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-36 to -50 (1976).
42. 289 N.C. 95, 221 S.E.2d 307 (1976).
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-43 (1976).
44. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
45. 289 N.C. at 101-02, 221 S.E.2d at 311.
46. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
47. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
48. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).




of the unborn child, the interests of the citizens of the state, 0 and the
interests of the retarded person justified the sterilization law.51 Again
relying on Buck v. Bell as authority, the court held that "sterilization
of mentally ill or retarded persons . . . is a valid and reasonable exer-
cise of the police power . and that these state interests rise to the
level of a compelling state interest." 52
The statute was also challenged on procedural due process
grounds. The court, however, found that the statute provided for suffi-
cient procedural safeguards: service of the petition upon the subject
of his guardian; 53 a hearing if requested; 54 a trial de novo in superior
court upon appeal; 5  the right to a jury trial;56 the right to retained or
appointed counsel; 57 and the right to cross-examine witnesses.58  The
court rejected the claim that the state would have to pay for a medical
expert to testify on behalf of the respondent in a sterilization petition. 9
While noting that G.S. 7A-45410 allows the trial court in its discretion
to pay for such a witness, the court stated that "no constitutional man-
date. . . requires more."61 Respondent also asked that the statute be
invalidated for not providing a proper standard by which a court can
reach a decision on whether to order sterilization. The court, however,
upheld the statute by construing it to require "clear, strong and convinc-
ing" evidence that the sterilization should be ordered.62 Finally,
respondent attacked the statute as being cruel and unusual punishment
forbidden by the eighth amendment. The court held this attack inap-
propriate since the statute is not a criminal penalty.
6
50. The court cited Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), as recognizing state inter-
est in sterilization of defectives. 289 N.C. at 103, 221 S.E.2d at 312-13.
51. Id. at 103-04, 221 S.E.2d at 312-13.
52. Id. at 104, 221 S.E.2d at 313. The court also found that the statute did not
violate the equal protection clause. Some sterilization statutes have been struck down
as violative of equal protection because they applied only to those imprisoned or com-
mitted. Id. at 98, 221 S.E.2d at 309.
53. N.C. GEM. STAT. § 35-41 (1976).
54. Id. § 35-43.
55. Id. § 35-44.
56. Id.
57. Id. § 35-45.
58. Id. § 35-43.
59. 289 N.C. at 100, 221 S.E.2d at 310.
60. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-454 (1969).
61. 289 N.C. at 100, 221 S.E.2d at 310.
62. Id. at 108, 221 S.E.2d at 315.
63. Id. A federal district court also upheld this sterilization statute in North Caro-
lina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F. Supp. 451 (E.D.N.C. 1976).
This court also found the state's interest in preventing the procreation of defective chil-
dren, or children whose retarded parents will be unable to care for them, to be a com-
pelling state interest. Id. at 457-58. The court did, however, invalidate N.C. GEN.
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3. Due Process and North Carolina's Attachment Statute
In a procedural due process case, Northside Properties, Inc. v.
Ko-Ko Mart, Inc.,64 the court of appeals upheld the North Carolina
attachment statute65 against a charge that it did not give adequate pro-
cedural due process protection to debtors. The court looked to a recent
United States Supreme Court decision, North Georgia Finishing, Inc.
v. Di-Chem, Inc. 6 for guidance. In Di-Chem the Supreme Court struck
down Georgia's attachment law, condemning the statute for allowing
attachment without participation by a judicial officer and for not pro-
viding an early post-attachment hearing. 67 The North Carolina Court
of Appeals relied on Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Di-Chem in
which he listed the elements that an attachment statute must have in
order to satisfy procedural due process requirements.68  According to
Justice Powell, those elements include: (1) posting of security by the
garnishor; (2) establishment before a judicial officer of the factual
basis of the need for attachment; (3) an early post-garnishment judicial
hearing, and (4) opportunity for the garnishee to free the property by
posting bond."' The court of appeals concluded that North Carolina's
statute meets Powell's tests and does not contain the deficiencies of the
Georgia statute.70 Specifically, the North Carolina statute requires
posting of bond by the garnishor 71 and the filing of an affidavit before
the judge or clerk of court by the garnishor 72 stating the grounds for
the attachment; 73 also, the statute permits the garnishee to move to dis-
solve the order of attachment. 74 The court of appeals, citing Hutchison
v. Bank of North Carolina,75 noted that the clerk of superior court has
STAT. § 39-4 (1976), which requires the institution of sterilization proceedings if the
next-of-kin of the retarded person requests it. The court felt that giving such power
to the next-of-kin was arbitrary and irrational. 420 F. Supp. at 455-56.
64. 28 N.C. App. 532, 222 S.E.2d 267, cert. denied, 289 N.C. 615, 223 S,E.2d
392 (1976).
65. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-440.1 to .46 (1969).
66. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
67. Id. at 606.
68. 28 N.C. App. at 540, 222 S.E.2d at 272-73.
69. 419 U.S. at 611-12 (Powell, J., concurring).
70. 28 N.C. App. at 540-41, 222 S.E.2d at 273.
71. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-440.10 (1969).
72. Id. § 1-440.11.
73. Id. § 1-440.3.
74. Id. § 1-440.36.
75. 392 F. Supp. 888, 896 (M.D.N.C. 1975). The court in Hutchison also de-
clared the North Carolina attachment statute to be constitutional.
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been held to be a judicial officer, thereby meeting Powell's require-
ment of judicial supervision. 6
4. Due Process and North Carolina's "Outlaw Statute"
The Federal District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina struck down North Carolina's "outlaw statute" 77 as violative
of the fourteenth amendment in Autry v. Mitchell.78  The statute re-
quires that a judge who receives information by affidavit that a person
has committed a felony and is evading arrest declare the person an out-
law. One so declared is subject to arrest by any citizen and may be
shot if he refuses to surrender. 79  The court held that the statute did
not provide procedural due process since there was no requirement that
probable cause be shown or that an indictment be issued. Furthermore,
there was no provision for notice and opportunity to be heard.8" The
statute was also found to violate the equal protection clause because it
was arbitrarily and capriciously applied to some accused felons and not
to many others.8'
D. Eighth Amendment: Mandatory Death Penalty
The United States Supreme Court held in Woodson v. North
Carolina"2 that North Carolina's mandatory death penalty statute"3 is
unconstitutional. The plurality opinion"4 cited three deficiencies in the
statute: (1) the meaning of the eighth amendment's prohibition on
76. 28 N.C. App. at 541, 222 S.E.2d at 273. In another procedural due process
case, Parker v. Stewart, 29 N.C. App. 747, 225 S.E.2d 632 (1976), the court invalidated
a massage parlor ordinance because the statute gave the sheriff power to revoke a
massage parlor's license without giving notice and a hearing to the proprietor. The court
based its holding on the "law of the land" clause of the state constitution, N.C. CoNsT.
art. I, § 19. See note 30 supra.
77. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-48 (1975).
78. 420 F. Supp. 967 (E.D.N.C. 1976).
79. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-48 (1975).
80. 420 F. Supp. at 970.
81. Id. at 970-72.
82. 96 S. Ct. 2978 (1976).
83. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975). After the case of Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), the North Carolina Supreme Court, in State v. Waddell,
282 N.C. 431, 194 S.E.2d 19 (1973), struck down the part of North Carolina's death
penalty statute that gave the jury the option of whether to impose the death penalty.
The North Carolina General Assembly then enacted a new law expressly making the
death penalty mandatory in convictions for first degree murder. N.C. GEN. STAT. §
14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
84. Justice Stewart wrote the opinion for himself and Justices Stevens and Powell.
Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred in the result. Chief Justice Burger and Jus-
tices Rehnquist, White, and Blackmun dissented.
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cruel and unusual punishments is drawn from "the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,"' ' 5 and contempo-
rary standards show a rejection of mandatory death sentences; 0 (2) the
mandatory death penalty deals inadequately with the problem of un-
bridled jury discretion in impositions of the death penalty condemned
in Furman v. Georgia,"7 since juries operating under mandatory death
penalty statutes frequently choose to acquit or convict on the basis of
whether they believe that the accused should be executed; North Caro-
lina's statute provided the jury with no guidelines for making such a
decision;88 and (3) the North Carolina statute fails "to allow the par-
ticularized consideration of relevant aspects of the character and record
of each convicted defendant before the imposition upon him of a sen-
tence of death.
89
In three cases decided on the same day, Gregg v. Georgia,0 Jurek
v. Texas,91 and Proffitt v. Florida,9 2 the Supreme Court upheld the
death penalty statutes of those three states. There are three basic char-
acteristics of the laws that the court found constitutional. First, the
jury93 must consider separately the question of guilt and the question
of sentencing. Secondly, when considering the sentence the jury is re-
quired to consider, under liberalized evidence rules, specific aggravat-
ing or mitigating circumstances and to find beyond a reasonable doubt
the existence of aggravating circumstances. Finally, any imposition of
a death sentence is automatically reviewed by an appellate court, which
must ascertain that the sentence was not imposed because of prejudice
or passion and was not out of line with sentences in similar cases.
4
E. North Carolina Constitution5
1. Criminal Fines and Restitution
In Shore v. Edmisten,96 a case involving the North Carolina
85. 96 S. Ct. at 2990 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality
opinion)).
86. id.
87. 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
88. 96 S. Ct. at 2990-91.
89. Id. at 2991.
90. 96 S. Ct. 2909 (1976).
91. 96 S. Ct. 2950 (1976).
92. 96 S. Ct. 2960 (1976).
93. Under the Florida statute the judge makes the sentencing decision. Proffitt v.
Florida, 96 S. Ct. at 2965.
94. Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. at 2920-22; Jurek v. Texas, 96 S. Ct. at 2954-58;
Proffitt v. Florida, 96 S. Ct. at 2964-67.
95. See also notes 30 & 31 supra.
96. 290 N.C. 628, 227 S.E.2d 553 (1976). This was a declaratory judgment action
brought by the clerk of the Superior Court of Guilford County to determine the owner.
ship of funds held by him in his official capacity. Id. at 629-30, 227 S.E.2d at 556.
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Constitution, the Supreme Court carefully distinguished the criminal
punishments of fine and restitution. Article IX, section 7 requires that
the proceeds from fines go to the public schools of the county.
91
Hence, money from criminal penalties cannot go to any other public
agencies unless the money is in fact restitution to the agency for losses
over and above normal operating costs, inflicted by reason of the
crime.9 ' Furthermore, since the fine is on the constitutional list of
punishments in Article XI, section 1, and restitution is not, the latter
penalty may only be imposed as a condition to a suspended sentence. 99
2. Mandatory Issuing of Liability Insurance
In Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Ingram'00 the North
Carolina Supreme Court invalidated a statute' 011 requiring all issuers of
general liability insurance to offer health care liability insurance. The
statute also required all of these general liability insurers to be mem-
bers of a Health Care Liability Reinsurance Exchange to which mem-
bers could turn over their health care liability insurance contracts.
Members would then share all of the losses or profits resulting there-
from.10 2 The court held that the statute violated the "law of the land"
clause'03 of the North Carolina Constitution because it was unreason-
able for the state to require general liability insurers to offer health care
liability insurance, a business "separate and distinct" from their normal
business.' 04 The court also held that the statute violated the equal pro-
tection clause' 5 of the North Carolina Constitution since it exempted
automobile liability insurers from its requirements without a rational
basis for such a distinction. 10
97. Id. at 632, 227 S.E.2d at 558.
98. Id. at 633-34, 227 S.E.2d at 558-59. For example, in one of the cases involved
in this action a trial judge had given a defendant a suspended sentence on the condition
that he pay the clerk $500 "for the use and benefit of the Vice Squad of the High Point
Police Department for continued enforcement." Id. at 638, 227 S.E.2d at 562. This
condition was invalid since the judge had no authority to order funds to go to the
police unless such funds were in the form of restitution. On the other hand, it was
proper in another case for the judge to suspend a sentence on the condition that defend-
ant repay the police the money that the police had used to purchase illegal drugs from
him, thereby gaining evidence of the crime. Id. at 636-37, 227 S.E.2d at 561.
99. Id. at 631-32, 227 S.E.2d at 557-58.
100. 290 N.C. 457, 226 S.E.2d 498 (1976). See this Survey, Insurance: Authority
of Commissioner To Act After a Hearing.
101. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-173.34 to .51 (Supp. 1975).
102. 290 N.C. at 461-66, 226 S.E.2d at 502-04.
103. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19.
104. 290 N.C. at 467-70, 226 S.E.2d at 505-06.
105. N.C. CONSr. art. I, § 19.
106. 290 N.C. at 470, 226 S.E.2d at 506.
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V. CRIMINAL LAW
A. Offenses Against Property
1. Actual and Constructive "Breaking" in Burglary
A "breaking" is an essential element of burglary.1 In State v.
Wilson,2 the evidence at trial indicated that the occupant of the house
"cracked" the door to see who was there, and defendant forced his way
into the house. Although entry through an open door3 or open window4
does not constitute a breaking, the North Carolina Supreme Court held
that entry by means of force and violence does constitute a breaking."
In its analysis the court distinguished between actual and constructive
breaking (constructive breaking includes gaining entry by means of
threats, fraud or trickery), and concluded that defendant's entry was
both actual and constructive. 6 Although the equation of actual and con-
structive breakings may prove to be an excessive refinement, the court's
conclusion was proper: a breaking certainly occurred.
2. Identification of Premises in Burglary Indictment
In State v. Beaver,' defendant contended that the indictment drawn
against him for burglary was defective because it identified the premises
by occupant rather than by owner. Citing a 1952 Mississippi case, 8
the North Carolina Supreme Court held: "[O]ccupation or possession
of a dwelling or sleeping apartment is tantamount to ownership. There
is no requirement that actual ownership of the occupied premises be
alleged and proved."9  This holding, according to the court, is con-
sistent with the purpose of stating ownership of the premises in a
burglary indictment: to show that the house was not defendant's and
to identify the offense to protect defendant from double jeopardy. 10
1. The crime of burglary entails five essential elements: (1) a breaking, (2) an
entry, (3) of a dwelling house, (4) at night and (5) with the intent to commit a felony.
State v. Alexander, 18 N.C. App. 460, 197 S.E.2d 272, cert. denied, 283 N.C. 666, 198
S.E.2d 721 and 284 N.C. 255, 200 S.E.2d 655 (1973).
2. 289 N.C. 531, 223 S.E.2d 311 (1976).
3. State v. Madden, 212 N.C. 56, 192 S.E. 859 (1937).
4. State v. Chambers, 218 N.C. 442, 11 S.E.2d 280 (1940).
5. 289 N.C. at 539, 223 S.E.2d at 316.
6. Id. at 539-40, 223 S.E.2d at 316.
7. 291 N.C. 137, 229 S.E.2d 179 (1976).
8. Taylor v. State, 214 Miss. 263, 266, 58 So. 2d 664, 665 (1952).
9. 291 N.C. at 141-42, 229 S.E.2d at 182.
10. Id. at 141, 229 S.E.2d at 181-82.
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3. Felonious Intent: Possession of a Stolen Vehicle
Defendant in State v. Abrams" was convicted of the felony of
possessing a vehicle knowing it to be stolen.12  The purpose of the stat-
ute, as stated by the North Carolina Court of Appeals, "'is to discourage
the possession of stolen vehicles by one who knows it is stolen or has
reason to believe it is stolen.' "13 In upholding defendant's conviction,
the appeals court sought to further this purpose by holdin'g that the
statute does not require felonious intent as an element of the offense.' 4
This decision should have the effect of limiting inquiries into an ac-
cused's knowledge, thus simplifying this area of law and easing the
State's burden of proof by the elimination of the issue of motive.
4. Safecracking
Defendant in State v. Thomas'5 removed valuables from a safe
after he opened the safe by dialing the last digit of the combination.
(The owner of the safe kept the combination partially dialed for con-
venience.) The trial court convicted defendant of safecracking 16 and
felonious larceny. The safecracking conviction was vacated on appeal.
In overturning the lower court, the court of appeals strictly construed
the safecracking statute and held that violation must be evidenced by
the use of "explosives, drills, or tools."" To reach this decision, the
court utilized the dictionary definition of "pick"'I and ordinary rules
of grammatical and statutory construction; furthermore, the court
pointed out that the severe penalty attendant to conviction (formerly
a maximum of life imprisonment, now thirty years), "strongly sug-
11. 29 N.C. App. 144, 223 S.E.2d 516 (1976).
12. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-106 (1975) states: "Any person who . . . has in his
possession any vehicle which he knows or has reason to believe has been stolen or un-
lawfully taken. . . is guilty of a felony."
13. 29 N.C. App. at 146, 223 S.E.2d at 518 (quoting State v. Rook, 26 N.C. App.
33, 35, 215 S.E.2d 159, 161, appeal dismissed, 288 N.C. 250, 217 S.E.2d 674 (1975)).
14. Id. The court rejected defendant's claim that "dishonest purposes" are an
element of the crime. Id. at 145, 223 S.E.2d at 517.
15. 31 N.C. App. 52, 228 S.E.2d 468 (1976).
16. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-89.1 (Cum. Supp. 1975) provides:
Any person who shall, by the use of explosives, drills, or tools, unlawfully
force open or attempt to force open or "pick" the combination of a safe or
vault used for storing money or other valuables, shall, upon conviction thereof,
receive a sentence, in the discretion of the trial judge, of not less than two years
nor more than 30 years' imprisonment in the State penitentiary.
17. 31 N.C. App. at 55, 228 S.E.2d at 470.
18. The court cited the definition in Webster's Third New International Dictionary:
"to turn (a lock) with a wire or a pointed tool instead of the key esp. with intent to
steal." Id. (emphasis added by the court).
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gests" that the General Assembly did not intend the statute to apply
to one who opens a safe merely by turning a dial.' " Although this
omission may well have been an oversight, it can be corrected by
amendment, and the court of appeals properly declined to read any
omitted language into the statute.
B. Driving Offenses
1. Notice of License Suspension
In State v. Atwood"0 defendant appealed a conviction of driving
with a suspended license.2' The Division of Motor Vehicles had sent
a notice of suspension to defendant, but it was returned undelivered
because she had moved to a new address. The North Carolina Supreme
Court reversed the conviction, holding that there must be actual or
constructive knowledge of the suspension in order to be convicted of
driving while one's license is suspended. 22  Although mailing of a notice
raises a prima facie presumption that defendant had knowledge of the
suspension, defendant may rebut this presumption. 3 Here, both the
State's and defendant's evidence rebutted the presumption, and, conse-
quently, the court held that nonsuit should have, been granted.
24
In a concurring opinion, Justice Exum departed from the specifics
of the case and set forth a rule by which courts can handle a mistake
of fact defense under G.S. 20-28(a). He stated that such a defense is
usually raised by defendant, but when, as in the instant case, the
State's own evidence shows that defendant acted under a mistake of
fact, nonsuit is proper.25 If, however, mistake of fact is shown only
by defendant's evidence, the issue should go to the jury, which will
19. Id. Chief Judge Brock dissented from the court's decision on the safecracking
conviction. He contended that the statute's purpose is to protect the property in the
safe, not to protect the safe from damage. Thus, he would have construed "pick" to
include opening a safe without the use of "explosives, drills, or tools." Id. at 57, 228
S.E.2d at 471 (Brock, C.J., dissenting).
20. 290 N.C. 266, 225 S.E.2d 543 (1976).
21. This offense is defined in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-28(a) (Supp. 1975).
22. 290 N.C. at 271, 225 S.E.2d at 545.
23. Id. at 271, 225 S.E.2d at 54546.
24. Id. at 272-73, 225 S.E.2d at 546. The court distinguished State v. Teasley,
9 N.C. App. 477, 176 S.E.2d 838, cert. denied, 277 N.C. 459, 177 S.E.2d 900 (1970)
(mailing notice in compliance with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 2048 (Supp. 1975) constituted
constructive notice of suspension of license) on the ground that defendant in Teasley of-
fered no evidence to rebut the presumption that he had received notice. 290 N.C. at 273,
225 S.E.2d at 546.
25. 290 N.C. at 276, 225 S.E.2d at 548 (Exun, J., concurring).
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decide whether defendant's evidence rebuts the presumption raised by
mailing a notice.
26
Following State v. Atwood, the court of appeals in State v.
Chester l held that in a prosecution for violation of G.S. 20-28 (a),
when the presumption of notice is raised: (1) the trial court need not
charge on guilty knowledge when there is no evidence that defendant
did not receive the mailed notice; (2) the trial court must instruct
the jury that guilty knowledge by defendant is necessary to convict
when some evidence indicates that defendant did not receive notice;
and (3) nonsuit should be granted when all evidence tends to prove
that defendant had no notice of suspension or revocation of his license.
28
Defendant in Chester presented evidence that he did not receive the
mailed notice because he had moved out of state. Utilizing the above
principles, the court of appeals reversed his conviction because the trial
court "did not charge the jury that it could find the defendant guilty
"929only if he knew of the license suspension ....
State v. Teasley,30 a 1970 decision by the court of appeals, con-
tained dictum to the effect that nothing in G.S. 20-28(a) implies
that knowledge or intent is a necessary part of the crime of driving
with a suspended license; the court held that defendant had received
constructive notice of suspension through mailing." Confusion en-
gendered by the Teasley dictum should be at least partially removed
by Atwood and Chester. The court of appeals' ruling in Chester,
requiring guilty knowledge as a requisite element of the crime, may
have the effect of overruling the earlier appeals court decision in
Teasley. Hence, constructive notice may no longer be sufficient to
sustain a conviction under the statute.
2. Determining the Period of Suspension for the Habitual Offender
State v. Freedle32 required the court of appeals to interpret seem-
ingly conflicting statutes. Defendant was declared an habitual offender 3
26. Id.
27. 30 N.C. App. 224, 226 S.E.2d 524 (1976).
28. Id. at 227-28, 226 S.E.2d at 526-27.
29. Id. at 228, 226 S.E.2d at 527.
30. 9 N.C. App. 477, 176 S.E.2d 838, cert. denied, 277 N.C. 459, 177 S.E.2d 900
(1970).
31. Id. at 486, 176 S.E.2d at 844.
32. 30 N.C. App. 118, 226 S.E.2d 184, appeal dismissed, 290 N.C. 779, 229 S.E.2d
34 (1976).
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-221 (Supp. 1975) defines "habitual offender."
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and was prohibited from operating a motor vehicle on state roads for
five years pursuant to G.S. 20-227. 34  G.S. 20-19(e),35 enacted twelve
years earlier, provides that the Division of Motor Vehicles may issue
a new license three years after a revocation that results from repeated
convictions for driving under the influence of liquor. Furthermore,
G.S. 20-23186 provides that laws pertaining to motor vehicles shall
not be construed so as to preclude the regulation of licensing by any
state division, agency or department.
On the basis of the latter two statutes, defendant contended on
appeal that the trial court's judgment wrongfully abrogated the Division
of Motor Vehicles' authority to reissue his license in three years. The
court of appeals disagreed with this contention and held that the appli-
cation of G.S. 20-227 does not abrogate the Division's authority.17  In
addition, the court held that the five-year period under the habitual of-
fender provisions of G.S. 20-227 prevails over the three-year period pro-
vided in G.S. 20-19(e).38 Resolution of this statutory conflict in favor
of the habitual offender provision of G.S. 20-227 prevents the diminution
of the penalties that can be imposed upon drivers adjudged to be habitual
violators of the motor vehicle laws.
3. Reckless Driving as a Lesser Included Offense in Driving Under
the Influence
Defendant in State v. Patel9 appealed his conviction for driving
under the influence,40 asserting that the trial court erred in not instruc-
ting the jury with respect to reckless driving, a lesser included offense.41
The court of appeals upheld the conviction because there was no "evi-
dence tending to show that defendant's consumption of intoxicating
liquor directly and visibly affected his operation of his motor vehicle
"42 Under this construction, the pertinent section of the reckless
34. Id. § 20-227 .(1975).
35. Id. § 20-19(e) (Supp. 1975).
36. Id. § 20-231 (1975).
37. 30 N.C. App. at 119-20, 226 S.E.2d at 185.
38. Id. at 119, 226 S.E.2d at 185.
39. 29 N.C. App. 35, 222 S.E.2d 741 (1976).
40. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-138 (1975) defines this offense.
41. 29 N.C. App. at 36, 222 S.E.2d at 742. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-140(c) (1975)
provides:
Any person who operates a motor vehicle upon a highway or public ve-
hicular area after consuming such quantity of intoxicating liquor as directly
and visibly affects his operation of said vehicle shall be guilty of reckless driv-
ing and such offense shall be a lesser included offense of driving under the
influence of intoxicating liquor as defined in G.S. 20-138 as amended.
42. 29 N.C. App. at 37, 222 S.E.2d at 743. The arresting officer witnessed the
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driving statute43 is limited to instances in which there is evidence that
defendant's driving was visibly affected by the consumption of liquor.
4. Manslaughter-Death By Vehicle
In a case of first impression the North Carolina Court of Appeals
decided that death by vehicle could be a lesser included offense under
a charge of manslaughter." Defendant in State v. Freeman45 was in-
dicted for manslaughter after the car he was driving was involved in an
accident that resulted in a death. 46  Defendant was convicted of death
by vehicle and driving on the wrong side of the .highway.47 On appeal
defendant contended that the trial court erred in failing to grant his
motion for arrest of judgment as to the offense of death by vehicle be-
cause that offense and the offense of involuntary manslaughter were
mutually exclusive; consequently, death by vehicle could not be a lesser
included offense of manslaughter.48
The general rule in North Carolina is that a defendant may be con-
victed of a lesser included offense when the offense charged in the in-
dictment contains all the elements of the lesser charge, all of which can
be proved by proof of the allegations in the indictment.49 The court
concluded that death by vehicle was a lesser included offense of man-
slaughter, since manslaughter included all the essential elements of death
by vehicle. 50 The court felt that the legislature had been cognizant of
accident, in which fault was not attributable to defendant; defendant did, however, appear
to be under the influence of liquor.
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-140(c) (1975).
44. State v. Freeman, 31 N.C. App. 93, 228 S.E.2d 516 (1976).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 94, 228 S.E.2d at 217.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 95-96, 228 S.E.2d at 518. Defendant argued that the trial judge's in-
struction on death by vehicle as a lesser included offense of manslaughter violated N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 20-141.4(c) (1975), which states, "no person who has been placed in
jeopardy upon a charge of manslaughter shall subsequently be prosecuted for death by
vehicle arising out of the same death." The court rejected this argument because it
found the purpose of the statute to be to prevent the state from bringing a new prose-
cution for death by vehicle after the conviction or acquittal of a person for manslaugh-
ter, rather than to prevent the court from treating one offense as a lesser included
offense of the other. 31 N.C. App. at 96, 228 S.E.2d at 518.
49. 31 N.C. App. at 96, 228 S.E.2d at 518; accord, State v. Riera, 276 N.C. 361,
368, 172 S.E.2d 535, 540 (1970); see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-170 (1975).
50. 31 N.C. App. at 97, 228 S.E.2d at 519. Death by vehicle is defined by statute
as follows:
Whoever shall unintentionally cause the death of another person while en-
gaged in the violation of any State law or local ordinance applying to the oper-
ation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic shall be guilty of
death by vehicle when such violation is the proximate cause of said death.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-141.4 (1975).
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the problems of proving criminal negligence necessary for a manslaughter
prosecution and intended for death by vehicle to be a lesser degree of
manslaughter wherein criminal responsibility did not depend upon the
presence of culpable or criminal negligence.r 1
C. Forgery
In State v. Williams,52 defendant signed his brother's name to a
check drawn on the brother's account; the forgery occurred in the pres-
ence of the store owner who cashed the check. The store owner knew
defendant, and realizing that defendant had signed his brother's name,
requested defendant to endorse the check in his own name. The store
owner never presented the check for payment, and defendant was later
convicted offorgery.
As defined in G.S. 14-119," forgery is the falsification of a paper
with intent to defraud. On appeal, defendant contended that there was
no evidence of fraud because the store owner knew that defendant had
signed the wrong name on the check. The North Carolina Supreme
Court upheld the conviction, noting, "An intent to defraud is an es-
sential element of forgery."54  Then, citing an 1891 case"5 in which a
forged paper defrauded the partner of the person on whom the paper
was drawn, the court stated, "However, it is not essential that any per-
son be actually defrauded or that any act be done other than the fraud-
ulent making or altering of the instrument."' 6 By so holding, the court
extended this principle from a situation in which fraud actually occurred
to the facts of the instant case, in which the store owner was not de-
frauded.
D. Aiding and Abetting
The North Carolina Supreme Court announced in State v. Scott57
that presence at the scene of a crime coupled with friendship with the
perpetrator is not enough to convict for aiding and abetting murder
51. 31 N.C. App. at 97, 228 S.E.2d at 519. Criminal negligence is "an inten-
tional, willful or wanton violation of a statute or ordinance, designed for the protection
of human life or limb, which proximately results in injury or death." State v. Massey,
271 N.C. 555, 557-58, 157 S.E.2d 150, 153 (1967).
52. 291 N.C. 442, 230 S.E.2d 515 (1976).
53. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-119 (1969).
54. 291 N.C. at 447, 230 S.E.2d at 518.
55. State v. Hall, 108 N.C. 776, 13 S.E. 189 (1891).
56. 291 N.C. at 447, 230 S.E.2d at 518.
57. 289 N.C. 712, 224 S.E.2d 185 (1976).
982 [Vol. 55
CRIMINAL LAW
when the defendant's presence can only be inferred.5 8 In Scott there was
no direct evidence of defendant's presence at the scene and therefore any
conclusion that defendant was present had to be inferred from circum-
stantial evidence. 9 The court in Scott acknowledged the principle artic-
ulated in 1973 in State v. Rankin0 to be that presence at the scene of
the crime may be regarded as aiding and abetting when a bystander is
a friend of the perpetrator and he knows that his presence will be viewed
by the perpetrator as protection and encouragement.,' The Scott court
distinguished Rankin because the defendant's presence at the scene in
that case was delineated by direct evidence, while the defendant's pres-
ence in Scott had to be inferred from evidence that defendant had been
seen near the scene with the perpetrator shortly before and after the
crime." To be convicted of aiding and abetting the bystander must
have knowledge that his presence will be regarded as an encouragement
by the perpetrator;63 such knowledge cannot reasonably be inferred when
there is no direct evidence of defendant's presence at the crime scene
itself.64 The court stated that knowledge by the defendant that his pres-
ence will be regarded as an encouragement may be inferred when the
scene of the crime and defendant's presence there are described by direct
evidence as they were in Rankin. 5
E. Conspiracy
The North Carolina Court of Appeals held in State v. Grier"6 that
a defendant may be liable as a principal for the commission of all crimes
contemplated in a conspiracy even if he is not present at the time the
crime is committed.67 State v. Wiggins68 held in 1972 that a conspir-
ator, if not present at the scene so as to make him an aider and abettor,
cannot be held liable as a principal to a substantive crime committed
by a co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy; but, according to











Id. at 721, 224 S.E.2d at 190-91.
Id.
284 N.C. 219, 200 S.E.2d 182 (1973).
Id. at 223, 200 S.E.2d at 185.
289 N.C. at 721, 224 S.E.2d at 190-91.
Id.; accord, State v. Banks, 242 N.C. 304, 87 S.E.2d 558 (1955); State v. Ham,
94, 98, 76 S.E.2d 346, 348-49 (1953).
289 N.C. at 721, 224 S.E.2d at 190-91.
Id.
30 N.C. App. 281, 227 S.E.2d 126, cert. denied, 291 N.C. 177, 229 S.E.2d 691
(1976).
67. Id. at 288-89, 227 S.E.2d at 130-31.
68. 16 N.C. App. 527, 192 S.E.2d 680 (1972).
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fore the fact.69 As a result of conflict between 1975 decisions of the
North Carolina Supreme Court 7°-after which the Grier decision was
patterned-and the Wiggins decision, the appeals court expressly over-
ruled Wiggins.7
F. Double Jeopardy
In State v. McKenzie 2 the North Carolina Court of Appeals held
that even though a defendant was acquitted of driving under the in-
fluence in violation of G.S. 20-138(a) 73 the trial court in a later man-
slaughter trial may nevertheless instruct the jury that a violation of G.S.
20-138(a) could be a basis for finding defendant's guilt when there is
evidence that defendant was violating G.S. 20-138(a) at the time in
question.7 4  Defendant was charged in district court with operating a
vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of
G.S. 20-138(a), but was found guilty only of operating a vehicle with
a blood alcohol content of .10% in violation of G.S. 20-138(b). 7  De-
fendant was later convicted in superior court of involuntary man-
slaughter.
7 6
Defendant alleged that the trial court erred in instructing the jury
that a violation of G.S. 20-138(a) could be the basis for finding de-
fendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter since he had been acquitted
of the charge of driving while under the influence in an earlier trial.77
The court of appeals rejected this argument and concluded that the
earlier acquittal of the offense of driving under the influence did not
69. Id. See also Note, Criminal Conspiracy in North Carolina, 39 N.C.L. REV.
422, 451-56 (1962).
70. State v. Bindyke, 288 N.C. 608, 618, 220 S.E.2d 521, 528 (1975); State v.
Carey, 288 N.C. 254, 273-75, 218 S.E.2d 387, 399-400 (1975).
71. 30 N.C. App. at 289, 227 S.E.2d at 131.
72. 29 N.C. App. 524, 225 S.E.2d 151 (1976).
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-138(a) (1975). Section 20-138 contains two sub-
stantive offenses. Subsection (a) defines the offense of driving under the influence
of intoxicating liquor. "The three elements of this offense are: (1) driving a vehicle,
(2) upon a highway within the state, (3) while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor." State v. Kellum, 273 N.C. 348, 349, 160 S.E.2d 76, 77 (1968). Subsection
(b) defines the offense of driving with a blood alcohol content of .10% or more. An
offense under subsection (b) is specifically stated to "be treated as a lesser included
offense of the offense of driving under the influence;" and a violator of subsection (b)
is eligible for consideration for limited driving privileges pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 20-179(b) (Supp. 1975). Id. § 20-138(b) (1975).
74. 29 N.C. App. at 528, 225 S.E.2d at 153-54.
75. Id. at 525, 225 S.E.2d at 152.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 528, 225 S.E.2d at 153-54.
984 [Vol. 55
1977] CRIMINAL LAW 985
preclude the prosecution for manslaughter arising out of the same oc-
currence.78  In a dissenting opinion Judge Clark agreed that the acquittal
did not preclude defendant's prosecution on the charge of involuntary
manslaughter arising out of the same event, but Clark felt that to allow
the violation of G.S. 20-138 (a) as the basis for the conviction of de-
fendant of involuntary manslaughter violated the "principle underlying
double jeopardy, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. ' ' 79
G. Motive
In State v. Davis, 0 the North Carolina Supreme Court held there
was no duty to instruct on motive in a second degree rape case.8' The
only real issue in the Davis case was whether the victim had consented
to an act of sexual intercourse, since defendant had admitted the act. 2
The court said that the trial judge correctly rejected defendant's request
for an instruction stating, in substance, that the jury might consider de-
fendant's lack of motive. The court stated that motive is not an element
of a crime, 3 but that in some cases motive may be of great value in
determining guilt or innocence of the accused.8 4 The instruction was
viewed as inappropriate in the Davis situation because the act was ad-
mitted and the only question was consent.88
H. Self Defense
The North Carolina Court of Appeals, in State v. Browning,88 held
78. Id. The court cited State v. Mundy, 243 N.C. 149, 90 S.E.2d 312 (1955), in
which the court held that a nonsuit on charges of reckless driving and speeding will not
preclude prosecution for a third charge of homicide, and State v. Midgett, 214 N.C.
107, 198 S.E. 613 (1938), in which the court held that an acquittal of reckless driving
will not bar a subsequent prosecution for manslaughter based on the same occurrence
since (1) the two offenses differ in grade and kind, (2) one of the offenses is not a
lesser degree of the other, and (3) the prosecutions for each crime are in separate tri-
bunals.
79. 29 N.C. App. at 529, 225 S.E.2d at 154 (Clark, J., dissenting). Judge Clark
cited State v. Heitter, 57 Del. 595, 203 A.2d 69 (1964). Clark's opinion seems more
reasonable and just than the majority opinion. The majority clearly subjected defendant
to double jeopardy on the issue of driving under the influence. It seems logical that
defendant could be convicted of manslaughter based upon a violation of some other
statute, but a conviction based upon a violation of a statute from which defendant had
previously been acquitted seems illogical.
80. 291 N.C. 1, 229 S.E.2d 285 (1976).
81. Id. at 14, 229 S.E.2d at 294.
82. Id.
83. Id. The court cited State v. Burno, 200 N.C. 267, 156 S.E. 781 (1931).
84. 291 N.C. at 14, 229 S.E.2d at 294; see, e.g., State v. Lawrence, 196 N.C. 562,
146 S.E. 395 (1929); State v. Wilcox, 132 N.C. 1120, 44 S.E. 625 (1903).
85. 291 N.C. at 14, 229 S.E.2d at 294.
86. 28 N.C. App. 376, 221 S.E.2d 375 (1976).
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that a person need not retreat when he is assaulted within the curtilage
of his home, even if the assailant is another lawful occupant of the
premises. 87 Defendant was charged with the murder of his brother and
there was evidence that the killing occurred in the yard of their mother's
home. Both men were living with their mother at that time.88  De-
fendant was convicted of murder and on appeal he assigned as error the
refusal of the trial judge to instruct that he had no obligation to retreat
or leave his own home in the face of an assault by his brother.80 A per-
son attacked within his own home or within the curtilage thereof has
no duty to retreat as a prerequisite to his claim that his fighting and
killing were in self defense if such action was necessary to repel and
overcome the attacker, regardless of the character of the assault. 0 The
court in Browning was faced with the question of whether a defendant
was entitled to an instruction in accordance with the above rule when
the assailant shared the home with defendant and had an equal right to
be there." The court noted that North Carolina's supreme court had
not yet decided this question and that other jurisdictions were not in
agreement.9 2 The court concluded that the principle applied should be
the same whether the assailant was an intruder or another lawful occu-
pant of the premises. 3
The court of appeals in State v. Neagle94 determined that a de-
fendant in a second degree murder prosecution, who admitted he was in-
87. Id. at 380, 221 S.E.2d at 378.
88. Id. at 377, 221 S.E.2d at 376.
89. Id. at 378, 221 S.E.2d at 377.
90. State v. Benge, 272 N.C. 261, 158 S.E.2d 70 (1967); State v. Johnson, 261
N.C. 727, 729, 136 S.E.2d 84, 86 (1964). Ordinarily, a person faced with a nonfelonious
assault must retreat if possible before he can justify killing his adversary in self-defense.
State v. Ellerbe, 223 N.C. 770, 28 S.E.2d 519 (1944).
In State v. Woodson, 31 N.C. App. 400, 229 S.E.2d 254 (1976), the court of
appeals held that a defendant who was standing on his porch when he fired a shot and
who was charged with assault with a deadly weapon was entitled to an instruction on
the law as it related to his right to defend himself in his home. See State v. Frizzelle,
243 N.C. 49, 89 S.E.2d 725 (1955); State v. Poplin, 238 N.C. 728, 78 S.E.2d 777
(1953).
91. 28 N.C. App. at 379, 221 S.E.2d at 377.
92. Id.; see Annot., 26 A.L.R.3d 1296 (1969).
93. 28 N.C. App. at 379, 221 S.E.2d at 377. The court cited State v. Absher, 220
N.C. 126, 16 S.E.2d 656 (1941), as consistent with but not directly supportive of its
decision. Defendant's evidence in Absher tended to show that he was living with his
wife's parents with their permission. After a family dispute defendant was ordered
to leave by his mother-in-law. Defendant was assaulted by his two brothers-in-law
before he could leave and he killed one. The court held that the evidence required
"the ordinary instructions with regard to the right of self-defense in case of assault where
a person has a right to be." 220 N.C. at 131, 16 S.E.2d at 659.
94. 29 N.C. App. 308, 224 S.E.2d 274, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 665, 228 S.E.2d
456 (1976).
CRIMINAL LAW
toxicated at the time of the occurrence, had no right to an instruction
on self defense." Defendant testified that an eyewitness had told him
after the incident that he hit his victim with a hatchet because his victim
was going to swing a bottle at defendant. 6 The eyewitness had told the
investigating officer the same story, but at trial she repudiated that state-
ment, stating that it resulted from intimidation by defendant." The
court of appeals found no error in the trial court's refusal to instruct on
self defense when defendant was too intoxicated to have any recollection
of the homicide, since such a defendant is incapable of fearing death or
bodily harm."
I. Narcotics
In State v. Dietz,9 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that
marijuana is a controlled substance by statute'00 and that it is not neces-
sary in a prosecution for violation of the Controlled Substances Act' 0 '
for the State to show that the North Carolina Drug Authority had ever
made a finding that marijuana was in fact a controlled substance. 0 2
Defendant Dietz had argued that statutory language allowing the North
Carolina Drug Authority to determine what substances come under the
Act'0 3 requires a finding by the Authority before any substance is con-
sidered a controlled substance under the Act.'04 The court rejected this
argument and concluded that all drugs specifically listed are controlled
substances and that no finding by the Authority to that effect is required
for convictions for illegal handling of these substances.' 05
95. Id. at 311-12, 224 S.E.2d at 275-76.
96. Id. at 309, 224 S.E.2d at 275.
97. Id. at 311, 224 S.E.2d at 276.
98. Id. at 311-12, 224 S.E.2d at 275-76. See State v. Absher, 226 N.C. 656, 40
S.E.2d 26 (1946).
99. 289 N.C. 488, 223 S.E.2d 357 (1976).
100. Id. at 497-98, 223 S.E.2d at 363. The court relied on N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-94
(1975), which lists Schedule VI controlled substances: marijuana and tetrahydrocanna-
binols.
101. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-86 to -113.8 (1975).
102. 289 N.C. at 497-98, 223 S.E.2d at 363.
103. Defendant relied on the following language in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-94 (1975):
In determining that such substance comes within this schedule, the North Caro-
lina Drug Authority shall find: no currently accepted medical use in the
United States, or a relatively low potential for abuse in terms of risk to
public health and potential to produce psychic or physiological dependence
liability based upon present medical knowledge, or a need for further and con-
tinuing study to develop scientific evidence of its pharmacological effects.
104. 289 N.C. at 498, 223 S.E.2d at 363.
105. Id. The court felt that the language in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-94 relied upon
by defendant, see note 103 supra, "applies only to drugs the Authority may wish to add,
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The court of appeals had an opportunity to interpret an aspect of
the Controlled Substances Act in State v. Austin, 100 and held that a
drug store owner not licensed as a pharmacist who had sold drugs
exactly like those called for in prescriptions was guilty of violating the
Act.10 7  Defendant store owner argued that he should only be guilty
of a violation of G.S. 90-71, which makes it unlawful for any person
not licensed as a pharmacist to sell any drug upon prescription of
a physician or otherwise. 0 8 The court said that even if defendant may
be guilty of violating G.S. 90-71, such a violation does not preclude
a conviction under G.S. 90-95(a)(1), which makes it a crime to
sell or deliver a controlled substance except as authorized by the Con-
trolled Substances Act.100 Consequently, after Austin it is clear that
a sale of a drug under circumstances that cause the sale to be unlawful
under G.S. 90-71 is also a violation of the Controlled Substances Act
when the drug involved is one governed by that Act.110
J. Acessory after the Fact
In State v. Martin"l ' the court of appeals held that defendant's con-
viction as an accessory after the fact to voluntary manslaughter should
not be arrested when the principal felon was convicted only of involun-
tary manslaughter.'12 The court reasoned that the substantive crime
charged was the offense of being an accessory after the fact to a
felony;"13 since both voluntary and involuntary manslaughter are felo-
nies,' 14 even if defendant were an accessory after the fact to involuntary
manslaughter he would still be guilty of the substantive offense of
being an accessory after the fact to a felony.1 5
delete, or reschedule." The court relied on an interpretation of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-88
for its conclusion. 289 N.C. at 498, 223 S.E.2d at 363.
106. 31 N.C. App. 20, 228 S.E.2d 507 (1976).
107. Id. at 24, 228 S.E.2d at 510-11.
108. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-71 (1975).
109. 31 N.C. App. at 24-25, 228 S.E.2d at 510-11. The court stated that there is
no authority in the Controlled Substances Act for a sale that is clearly unlawful under
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-71.
110. 31 N.C. App. at 24-25, 228 S.E.2d at 510-11.
111. 30 N.C. App. 166, 226 S.E.2d 682 (1976).
112. Id. at 171, 226 S.E.2d at 685.
113. See State v. McIntosh, 260 N.C. 749, 133 S.E.2d 652 (1963).
114. See State v. Swinney, 271 N.C. 130, 133, 155 S.E.2d 545, 547 (1967).




A. Requirement of Assistance for Indigent Defendants
In State v. Tatum' the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that
the appointment at state expense of an expert to assist an indigent de-
fendant's attorney lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge,
and should be made only when necessary to ensure the fundamental
fairness of the trial.2 In so deciding North Carolina has taken a
position in conformity with the approach of most other courts that have
faced this issue.'
The indigent defendant in Tatum faced charges of kidnapping,
armed robbery and first degree murder; at trial he was represented by
court-appointed counsel. Defendant's attorney requested that the
court order the State to pay a private investigator to determine the
availability of witnesses to the events of the night of the alleged crimes.
Upon a denial of the request defendant was tried, found guilty and
sentenced." On appeal to the supreme court, he claimed that denial
of his pretrial motion was a violation of due process. 5
In United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi6 an indigent defendant, who
had tried to establish an insanity defense, claimed that he was denied
the benefit of adequate counsel when the trial court refused to order
the State to provide him with the assistance of a psychiatrist for his de-
fense. The United States Supreme Court refused to "say that the State
has that duty by constitutional mandate";7 therefore, the Court held
that denial of expert assistance to an indigent defendant is not consti-
tutional error. Baldi has never been overruled and remains law today;
nevertheless, the combined effect of the holdings in Powell v. Ala-
bama,8 Griffin v. Illinois,9 and Gideon v. Wainwright' 0-that due pro-
1. 291 N.C. 73, 229 S.E.2d 562 (1976).
2. Id. at 82, 229 S.E.2d at 567-68.
3. E.g., State v. Taylor, 202 Kan. 202, 447 P.2d 806 (1968).
4. 291 N.C. at 77, 229 S.E.2d at 565.
5. Defendant also claimed the right to appointment of expert assistance on equal
protection grounds, since the counties of the state serviced by a public defender's office
provide state resources for expert assistance when they are required to establish indi-
gents' defenses. The court answered that even in those counties aid was not available
to an individual defendant as a matter of right, but rather that its award was within
the discretion of the public defender. Id. at 83-84, 229 S.E.2d at 568-69.
6. 344 U.S. 561 (1953).
7. Id. at 568.
8. 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (assistance of counsel for a criminal defendant is funda-
mental to a fair trial).
9. 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (access to effective justice may not be denied merely be-
cause of a criminal defendant's lack of funds).
10. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (state must provide counsel to an indigent criminal de-
fendant).
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cess requires the state to provide an indigent with the assistance of
counsel for his defense and that equal protection requires that the as-
sistance provided be adequate to ensure an effective defense-has nec-
essarily modified the no duty rule.
The courts that have attempted to harmonize and apply these
seemingly conflicting rules in the context of requests for expert assistance
may be categorized into three groups. Some courts have held that the
appointment is not constitutionally required unless there is a showing
that refusal would amount to a denial of fundamental fairness." Other
courts have stated that the judge is constitutionally required to make
the appointment when a reasonable necessity to ensure fundamental
fairness is shown. 2 A third group of courts leaves the appointment,
upon a showing of need, to the discretion of the trial judge, but adds
that denial would be an abuse of discretion when such a denial would
be fundamentally unfair.13  All jurisdictions are not so easily catego-
rized; it may well be that positions differ more in approach and em-
phasis than in substance. Nevertheless, it is clear that it is consti-
tutional error, in any jurisdiction, to deny appointment of expert as-
sistance when fundamental fairness would thereby be abridged.
A North Carolina statute gives the trial judge power, in his dis-
cretion, to order appointment of state-paid expert assistance for an indi-
gent defendant. 14  Nevertheless, the Tatum court independently ana-
lyzed the issue without regard to the relevant statutory provision.' 5 It
found that the appointment of state-paid expert assistance was not con-
stitutionally required, apparently aligning North Carolina with those
courts that place the matter within the discretion of the trial judge:
We conclude that our statutes and the better reasoned deci-
sions place the question of whether an expert should be appointed
at State expense to assist an indigent defendant within the sound
discretion of the trial judge. We adopt that rule. . . . [S]uch
11. E.g., Watson v. Patterson, 358 F.2d 297 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 876
(1966).
12. E.g., Hintz v. Beto, 379 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1967).
13. E.g., Collins v. State, 14 Md. App. 674, 288 A.2d 221, cert. denied, 409 U.S.
882 (1972).
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-454 (1969).
15. 291 N.C. at 80-84, 229 S.E.2d at 566-69. Earlier in the year the supreme court
dealt with a similar issue in In re Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 221 S.E.2d 307 (1976). There
an indigent defendant in a statutory sterilization proceeding was denied an order requir-
ing the state to pay an expert's fee. All that was held to be constitutionally required
is that the judge have the power in his discretion to approve such payments, Id. at 100,
221 S.E.2d at 310.
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appointment should be made with caution and only upon a clear
showing that specific evidence is reasonably available and neces-
sary to a proper defense.' 6
Defendant in Tatum had not shown any such need and therefore, ac-
cording to the court, the judge had not abused his discretion.' 7  The
court, however, recognized the possibility that denial of appointment
could, in some cases, amount to a denial of fundamental fairness.
18
After Tatum an indigent defendant in North Carolina will have
to address any request for state-paid expert assistance for his defense
to the discretion of the trial judge. It is clear that such a defendant
is not entitled to such an appointment as a matter of right; he must
be prepared to show a specific need for the assistance. The trial
judge's discretion, however, is limited by a constitutional standard: that
which is needed to ensure fundamental fairness. Considering that the
North Carolina Supreme Court has cautioned against making appoint-
ment on less than a showing of necessity for a proper defense, the lat-
itude of the judge's discretion is in fact very narrow.
B. Rights of Juveniles
In 1976 the North Carolina Court of Appeals took a major step
toward extending more complete due process protection to juveniles
accused of crime. Juvenile proceedings differ significantly from other
criminal trials in that there is no jury, and the district judge not only
rules on the admissibility of evidence, but also evaluates its weight and
credibility.' 9 In In re Chavis, ° the court of appeals held that a defend-
dant's admission of the allegations in a juvenile petition is equivalent
to a guilty plea in a criminal case, and' that a juvenile making an ad-
mission must be accorded the full constitutional protections required
by the United States Supreme Court in Boykin v. Alabama2' and ap-
plied by the North Carolina courts in State v. Ford22 and State v.
Harris.2 1 Thus, a juvenile's admission must now be made knowingly
16. 291 N.C. at 82, 229 S.E.2d at 567-68.
17. Id. at 83, 229 S.E.2d at 568.
18. Id. at 80-81, 229 S.E.2d at 566-67.
19. See In re Simmons, 24 N.C. App. 28, 210 S.E.2d 84 (1974).
20. 31 N.C. App. 579, 230 S.E.2d 198 (1976).
21. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
22. 281 N.C. 62, 187 S.E.2d 741 (1972).
23. 10 N.C. App. 553, 180 S.E.2d 29 (1971).
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and voluntarily, and this fact must appear affirmatively on the face of
the juvenile hearing record or the defendant will be allowed to re-
plead.2 The trial judge should question the juvenile prior to pleading
in order to determine whether the admission is voluntary and
knowing,25 and should make certain that the juvenile is aware of the
nature and consequences of his plea.
26
Chavis was a consolidation of the appeals of three juveniles who
had been adjudged delinquent on the basis of admissions they had
made at their respective hearings. In all three cases the record of the
hearing failed affirmatively to disclose that the admissions had been
made knowingly and voluntarily; accordingly, all three defendants were
allowed to replead on remand. 27 In two of the appeals, the State main-
tained that.the evidence was sufficient to support the adjudications of
delinquency even without the defendants' admissions. It was further
contended by the State that even though there was no summary of the
evidence, since the proceedings were not recorded, there was a pre-
sumption of sufficient evidence to support the judicial findings of fact.28
The court of appeals conceded that this was the rule in civil cases, but
expressly declined to extend it to juvenile proceedings, recalling its own
observation in In re Meyers:20 "'The fact that the present proceeding is
not an ordinary criminal prosecution but is a juvenile proceeding under
G.S. Chap. 7A, Article 23, does not lessen but should actually increase
the burden upon the State to see that the child's rights were protected.' "30
Moreover, the court reaffirmed its earlier holdings that the Miranda
rights are applicable to interrogations of juveniles by refusing to admit
an officer's testimony concerning one of the juvenile's extra-judicial
admissions; this ruling was made since the record did not show that
the juvenile was given the Miranda warnings and the trial judge had
made no finding as to the voluntariness of the statements.
3 1
C. Miranda Rights-Sufficiency of Waiver
In State v. Swift32 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that
24. 31 N.C. App. at 581, 230 S.E.2d at 200.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 581, 230 S.E.2d at 200; see State v. Ford, 281 N.C. 62, 68, 187 S.E.2d
741, 745 (1972).
27. 31 N.C. App. at 581, 230 S.E.2d at 200.
28. Id.
29. 25 N.C. App. 555, 214 S.E.2d 268 (1975).
30. 31 N.C. App. at 581, 230 S.E.2d at 200 (quoting In re Meyers, 25 N.C. App.
555, 558, 214 S.E.2d 268, 270 (1975)).
31. 31 N.C. App. at 582, 230 S.E.2d at 200.
32. 290 N.C. 383, 226 S.E.2d 652 (1976).
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the absence of an express oral relinquishment by a criminal suspect
of his constitutional right to remain silent did not preclude a finding
of effective waiver of the right, and that.such waiver could be inferred
from the circumstances of the interrogation. 3  Although the standard
for a valid waiver of the right to silence has never been stated with
certainty by the North Carolina Supreme Court, Swift does appear to
relax both the prosecutor's burden of proving and police responsibilities
in procuring such a waiver. Moreover, the Swift holding represents
a clear departure from the "heavy burden" of proof placed by the
original Miranda decision 4 upon the government to establish that
waiver was knowing and intelligent.
The United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona35 re-
quired not only that an accused be given a statement of his fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination, but also that there be "real
understanding and [an] intelligent exercise of the privilege" 6 before
interrogation. Although the Court did not delineate precisely the
minimum requirements of a sufficient waiver, it emphasized that "a
valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the
accused"3' and, additionally, implied that the accused's affirmatively
stated assent was a prerequisite to interrogation. 8 The Supreme Court
has yet to specify a standard of sufficiency for the government's proof
of waiver under the Miranda "heavy burden" requirement, but subse-
quent lower court cases, before presuming a waiver of the right to
silence, have generally sought some positive statement by the defend-
ant demonstrating his consent to being interrogated.3 9
Before Swift, the North Carolina Supreme Court's most recent
pronouncement concerning waiver of the right to silence was made in
33. Id. at 398, 226 S.E.2d at 664.
34. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
35. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
36. Id. at 469.
37. Id. at 475.
38. "An express statement that the individual is willing to make a statement and
does not want an attorney followed closely by a statement could constitute a waiver."
Id.
39. See United States v. Montos, 421 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1970), in which the court
said:
At trial the prosecution must show that the defendant was given the Miranda
warnings before custodial interrogation began, that he had the opportunity to
exercise the rights to which he was so advised throughout the interrogation, and
that he knowingly, intelligently waived these rights and agreed to answer ques-
tions or make a statement.
Id. at 222 (emphasis added). See also United States v. Johnson, 455 F.2d 311, 313 (5th
Cir. 1972). But see United States v. McNeil, 433 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Petty-
john v. United States, 419 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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December, 1975, in State v. Patterson,4 ° in which it was held that a
defendant's refusal to sign a written waiver form did not preclude a
finding of a valid oral waiver. In that case, defendant had previously
invoked his right to remain silent by refusing to be interrogated; two
days later, after receiving a second proper statement of his Miranda
warnings, defendant said that he understood them and told the officers
that he was ready to talk. Under those circumstances, the court found
that defendant had knowingly and intelligently waived his fifth amend-
ment privilege even though he had refused to sign a written waiver.41
The court noted that G.S. 7A-457 (c)" 2 expressly permits oral waivers,
and therefore concluded, "Refusal to sign a written waiver is a fact
which may tend to show that no waiver occurred. It is not conclusive
in the face of other evidence tending to show waiver. '48  Thus, al-
though Patterson endorsed a "totality of the circumstances" approach,
it also implicitly acknowledged the necessity of some express statement
by the defendant of his willingness to waive his right to silence.
Swift is significant in its recognition that such an express statement
is not a prerequisite to finding a valid waiver. Defendant in Swift, ap-
pealing a first degree murder conviction, argued that the trial court
erred in finding that he intelligently and voluntarily waived his right
to remain silent. Defendant conceded that he had received a proper
Miranda warning and that he had affirmatively waived his right to
counsel, but contended that he never expressly waived his right to
silence. To support this claim, he pointed to the trial court's finding
of fact "that in response to the specific question, 'Did he desire to
answer the question?' the defendant did not make a specific answer
to that question but he continued to state that he did not know anything
about the charge against him. '4 4 The court ruled that this lack of an
affirmative response was not dispositive, but that "in order to determine
whether defendant waived his right to remain silent, it is also necessary
to look at the other circumstances.""'  The court then found that de-
fendant's acknowledgement that he understood his Miranda rights,
along with his express waiver of counsel, represented "a specific indi-
cation that he was willing to answer the questions of the officers and
40. 288 N.C. 553, 220 S.E.2d 600 (1975).
41. Id. at 566, 220 S.E.2d at 610.
42. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-457(c) (Cum. Supp. 1975). The statute applies only
to waiver of the right to counsel.
43. 288 N.C. at 565, 220 S.E.2d at 609.




be interrogated, ' 40 and also found it notable that "he did nothing to
indicate that he did not want to talk to them. 47  Since the necessity
of a specific statement of defendant's willingness to answer questions
has never been overtly recognized as a pre-condition to valid waiver,
at least by the North Carolina courts, Swift may not appear to represent
a radical departure from past cases at first glance. Its definitive aban-
donment of the "express statement" requirement, however, clarifies the
extent to which the original stringency of the Miranda mandates has.
been eroded. The theoretically "heavy burden" on the prosecution to
demonstrate validity of a waiver has now become a presumption of
validity as long as the warnings were properly given and the suspect has
admitted his understanding.
After the Swift decision, courts may be less probing in their
search for evidence of a knowing waiver of the right to silence. Once
the suspect, however, has said that he does not want to talk, the Miranda
rule still applies to require termination of the interrogation.48 In State
v. Toms4" defendant told the sheriff that he did not want to talk, yet
the sheriff did not even pause, but continued his interrogation until a
confession was obtained some thirty to forty minutes later. The North
Carolina Court of Appeals held that such procedure did violate defend-
ant's right to silence and constituted prejudicial error so as to require
a new trial.5" In its opinion the court indicated that the result might
have been different had there been some delay between defendant's
initial refusal to talk and a subsequent interrogation that bore fruit.5'
The court cited the recent United States Supreme Court decision of
Michigan v. Mosley" to the effect that once the suspect has indicated
a desire to remain silent, the current interrogation must end, but may
be resumed at some future point. Thus, when read together, the Swift
and Toms decisions could be interpreted as holding that once the police
have given the warnings in a proper manner and the accused has some-
how demonstrated his understanding of them, the police have fulfilled
their responsibility and need not evaluate the situation further unless
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. "Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the in-
dividual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he
wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 473-74 (1966).
49. 28 N.C. App. 394, 221 S.E.2d 94 (1976).
50. Id. at 397, 221 S.E.2d at 96.
51. Id. at 396, 221 S.E.2d at 96.
52. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
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the accused indicates a desire that the interrogation end, whereupon
the questioning must cease at least for a while.
In State v. Biggs53 the North Carolina Supreme Court declined
to reduce the prosecution's burden of proving a waiver of the right to
counsel, and reaffirmed its earlier decisions that a waiver of this right
will not be presumed, but must be expressly stated. 4 In Biggs the
evidence regarding waiver was conflicting; the sheriff testified that de-
fendant received a detailed explanation of his Miranda rights, including
his right to have a lawyer present during questioning, but defendant
testified that he was never informed of that right. The trial court ad-
mitted defendant's inculpatory statements upon finding that he had
knowingly waived his right to remain silent.:5 The supreme court
found this ruling inadequate, noting that in North Carolina
when a defendant challenges the admissibility of an in-custody con-
fession, the trial judge must conduct a voir-dire hearing to deter-
mine whether the confession was voluntarily made and whether the
requirements of the Miranda decision have been met....
... [W]hen the voir-dire evidence is conflicting and contra-
dictory, it is incumbent upon the trial judge to weigh the credibil-
ity of the witnesses, resolve the crucial conflicts, and make
appropriate findings of fact.56
Since in this case the trial' court's findings of fact did not include an
express finding that defendant had knowingly and intelligently waived
his right to counsel, the supreme court held that the admission of defend-
ant's incriminating statements was prejudicial error and required that
he be given a new trial. 7
In explaining what the State must show in order to establish a
knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel, the North Carolina court
cited its 1971 decision in State v. Blackmon' s as the standard to be ap-
plied: a waiver of the right to counsel must be deliberate and specific;
a mere failure to request an attorney, even after being advised of the
right to one, is insufficient to constitute waiver. Since Blackmon, the
court has consistently followed this stringent standard in cases involving
53. 289 N.C. 522, 223 S.E.2d 371 (1976).
54. Id. at 530, 223 S.E.2d at 377; see, e.g., State v. Blackmon, 280 N.C. 42, 185
S.E.2d 123 (1971). See also cases cited note 59 inira.
55. 289 N.C. at 529, 223 S.E.2d at 375.
56. Id. at 529-30, 223 S.E.2d at 376.
57. Id. at 530, 223 S.E.2d at 377.
58. 280 N.C. 42, 185 S.E.2d 123 (1971).
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waiver of the right to counsel. 50 Indeed, in State v. White,"' the North
Carolina Supreme Court refused to find a valid waiver in a fact situation
that was closely analogous to that in Michigan v. Mosley,"' in which
the United States Supreme Court held that an effective waiver could
be inferred. Defendant in White had been interrogated twice, and
gave an affirmative, specific waiver of his right to counsel during the
first interrogation. In a second interrogation conducted a few hours
later, defendant was read his rights again and stated that he understood
them; however, he did not make an affirmative waiver of counsel this
time. Even in these circumstances, the North Carolina court would not
presume a waiver from defendant's failure to request counsel during
the second interrogation.
62
The court's reiteration of this rigid standard for waiver of counsel
in the Biggs case, when considered with its development of a more
lenient test regarding waiver of silence in Swift, makes Miranda waivers
a somewhat uncertain area of North Carolina law. Although on first
sight these cases appear to establish different requirements for the two
types of waiver, it is difficult to perceive any justification in precedent
or policy for such divergent standards, and the court has not yet sug-
gested that this approach has become a consciously established principle.
The uncertainty generated by these cases was reflected by a decision
by the North Carolina Court of Appeals filed in December, 1976. In
State v. Rives,"3 the court of appeals offered a brief review of post-
Miranda cases concerning the issue of waiver, contrasting the North
Carolina decisions in Blackmon and its progeny with recent federal
cases that seem to facilitate the prosecutor's task in demonstrating a
knowing and intelligent waiver."4 Concluding that the past North
Carolina cases have "adopted a more stringent standard than the feder-
59. See State v. Carter, 289 N.C. 35, 44, 220 S.E.2d 313, 319 (1975), modified,
96 S. Ct. 3212 (1976); State v. Patterson, 288 N.C. 553, 220 S.E.2d 600 (1975), modi-
fied, 96 S. Ct. 3211 (1976); State v. White, 288 N.C. 44, 215 S.E.2d 557 (1975); State
v. Lawson, 285 N.C. 320, 204 S.E.2d 843 (1974); State v. Thacker, 281 N.C. 447, 189
S.E.2d 145 (1972); State v. Turner, 281 N.C. 118, 187 S.E.2d 750 (1972).
60. 288 N.C. 44, 215 S.E.2d 557 (1975).
61. 423 U.S. 96 (1975). In Mosely, the second interrogation concerned a differ-
ent crime from the one discussed in the earlier interrogation.
62. 288 N.C. at 52, 215 S.E.2d at 562.
63. 31 N.C. App. 682, 230 S.E.2d 583 (1976).
64. In addition to Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), the court referred to
Blackmon v. Blackledge, 541 F.2d 1070 (4th Cir. 1976) and United States v. Frazier,
476 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 31 N.C. App. at 684-85, 230 S.E.2d at 585. Frazier
held that absent other mitigating circumstances, the prosecution could satisfy its "heavy
burden" in establishing a legitimate waiver by proof that the warnings were properly
given and the suspect was capable of understanding them. 476 F.2d at 896.
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al courts have, ' 65 the court asked whether the Swift decision might
have in fact changed that trend. The court observed:
[T]he logic of Swift leads to the conclusion that the State is not
required to show that a defendant expressly waived each Miranda
right with an affirmative statement. Once there has been a show-
ing that the Miranda warnings were properly given and understood
by the defendant, Swift seems to hold that a waiver may be in-
ferred from the statements and conduct of the defendant and other
relevant circumstances.
66
This suggestion that Swift signals a complete incorporation of the "to-
tality of circumstances" test and a complete abandonment of requiring
an affirmative statement as a prerequisite to waiver may be premature.
Nowhere in Swift did the supreme court expressly indicate the adoption
of a new standard; moreover, the Biggs case appears to imply that an
affirmative waiver of counsel is still required. The rationale of Swift,
however, seemingly could be applied to waiver of counsel cases, and
it may well be that the supreme court is re-evaluating its entire approach
to the waiver problem. As for now, the uncertainty remains to be re-
solved by future cases.
D. Unconsummated Plea Bargains as Evidence
In State v. Harrill67 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that it
was not error for a trial judge to exclude evidence of an unconsum-
mated plea bargain. 68 During defendant's trial for first degree murder,
his attorney attempted to present to the jury the fact that defendant
had tendered a plea of guilty to second degree murder and that the
plea offer was rejected by the prosecutor. Defendant claimed that he
wanted his belief about his guilt of the lesser offense placed before
the jury. Since the judge charged the jury on second degree murder,
defendant argued that anything from which guilt of second degree
murder could be inferred could properly be presented as argument.60
The judge found defendant's argument improper and excluded it;7° de-
65. 31 N.C. App. at 685, 230 S.E.2d at 584.
66. Id. at 686, 230 S.E.2d at 585. The court's analysis is clearly dictum. In Rives
the trial court found in voir dire that defendant was properly advised of his rights and
had waived his rights to counsel and silence. Since the court of appeals did not find
the trial court's findings of fact to lack substantial support, it was bound by them, and
on this basis found that even the Blackmon test for waiver was satisfied. Id.
67. 289 N.C. 186, 221 S.E.2d 325, vacated on other grounds mem., 96 S. Ct. 3212
(1976).
68. Id. at 195, 221 S.E.2d at 331.
69. Defendant Appellants Brief at 16-17.
70. 289 N.C. at 194, 221 S.E.2d at 330.
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fendant then appealed this ruling after being found guilty of the greater
offense.
The Harrill decision, affirming the trial court, is in conformity with
the majority of jurisdictions as well as the North Carolina statute
dealing with the use of plea bargains as evidence.7' Originally, Amer-
ican common law allowed offers of guilty pleas to be introduced into
evidence against the defendant;72 later, only when the offer could be
considered indicative of guilt was it admissible.73 With the practice
of plea bargaining formally sanctioned by the United States Supreme
Court in Santobello v. New York74 the basis for arguing that a plea
offer is indicative of guilt was eliminated. The ABA Standards75
codify the modem approach:
Unless the defendant subsequently enters a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere which is not withdrawn, the fact that the defendant or
his counsel and the prosecuting attorney engaged in plea discus-
sions or made a plea agreement should not be received into evi-
dence against or in favor of the defendant in any criminal or civil
action or administrative proceedings.
76
The reason usually given for excluding unconsummated plea bargains
is the wish to protect the defendant. 77  In Harrill it was defendant who
sought to introduce the offer. The court did not address the question
of whether there is a different policy in this type of case and therefore
if a different rule ought to apply.78
71. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1025 (1975), quoted in note 76 inlra. The wording
of the statute is similar to AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STAND-
ARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILT! § 3.4, at 77
(Tentative Draft 1967) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS], quoted in text accom-
panying note 76 in!ra.
72. See, e.g., Christian v. United States, 8 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1925) (offers to
compromise criminal charges are against public policy as compounding the crime).
73. E.g., Kirby v. Alcoholic Control Appeals Bd., 17 Cal. App. 3d 255, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 514 (1974). The purpose was to protect defendant by eliminating nonprobative
evidence.
74. 404 U.S. 257 (1971). The importance of preserving the integrity of the plea
bargain was stressed.
75. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 71.
76. Id. § 3.4, at 77. The language North Carolina adopted for its statutory pro-
vision is similar: "The fact that the defendant or his counsel and the solicitor engaged
in plea discussions or made a plea arrangement may not be received in evidence against
or in favor of the defendant in any criminal or civil action or administrative proceed-
ings." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1025 (1975).
77. See, e.g., Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927) (allowing a with-
drawn guilty plea to be entered against defendant would eliminate the right of with-
drawal).
78. The only reason given by the ABA STANDARDS for applying the rule of ex-
clusion both ways is that neither defendant nor the prosecutor should be penalized for
engaging in plea bargaining. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 71, at 78. In Hineman v.
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In North Carolina, in addition to a statutory enactment similar to
the ABA Standards, 79 there is a general rule in civil cases that offers
of compromise as implied admissions of guilt are to be excluded. 0 The
supreme court in Harrill held that since the trend and the weight of
the reasoning tend to exclude unconsummated plea bargains, the trial
judge in this case did not err by doing so.81 Therefore, after Harrill,
an unconsummated plea bargain in North Carolina has no place in any
proceedings before the court and is rightfully excluded from evidence82
and the record.8
E. Physical Restraints at Trial
The question presented to the North Carolina Supreme Court in
State v. Tolley, 4 one of first impression,"5 was whether a defendant's
State, 154 Ind. App. 293, 292 N.E.2d 618 (1973), another court applied the exclusion
to a defendant. In that case defendant was trying to show his veracity through his re-
fusal to plead guilty to a lesser charge that would have kept him out of prison. The
Indiana Court of Appeals based its holding on the ABA STANDARDS without providing
elaboration or reasoning. 154 Ind. App. at -, 292 N.E.2d at 623.
Santobello did not overturn the indicative of guilt rule; it only removed the basis
for believing that a legitimate plea bargaining attempt was so indicative. When it is
the defendant who wishes to introduce the offer into evidence and it has some probative
value it is questionable whether it should be excluded. So far such exclusion has not
been done on the basis of sound reasoning. It is doubtful that a prosecutor will refuse
to engage in plea bargaining because some defendants might consider it to their ad-
vantage to place the unconsummated plea bargain before the jury. Also the reasoning of
Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927), would not apply. See note 77 supra.
79. See note 71 supra.
80. See 2 D. STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE (H. Brandis rev. 1973) § 180,
at 56. The court in Harrill distinguished the old North Carolina case of State v.
DeBerry, 92 N.C. 800 (1885). 289 N.C. at 195, 221 S.E.2d at 331. In DeBerry de-
fendant's offer was admitted into evidence as a confession, because defendant dealt with
the complaining witness and not with the State; therefore, it could not be considered
a legitimate plea bargain attempt. The offer in DeBerry, however, could be considered
indicative of guilt and its admission also justified on those grounds; that is, the offering
to "take 39 lashes" rather than face charges of "stealing money" in 1885 is indicative
of guilt while offering to plead guilty to second degree murder when charged with first
degree murder in 1976 is not.
81. 289 N.C. at 194-95, 221 S.E.2d at 331.
82. The court in Harrill noted that the plea bargain that defendant's attorney tried
to place before the jury was not properly before the trial court, having never been intro-
duced into evidence. 289 N.C. at 194, 221 S.E.2d at 330.
83. Later in the year the North Carolina Supreme Court, in State v. Slade, 291
N.C. 275, 229 S.E.2d 921 (1976), held that it is not error for an unconsummated plea
bargain to be excluded from the record on appeal. Defendant in Slade did not try to
introduce it at trial but wanted it before the reviewing court. The court in Slade cited
Harrill and rested its decision on the sanctity of the plea bargain, the need to protect
the defendant, the lack of need for its inclusion and the lack of prejudice in omitting
it. Id. at 278-79, 229 S.E.2d at 923-24.
84. 290 N.C. 349, 226 S.E.2d 353 (1976).
85. Id. at 363, 226 S.E.2d at 365.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
being shackled in front of the jury prejudices the presumption of in-
nocence that is necessary to the fundamental fairness of the trial.
Symbols of innocence are necessary, the Tolley court held, when a de-
fendant appears in court.8 6 This requires, as a general rule, that a de-
fendant not be shackled. 7  Additionally, the court based this right on
the defendant's need of ease of thought and communication with
counsel, the insurance of the dignity of the trial and the elimination of
any possible jury prejudice from the inference that defendant is a
person whom it is necessary to shackle. 8 Therefore, shackling without
a proper showing of need was held to be unduly prejudicial.8 9
Nevertheless, according to the court, shackling can be justified
when, in the court's discretion, an overriding need for order in the
court, protection of those present or the prevention of escape out-
weighs the possible prejudice. ° The trial judge must balance defend-
ant's right in light of relevant surrounding circumstances.01 These
were listed as follows: the nature of the crime with which defendant
is charged; the character, physical ability and criminal record of defend-
ant; past escapes, attempted escapes or known escape plans; the
possibility of harm to or disturbance of the court; the threat of rescue
of, revenge upon or suicide by defendant; and the mood and physical
arrangement of the courtroom.92 Additionally, the judge must first
consider any available alternatives that would accomplish the same ends
before he orders shackling. 93
If shackling is found to be warranted according to the standards
set forth in Tolley, the trial judge must "state for the record, out of the
presence of the jury, the particular reasons therefor and give counsel
an opportunity to voice objections and persuade the court that such
measures are unnecessary."94 The determination need not be a formal
proceeding as long as it is clear from the record the reasons for the
judge's action and that counsel had an opportunity to offer opposition.9"
86. Id. at 365, 226 S.E.2d at 366.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 366, 226 S.E.2d at 367.
89. Id. at 366-67, 226 S.E.2d at 367.
90. Id. at 367, 226 S.E.2d at 367.
91. Id. at 367, 226 S.E.2d at 367-68.
92. Id. at 368, 226 S.E.2d at 368.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 368-69, 226 S.E.2d at 368. The supreme court found that the trial judge
in Tolley was faced with a physically fit defendant who was charged with second degree
rape. The sheriff had requested that defendant be shackled because of an escape at-
tempt while in custody. The judge read into the record his reasons for allowing the
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When shackling is necessary and the proper procedure has been fol-
lowed the trial judge should instruct the jury directly and clearly that
the shackles are not an indication of guilt and are not to be considered
in reaching a verdict.9 6 The Tolley court held, however, that while
it would be error not to instruct upon request and that it would be




In 1976 the North Carolina Supreme Court and the North
Carolina Court of Appeals considered a number of witness identifi-
cation cases. The basic question before the courts in these cases was
whether some pretrial procedure-such as a lineup, showup, or photo-
graphic display-at which a defendant was identified by a prosecution
witness, was so unnecessarily suggestive as to violate due process and
require exclusion of the identification from evidence.98 In North
Carolina, even if a witness has previously viewed a defendant at a sug-
gestive or unconstitutional pretrial procedure, the witness is nonethe-
less permitted to make an in-court identification of the defendant so
long as the court finds that the identification has some reliable basis
shackling and opposing counsel had an opportunity to voice objections, which he did not
do. This procedure took place outside the presence of the jury. Although no specific
finding was made concerning suitable alternatives, the supreme court assumed that the
trial judge did consider them. The court found that on the face of the record the judge
had a reasonable basis for making his choice and therefore it was not an abuse of discre-
tion.
96. Id. at 369, 226 S.E.2d at 368.
9-7. Id. at 369, 371, 226 S.E.2d 368, 369-70. The supreme court decided that de-
fense counsel's failure to request an instruction telling the jury to ignore the shackles
amounted to waiver of any error resulting from the omission of such an instruction.
98. The fundamental constitutional requirement placed upon identification pro-
cedures by the United States Supreme Court is that they be basically fair so as to com-
port with due process; the danger that the court wishes to avert is suggestiveness or other
circumstances that could create possibilities of misidentification. Stovall v. Denno, 388
U.S. 293 (1967). The North Carolina Supreme Court's statement of the test for judging
soundness of a pretrial procedure is phrased somewhat less stringently: "the test under
the due process clause as to pretrial identification procedures is whether the totality of
the circumstances reveals pretrial procedures so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive
to irreparable mistaken identification as to offend fundamental standards of decency,
fairness, and justice." State v. Henderson, 285 N.C. 1, 9, 203 S.E.2d 10, 16 (1974).
Additionally, when the procedure employed is a lineup, the accused has a right to coun-
sel if the lineup is conducted after he has been indicted. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S.
682 (1972); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). Violation of the right to
counsel or the due process requirements of the procedure requires exclusion of the identi-
fication made at the pretrial procedure and examination of any subsequent in-court
identification for possible taint. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
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other than the pretrial confrontation, such as the witness' observations
at the scene of the crime.99 Thus, when a defendant claims that he
was subjected to a constitutionally defective pretrial identification tech-
nique, the trial court conducts a voir dire hearing at which it makes
findings of fact regarding both the allegedly suggestive police proce-
dure and the circumstances of the witness' observations at the scene
of the crime.' The supreme court and court of appeals almost always
accept, as a matter of course, the trial court's findings, viewing them
as conclusive on appeal when supported by competent evidence. 10'
The North Carolina courts' approach to these claims has not com-
monly involved a close examination of the nature of the challenged pre-
trial procedure, but has focused instead upon the reliability of the eye-
witness. In evaluating witness reliability, the courts have applied the
criteria listed by the United States Supreme Court in Neil v. Biggers:' 2
the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the crime; the witness'
degree of attention; the accuracy of any prior description; the amount
of uncertainty in identification; and the time span between the crime
and the confrontation. 10 3  If a review of these factors indicates a sub-
stantial likelihood that the witness' identification is sufficiently reliable
to be independent of the custodial confrontation, the courts will not ex-
clude an in-court identification even if the pretrial procedure is deemed
suggestive. 04  Indeed, in several cases during the survey period, the
North Carolina Supreme Court and Court of Appeals totally omitted
any examination of the identification procedure used, assuming arguendo
its constitutional defectiveness, but allowed the in-court identification
when it appeared basically reliable in light of the Biggers factors.' 5
An illustrative case is State v. Sweezy' 06 in which the trial court
concluded on voir dire that the lineup procedure challenged by defend-
ant was defective' but found that the in-court identification of defend-
99. In State v. Henderson, 285 N.C. 1, 12, 203 S.E.2d 10, 18 (1974), the North
Carolina Supreme Court interpreted Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), to permit this
result. See also text accompanying notes 114 & 115 infra.
100. See, e.g., State v. Tuggle, 284 N.C. 515, 201 S.E.2d 884 (1974).
101. Id.
102. 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
103. Id. at 199-200.
104. See State v. Henderson, 285 N.C. 1, 14, 203 S.E.2d 10, 19 (1974).
105. See State v. Covington, 290 N.C. 313, 226 S.E.2d 629 (1976); State v. Collins,
29 N.C. App. 478, 224 S.E.2d 647 (1976); State v. Bozeman, 28 N.C. App. 404, 221
S.E.2d 91 (1976); State v. Moore, 28 N.C. App. 353, 220 S.E.2d 860 (1976).
106. 291 N.C. 366, 230 S.E.2d 524 (1976).
107. Id. at 376, 230 S.E.2d at 531. The North Carolina Supreme Court assumed
that the trial court found the lineup to be illegal because defendant had been deprived
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ant by the prosecuting witness was based upon his observations at the
scene of the crime, and therefore admissible.' 08 The supreme court
approvingly reviewed the evidence of the witness' observation of defend-
ant during the alleged crime and noted: "Even had the lineup been
illegal, and had the pretrial photographic procedure been impermissibly
suggestive, there was ample clear and convincing evidence that the in-
court identification was of independent origin. Thus, the trial judge
correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress the identification testi-
mony ..... 109 Somewhat more interesting is the case of State v. Lank-
ford,110 in which the court of appeals, reviewing the trial court's finding
that the challenged identification was of independent origin and suffi-
ciently reliable to be admitted, concluded: "Since this finding is sup-
ported by competent evidence, it alone renders the in-court identifi-
cation competent even if it be conceded arguendo that the lineup or
showup procedure was improper."'' Here, not only did the court of
appeals find it unnecessary to review the nature and possible flaws of
the pretrial procedure, but the court apparently was unsure of what
kind of procedure was even used.
11 2
The court of appeals' cursory review of the identification proce-
dure involved in Lankford clearly demonstrates the disadvantage of the
North Carolina courts' approach to eyewitness identifications. As long
as the appellate courts examine only the reliability of the evidence and
not the reliability of the procedure used, there will be no deterrent to
the employment of improper, suggestive identification techniques by
the police. Although North Carolina's approach appears to conform
with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Neil v. Biggers,"13
several federal courts of appeals' 1 4 have limited Biggers' application to
cases arising before the Stovall v. Denno" decision of 1967, since the
Supreme Court ruled that it would not be applied retroactively.",,
These circuit courts have adopted a somewhat more stringent test,
of his right to counsel; however, the trial record was apparently so incomplete that the
court was not certain of the basis for the trial court's conclusion. Id.
108. Id. at 377, 230 S.E.2d at 531-32.
109. Id. at 377, 230 S.E.2d at 532.
110. 28 N.C. App. 521, 221 S.E.2d 913 (1976).
111. Id. at 524, 221 S.E.2d at 915.
112. Id. at 523, 221 S.E.2d at 915.
113. 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
114. See Brathwaite v. Manson, 527 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S.
Ct. 1737 (No. 75-871 1976); Rudd v. Florida, 477 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1973); Smith
v. Coiner, 473 F.2d 877 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1115 (1973).




which shifts the court's emphasis from the reliability of the identifi-
cation to the unnecessarily suggestive confrontation,"1 and have been
willing to exclude a witness' in-court identification even when that
identification could be construed to be of independent origin, "in order
to deter the police from using a less reliable procedure when a more
reliable procedure may be available." 118
The North Carolina courts have not always applied even the re-
laxed Biggers test with its full force. In State v. Collins"9 the court
of appeals found the eyewitness' observation of defendant at the scene
of the crime to be sufficiently reliable to admit an in-court identifica-
tion, even though the crime had occurred six years earlier and that one
instance was the only time the witness claimed ever to have seen the
defendant. The fifth Biggers factor-the amount of time that has
elapsed between the crime and the police-conducted confrontation-
seemingly cuts against basing an in-court identification upon a six year
old observation; the possibilities of the witness' recollection being
"tainted" by a suggestive pretrial procedure could be significant in this
situation. In Collins, however, the identification may not have been
crucial to the outcome since defendant did admit to being at the scene
of the crime.120
Although the North Carolina courts will usually affirm trial court
findings that in-court identifications are admissible because of their in-
dependence from possibly suggestive confrontation procedures, they do
insist upon exclusion from evidence of identifications made at a proceed-
ing that was improper. In State v. Williamson'2' the North Carolina
Court of Appeals held that a showup 122 conducted in a non-emergency
situation, when defendant was not informed of his right to have counsel
present, was improper as overly suggestive. Although the trial court
found that the witness' observations at the scene of the crime furnished
a basis for in-court testimony that could be free of influence from the
117. Smith v. Coiner, 473 F.2d 877, 882 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1115
(1973).
118. Id. (quoting Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972)).
119. 29 N.C. App. 478, 224 S.E.2d 647 (19716).
120. Id. at 480, 224 S.E.2d at 648.
121. 31 N.C. App. 132, 228 S.E.2d 546 (1976).
122. A "showup" is a confrontation in which the witness views the suspect standing
alone, as opposed to in a line with others of similar description. The United States
Supreme Court condemned this procedure as inherently suggestive in Stovall v. Denno,
388 U.S. 293 (1967), and the North Carolina Court of Appeals has stated that the tech-
nique is to be resorted to only when there is no substantial risk of misidentification. See
State v. Sharatt, 29 N.C. App. 199, 223 S.E.2d 906 (1976).
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showup, it permitted in-court testimony about the identification that
occurred at the showup. The court of appeals awarded defendant a
new trial, observing that if the trial court had permitted only the in-
court identification and not the testimony relating to the showup, there
would have been no reversal, pointing out: "The district attorney
should have known better than to have tendered evidence of the lineup
identification. The trial judge committed error in permitting such testi-
mony . . . [T]he in-court identification of defendant was ample to
require submission of the case to the jury without necessity for evidence
of a lineup identification.' 2 3  In Williamson, the appeals court was
clearly willing to permit an in-court identification by a witness who
had viewed the defendant at an admittedly "suggestive" showup, and
reluctantly reversed the trial court because it had admitted evidence of
the identification made at the showup, as well as an in-court identifica-
tion.124 Thus, although Williamson did grant defendant's appeal, it
nonetheless is indicative of the unwillingness of the North Carolina
courts to use the Stovall decision positively as a deterrent to improper
police techniques.
G. Witness Intimidation
In a case of first impression, the state supreme court followed
recent federal precedent in placing limits on the extent to which a trial
judge may comment on the quality of a witness' testimony. In State
v. Rhodes 25 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that lengthy, dis-
paraging remarks regarding the truthfulness of a witness are prejudicial
when they are so intimidating as to stifle "the free presentation of
competent, available testimony.' 12  Such comments, the court stated,
violated defendant's right to due process, effective counsel and trial by
jury, and therefore were grounds for a new trial notwithstanding the ab-
sence of the jury12 when the comments were made.
During cross-examination by defense counsel, the witness 128 in
Rhodes repudiated any recollection of a signed statement she had pre-
viously given to police detailing defendant's illegal activities.12 0  The
123. 31 N.C. App. at 134, 228 S.E.2d at 547-48.
124. Id. at 134, 228 S.E.2d at 548.
125. 290 N.C. 16, 224 S.E.2d 631 (1976).
126. Id. at 28, 224 S.E.2d at 638.
127. id. at 23, 224 S.E.2d at 636.
128. The witness was the wife of defendant and mother of the prosecuting witness.
The crime with which defendant was charged was incest.
129. 290 N.C. at 18, 224 S:E.2d at 633.
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judge excused the jury, told counsel that he was not "impressed" with
the truthfulness of the witness and warned that the witness was
"treading on very dangerous ground."' 30  Having received this warn-
ing, the witness renounced the allegations in her signed statement
entirely.'' Defense counsel, however, apparently convinced that the
court believed this repudiation to be perjurious, terminated his cross-
examination.1"'
Chief Justice Sharp, writing for the court, relied heavily on Webb
v. Texas, 33 in which the United States Supreme Court held that a
lengthy admonition to a prospective witness about the consequences of
perjury "exerted such distress on the witness' mind as to preclude him
from making a free and voluntary choice whether or not to testify," and
thereby denied defendant due process.' Narrowly interpreted, the
Webb decision does not compel the Rhodes holding, since in Rhodes
it was defense counsel, not the witness, who modified his behavior in
accordance with the judge's warnings.' 35 Webb, however, was based
on the previously established due process "right to present . . .wit-
ness[es] to establish a defense."' 36  As Chief Justice Sharp appar-
ently recognized, a restriction of Webb to cases in which a witness is
intimidated into refusing to testify or into changing his testimony would
unduly confine the defendant's rights. When defense counsel is so ad-
monished by the judge as to necessitate the termination of his exami-
nation of a witness, the defendant, it would seem, has been denied his
right to present witnesses to establish a defense. In addition, since the
witness in Rhodes was called by the State, the judge's actions may be
viewed as an infringement on "the right to confront the prosecution's
witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony.' 37  The
North Carolina Supreme Court flatly stated that such practices deny de-
fendant his sixth amendment right to effective representation.
138
130. Id. at 20, 224 S.E.2d at 634.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 29, 224 S.E.2d at 639.
133. 409 U.S. 95 (1972) (per curiam) (Blackmun & Rehnquist, JI., dissenting).
134. Id. at 98. See also United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976)
(intimidating statements made by a prosecuting attorney constitutionally infirm).
135. Cf. State v. Davis, 266 N.C. 633, 146 S.E.2d 646 (1966) (instruction to de-
fense counsel to "sit down" and "hush" not a denial of defendant's right to present his
evidence under the circumstances).
136. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.s. 14, 19 (1967) (compulsory process).
137. Id.
138. 290 N.C. at 26, 224 S.E.2d at 638. See generally Finer, Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel, 58 COmNELL L. REV. 1077, 1096-98 (1973).
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The rule laid down in Rhodes is not without limitations, however.
The court characterized the trial judge's remarks as "extensive, accu-
satory, and threatening.' '189 Lesser admonitions to trial participants
will likely be found to fall within the courts' discretionary power to
control the conduct of a trial. 140 In addition, even if the judge's con-
duct falls within the Rhodes rubric, that conduct will not justify reversal
absent evidence in the record that the conduct of a trial participant was
altered in some manner prejudicial to the interests of the defendant.' 4'
H. Juries
1. Right of Defendant to Have the Jury Informed of the
Effect of Its Verdicts.
During the past year the North Carolina Supreme Court decided
two cases that broadened significantly a defendant's ability to inform
the jury of the consequences of its verdict: State v. Hammonds142 and
State v. McMorris.43 In State v. Hammonds, the court held that a de-
fendant has the right, upon request, to have the jury informed of the
commitment procedures resulting from an acquittal by reason of
insanity. 4 ' In so holding, the court disapproved the contrary
opinion in State v. Bracy,14 5 the only prior North Carolina case to have
presented the issue. The decision to allow such instructions aligns
North Carolina with several other states and at least one United States
Circuit Court of Appeals. 46  The Hammonds opinion, however, leaves
unresolved questions about the circumstances under which the
failure to give the instruction will be considered reversible error.
Defendant in Hammonds was tried on the charge of first degree
murder.'47 In his final argument, the District Attorney told the jury
that if defendant were found not guilty by reason of insanity he would
be "returned to this community."' 4 8 On defendant's request, the court
139. 290 N.C. at 28, 224 S.E.2d at 639.
140. Id. at 23, 224 S.E.2d at 635-36.
141. See, e.g., State v. Blalock, 9 N.C. App. 94, 175 S.E.2d 716 (1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 912 (1971).
142. 290 N.C. 1, 224 S.E.2d 595 (1976); accord, State v. Taylor, 290 N.C. 220,
226 S.E.2d 23 (1976).
143. 290 N.C. 286, 225 S.E.2d 553 (1976).
144. 290 N.C. at 15, 224 S.E.2d at 604. Those procedures are specified in N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 122-84.1 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
145. 215 N.C. 248, 1 S.E.2d 891 (1939).
146. See cases cited note 159 infra. See generally Annot., 11 A.L.R.3d 737 (1967).
147. 290 N.C. at 3, 224 S.E.2d at 595.
148. Id. at 11, 224 S.E.2d at 601.
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instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor's statement, but refused
to instruct the jury on the procedures that would be invoked by an ac-
quittal on insanity grounds. 49
Justice Moore, writing for the court, noted that this case was not
controlled by prior decisions on the right of a defendant to have the
jury informed of the punishment accompanying possible verdicts since
post-acquittal commitment procedures are not, strictly speaking, pun-
ishment.1 0 However, he found these cases to provide a useful analogy
in their holdings that curative instructions on punishment were appro-
priate when the punishment issue had been injected into the trial
in such a way as to create confusion among the jurors."' In Hammonds,
the post-acquittal procedures issue had been brought to the attention
of the jury in the prosecutor's argument; his suggestion that such pro-
cedures were wholly lacking was clearly misleading.'" 2 Such unabated
confusion, the court held, is prejudicial because it increases the possi-
bility that the jury will convict the defendant solely to insure his con-
tinued confinement.'58
In support of its holding the court first attempted to distinguish
State v. Bracy, 54 a case decided in 1939 that held that the trial court
did not commit error in refusing to instruct on post-acquittal proce-
dures.' 55 In Bracy, defense counsel during his final argument was able
to inform the jury of the relevant commitment procedures without ob-
jection of the prosecutor. 6 On its facts, then, Bracy arguably stands
only for the proposition that the defendant is not entitled to have a jury
instruction on the procedures when they have already been accurately
presented in argument.157  Nothing in the Bacy opinion, however,
suggests that the ability of the defendant to have the procedures out-
lined for the jury was due to anything other than the prosecutor's
149. Id.
150. Id. at 12, 224 S.E.2d at 602; accord, Kuk v. State, 80 Nev. 291, 300, 392 P.2d
630, 634 (1964). For an analysis of the recently expanded right to inform the jury
of punitive consequences, see the discussion of State v. McMorris in text accompanying
notes 176-89 infra.
151. 290 N.C. at 12, 224 S.E.2d at 602 (quoting State v. Britt, 285 N.C. 256, 204
S.E.2d 817 (1974)); see State v. Ward, 222 N.C. 316, 321, 22 S.E.2d 922, 925 (1942).
152. 290 N.C. at 13, 224 S.E.2d at 602.
153. Id. at 15, 224 S.E.2d at 603.
154. 215 N.C. 248, 1 S.E.2d 891 (1939).
155. Id. at 258-59, 1 S.E.2d at 897.
156. Id. at 258, 1 S.E.2d at 897.
157. The Hammonds court suggested this interpretation in concluding that its holding
only modifies the holding in Bracy. 290 N.C. at 15, 224 S.E.2d at 604.
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failure to object. 158 Consequently, the Bracy opinion is not persua-
sively reconcilable with the Hammonds holding.
Justice Moore found more direct support in cases from other juris-
dictions that have provided for instructions on post-acquittal proce-
dures. 150 The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals' decision
in Lyles v. United States6 ° laid the theoretical foundation for requiring
these instructions' 6' by stating that "the jury has a right to know the
meaning of this possible verdict as accurately as it knows by common
knowledge the meaning of the other two possible alternatives [guilt
or innocence].' 62  This right, the Lyles court reasoned, arises from
the fact that jurors, as a matter of course, will be uncertain of the impact
of a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict. 1 3  Since the instruction
is a matter of jury entitlement, the failure so to instruct was, according
to the Lyles court, prejudicial per se.'
6 4
State courts that have followed Lyles in requiring instructions on
the meaning of an acquittal on insanity grounds have, with one excep-
tion, 6 5 relied on Lyles as providing the rationale for their decisions.106
But in spite of this apparent acceptance of the "jury entitlement"
theory, only one of the state cases carried the theory to the Lyles con-
158. Cf. Catlin v. United States, 251 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (per curiam)
(when post-acquittal commitment procedures are to be explained to the jury, it is better
practice to have the trial judge, rather than counsel, broach the topic).
159. See Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (en banc) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 961 (1958); Schade v. State, 512 P.2d 907 (Alas. 1973);
Dipert v. State, 259 Ind. 260, 286 N.E.2d 405 (1972); State v. Babin, 319 So. 2d 367
(La. 1975); Commonwealth v. Mutina, - Mass. -, 323 N.E.2d 294 (1975); People
v. Cole, 382 Mich. 695, 172 N.W.2d 354 (1969); Kuk v. State, 80 Nev. 291, 392 P.2d
630 (1964).
160. 254 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
961 (1958) (defendant convicted of robbery and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle).
161. See also Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
162. 254 F.2d at 728 (opinion of Prettyman & Burger, JJ.) (emphasis added).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 728-29. The only exception to this rule is that no prejudice will arise
if the record shows that defendant did not want the jury to be so informed. Id.
Lyles is a unique decision in the federal courts because the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit may rely on the District's commitment statutes. Federal courts in other circuits
lack authority to commit defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity; they must
rely on the states to exercise commitment power. United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d
1036, 1048 (3d Cir. 1975); accord, Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1967),
vacated per curiam on other grounds, 392 U.S. 651 (1968).
165. Dipert v. State, 259 Ind. 260, 286 N.E.2d 405 (1972).
166. Schade v. State, 512 P.2d 907, 918 (Alas. 1973); State v. Babin, 319 So. 2d
367, 380-81 (La. 1975); Commonwealth v. Mutina, - Mass. -, -, 323 N.E.2d 294,
301 n.9 (1975); People v. Cole, 382 Mich. 695, 720-21, 172 N.W.2d 354, 366 (1969);
Kuk v. State, 80 Nev. 291, 300, 392 P.2d 630, 634-35 (1964).
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clusion: that failure to instruct is prejudicial per se.167  The others have
imposed the additional requirements of a request by defendant,0 s or
a request by defendant or by the jury.' 69 These preconditions to a
finding of prejudice are illogical if the Lyles presumption of juror con-
fusion is accepted. If the jury has a right to abate its confusion then
relief should not be predicated on defendant's request. Furthermore,
a jury, although confused, may nevertheless fail to request the instruction
from the judge, assuming that he has provided them with all the infor-
mation they are entitled to have.
This apparent inconsistency notwithstanding, the Hammonds court
found these state court cases to be "persuasive,"' 70 and held that the
request by defendant should have been honored by the trial court. The
opinion, however, does not specify whether such a request is a neces-
sary, as well as a sufficient, precondition to a showing of error. The
court clearly rejected the Lyles per se rule,' 7' but it might also, at some
future time, find a jury request, absent a request by the defendant, suf-
ficient. Such an extension of Hammonds would be consistent with
most of the cases upon which it relies and would more nearly approxi-
mate a logical adaptation of the Lyles rationale.1
71
The court might, however, restrict the finding of prejudice to
cases, such as Hammonds, in which jury confusion can be demon-
strated on the record from misleading arguments of counsel. This
position was taken by the Indiana Supreme Court in Dipert v. State.'
73
Although Justice Moore did not accept the Dipert criterion as appro-
priate for determining the existence of error, his opinion extensively
refers to the prosecutor's misleading argument to demonstrate jury con-
fusion,' 74 mere surplusage if the Lyles presumption is to be relied
on.'17  The court thus left open the possibility that the Dipert test
might be invoked in the future as the criterion of prejudice, if not error.
167. Kuk v. State, 80 Nev. 291, 300, 392 P.2d 630, 635 (1964) (dictum).
168. Schade v. State, 512 P.2d 907, 918 (Alas. 1973).
169. State v. Babin, 319 So. 2d 367, 380-81 (La. 1975); Commonwealth v. Mutina,
- Mass. -, -, 323 N.E.2d 294, 302 & n.12 (1975); People v. Cole, 382 Mich. 695,
720-21, 172 N.W.2d 354, 366 (1969).
The case that did not rely on the Lyles rationale, Dipert v. State, held that a de-
fendant has a right to instructions on post-acquittal procedures only "where an erroneous
view of the law . . . has been planted in [the jurors'] minds." 259 Ind. 260, 262, 286
N.E.2d 405, 407 (1972).
170. 290 N.C. at 15, 224 S.E.2d at 603.
171. Id. at 14-15, 224 S.E.2d at 603-04.
172. But see State v. McSwain, 15 N.C. App. 675, 190 S.E.2d 682 (1972).
173. 259 Ind. 260, 286 N.E.2d 405 (1972); see text accompanying note 165 supra.
174. 290 N.C. at 13, 224 S.E.2d at 602-03.
175. See text accompanying notes 160-64 supra.
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Considered in isolation, State v. Hammonds might be viewed as
no more than a decision necessitated by the unique nature of the in-
sanity defense. When considered in conjunction with State v.
McMorris,176 however, Hammonds may indicate a dramatic shift in
policy by the North Carolina Supreme Court towards ensuring that
jurors in atl criminal cases are made aware of the consequences of
their actions.
Defendant in McMorris was tried and convicted of burglary and
rape.'77 Before final arguments defense counsel requested permission
to inform the jury that a mandatory life sentence would result from a
conviction on the burglary count; his request was denied.' 78 The court
held that this denial was in contravention of defendant's right under
G.S. 84-14 to argue "the whole case as well of law as of fact" to the
jury,17 and therefore reversible error.' s0
Justice Exum, writing for the court, found support for his inter-
pretation of G.S. 84-14 in a statement in State v. Britt""' that counsel
may inform the jury of punishment provisions "in any case."'18 2 Britt,
however, was a case involving the prospect of capital punishment. The
McMorris opinion itself notes that the holding in Britt, in conjunction
with G.S. 15-176.4,183 was intended to reverse the traditional rule that
the jury in a capital case should not be informed of the prescribed pun-
ishment.8 4  The language in Britt extending the decision to noncapital
cases is clearly dictum.'8 5
176. 290 N.C. 286, 225 S.E.2d 553 (1976).
177. Id. at 286, 225 S.E.2d at 554.
178. Id. at 287, 225 S.E.2d at 554.
179. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-14 (1975).
180. 290 N.C. at 287-88, 225 S.E.2d at 554-55. This rationale should be contrasted
with the jury entitlement concept utilized in State v. Hammonds.
The day after the McMorris opinion was filed, the North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals reversed on identical grounds a conviction for assault with a firearm upon a law
enforcement officer. State v. Thomas, 29 N.C. App. 757, 226 S.E.2d 163 (1976).
181. 285 N.C. 256, 204 S.E.2d 817 (1974), later appeal, 288 N.C. 699, 220 S.E.2d
283 (1975).
182. Id. at 273, 204 S.E.2d at 829 (emphasis added).
183. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-176.4 (1975) specifically provides for instructions on
punishment by the trial court in capital cases.
184. 290 N.C. at 290, 225 S.E.2d at 556.
185. This view of Britt is further supported by the fact that in State v. Hedrick,
289 N.C. 232, 221 S.E.2d 350 (1976) (decided five months before McMorris), the court
did not mention Britt when it refused to allow defense counsel to discuss punishment
with the jury even after the prosecutor had mentioned that the crime involved was no
longer punishable by death. Id. at 238-39, 221 S.E.2d at 354-55. The McMorris court
explained that it was unclear in Hedrick whether defense counsel wished to argue or
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The court also sought support by analogizing to the statutory pro-
vision permitting counsel in specific noncapital cases to inform the jury
of the prescribed punishment: G.S. 15-176.9.188 This analogy reveals
the departure in McMorris from prior law. The court characterized
the policy of G.S. 15-176.9 as a "general rule," the force of which is
more compelling in cases with more serious consequences than those
covered by the statute.18 7  In fact, the general policy until McMorris
appears to have been expressed in State v. Rhodes: absent "some com-
pelling reason . . . the trial judge should not inform the jurors as to
punishment in noncapital cases."'88  That is, when sentencing is out-
side the province of the jury the information is not relevant to any
proper jury concern and therefore should not be transmitted to it.
G.S. 15-176.9 was most probably a legislative response to this restric-
tion on the judge's power under Rhodes and to counsel's power under
prior interpretations of G.S. 84-14.189
By reading into G.S. 84-14 the right of counsel to inform the jury
of the prescribed punishment, the decision in McMorris greatly limits
the prospective impact of Rhodes and relegates G.S. 15-176.9 to sur-
plusage. Apparently, defense counsel may now directly present pun-
ishment information to juries unhampered by whatever restrictions may
remain upon the judges' ability to do so.
2. Misleading Statements to the Jury
In State v. Harris9 ' the North Carolina Supreme Court held that
an instruction that places a burden of persuasion on the defendant en-
titles him to a new trial.' 9' This holding is consistent with the long-
standing doctrine that, notwithstanding a subsequent correct instruction
on the same issue, an instructional error about either the essential ele-
explain the punishment prescribed, only the latter being permissible. 290 N.C. at 288-
89, 225 S.E.2d at 555.
186. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-176.9 (1975). The statute allows counsel to inform the
jury of punishment when convention will result in the loss of a motor vehicle driver's
license.
187. 290 N.C. at 288, 225 S.E.2d at 555.
188. 275 N.C. 584, 592, 169 S.E.2d 846, 851 (1969); accord, State v. Walls, 211
N.C. 487, 191 S.E. 232, cert. denied, 302 U.S. 635 (1937).
189. See, e.g., State v. Little, 228 N.C. 417, 45 S.E.2d 542 (1947).
190. 289 N.C. 275, 221 S.E.2d 343 (1976).
191. Id. at 280, 221 S.E.2d at 347. (on a second degree murder charge the court
instructed in part: "the burden is upon the defendant to satisfy you . . . that the death
. ..was an accident") (emphasis omitted).
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ments of a crime'9 2 or the placing of a burden of proof 1 3 is prejudicial
error.'94 In State v. Anderson9 5 and State v. Cherry90 the North
Carolina Court of Appeals appears to have adopted a somewhat nar-
rower view of prejudicial error, ignoring the Harris test and relying on
the doctrine of lapsus linguae to find the challenged instructions, when
viewed in the context of the entire jury charge, harmless error.' 9"
In Anderson the trial court instructed the jurors at one point that
if they had a reasonable doubt as to every element of the offense
charged, defendant should be found guilty.198 In Cherry the court mis-
192. State v. Ingland, 278 N.C. 42, 178 S.E.2d 577 (1971) (erroneous inclusion of
an alternative, sufficient element); State v. Weston, 273 N.C. 275, 159 S.E.2d 883
(1968) (erroneous instruction on mens rea); State v. Gurley, 253 N.C. 55, 116 S.E.2d
143 (1960) (omission of essential element); State v. MeDay, 232 N.C. 388, 61 S.E.2d 86
(1950) (erroneous instruction on mens rea); State v. Starnes, 220 N.C. 384, 17 S.E.2d
346 (1941) (erroneous instruction on essential elements).
193. State v. Holloway, 262 N.C. 753, 138 S.E.2d 629 (1964) ("duty" of explana-
tion placed on defendant); State v. Faulkner, 241 N.C. 609, 86 S.E.2d 81 (1955) (in-
timation that defendant must satisfy jury of his innocence).
194. The North Carolina courts continued in 1976 to find prejudicial error in mis-
statements of facts only when unsupported by the record and on a material issue or when
they amounted to an expression of opinion prohibited by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-180
(1969) prejudicial to defendant's interests. State v. Covington, 290 N.C. 313, 226 S.E.2d
629 (1976) (characterizing testimony as consistent not prejudicial when subsequent
instruction left that conclusion to jury); State v. Brower, 289 N.C. 644, 224 S.E.2d 551
(1976) (characterizing testimony as established fact not prejudicial when subsequently
corrected); State v. Hunt, 289 N.C. 403, 222 S.E.2d 234 (1976) (characterizing defend-
ant as common law wife of victim not on a material point); State v. Flannery, 31 N.C.
App. 617, 230 S.E.2d 603 (1976) (failure to object to misstatement of defendant's
physical condition at time of arrest constitutes waiver); State v. Moore 31 N.C. App.
536, 230 S.E.2d 184 (1976) (misinterpreting defendant's legal theory prejudicial error);
State v. Dupree, 30 N.C. App. 232, 226 S.E.2d 670 (1976) (characterization of State's
witness as defendant's accomplice not prejudicial when subsequent instruction left that
conclusion to the jury); State v. Norman, 29 N.C. App. 606, 225 S.E.2d 141 (1976)
(more time spent summarizing State's evidence than defendant's evidence not prejudicial
when proportionate to amount of evidence presented by respective parties); State v.
Bobbitt, 29 N.C. App. 155, 223 S.E.2d 398 (1976) (summarization of evidence in words
other than those used by witnesses not an expression of opinion if fairly based on the
evidence). Compare State v. Teasley, 31 N.C. App. 729, 230 S.E.2d 692 (1976) and
State v. Brown, 29 N.C. App. 391, 224 S.E.2d 206 (1976) (comments criticizing defend-
ants in similar cases within hearing of jurors constitute expressions of opinion) with
State v. Vanderhall, 30 N.C. App. 239, 226 S.E.2d 402 (1976) (statement by defense
attorney in another case within hearing of jurors that his client did not testify because
of lengthy criminal record not prejudicial to defendant who did not testify).
195. 31 N.C. App. 113, 228 S.E.2d 543 (1976).
196. 29 N.C. App. 599, 225 S.E.2d 119 (1976).
197. State v. Anderson, 31 N.C. App. at 117, 228 S.E.2d at 546; State v. Cherry,
29 N.C. App. at 601, 225 S.E.2d at 121.
The phrase lapsus linguae has become a shorthand expression for the proposition
that a technical instructional error of an insubstantial nature will not be grounds for
reversal. See, e.g., State v. Gatling, 275 N.C. 625, 170 S.E.2d 593 (1969).
198. 31 N.C. App. at 117, 228 S.E.2d at 546.
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stated an essential element in such a manner that the State's burden
was considerably eased.' 9 In both cases the judges gave correct in-
structions on these matters after the erroneous ones.
The supreme court has restricted its invocation of the lapsus
linguae doctrine to four factual settings: when there is no error per se,
only a prior ambiguous instruction; 00 when the error does not involve
an essential element or the burdens of proof;20 ' when the error, al-
though involving an essential element, is immediately and explicitly
corrected so as to make it clear to the jury that the latter instruction
is to supersede the former;20 2 and when the element involved is in no
way controverted by defendant's evidence.20 3 In neither Cherry nor
Anderson did the trial court explicitly strike the erroneous instructions:
that task was left to juror inference. Nevertheless, the application of
lapsus linguae to the Anderson charge seems reasonable since laymen
of ordinary intelligence and experience will certainly realize that the
State cannot prove a case by failing to prove every element of the of-
fense charged. The error in Cherry, however, is not necessarily one that
jurors would readily recognize. A juror of ordinary experience is not
likely to be familiar with the essential elements of any particular crime,
and is less likely to make the proper inference of error when neither
the correct nor the incorrect instruction is patently unrelated to the of-
fense.20 4 The court of appeals nevertheless found the subsequent cor-
rect instruction in Cherry to be curative.
3. Jury Selection
Of the several cases reviewed by the state supreme court in which
challenges to the method of jury selection were raised, 05 one case is
199. 29 N.C. App. at 601, 225 S.E.2d at 121. "Now, as I have said, the defendant
has been accused of attempting robbery with a firearm which is attempting to rob or
[should read "by"] endangering or threatening that other person with a firearm." Id.
(emphasis added).
200. E.g., State v. Bailey, 280 N.C. 264, 185 S.E.2d 683, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948
(1972); State v. Tomblin, 276 N.C. 273, 171 S.E.2d 901 (1970).
201. E.g., State v. Gatling, 275 N.C. 625, 170 S.E.2d 593 (1969); State v. Gray,
268 N.C. 69, 150 S.E.2d 1 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 911 (1967).
202. E.g., State v. Wither, 271 N.C. 364, 156 S.E.2d 733 (1967).
203. E.g., State v. Sanders, 280 N.C. 81, 185 S.E.2d 158 (1971).
204. See note 199 supra.
205. Several unsuccessful challenges were made to selection practices on the ground
of unconstitutional racial exclusion. State v. Tatum, 291 N.C. 73, 229 S.E.2d 562
(1976) (peremptory challenge of all black prospective jurors by State not in itself prima
facie showing of systematic exclusion); State v. Wright, 290 N.C. 45, 224 S.E.2d 624
(1976) (absence of blacks from jury panel not prima facie showing of systematic ex-
clusion); State v. Alford, 289 2N.C. 372, 222 S.E.2d 222 (1976) (peremptory challenge
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of particular interest. In State v. Hayes,20 the court held that a defend-
ant was entitled to a new trial when he was not personally present
during jury selection because of his reliance on the prosecutor's prom-
ise to give adequate notice before the case was called.2 °7 The prose-
cutor had told defendant and his counsel that they could leave the
courthouse and would receive notice one-half day prior to trial. Defend-
ant's counsel, however, received only two hours notice-notice suf-
ficient to ensure his presence, but not defendant's, during jury selec-
tion.10 8 When defendant arrived later in the day his peremptory chal-
lenges had been exhausted by counsel.20 9
The North Carolina Supreme Court relied on Lewis v. United
States210 as establishing the right of defendant to come "face to face"
with prospective jurors.2 "1 In Lewis, however, both defendant and his
counsel were deprived of that confrontation by the juror challenging
system sub judice.21 2  Nevertheless, the policy underlying Lewis
squarely supports the Hayes decision: "[Defendant's] life or liberty
may depend upon the aid which, by his personal presence, he may give
to counsel . . .in the selection of jurors. The necessities of the de-
of all black prospective jurors not in itself prima facie showing of systematic exclusion);
State v. Brower, 289 N.C. 644, 224 S.E.2d 551 (1976) (showing that county's population
is 24% black but only 13.5% of veniremen were black not in itself prima facie showing
of racial exclusion),
Several objections to selection practices on grounds of abuse of discretion in permit-
ting challenges by the state in contravention of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-21 (1969 & Cum.
Supp. 1975) were also unsuccessful. State v. Bowden, 290 N.C. 702, 228 S.E.2d 414
(1976) (court's allowance of peremptory challenge by State after jurors had been
passed to defendant not abuse of discretion when juror equivocated during court ex-
amination on ability to convict defendant even if State met its burden of proof); State
v. Harris, 290 N.C. 681, 228 S.E.2d 437 (1976) (court's allowance of late challenge
for cause by State not an abuse of discretion when juror's prejudicial remarks were
made only after juror had been tendered to defendant); State v. Smith, 290 N.C.
148, 226 S.E.2d 10 (1976) (court's allowance of too many peremptory challenges by
State not reversible error when defendant failed to exhaust his own peremptory chal-
lenges); State v. McKenna, 289 N.C. 668, 224 S.E.2d 537 (1976) (court's allowance
of late peremptory challenge by State not an abuse of discretion when there was evidence
of juror misconduct).
206. 291 N.C. 293, 230 S.E.2d 146 (1976).
207. Id. at 297, 230 S.E.2d at 149.
208. Id. at 295, 230 S.E.2d at 148.
209. Id.
210. 146 U.S. 370 (1892).
211. 291 N.C. at 296, 230 S.E.2d at 148; see 146 U.S. at 376.
212. 146 U.S. at 371. Challenges were made from lists of names given to oppos-
ing counsel. See also Bailey v. United States, 53 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1931) (summary
refusal to grant defendant's request that jurors be asked additional questions a denial of
right to confrontation); State v. Perry, 277 N.C. 174, 176 S.E.2d 729 (1970) (denial
of request to examine members of jury venire separately not a denial of right to con-
frontation).
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fence may not be met by the presence of his counsel only."21
The Hayes court noted that upon defendant's arrival the trial court
did not offer him any additional peremptory challenges.214 The possi-
bility therefore remains that an allowance of such additional challenges
might be held to cure the constitutional infirmity caused by a defend-
ant's initial absence. The bright line test adopted in Hayes seems pre-
ferable, however, because it avoids controversies concerning the num-
ber of additional challenges that would otherwise be required, and, ad-
ditionally, prevents the State from attempting to take advantage of the
notice device to secure defendant's absence when jury selection is
begun.
I. Coerced and Insufficient Verdicts
The North Carolina appellate courts reviewed several cases in
1976 in which defendants asserted that the jury's verdict was coerced
or not in proper form when accepted by the trial court.215 In State
v. Sutton2"" the court of appeals held that a verdict was coerced when
the trial judge requested the jury to return to the jury room for the
"one purpose" of determining whether the deliberations of the day be-
fore had resulted in a unanimous verdict.217 Since the jury had re-
ported itself deadlocked at the end of those prior deliberations, the ap-
peals court reasoned that the judge's instruction to reconsider the dead-
lock amounted to a prejudicial suggestion that the jurors' convictions be
abandoned for the sake of unanimity. 18 The court of appeals found
a similarly impermissible suggestion in the jury instruction in State v.
Parker:21 9 "You cannot return a verdict without a majority vote ...
213. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 578 (1884); accord, Diaz v. United States, 223
U.S. 442 (1912). See also FED. R. Caum. P. 43(a) ("The defendant shall be present at
...every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury . ")
214. 291 N.C. at 296, 230 S.E.2d at 148.
215. These cases included: State v. Gresham, 290 N.C. 761, 228 S.E.2d 244 (1976)
(sending jurors back for further deliberation without reminding them that they need not
relinquish their "conscientious convictions" not coercive per se); State v. Swift, 290 N.C.
383, 226 S.E.2d 652 (1976) (instruction that any verdict arrived at must be unanimous,
"a meeting of the minds," not coercive when accompanied by instruction to "arrive at
the truth of the matter"); State v. Ware, 31 N.C. App. 292, 229 S.E.2d 249 (1976)
(clarification by clerk during jury poll of an unresponsive verdict permissible); State v.
Sellers, 29 N.C. App. 22, 222 S.E.2d 750 (1976) (not error for court to send jury back
for further deliberations when one juror stated during jury poll that he still had doubts).
216. 31 N.C. App. 697, 230 S.E.2d 572 (1976).
217. Id. at 701, 230 S.E.2d at 575.
218. Id. at 703, 230 S.E.2d at 575; cf. State v. Bowers, 273 N.C. 652, 161 S.E.2d
11 (1968) ("[y]ou have to reach a verdict" held coercive).
219. 29 N.C. App. 413, 224 S.E.2d 280 (1976).
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[I]t must be unanimous when you return to open court to announce
it ..... 220 The language referring to a majority vote was held to be
susceptible to the interpretation that jurors were to abandon minority
positions once a majority existed. 2 ' In State v. Asbury222 the supreme
court held that a verdict was properly accepted by the court after all
the jurors affirmatively answered the questions put to ihem in the jury
poll, 223 despite the trial judge's erroneous statement to one of the
jurors that the questions "would really call for the same response." '24
The court relied on the self-explanatory nature of the questions and
the juror's later indication to the judge that he understood the meaning
of each of the questions in the poll. 22 5
VII. DOMESTIC RELATIONS
A. Child Custody
The position of the North Carolina courts with respect to child
custody jurisdiction continued to conform with established doctrine.
Relying on an interpretation of new G.S. 50-13.5(f),' the court of
appeals in Kennedy v. Surratt2 concluded that a prayer for custody in
the pleadings of a prior divorce action in Guilford County, even though
custody had not been decided, brought the question to issue and vested
jurisdiction in Guilford County pending a final judgment in the custody
matter.3  In several other decisions,4 the court of appeals also gave
220. Id. at 414, 224 S.E.2d at 281.
221. Id.; cf. State v. McKissick, 268 N.C. 411, 150 S.E.2d 767 (1966) ("[y]ou must
consider this case until we have exhausted every possibility of an agreement" constitutes
suggestion that jurors in minority abandon convictions to reach a verdict).
222. 291 N.C. 164, 229 S.E.2d 175 (1976).
223. "Was this your verdict? Is this now your verdict? Do you still agree and as-
sent thereto?" Id. at 166, 229 S.E.2d at 176.
224. The judge's statement was made in response to an inquiry by one of the jurors.
Id.
225. Id. at 171, 229 S.E.2d at 178; cf. State v. Gaten, 28 N.C. App. 273, 220 S.E.2d
845 (1976) (verdict may be accepted notwithstanding initial expression of uncertainty
by one juror); State v. Blackmon, 28 N.C. App. 255, 220 S.E.2d 850 (1976) (verdict
may be accepted notwithstanding comment on the evidence by one juror).
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.5(f) (1976).
2. 29 N.C. App. 404, 224 S.E.2d 215 (1976).
3. Id. at 406, 224 S.E.2d at 216. The effect of the decision was to deny the dis-
trict court in Randolph County jurisdiction to consider the father's petition for custody.
4. In both Hampton v. Hampton, 29 N.C. App. 342, 224 S.E.2d 197 (1976), and
Hunt v. Hunt, 29 N.C. App. 380, 224 S.E.2d 270 (1976), the court remanded the case
and ordered findings of fact sufficient to ascertain "'that the order is adequately sup-
ported by competent evidence and the welfare of the child subserved . . . ."' 29 N.C.
App. at 344, 224 S.E.2d at 199; 29 N.C. App. at 383, 224 S.E.2d at 271-72, (both quot-
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effect to the longstanding rule5 that the welfare or best interest of the
child, in light of all relevant circumstances, is the paramount considera-
tion in determining the custody of minor children.
In Owen v. Owen6 the court of appeals clarified the standards for
modifying custody decrees by holding that it was not error for the trial
judge to exclude evidence of plaintiff's conduct at times prior to the
original order awarding plaintiff custody of the child. The court distin-
guished the 1974 case of Paschall v. Paschall,7 in which evidence of
adultery commencing before entry of the order, coupled with the con-
tinuation of the relationship and the ever increasing maturity of the
child, indicated sufficiently changed circumstances to warrant a change
of custody.8
The courts of North Carolina, upon gaining the requisite jurisdic-
tion and finding a change of circumstances, generally have the power
to modify or supersede an order for the custody and support of a child
entered by the court of another state.' In Johnston v. Johnston,'° how-
ever, the court of appeals avoided meeting the changed circumstances
requirement by finding that the temporary custody granted the wife by
a Tennessee court was a protective order rather than an adjudication
of custody. The court decided that retaining jurisdiction was in the
children's best interest and reasoned that the full faith and credit clause
did not require it "to give greater effect to a decree of another state
than it has in that state, or to treat as final and conclusive an order of
a sister state which is interlocutory in nature.""
ing Crosby v. Crosby, 272 N.C. 235, 238-39, 158 S.E.2d 77, 80 (1967)). The court,
in Hunt particularly, stressed the importance of considering all of the circumstances in
declaring that the trial court erred in refusing evidence of the wife's adultery, even
though it would not have been determinative of fitness. 29 N.C. App. at 383, 224 S.E.2d
at 271-72. When the lower court findings are adequate, however, the appellate court
will assume that the trial judge is best able to resolve conflicts of evidence and will re-
view his decision only in the event of a clear abuse of discretion. Wyche v. Wyche,
29 N.C. App. 685, 688, 225 S.E.2d 626, 628 (1976). See also 3 R. LEE, NORTH CARO-
LiNA FAMILY LAW § 224, at 22 (3d ed. 1963).
5. Crosby v. Crosby, 272 N.C. 235, 158 S.E.2d 77 (1967); Wilson v. Wilson, 269
N.C. 676, 153 S.E.2d 349 (1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(a) (1976); 3 R. LEE,
supra note 4, § 224, at 21.
6. 31 N.C. App. 230, 229 S.E.2d 48 (1976).
7. 21 N.C. App. 120, 203 S.E.2d 337 (1974).
8. The court cautioned that its decision in Paschall should "not be taken as an
approval of the relitigation of conduct and circumstances antedating a prior custody
order." 31 N.C. App. at 233, 229 S.E.2d at 51.
9. In re Kluttz, 7 N.C. App. 383, 172 S.E.2d 95 (1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-
13.7(b) (1976); 3 R. LEE, supra note 4, § 228, at41 (Supp. 1976).
10. 29 N.C. App. 345, 224 S.E.2d 276 (1976).
11. Id. at 347, 224 S.E.2d at 278 (quoting In re Kluttz, 7 N.C. App. 383, 385,
172 S.E.2d 95, 96 (1970)).
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B. Divorce and Separation
In Traywick v. Traywick,12 the court outlined the essence of
cruelty and indignities as grounds for alimony without divorce. With
respect to cruelty the court declined to announce a well-defined test,
preferring instead to allow each case to be determined by its own par-
ticular circumstances.1 3 Employing this approach, the court found the
cruelty instruction prejudicial to defendant because it compelled, rather
than permitted, the jury to find cruelty upon a showing of several
threats and assaults by defendant against his wife. Essential to proving
indignities, the court announced, is "'a course of conduct or continued
treatment which renders the condition of the injured party intolerable
and life burdensome.' "14 Necessarily, an instruction that allowed a
finding of indignities because defendant had on a single occasion
thrown his wife out of their bedroom or visited a woman neighbor in
the middle of the night was held prejudicial. 15
The court of appeals, in Privette v. Privette,'0 acknowledged that
traditionally the defense of condonation17 has not been established by
showing that the parties continue to live in the same house, so long as
it appears they do not have sexual intercourse."" The court, recogniz-
ing a general exception to the rule, 9 adopted the slightly more lenient
standard that" 'sexual cohabitation after acts of cruelty cannot be consid-
ered a condonation in the sense in which it would be after an act of
adultery.'"20 This limited departure from the rule arguably indicates
a desire by the court to apply the defense in a way that considers the
practical realities of the situation, as when the parties had not engaged
in sexual intercourse for over a year,2' rather than general appearances.
12. 28 N.C. App. 291, 221 S.E.2d 85 (1976).
13. Id. at 294, 221 S.E.2d at 88.
14. Id. at 295, 221 S.E.2d at 88 (quoting 1 R. LEE, supra note 4, § 82, at 311)
(emphasis added by the court).
15. Id.
16. 30 N.C. App. 305, 227 S.E.2d 137 (1976).
17. Although applied to an action for alimony pendente lite and child custody in
Privette, condonation is generally "the forgiveness of a martial offense constituting a
ground for divorce." 1 R. LEE, supra note 4, § 87, at 330.
18. 30 N.C. App. at 308, 227 S.E.2d at 140; see 1 R. LEE, supra note 4, § 87,
at 332-33; 24 AM. JuR. 2d Divorce and Separation § 211 (1966).
19. 30 N.C. App. at 308, 227 S.E.2d at 140; see 24 AM. JuR. 2d Divorce and Sep-
aration §§ 214-216 (1966).
20. 30 N.C. App. at 308, 227 S.E.2d at 140 (quoting Brown v. Brown, 171 Kan.
249, 252, 232 P.2d 603, 605-06 (1951)). The policy behind the rule, according to the
court, is that a spouse who patiently endures ill treatment should not have his or her
right to relief weakened by reason of such commendable endurance. Id,
21, Id. at 306, 227 S.E.2d at 139.
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In Earles v. Earles22 the court of appeals continued to erode the de-
fense of recrimination 2 by granting an absolute divorce to the husband,
even though the original separation was the fault of the wilfully
abandoning husband, when there was a legalized separation for the
requisite period under an order awarding the wife alimony pendente
lite and exclusive possession of the residence. 24
C. Separation Agreements
In several decisions the court of appeals articulated some of the
general requirements for a valid separation agreement. In Barnes v.
Barnes25 the court relied on traditional contract principles to find that
a separation agreement between a husband and wife under seal was
supported by valid consideration.26 Moreover, the court found the
agreement was supported by valid consideration because it provided
benefits to both parties.27 Although parol evidence has been allowed
in limited instances to explain a written contract, the court of appeals
in Grady v. Grady28 ruled that the intention of the parties at the time
of the separation agreement was a question of law and "[a]bsent fraud
or mistake the undisclosed intention of either party is immaterial. 29
22. 29 N.C. App. 348, 224 S.E.2d 284 (1976).
23. According to Professor Lee, "recrimination is a rule which bars the plaintiff's
right to divorce if the defendant proves that the plaintiff has himself been guilty of con-
duct which would entitle the defendant to a divorce." 1 R. LEE, supra note 4, § 88,
at 336.
24. 29 N.C. at 351, 224 S.E.2d at 287. Prior decisions have granted absolute di-
vorce in similar situations so long as there has been some form of legally recognized
separation for the required statutory period. See Eubanks v. Eubanks, 273 N.C. 189.
159 S.E.2d 562 (1968) (divorce from bed and board); Becker v. Becker, 262 N.C. 685,
138 S.E.2d 507 (1964) (valid separation agreement); Wilson v. Wilson, 260 N.C. 347,
132 S.E.2d 695 (1963) (alimony without divorce). See also 1 R. LEE, supra note 4,
§ 88, at 82 (Supp. 1976).
25. 30 N.C. App. 196, 226 S.E.2d 549, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 775, 229 S.E.2d 31
(1976).
26. The court declared that "[tihe solemn act of sealing and delivering is a deed,
a thing done which, by the rule of the common law, has full force and effect, without
any consideration." Id. at 199, 226 S.E.2d at 552 (quoting Harrell v. Watson, 63 N.C.
454, 456 (1869)); see Honey Properties, Inc. v. Gastonia, 252 N.C. 567, 114 S.E.2d
344 (1960); ci. 2 R. LEE, supra note 4, § 190, at 396 (a seal is a sufficient, but not
necessary, means of providing consideration).
27. 30 N.C. App. at 199, 226 S.E.2d at 552 (citing 2 J. STRONG, NORTH CAROLINA
INDEX Contracts § 4 (2d ed. 1967)). See also Tripp v. Tripp, 266 N.C. 378, 146
S.E.2d 507 (1966).
28. 29 N.C. App. 402, 224 S.E.2d 282 (1976).
29. Id. at 404, 224 S.E.2d at 283; see Van Every v. Van Every, 265 N.C. 506,
144 S.E.2d 603 (1965); Joyner v. Joyner, 264 N.C. 27, 140 S.E.2d 714 (1965).
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The North Carolina Supreme Court continued to follow the rule3°
that an executory separation agreement between husband and wife is
terminated upon a resumption of the marital relation. In In re Estate
of Adamee3 1 a separation agreement and consent judgment, in which
the wife had waived her right to administer or share in her husband's
estate, was held rescinded prior to his death by their resuming to live
together and hold themselves out as man and wife. 2
Despite the presumption that the amount of support provided for
children in a separation agreement is just and reasonable,33 the court
of appeals reinforced the firmly established principle34 that a separation
agreement between a husband and wife does not deprive the court of
its inherent or statutory authority to protect the interests and welfare of
minor children. The wife in Soper v. Soper" offered evidence to show
that since signing the separation agreement she had returned to work
and suffered a major change in her expenses due to child care and in-
flation. The court of appeals agreed with the trial court and ruled that
the facts amounted to a substantial change of conditions sufficient to
rebut the original award in the separation agreement and merit an in-
crease in the child support payments.36
30. See Tilley v. Tilley, 268 N.C. 630, 151 S.E.2d 592 (1966); Hutchins v. Hut-
chins, 260 N.C. 628, 133 S.E.2d 459 (1963); Jones v. Lewis, 243 N.C. 259, 90 S.E.2d
547 (1956); 2 R. LEE, supra note 4, § 200, at 418.
31. 291 N.C. 386, 230 S.E.2d 541 (1976). See also this Survey, Wills, Trusts and
Estates: Executors and Administrators (wife can qualify as personal representative).
32. Chief Justice Sharp emphasized that their living together and holding them-
selves out as man and wife, without necessarily renewing sexual relations, was sufficient
to amount to a resumption of marital cohabitation that would rescind the unexecuted
portion of the separation agreement. Id. at 392-93, 230 S.E.2d at 546.
33. Fuchs v. Fuchs, 260 N.C. 635, 133 S.E.2d 487 (1963); Wyatt v. Wyatt, 27
N.C. App. 134, 218 S.E.2d 194 (1975); Rabon v. Ledbetter, 9 N.C. App. 376, 176 S.E.
2d 372 (1970).
34. Williams v. Williams, 261 N.C. 48, 134 S.E.2d 227 (1964); Kiger v. Kiger,
258 N.C. 126, 128 S.E.2d 235 (1962); 2 R. LEE, supra note 4, § 152, at 223-24.
35. 29 N.C. App. 95, 223 S.E.2d 560 (1976).
36. Id. at 100, 223 S.E.2d at 563; see 2 R. LEE, supra note 4, § 153, at 228. In
awarding the increase in support to the wife the court appeared to be influenced by the
possibility of overreaching in the original separation agreement. The court took careful
note of the fact that the original agreement providing support for the children was
drafted by the husband's attorney in order to provide the husband with tax advantages,
whereas the wife was not represented in negotiating the terms of the agreement. 29
N.C. App. at 100, 223 S.E.2d at 563.
In McKaughn v. McKaughn, 29 N.C. App. 702, 225 S.E.2d 616 (1976), the hus-
band was unable to comply with the child support provisions of the separation agreement
because his net worth had decreased from $1,000,0000 to $61,000 and his income had
decreased from $50,000 to $26,000. The court of appeals determined that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in ordering a reduction in payments. The court was care-
ful to note, however, that it was not changing the husband's contractual obligations
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
D. Child Support
In North Carolina the amount of child support ordered in a given
case has always been held to depend upon the needs of the child and
the financial condition of the father, including his earning capacity.
3
The court of appeals in Holt v. Holt,"8 however, rejected earning
capacity as an automatic consideration in making the award and gener-
ally defined ability to pay in terms of present earnings. In Holt the
trial court based the child support award upon the fact that the husband
had previously earned between $12,000 and $14,000 per year as a
truck driver, despite the fact that due to the weather and the economy
he had earned no more than $2,000 in the previous two years.30 The
appellate court, in what appears to be a more equitable standard for
determining child support awards, remanded the case and stated that
before basing" 'an award on capacity to earn rather than actual earnings,
there should be a finding, based on evidence that the husband is fail-
ing to exercise his capacity to earn because of a disregard of his marital
obligation to provide reasonable support for his wife and children.' "40
Another aspect of the child support duty in North Carolina has
been the father's primary obligation to furnish support, with the
mother's obligation being secondary. 41 Recognizing this policy, the
North Carolina Supreme Court in Tidwell v. Booker42 reaffirmed the
prevailing rule that, within the applicable statute of limitations, the
father can be held liable to reimburse the mother for her expenditures
in supporting the children.4a  Arguably, the practical effect of such re-
under the separation agreement, but was simply exercising "its inherent and statutory
authority to provide for the welfare of minors" in order to determine the amount he
should provide considering the impossibility of his performance under the present fin-
ancial circumstances. Id. at 706, 225 S.E.2d at 619.
37. Williamson v. Williamson, 20 N.C. App. 669, 202 S.E.2d 489 (1974); 2 R.
LEE, supra note 4, § 150, at 211.
38. 29 N.C. App. 124, 223 S.E.2d 542 (1976).
39. Id. at 125-26, 223 S.E.2d at 543.
40. Id. at 126, 223 S.E.2d at 544 (quoting Robinson v. Robinson, 10 N.C. App.
463, 468, 179 S.E.2d 144, 147 (1971)). The rule announced in Holt conforms with
prior decisions. See Crosby v. Crosby, 272 N.C. 235, 158 S.E.2d 77 (1967) (ultimate ob-
ject of the child support order is to secure support commensurate with the needs of the
child and the ability of the father to meet those needs); Fuchs v. Fuchs, 260 N.C. 635,
133 S.E.2d 487 (1963) (child support order should be for a fair amount not confiscatory
in light of the father's earning ability).
41. Wells v. Wells, 227 N.C. 614, 44 S.E.2d 31 (1947); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-
13.4(b) (1976).
42. 290 N.C. 98, 225 S.E.2d 816 (1976). This case is also discussed in this Sur-
vey, Civil Procedure: Collateral Estoppel.
43. Id. at 116, 225 S.E.2d at 827; see 3 R. LEE, supra note 4, § 229, at 57.
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imbursement is ultimately to place the entire obligation to furnish child
support solely upon the father.
The court of appeals continued to apply G.S. 50-13.4(e) 44 strictly
and to require the court order to state separately and identify awards
for alimony and child support when both awards are granted in the
same proceeding. 5
With respect to the modification of child support orders, the court
of appeals continued to apply the longstanding "changed circumstan-
ces" rule. 6  In Harding v. Harding47 the father initially agreed to sup-
port his children through college and was financially able to comply
with the agreement. The enrollment of one of his children in college
was deemed by the court to be a sufficient change in circumstances to
require an increase in the amount of support equal to the college ex-
penses. 8 In further defining "changed circumstances" for purposes of
modifying a child support order, the court of appeals in Hemby v.
Hemby49 ruled that an order for child support will not be modified
merely because the husband has remarried and assumed additional ob-
ligations.5 0
The North Carolina appellate courts attempted to clarify the con-
fusion surrounding the duty to provide child support that has resulted
44. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.4(e) (1976).
45. This separation is required by Williams v. Williams, 13 N.C. App. 468, 473-
74, 186 S.E.2d 210, 214-15 (1972). In Amaker v. Amaker, 28 N.C. App. 558, 562-
63, 221 S.E.2d 917, 919-20 (1976), the court rigidly followed the statute and remanded
the case for a separate statement of allowances. In Arnold v. Arnold, 30 N.C. App.
683, 684, 228 S.E.2d 48, 50 (1976), however, the provision was held inapplicable on
the ground that since the trial court had determined that plaintiff was not a dependent
spouse for purposes of alimony pendente lite, the full award must have been for the
children.
46. Professor Lee defines the "changed circumstances rule" as follows: "A court
order dealing with the custody or support of a minor child may be modified where there
occurs a change of circumstances affecting the welfare of the child." 2 R. LEn, supra
note 4, § 153, at 228; see Pruneau v. Sanders, 25 N.C. App. 510, 515-16, 214 S.E.2d
288, 291-92, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 664, 216 S.E.2d 911 (1975); Carpenter v. Carpenter,
25 N.C. App. 235, 240, 212 S.E.2d 911, 914-15, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 465, 215 S.E.2d
623 (1975).
47. 29 N.C. App. 633, 225 S.E.2d 590, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 661, 228 S.E.2d 452
(1976).
48. Id. at 641, 225 S.E.2d at 595. The underlying philosophy of the court's decision
corresponds with prior determinations concerning the ultimate object of child support.
See note 40 supra.
49. 29 N.C. App. 596, 225 S.E.2d 143, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 661, 228 S.E.2d 452
(1976).
50. Id. at 597-98, 225 S.E.2d at 145. The court reached its decision in this case
by applying the rule derived from decisions refusing modification of alimony awards




from reducing the age of majority5' from twenty-one to eighteen. In
Shoal v. Shoal5 2 the supreme court announced that the reduction of the
age of majority to eighteen had left the courts without authority to re-
quire child support beyond that age.53 In White v. White,54 however,
the supreme court ruled that a court may enforce by contempt proceed-
ings its consent order requiring the father to continue child support pay-
ments beyond the statutory age of majority for four years of college. 5
The court of appeals, in Harding v. Harding,56 highlighted this distinc-
tion by declaring that "a parent can by contract assume an obligation
to his child greater than the law imposes, and by contract bind himself
to support his child after emancipation and past majority." 51  In Loer
v. Loer,5 s however, the court decided that a father's contractual obliga-
tion under a separation agreement to support and educate his son until
he reached age twenty-one or was emancipated terminated "when the
son attain[ed] legal emancipation at age 18 . . .-.
E. Alimony
In Sherwood v. Sherwood 0 the wife brought an action for alimony
against her husband, alleging that they were married and had resided
together in North Carolina for nearly two years when he abandoned
her and went to Delaware. The husband personally received copies
of the summons and complaint by certified mail while in Delaware. An
alimony pendente lite order was entered on March 25, 1975, and on
May 14, 1975, the wife moved to have her husband held in contempt
51. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 48A-1 to -2 (1976).
52. 282 N.C. 287, 192 S.E.2d 299 (1972).
53. Id. at 291, 192 S.E.2d at 303.
54. 289 N.C. 592, 223 S.E.2d 377 (1976).
55. The court distinguished Shoal v. Shoal by noting that in Shoaf there was no
consent to a court order that would have enlarged the authority of the court to require
support beyond the child's minority. Id. at 595-96, 223 S.E.2d at 379.
56. 29 N.C. App. 633, 225 S.E.2d 590, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 661, 228 S.E.2d 452
(1976).
57. Id. at 639, 225 S.E.2d at 594 (citing Carpenter v. Carpenter, 25 N.C. App.
235, 212 S.E.2d 911, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 465, 215 S.E.2d 623 (1975)).
58. 31 N.C. App. 150, 228 S.E.2d 473 (1976).
59. Id. at 151, 228 S.E.2d at 474. The court's decision in Loer implies that in
order to ensure a binding obligation to provide child support beyond age eighteen the
contract must specifically designate the period for which support is extended. Both
White and Harding can be distinguished by language in the contract requiring the father
to support the child through college, without reference to the limiting words of "major-
ity" or "emancipation." The court in Loer clearly equates "emancipation" with the
statutory age of majority, and will not enforce child support beyond that age, even if
the person agrees to a greater age in the alternative. Id.
60. 29 N.C. App. 112, 223 S.E.2d 509 (1976).
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for failure to make the required payments. The trial court denied the
husband's motion to dismiss the complaint for alimony on grounds of
lack of jurisdiction, insufficiency of process, and insufficiency of service
of process. 6'
Traditionally, the courts have held that in personam jurisdiction
is necessary in an alimony proceeding" and that "'constructive service
. . . of process upon the defendant without the state is insufficient to
give jurisdiction to render a judgment for alimony against a nonresident
which will be binding upon him except as to his property within the
jurisdiction.' "63 In Sherwood, however, the court of appeals affirmed
the trial court and held that an action for alimony on the ground of
abandonment is an "injury to the person or property" under the North
Carolina long-arm statute, 4 thus enabling the trial court to obtain per-
sonal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant by serving summons
and complaint by registered mail.65
Invoking a completely original analysis, the court reasoned that the
actions referred to in the statute were not limited to traditional claims
for bodily injury and property damage.66 It is significant to note that
a few other courts have also employed a long-arm statute to obtain in
personam jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in a divorce action,
but only "if a statute of the support-ordering state has authorized the
acquisition of such jurisdiction in that manner .. . ."07 Sherwood,
however, apparently represents the first case in which a long-arm stat-
ute, not expressly authorizing its use for the enforcement of some form
of support, has been construed to authorize acquisition of jurisdiction
by defining the ground upon which the alimony is based as an "injury."
Whether this sharp departure from established North Carolina
case law will be sustained in other contexts is a matter open for specu-
61. Id. at 116, 223 S.E.2d at 512.
62. See 2 R. LEE, supra note 4, § 142, at 181; 24 AM. JUR. 2d Divorce and Separa-
tion § 544 (1966).
63. Surratt v. Surratt, 263 N.C. 466, 468-69, 139 S.E.2d 720, 722 (1965) (quoting
17 AM. JuR. Divorce and Separation § 592, at 679 (1957)).
64. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4(3) (1969). The long-arm statute, in pertinent part,
gives the court jurisdiction over a person properly served "[in any action claiming in-
jury to a person. . . within or without this State arising out of an act or omission within
this State by the defendant." Id.
65. Moreover, the court applied the "minimum contacts" test and concluded that
obtaining personal jurisdiction under these circumstances complied with the traditional
requirements of due process and fairness. 29 N.C. App. at 116, 223 S.E.2d at 512.
66. Id.
67. 24 AM. JUR. 2d, Divorce and Separation § 544, at 32 (Supp. 1976); see Mizner
v. Mizner, 84 Nev. 268, 439 P.2d 679, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968); Hines v.
Clendenning, 465 P.2d 460 (Okla. 1970).
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lation, since the court expressly stated that its decision was influenced
by the particular circumstances of the case.68 Whatever the scope of
the holding, however, it represents too little, too late. Granted that
the basis of the personal jurisdiction is valid, the court still lacks an ef-
fective means of enforcing its order against the absent party. The Uni-
form Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act,69 on the other hand, has
already superseded the insufficient long-arm remedy with a specially
designed procedure for efficiently obtaining and enforcing the support
judgment against a nonresident defendant.70
The legislature in 1967 discarded the illogical procedure that
required a wife wanting both absolute divorce and permanent alimony
from her husband to initiate two separate actions.7 While providing
that a spouse could receive alimony before or at the same time a judg-
ment was rendered for absolute divorce, however, the legislature con-
tinued specifically to exempt the case of a "divorce obtained by the
dependent spouse in an action initiated by such spouse on the ground
of separation for the statutory period." 2  In McCarley v. McCarley,
7 3
however, the supreme court declared that the wife's application for ali-
mony should have been considered at the same time the absolute
divorce was granted on the ground of separation.
The trial judge in McCarley refused to consider the wife's applica-
tion for alimony at the same time the absolute divorce was granted
68. 29 N.C. App. at 116, 223 S.E.2d at 512. Although this method of obtaining
personal jurisdiction was not recognized by the supreme court in Surratt v. Surratt, 263
N.C. 466, 139 S.E.2d 720 (1965), that case was decided before the North Carolina long-
arm statute was enacted.
69. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 52A-1 to -32 (1976).
70. See Comment, The New Uniform Support and Dependents Act, 45 ILL. L.
REV. 252, 253-54 (1950); Comment, Conflict of Laws-Survival of Support and the
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, 48 N.C.L. REv. 100, 108-09 (1969).
71. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-11(c) (1976). The statute provides that "a decree of
absolute divorce shall not impair or destroy the right of a spouse to receive alimony...
under any judgment or decree of a court rendered before or at the time of the rendering
of the judgment for absolute divorce." Id. Prior to the amendment in 1967 allowing
for permanent alimony and absolute divorce in the same action, the court had declared
that to provide for permanent alimony in an action for absolute divorce was a violation
of public policy. Livingston v. Livingston, 235 N.C. 515, 70 S.E.2d 480 (1952); see
2 R. LEE, supra note 4, § 135, at 153.
72. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-11(c) (1976). The probable reason for this exception
is the North Carolina policy that alimony is fault-based, whereas separation as a ground
for divorce does not impute fault to either party. The questionable rationale of this
position notwithstanding, Professor Lee suggests that the statutory exception is necessary
to the policy's preservation, because "[i]f it were not for the language of N.C. Gen.
State. § 50-11 (c), a dependent spouse . . .could obtain an absolute divorce on the
ground of separation and, in the same proceeding, on the ground of abandonment, per-
manent alimony." 2 R. LEE, supra note 4, § 135, at 43 (Supp. 1976).
73. 289 N.C. 109, 221 S.E.2d 490 (1976).
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because she had initially filed the divorce action, even though it was
eventually continued by her husband. 74  In reversing, the supreme
court held that, despite language in G.S. 50-11(c) 7 excepting a de-
pendent spouse from obtaining alimony in the same action when that
person both initiates and obtains an absolute divorce on the ground of
separation, the wife's application for alimony should have been consid-
ered"8 and would have "survive[d] the divorce decree which in this
case was obtained, not by her, but by the defendant. ' 77  While the
wife was able to avoid the working of the exception under these unique
circumstances, the implication for the typical case, since the exception
also applies to alimony obtained before the divorce decree, is that the
dependent spouse will not be allowed to obtain both alimony and abso-
lute divorce on the ground of separation, even if she is willing to resort
to the illogical procedure of bringing two separate actions.7 In light
of the popularity of separation for the statutory period as a ground for
divorce,79 the opportunity to grant a dependent spouse alimony in the
same action as an absolute divorce is severely limited by the statute.
While historically the right to alimony was dependent primarily on
the husband's property, recently it has become more a question of fair-
ness to all of the parties.80  Conforming with the trend against over-
burdening the husband, the supreme court in Beall v. Beall8' held that
the amount of alimony 2 and child support83 that the husband is re-
quired to pay depends upon balancing the needs of the wife and chil-
74. After her original application for divorce, the wife subsequently filed for a vol-
untary dismissal of the action and applied for alimony pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 50-16.8(b)(1) (1976). The judge set aside the wife's notice of voluntary dismissal
and, treating the husband's answer as a counterclaim, entered a judgment of absolute
divorce based on his evidence. Id. at 110-11, 221 S.E.2d at 492.
75. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-11(c) (1976).
76. The court construed the language of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.8(b) (1976) to
allow application for alimony on a motion in the cause, not requiring that it be con-
tained in the pleadings or an amendment to the action for absolute divorce. 289 N.C.
at 115-16, 221 S.E.2d at 495.
77. Id. at 119, 221 S.E.2d at 497. The court reached this result by holding that
"in the context of [N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-11(C) (1976)] a 'divorce obtained by the de-
pendent spouse' means a divorce which is pursued to completion by that spouse." Id.
78. The effect of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-11(c) (1976), according to Professor Lee,
is that "the prudent wife who has obtained a court order for permanent alimony should
let her husband be the plaintiff if a subsequent action for absolute divorce is to be in.
stituted on the ground of separation." 2 R. LEE, supra note 4, § 135, at 44 (Supp.
1976).
79. Id. at 43.
80. See Sayland v. Sayland, 267 N.C. 378, 148 S.E.2d 218 (1966).
81. 290 N.C. 669, 228 S.E.2d 407 (1976).
82. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.5(a) (1976) governs the award of alimony.
83. Id. § 50-13.4(c) governs the award of child support.
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dren against his estate and earnings, with the husband's ability to pay
determined by his income at the time of the award. 84  An order for
alimony may be modified or vacated at any time upon a showing of
changed circumstances. 5 The court of appeals in Gill v. Gill, 6 while
recognizing this general rule, vacated the trial court's order reducing
the plaintiff's alimony because neither party presented evidence of the
circumstances of the parties at the time of the original award, thus mak-
ing it impossible to determine if there had been a change in those cir-
cumstances. With respect to recognizing foreign alimony decrees, the
court of appeals in Downey v. Downey17 followed the general trend 8
in finding that, upon obtaining personal jurisdiction over both parties
and finding a change of circumstances, the trial court was authorized
to modify a Tennessee order for alimony and support.8"
F. Alimony Pendente Lite and Attorney's Fees
The court of appeals emphasized that the award of alimony
pendente lite is intended to be the result of a speedy proceeding that
provides the dependent spouse with reasonable living expenses pending
trial of the action on the merits. 0 Additionally, the court of ap-
84. The husband's earning capacity may be used as the basis of an alimony award
only "if it is based upon a proper finding that the husband is deliberately depressing
his income or indulging himself in excessive spending because of a disregard of his mar-
ital obligation to provide reasonable support for his wife and children." 290 N.C. at
674, 228 S.E.2d at 410. The desire to prevent overburdening the husband appears to
be a general trend in awarding both child support and alimony. See note 40 supra.
85. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9(a) (1976); 2 R. LEE, supra note 4, § 153, at 227.
86. 29 N.C. App. 20, 222 S.E.2d 754 (1976).
87. 29 N.C. App. 375, 224 S.E.2d 255, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 550, 226 S.E.2d 509
(1976).
88. See 2 R. LEE, supra note 4, § 168, at 299-301.
89. The court relied upon N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9(c) (1976), which provides
for the modification of alimony orders. The changed circumstances found by the trial
court were that the two children provided for in the Tennessee decree had reached their
majority, implying that child support was reduced rather than the wife's alimony.
Nevertheless, the court said that § 50-16.9(c) authorized "reducing the '$700 per
month as alimony and support' to $300 per month 'alimony."' 29 N.C. App. at 377,
224 S.E.2d at 256. The distinction is not practically significant, in that this rule has
long been applied to the modification of child support orders. See Thomas v. Thomas,
248 N.C. 269, 103 S.E.2d 371 (1958).
90. Orders for alimony pendente lite hearings were vacated in both Black v. Black,
30 N.C. App. 403, 226 S.E.2d 858 (1976), and Roberts v. Roberts, 30 N.C. App. 242,
226 S.E.2d 400 (1976), because the trial judge determined matters that should have been
preserved for a final hearing on all of the merits. In Black the court of appeals held
the judge was without jurisdiction "to determine matters of constitutional proportions
concerning the ultimate property rights of the parties," 30 N.C. App. at 404, 226 S.E.2d
at 859, while in Roberts the court decided that "[a] determination of the right to the
joint savings account was a matter for a final hearing on all the merits .... ." 30 N.C.
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peals in Bridges v. Bridges9' held the trial court lacked authority to
transfer specific terms of personal property to plaintiff immediately
after determining as a matter of law that plaintiff was not entitled to
alimony pendente lite. 2  The modification of alimony pendente lite
awards was considered in Strother v. Strother,0' in which the court of
appeals held it was not error for the trial judge to reduce the wife's award
of alimony pendente lite upon a finding of changed circumstances in her
financial status resulting from a profitable sale of land.
0 4
Several cases considered the award of attorney's fees in conjunc-
tion with an action for the support of minor children.oa The purpose
of awarding attorney's fees has always been to place the dependent
spouse on substantially even terms with the supporting spouse during
the course of the litigation. 6 After declaring that the lower court had
made insufficient findings, the court of appeals in Holt v. Holt0  held
that prior to awarding attorney's fees in a child support action the court
is required to find "'that the party ordered to furnish support has refused
to provide support which is adequate under the circumstances existing
at the time of the institution of the action or proceeding . *...' ",' The
supreme court, in Tidwell v. Booker," interpreted the attorney's fee
statute'00 to apply to proceedings for the future support of a child, but
App. at 244, 226 S.E.2d at 401; see Sguros v. Sguros, 252 N.C. 408, 412, 114 S.E.2d
79, 82 (1960); Guy v. Guy, 27 N.C. App. 343, 345-46, 219 S.E.2d 291, 293 (1975);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3(a) (1976); 2 R. LEE, supra note 4, § 138, at 166.
91. 29 N.C. App. 209, 223 S.E.2d 845 (1976).
92. The decision of the court was based on the assumption that the transfer of
property by the judge was an attempt to award the plaintiff alimony pendente lite. Id.
at 212, 223 S.E.2d at 847.
93. 29 N.C. App. 223, 223 S.E.2d 838 (1976).
94. The court of appeals relied on the general rule that "[t]he specific amount of
alimony pendente lite to be paid a dependent spouse is within the discretion of the trial
judge to determine and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of
discretion." Id. at 225, 223 S.E.2d at 840; see Griffith v. Griffith, 265 N.C. 521, 144
S.E.2d 589 (1965); Holcomb v. Holcomb, 7 N.C. App. 329, 172 S.E.2d 212 (1970).
95. Such an award is allowed by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.6 (1976).
96. See Stanback v. Stanback, 270 N.C. 497, 509, 155 S.E.2d 221, 230 (1967);
Harrell v. Harrell, 253 N.C. 758, 762, 117 S.E.2d 728, 731 (1961). The court of ap-
peals, in Wyche v. Wyche, 29 N.C. App. 685, 225 S.E.2d 626 (1976), reaffirmed the
general principle that the award of attorneys' fees is within the sound discretion of the
trial judge and binding on the appellate court in the absence of a, clear abuse of discre-
tion. See Stadiem v. Stadiem, 230 N.C. 318, 52 S.E.2d 899 (1949); 2 R. LEE, supra
note 4, § 148, at 206.
97. 29 N.C. App. 124, 223 S.E.2d 542 (1976).
98. Id. at 127, 223 S.E.2d at 544 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.6 (1976)).
See notes 38-40 and accompanying text supra for the insufficient findings of the trial
court.
99. 290 N.C. 98, 225 S.E.2d 816 (1976).
100. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.6 (1976).
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not to a proceeding to compel reimbursement for past payments made
by a person secondarily liable for the support of the child.10 1
G. Enforcement of Support
The court of appeals decided several questions with respect to the
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.102 In Pifer v. Pifer02
the parties were granted a divorce in Florida and the husband
later moved to North Carolina. The divorce order granted the wife
custody and child support and granted the husband reasonable visita-
tion rights unless otherwise ordered. Subsequently, the wife filed a
petition for support under the Act in Florida alleging the husband was
in arrears of his support obligation. Following receipt of the petition
in North Carolina, the district court judge entered an order requiring
the husband to pay the support, conditioned, however, upon his being
allowed reasonable visitation rights.'
0 4
The court of appeals voided the order imposing a visitation condi-
tion upon the husband's duty to provide support for his children, and
confined the scope of the responding state's jurisdiction to determining
"whether the defendant owed a duty of support to his children in the
initiating state of Florida, and to enter an order requiring defendant
to furnish such support."' 0 5 While recognizing that some states take a
contrary position, 06 the court stated that the main purpose of the stat-
ute is to reach husbands and fathers who abandon their support obliga-
tions, not to litigate extraneous family matters that might deprive
innocent children of support.
10 7
H. Child Neglect
The duty of a parent to provide an education for his children is
normally enforced by the compulsory school attendance law.'0 8 In In
re McMillan,' however, the court of appeals recognized a coincidental
101. See text accompanying notes 41-43 supra on secondary and primary liability.
102. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 52A-1 to -32 (1976). In Brondum v. Cox, 30 N.C. App.
35, 226 S.E.2d 193 (1976), the court of appeals held that defendant in a proceeding
under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act is entitled to a jury trial
when a genuine issue of fact is raised upon a timely motion.
103. 31 N.C. App. 486, 229 S.E.2d 700 (1976).
104. Id. at 487, 229 S.E.2d at 702.
105. Id. at 489, 229 S.E.2d at 703.
106. See, e.g., Chandler v. Chandler, 109 N.H. 477, 256 A.2d 157 (1969).
107. 31 N.C. App. at 489, 229 S.E.2d at 703.
108. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-166 (1976); see 3 R. LEE, supra note 4, § 237 at 96.
109. 30 N.C. App. 235, 226 S.E.2d 693 (1976). See also this Survey, Constitu-
tional Law: First Amendment.
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policy and held that children whose parents wilfully refused to allow
them to attend school because they were not taught Indian culture were
neglected within the meaning of G.S. 7A-278(4)." 0  In matters con-
cerning child neglect the courts have generally emphasized that a
parent's right to custody is forfeited only by misconduct or other facts
that substantially affect the welfare of the child."1  The court of
appeals in In re Godwin"2 took an extreme view of this rule in hold-
ing that the refusal of the parents to consent to the adoption of their
four-year-old daughter, who had lived in a foster home since she was
eighteen months old, and the refusal of the father, a diagnosed chronic
paranoid schizophrenic, to submit to counseling to determine his ability
as a parent did not constitute "physical abuse or serious neglect" within
the meaning of G.S. 7A-288(4). 113
1. Paternity
In State v. Morgan"4 the court of appeals approved the old practice
of exhibiting the child to the jury as evidence of its parentage.lla The
court, in response to the defendant's complaint of prejudice, held that
there was no abuse of discretion by the trial judge in allowing the district
attorney "to ask defendant questions concerning the child's features and
to thereby exhibit the child to the jury.""('
110. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-278(4) (1976). The court concluded the children were
living in an "environment injurious to their welfare," and that the action by the Depart-
ment of Social Services was in "the best interest and welfare of the children." 30 N.C.
App. at 238, 226 S.E.2d at 695.
111. See Wilson v. Wilson, 269 N.C. 676, 153 S.E.2d 349 (1967); Jolly v. Queen,
264 N.C. 711, 142 S.E.2d 592 (1965).
112. 31 N.C. App. 137, 228 S.E.2d 521 (1976).
113. Id. at 139, 228 S.E.2d at 522 (construing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-288(4)
(1976)). In light of the compelling facts presented in this case, the Court would ap-
pear to require evidence of physical abuse before the child will be considered neglected.
This would be a serious precedent, when one considers the many possible forms of abuse
that might be rendered against children and, yet, not rise to the level of actual physical
mistreatment.
114. 31 N.C. App. 128, 228 S.E.2d 523 (1976).
115. Id. at 131, 228 S.E.2d at 525; see, e.g., State v. Brackett, 218 N.C. 369, 11
S.E.2d 146 (1940); State v. Horton, 100 N.C. 443, 6 S.E. 238 (1888); State ex rel.
Stublefield, 67 N.C. 89 (1872).






In a perjury prosecution, the general rule in North Carolina
requires that the falsity of the oath be established by the testimony of
at least two witnesses, or by the testimony of one witness and corrobo-
rating circumstances.1 In State v. Home2 the North Carolina Court of
Appeals amplified the general rule when it held that to sustain a con-
viction for perjury, in addition to corroborative evidence of an inde-
pendent nature, the testimony of at least one witness must directly
prove the falsity of the oath.3  The court reversed defendant's convic-
tion, despite "plenary circumstantial and indirect evidence"' of the
crime, because of the absence of any direct testimony of perjury.
2. The Objection
In State v. Hunter5 the court followed the well-established rule in
this jurisdiction that the admission of testimony over objection cannot
be regarded as prejudicial when testimony of similar import is later ad-
mitted without objection.6 Defendant contended that his initial objec-
tion was a "line objection" within the meaning of North Carolina Rules
1. State v. King, 267 N.C. 631, 148 S.E.2d 647 (1966); State v. Arthur, 244
N.C. 582, 94 S.E.2d 646 (1956); State v. Hill, 223 N.C. 711, 28 S.E.2d 100 (1943);
State v. Rhinehart, 209 N.C. 150, 183 S.E. 388 (1936). See also 1 D. STANSBURY,
NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 21, at 51 (H. Brandis rev. 1973).
In State v. Jackson, 30 N.C. App. 187, 226 S.E.2d 543 (1976), the court of appeals
upheld the general rule that the trial judge has discretion to limit the number of wit-
nesses who can testify at trial. There was no abuse of discretion when the trial judge
allowed testimony from only five of defendant's eleven alibi witnesses since the court
found that their testimony would be cumulative and the credibility of the five witnesses
was not attacked by the State. Id. at 188-89, 226 S.E.2d at 544; see 1 D. STANSBURY,
supra.
2. 28 N.C. App. 475, 221 S.E.2d 715 (1976).
3. Id. at 477, 221 S.E.2d at 716. The court relied on State v. Molier, 12 N.C.
263, 1 Dev. 217 (1827), establishing the rule that the testimony by at least one witness
must be direct proof of the crime.
4. 28 N.C. App. at 477, 221 S.E.2d at 716.
5. 290 N.C. 556, 227 S.E.2d 535 (1976), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1106 (1977).
6. Id. at 572, 227 S.E.2d at 545. See also State v. Harris, 290 N.C. 681, 695,
228 S.E.2d 437, 445 (1976). In Harris, the court also sustained the general principle
that failure to make an objection waives the right to appeal the evidence so admitted.
Id. at 695, 228 S.E.2d at 445; see State v. Norwood, 289 N.C. 424, 430, 222 S.E.2d
253, 257 (1976). But see State v. Warren, 289 N.C. 551, 223 S.E.2d 317 (1976),
in which the court took cognizance of error ex meru motu.
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of Civil Procedure, rule 46(a)(1), 7 and that, therefore, the court
should deem that a like objection had been taken to the subsequent
admission of testimony involving the same line of questioning!, The
court noted that the "line objection," an evidentiary rule of civil proce-
dure, had never been applied in a criminal case in North Carolina, but
indicated that under appropriate circumstances an extension of this rule
to criminal cases might be forthcoming.0 The court further noted that
the objection must be to a specified line of questioning, and since de-
fendant merely objected generally, he would have been unable to avail
himself of the rule in any case.' 0
3. Leading Questions
In 1976 the North Carolina courts reaffirmed the established law
in this jurisdiction that the trial court has broad discretion over the use
of leading questions and that its rulings are reversible only for gross
abuse of discretion." Guidelines for situations in which leading ques-
The court also upheld the rule that when evidence is competent for some purposes,
but not for others, the objecting party must timely request an instruction that its purpose
be so limited. State v. Brower, 289 N.C. 644, 664, 224 S.E.2d 551, 565 (1976) (trial
court did not err by its failure to instruct jury that prior convictions may be used only
for impeachment purposes when defendant fails to request limiting instruction); State
v. Cox, 289 N.C. 414, 419, 222 S.E.2d 246, 250 (1976) (no error in not giving limiting
instruction to jury regarding use of photograph in evidence, since no instruction was
requested). The court of appeals also sustained this rule in State v. Lankford, 31 N.C.
App. 13, 15-16, 228 S.E.2d 641, 643 (1976) (defendant not entitled to limiting instruc-
tion, since defendant made only a general objection to the introduction of evidence
at trial and failed to request a limiting instruction). See 1 D. STANSBURY, supra note
1, §§ 27, 79.
7. N.C.R. Civ. P. 46(a) (1) provides:
When there is objection to the admission of evidence on the ground that the
witness is for a specified reason incompetent or not qualified or disqualified,
it shall be deemed that a like objection has been made to any subsequent ad-
mission of evidence from the witness in question. Similarly, when there is ob-
jection to the admission of evidence involving a specified line of questioning,
it shall be deemed that a like objection has been taken to any subsequent ad-
mission of evidence involving the same line of questioning.
8. 290 N.C. at 572, 227 S.E.2d at 545; see 1 D. STANSBURY, supra note 1, § 30,
at 81-82.
9. For example, the rule might be extended to the criminal context when line ob-
jections are sanctioned by the trial judge. 290 N.C. at 572-73, 227 S.E.2d at 545.
10. Id.
11. State v. Harris, 290 N.C. 681, 694-95, 228 S.E.2d 437, 444-45 (1976) (no
abuse when leading questions produced merely cumulative evidence and when similar
evidence was later admitted without objection); State v. Peplinski, 290 N.C. 236, 241-
43, 225 S.E.2d 568, 572 (1976) (no abuse of discretion when witness allowed to respond
to questions with "yes" or "no" answers); State v. Smith, 290 N.C. 148, 160-61, 226
S.E.2d 10, 18 (1976) (no abuse when questions fall within permissible guidelines). In
State v. Watlington, 30 N.C. App. 101, 226 S.E.2d 186 (1976), the court of appeals
held that the trial court did err when it asked leading questions to the witness for the
purpose of clarifying his testimony.
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tions are permissible were enumerated in State v. Smith. 2
4. Refreshing Memory of Witness
In State v. Greene'" the court of appeals held in line with the law
in this jurisdiction that a witness can be compelled to read and inspect
a writing in court for the purpose of refreshing his memory.14 Simi-
larly, a tape recording is admissible, subject to strict requirements, 15 to
refresh the recollection of a witness (and as substantive evidence). 16
The court of appeals maintained this strict standard by its affirmance
of two cases' 7 in which the trial court excluded tape recordings from
admission into evidence because of a failure to meet the authentication
requirements.
12. The established guidelines provide:
"[C]ounsel should be allowed to lead his witness on direct examination when
the witness is: (1) hostile or unwilling to testify, (2) has difficulty in under-
standing the question because of immaturity, age, infirmity or ignorance or
where (3) the inquiry is into a subject of delicate nature such as sexual mat-
ters, (4) the witness is called to contradict the testimony of prior witnesses,
(5) the examiner seeks to aid the witness' recollection or refresh his memory
when the witness has exhausted his memory without stating the particular mat-
ters required, (6) the questions are asked for securing preliminary or intro-
ductory testimony, (7) the examiner directs attention to the subject at hand
without suggesting answers and (8) the mode of questioning is best calculated
to elicit the truth."
290 N.C. 148, 161, 226 S.E.2d 10, 18 (1976) (quoting State v. Greene, 285 N.C. 482,
492-93, 206 S.E.2d 229, 236 (1974)).
13. 30 N.C. App. 507, 227 S.E.2d 154 (1976).
14. Id. at 510, 227 S.E.2d at 156. See generally 1 D. STANSBURY, supra note
1, § 32, at 88. In Greene, the trial court did not err by directing the witness to read,
out of the jury's presence, two statements, one by his own hand and the Qther a sum-
mary of statements made by him to a private prosecutor and a deputy sheriff, for the
purpose of refreshing the witness' memory. 30 N.C. App. at 510, 227 S.E.2d at 156.
15. See State v. Lynch, 279 N.C. 1, 17-18, 181 S.E.2d 561, 571-72 (1971).
16. See I D. STANSBURY, supra note 1, § 32, at 89-90 & § 33, at 92.
17. State v. Harmon, 31 N.C. App. 368, 229 S.E.2d 233 (1976) (tape recording
properly excluded when defendant failed to establish the authenticity and correctness
of the recording, to show the manner of the preservation of the recording, and to iden-
tify properly the speakers); Traywick v. Traywick, 28 N.C. App. 291, 221 S.E.2d 85
(1976) (exclusion of tape recording proper when not authenticated as required by State
v. Lynch, 279 N.C. 1, 181 S.E.2d 561 (1971)); see text accompanying note 15 supra.
The generally established authentication requirements for the admissibility of a tape
recording are a showing:
(1) that the recorded testimony was legally obtained and otherwise competent;
(2) that the mechanical device was capable of recording testimony and that
it was operating properly at the time the statement was recorded; (3) that the
operator was competent and operated the machine properly; (4) the identity
of the recorded voices; (5) the accuracy and authenticity of the recording; (6)
that the defendant's entire statement was recorded and no changes, additions,
or deletions have since been made; and (7) the custody and manner in which
the recording has been preserved since it was made.
State v. Lynch, 279 N.C. 1, 17, 181 S.E.2d 561 571 (1971). See also State v. Harmon,
31 N.C. App. 368, 370, 229 S.E.2d 233, 234 (1976).
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5. Photographs, Maps and Models
The general rule continues to exist in North Carolina that photo-
graphs, maps, and other diagrams are admissible, if relevant, to
illustrate a witness' testimony.' Relevant and material photographs
are not inadmissible merely because they tend to be gory and arouse
prejudice, 19 or because they were not made at the time of the crime.20
6. Impeachment of One's Own Witness
In State v. Smith21 the supreme court reiterated the general rule
in North Carolina that the State may not impeach its own witness
through the use of character evidence or prior inconsistent statements.
18. State v. McKenna, 289 N.C. 668, 224 S.E.2d 537 (1976) (court did not err
by admitting two photographs of victim's body for the purpose of illustrating the witness'
testimony); State v. Williams, 289 N.C. 439, 222 S.E.2d 242 (1976) (admission of
photograph of deceased not error even though defendant did not contest cause of death,
since photograph was admissible to illustrate doctor's testimony regarding the cause of
death); State v. Lester, 289 N.C. 239, 221 S.E.2d 268 (1976) (photographs admissible
to illustrate witness' testimony so that court and jury might better evaluate the testi-
mony); State Highway Comm'n v. Rose, 31 N.C. App. 28, 228 S.E.2d 664 (1976)
(in land condemnation proceeding error to prohibit defendants from introducing maps,
photographs and other exhibits for purpose of illustrating testimony); cf. State v. Craw-
ford, 29 N.C. App. 487, 224 S.E.2d 680 (1976) (not error to refer to photograph not
placed into evidence when defendant had been cross-examined about the photograph
and had acknowledged that it was a picture of himself and when the prosecutor apolo-
gized for such reference).
19. State v. McKenna, 289 N.C. 668, 224 S.E.2d 537 (1976) (court did not abuse
discretion by admitting two photographs of deceased's mutilated body at scene of crime
when not excessive, unnecessarily duplicative, or inflammatory); State v. Williams, 289
N.C. 439, 222 S.E.2d 242 (1976) (it can be concluded that admitted photograph of
deceased was not unduly inflammatory when trial court later excluded another photo-
graph that it did consider to be unduly inflammatory); State v. Cox, 289 N.C. 414,
222 S.E.2d 246 (1976) (not error to admit photograph of the deceased's appearance
at the hospital the night he died).
20. State v. Cox, 289 N.C. 414, 222 S.E.2d 246 (1976) (no error when photograph
is of deceased's body after it had been removed to the hospital); State v. Lester, 289
N.C. 239, 221 S.E.2d 268 (1968) (no error when photograph taken at scene of crime
in daylight even though crime was committed at night).
21. 289 N.C. 143, 221 S.E.2d 247 (1976).
22. See, e.g., State v. Pope, 287 N.C. 505, 215 S.E.2d 139 (1975); State v. Ander-
son, 283 N.C. 218, 195 S.E.2d 561 (1973); State v. Tilley, 239 N.C. 245, 79 S.E.2d
473 (1954). See generally 1 D. STANsnuxY, supra note 1, § 40.
The court in State v. Peplinski, 290 N.C. 236, 225 S.E.2d 568 (1976), did not
order a new trial even though the prosecutor attempted to discredit a State's witness
through evidence of prior inconsistent statements. The court found "little evidence of
prejudice to defendant since the witness seemed to get the better of [the] exchange."
Id. at 250, 225 S.E.2d at 576. The court also noted that the trial court gave prompt
curative instructions. Id. See also State v. Wilson, 30 N.C. App. 149, 226 S.E.2d
518 (1976) (confession by a State's witness on direct testimony of perjury committed
at a former trial did not violate the rule against impeachment of one's own witness,
since the testimony was introduced in defendant's own perjury trial for the purpose
Additionally, the court scrutinized for the first time a factual situation
relevant to the State v. Pope23 exception to the anti-impeachment rule,
whereby a party can impeach his own witness when the party has been
"misled and surprised, or entrapped to his prejudice" 24 by his witness.
The State's witness, a convicted criminal who had testified for the
prosecution in defendant's first trial (which had ended in a mistrial),
became uncooperative with the prosecution before the subsequent trial
when the district attorney refused to guarantee him a reduced prison
sentence in exchange for his testimony. The district attorney called
him to testify anyway, and the witness contradicted his testimony at the
first trial. When the trial court was apprised of the reason for the wit-
ness' different testimony, it allowed the district attorney to lead and
cross-examine the witness in an attempt to impeach his changed story.
On appeal, the supreme court reversed and ordered a new trial, since
it drew the "inescapable conclusion" that "the State was seeking not
only to impeach the credibility of its own witness but was also attempt-
ing to force the witness to give the jury the same account of events
he had given at the first trial. '2 5 The court refused to apply the State
v. Pope exception, pointing out that surprise means "taken unawares,"
and that under these circumstances the district attorney had substantial
reason to believe that his witness would be uncooperative on the stand.
Therefore, the prosecutor could not have been surprised by the testi-
mony and could not avail himself of the anti-impeachment exception.
Instead, the prosecutor should have refused to call the witness at all.26
7. Impeachment of Another Party's Witness
Any witness, deponent, or person whose hearsay statements are
received into evidence-other than a party who seeks impeachment-
may be impeached by various methods2 T The court of appeals held
that the trial court did not err when it allowed cross-examination of a
witness, for impeachment purposes, concerning prior statements other-
of establishing the falsity of the oath of defendant, who had corroborated the witness'
perjured testimony at the former trial).
23. 287 N.C. 505, 215 S.E.2d 139 (1975). In Pope the court took the opportunity
to establish this new exception without its being pertinent to the facts of the case.
24. Id. at 512, 215 S.E.2d at 144.
25. 289 N.C. at 157, 221 S.E.2d at 255.
26. Id. at 159, 221 S.E.2d at 256.
27. 1 D. STANSBURY, supra note 1, § 39, at 113-14. See also this Survey, Civil
Procedure: Trial Court Review of Judgments (admissibility of arbitrator's statement to
impeach his award).
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wise inadmissible2" and prior conduct inconsistent with the witness'
testimony.
2 9
In another case, the court of appeals held improper the trial court's
exclusion of expert evidence on the mental capacity and psychiatric his-
tory of the State's eyewitness that defendant wanted admitted to
impeach the witness' credibility. 3° The court stated that defendant had
a right to use this evidence to impeach the State's eyewitness and
ordered a new trial.3 '
Generally, a witness can be impeached by a showing of bias due
to interest.3 2 In State v. Lamb33 the court of appeals held, however, that
when the witness' interest in avoiding self-incrimination was at least as
strong as his bias as an interested witness, a jury instruction that the testi-
mony of the witness should be carefully scrutinized because of the wit-
ness' bias was improper.34
8. Impeachment of Defendant
A defendant who testifies in his own behalf is subject to impeach-
ment by cross-examination to the same extent as any other witness, and,
in addition, he surrenders his privilege against self-incrimination. 5 On
the stand a defendant becomes subject to impeachment by questions
concerning not only specific acts of criminal and degrading conduct but
28. Maness v. Ingram, 29 N.C. App. 26, 222 S.E.2d 737 (1976). In Maness the
trial court allowed defendant to cross-examine plaintiff's witness about a statement the
witness had made to an insurance adjuster. Although the statement was otherwise inad-
missible, the court allowed cross-examination concerning it for impeachment purposes
only, as long as the parties did not indicate that the statement had been obtained by
an adjuster.
29. State v. Lankford, 31 N.C. App. 13, 228 S.E.2d 641 (1976). In Lankford
defendant's witness had testified in support of defendant's alibi. The prosecutor was
allowed to impeach the witness by questions about his conduct prior to trial to show
that the witness failed to inform the police about defendant's alibi, an event that would
have tended to absolve defendant from wrongdoing.
30. State v. Wright, 29 N.C. App. 752, 225 S.E.2d 645 (1976).
31. Id. at 753, 225 S.E.2d at 645-46. But see Peterson v. Johnson, 28 N.C. App.
527, 221 S.E.2d 920 (1976) (Trial court did not err in refusing to permit defendant
to cross-examine a policeman concerning a statement made by an eyewitness at the
scene of the collision, since the eyewitness had not yet testified. When the eyewitness
later testified that he could not remember the contents of his statement, the court said
defendant had to call the policeman as his own witness, if he wanted to question him
further about the eyewitness' statement.).
32. See generally 1 D. STANsHurY, supra note 1, § 45.
33. 30 N.C. App. 255, 226 S.E.2d 680 (1976).
34. Id. at 257, 226 S.E.2d at 682. In this case the witness, defendant's uncle,
testified that he had committed the offense with which defendant was charged.
35. 1 D. S-rNSBURY, supra note 1, § 56, at 163-65.
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also acts that tend to impeach his character.
36  In State v. McKenna37
the court refused defendant's request to repudiate the above evidenti-
ary rules and held that these rules are necessary to allow the state to
impeach "the credibility of a defendant's self-serving testimony.""8
B. Competency
1. Husband and Wife in Criminal Actions
In State v. Aaron39 defendant was charged, inter alia, with larceny
of personal property. At the trial a police officer testified for the State
that the stolen property was recovered as a result of information volun-
tarily supplied by defendant's wife and another person. On appeal de-
fendant contended that the admission of the police officer's testimony
violated not only the hearsay rule but also the husband-wife statutory
privilege4" that provides that one spouse is not competent to testify
against the other in a criminal proceeding. The court of appeals
affirmed and held that the hearsay rule was not violated since the offi-
cer's testimony was not admitted to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.4' The court also said that G.S. 8-57 does not prohibit the
36. See, e.g., State v. Mack, 282 N.C. 334, 193 S.E.2d 71 (1972); State v. Gainey,
280 N.C. 366, 185 S.E.2d 874 (1972); State v. Sims, 213 N.C. 590, 197 S.E. 176 (1938).
37. 289 N.C. 668, 224 S.E.2d 537 (1976).
38. Id. at 685, 224 S.E.2d at 548. In McKenna the district attorney cross-ex-
amined defendant about unrelated criminal conduct, and while doing so, held arrest
warrants in his hand in plain view of the jury. Although the court said that it would
be highly improper to exhibit to the jury outstanding arrest warrants in which defendant
is accused of offenses unrelated to the charge at trial, there was no error since the
jury was not aware of the nature of the documents. See also State v. Lester, 289 N.C.
239, 245, 221 S.E.2d 268, 272 (1976) (proper to ask defendant why he had not turned
himself in to the police after defendant had already testified that he "did not want
to run"); State v. Sanders, 29 N.C. App. 662, 225 S.E.2d 620 (1976) (not improper
or inflammatory on voir dire to ask defendant, on trial for attempted armed robbery,
whether he had grabbed a purse of an "old lady" in an unrelated incident); State v.
Clark, 28 N.C. App. 585, 221 S.E.2d 841 (1976) (no error to cross-examine defendant,
charged with second degree rape, as to whether he had ever written worthless checks).
39. 29 N.C. App. 582, 225 S.E.2d 117, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 663, 228 S.E.2d
455 (1976).
40. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57 (Supp. 1975) provides in part:
The husband or wife of the defendant, in all criminal actions or proceedings,
shall be a competent witness for the defendant, but the failure of such witness
to be examined shall not be used to the prejudice of the defense. Every such
person examined as a witness shall be subject to be cross-examined as are other
witnesses. No husband or wife shall be compellable to disclose any confiden-
tial communication made by one to the other during their marriage. Nothing
herein shall render any spouse competent or compellable to give evidence
against the other spouse in any criminal action or proceeding, except to prove
the fact of marriage and facts tending to show the absence of divorce or annul-
ment in cases of bigamy and in cases of criminal cohabitation in violation of
the provision of G.S. 14-183 ....
41. 29 N.C. App. 582, 585, 225 S.E.2d 117, 119 (1976).
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making of voluntary statements by a husband or wife to the police dur-
ing a criminal investigation. 2
Although the court's view of G.S. 8-57 may be technically correct
in that the statute does not expressly prohibit the making of a statement
by a spouse, case law within North Carolina has generally established
that extrajudicial statements by a defendant's spouse are not admissible
against the defendant in a criminal proceeding, unless the statements
were made in the defendant's presence or by the defendant's authority
and were not denied.48 The court in this case seems to have added
to the exceptions 44 to this general rule by its allowance of references
to extrajudicial declarations by a defendant's spouse when the referen-
ces are not admitted to prove the truth of the matter asserted within
the declarations.
In State v. Cousin45 the North Carolina Supreme Court held in a
case related to State v. Aaron that G.S. 8-57 cannot be invoked to sup-
press a gun that was obtained by the police through the directions and
assistance of defendant's spouse.48  Defendant contended that his
spouse knew the location of the weapon through a confidential marital
communication and that, therefore, the gun was "fruit of the poisonous
tree."47 The court, however, refused to apply this fourth amendment
doctrine to the evidentiary rule in G.S. 8-57. It also stated that G.S.
8-57 alone did not bar the production of the gun into evidence, since
defendant's spouse never testified and no extrajudicial statements by
her were admitted into evidence.48
In another case the supreme court, in line with established author-
ity,49 ordered a new trial when the trial court violated G.S. 8-57 by
allowing the State to prejudice the defense through references in cross-
examination and jury argument to defendant's wife's failure to testify
and by not instructing the jury that defendant's failure to call his wife
42. Id.
43. See State v. Dillahunt, 244 N.C. 524, 94 S.E.2d 479 (1956); State v. Warren,
236 N.C. 358, 72 S.E.2d 763 (1952); State v. Reid, 178 N.C. 745, 101 S.E. 104 (1919).
44. See 1 D. STANSBURY, supra note 1, § 59, at 187, 188 & n.18.
45. 291 N.C. 413, 230 S.E.2d 518 (1976).
46. Id. at 418-19, 230 S.E.2d at 521.
47. Id.
48. Id. An additional reason for not applying the husband-wife privileged com-
munications rule is that under the facts of the case a third party had also been informed
as to the location of the gun; therefore, the communication was not strictly confidential
between defendant and his spouse. See I D. STANSBURY, supra note 1, § 60, at 192.
49. State v. Porter, 272 N.C. 463, 158 S.E.2d 626 (1968); State v. Dillahunt, 244
N.C. 524, 94 S.E.2d 479 (1956); State v. Helms, 218 N.C. 592, 12 S.E.2d 243 (1940).
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as a witness could not be used against him.5"
2. Husband and Wife in Civil Actions
Although G.S. 8-5651 states that a spouse is both competent and
compellable to testify against the other spouse in all civil actions and
proceedings, it also bars a spouse from testifying "for or against the
other in any action or proceeding in consequence of adultery, or...
for divorce on account of adultery."" z In an action for alimony without
divorce, the court of appeals held admissible plaintiff's testimony re-
garding defendant's visits with a female neighbor, since plaintiff was
not attempting to prove adultery but merely that defendant offered her
indignities by evidencing a greater preference for another female than
for herself and since there was no clear implication of intercourse.53
3. Age
In a case of first impression, State v. Bolton,54 the court of appeals
held that it was in the trial court's discretion whether to instruct the
jury to consider the age and maturity of minor witnesses in determining
the credibility and weight of their testimony. 5 Two girls, ages nine
and ten, testified at trial to the events that they had witnessed shortly
after a robbery of a convenience store. Both girls identified defendant
as the driver of a car that had raced away from the store parking lot.
The trial court refused defendant's requested jury instruction56 that the
children's age and maturity should be considered in the assessment of
their testimony. Defendant asserted that the trial court should be re-
quired to give the instruction when requested.5 7  The court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's ruling, although the appellate court did not
50. State v. McCall, 289 N.C. 570, 223 S.E.2d 334 (1976).
51. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-56 (1975).
52. Id.
53. Traywick v. Traywick, 28 N.C. App. 291, 221 S.E.2d 85 (1976).
54. 28 N.C. App. 497, 221 S.E.2d 747, cert. denied, 289 N.C. 616, 223 S.E.2d
455 (1976).
55. Id. at 499, 221 S.E.2d at 748.
56. Defendant requested the following instruction: "Minor children have testified
for the prosecution during this trial. The Court instructs you that they are legally
competent so to testify, but you should, in determining the credibility and weight to
be given their testimony, consider their age and maturity." Id. at 499, 221 S.E.2d at
748.
57. For jurisdictions in support of defendant's position, see State v. Anderson, 152
Conn. 196, 205 A.2d 488 (1964); Rosche v. McCoy, 397 Pa. 615, 156 A.2d 307 (1959).
For jurisdictions that have ruled otherwise, see People v. Norred, 110 Cal. App. 2d
492, 243 P.2d 126, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 869 (1952); Overton v. State, 230 Ga. 830,
199 S.E.2d 205 (1973); Marks v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 769, 218 N.W.2d 328 (1974).
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say the instruction would never be proper. The court of appeals
merely felt that the trial court should not, as a matter of law, be re-
quired to give the instruction upon a party's request and held that the
trial judge could determine, based upon the evidence in the case, when
such an instruction would be appropriate.5"
C. Relevancy
1. Fingerprints
In a case that involved armed robbery of a convenience store, the
court of appeals held that it was permissible to admit evidence that de-
fendant's thumbprint was found on a small cake that was on a store
counter.5 9 Defendant contended that the print was of no probative
value, since the store was a public place and his print could have been
impressed there at any time. The court ruled, however, that there was
sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a jury could find that de-
fendant's print was impressed at the time of the crime.60
2. Condition at One Time as Evidence of Condition
at Another Time
In an action to recover on a life insurance policy when defendant-
insurer's reason for non-payment was that the insured had committed
suicide, the court of appeals affirmed the exclusion of the deceased's
medical records that indicated he was hospitalized for depression six
months prior to his alleged accidental shooting death.01 The court held
that the medical evidence in decedent's hospital records was too remote
to be of probative value.2
3. Prior Offenses
In a prosecution for kidnapping and murder, evidence that
defendant committed a separate and distinct crime on another occasion
was admissible for the purpose of rebutting defendant's attempt to im-
peach the State's witness by suggesting that the witness had committed
58. 28 N.C. App. at 499, 221 S.E.2d at 748.
59. State v. Gaten, 28 N.C. App. 273, 220 S.E.2d 845 (1976). See also State
v. McNeil, 28 N.C. App. 347, 220 S.E.2d 869 (1976) (no prejudicial error in admitting
into evidence defendant's fingerprint identification card).
60. 28 N.C. App. 273, 276-77, 220 S.E.2d 845, 848 (1976).
61. Adcock v. Life Assurance Co., 31 N.C. App. 97, 228 S.E.2d 654 (1976).
62. Id. at 100, 228 S.E.2d at 656.
1042 [Vol. 55
1977] EVIDENCE 1043
the other crime.6 3  In a trial for first degree burglary, testimony by a
State's witness, before defendant ever testified, that defendant had par-
ticipated in numerous breakings and enterings and stealings throughout




A single reference by a witness to his taking a polygraph test with-
out disclosure of the questions asked, the answers given, or the results
received did not constitute prejudicial error when the court immediately
instructed the jury to disregard the statement.6 5 In a prosecution for
felonious possession of a controlled substance (marijuana), testimony
from an expert chemical and microscopic analyst that he had examined
the contents of nineteen envelopes seized from defendant and that the
contents appeared to be the same, and that analysis of five envelopes
chosen at random indicated the contents were marijuana was sufficient
evidence to submit to the jury whether the contents of all the envelopes
were marijuana. 6
E. Evidence Illegally Obtained
In Rickenbaker v. Rickenbaker67 the supreme court affirmed a
lower court order that excluded from trial all references of plaintiff's
63. State v. Shrader, 290 N.C. 253, 225 S.E.2d 522 (1976). In Shrader defendant
attempted to impeach a State's witness by suggesting to the jury that the witness had
been involved in kidnappings and murders. The court held that it was then proper,
on redirect, for the state to show that defendant was the kidnapper and murderer on
the other occasion. This questioning was allowed despite the rule that the State cannot
offer evidence through its own witness that tends to show that defendant committed
an unrelated and separate offense to the crime charged, except its tendency to show
his disposition to commit a crime similar to the one for which he is on trial. Id.
at 264, 225 S.E.2d at 530.
64. State v. Duncan, 290 N.C. 741, 228 S.E.2d 237 (1976); accord, State v.
Hunter, 290 N.C. 556, 227 S.E.2d 535 (1976); State v. Hamrick, 30 N.C. App. 143,
226 S.E.2d 404 (1976), in which it was held proper to admit evidence of a prior crime
by defendant, when it tended "to show quo animo, intent, design, guilty knowledge,
make out the res gestae, or shows a chain of circumstances concerning the offense
charged .... ." Id. at 146, 226 S.E.2d at 406. In Hamrick, evidence that defendant
had not received his share of the stolen money from a prior robbery from an accomplice
and that the accomplice, who had told defendant that he had lost the booty, was spend-
ing money freely was competent to show intent and design for defendant to kill the
accomplice. Id. at 146, 226 S.E.2d at 407.
65. State v. Montgomery, 291 N.C. 235, 229 S.E.2d 904 (1976); cf. State v. Harris,
290 N.C. 681, 228 S.E.2d 437 (1976) (trial court did not err in allowing references
in jury arguments to the results of a polygraph test, since evidence regarding the test
results had been introduced without objection).
66. State v. Hayes, 291 N.C. 293, 230 S.E.2d 146 (1976).
67. 290 N.C. 373, 226 S.E.2d 347 (1976).
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alleged adulterous conduct discovered as a result of telephone calls in-
tercepted in violation of federal law. 8 In an action for child support
and alimony, defendant answered, as a bar to plaintiff's claim, with alle-
gations of adulterous conduct by plaintiff. At a hearing on plaintiff's
motion to suppress, defendant related that he had the phone company
install in a closet in his office an extension to his home telephone. De-
fendant testified that he then installed, without plaintiff's knowledge
or consent, a sound activated tape recorder to the phone. As a result
of the recorded conversations, defendant was able to garner information
concerning the alleged adulterous conduct, despite defendant's state-
ment that his purpose in recording was to determine if his spouse was
referring his business calls to the office.
The trial court found defendant in violation of the federal law,
ruled stricken the allegations of adultery in defendant's answer, and
denied defendant the use at trial of any evidence obtained through the
use of the illegal telephone interceptions. 9 The court of appeals af-
firmed the order pertaining to the exclusions of evidence at trial, but
vacated the order in so far as it excluded defendant's allegations in his
answer.70  The supreme court affirmed, holding that there was ample
evidence to find that defendant had not used the telephone in the
course of his business.7 1  Furthermore, the court refuted defendant's
argument that Congress did not intend for the law to extend to a spouse
tapping telephone conversations of the other spouse.7 2 The court in-
terpreted the Act literally and held, in accordance with federal law, that
no evidence derived from illegally intercepted communications may be
68. Id. at 382, 226 S.F.2d at 353. The relevant federal law is the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Street Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970). In particular,
18 U.S.C. § 2515 provides:
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the
contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be re-
ceived in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any
court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative com-
mittee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivi-
sion thereof if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this
chapter.
69. 290 N.C. at 375, 226 S.E.2d at 349.
70. 28 N.C. App. 644, 648, 222 S.E.2d 463, 465 (1976).
71. 290 N.C. at 379, 226 S.E.2d at 350. The court followed United States v.
Harpel, 493 F.2d 346 (10th Cir. 1974), which held that use of a telephone extension,
without authorization or consent, to tap and record a private telephone conversation was,
as a matter of law, not in the ordinary course of business.
72. Defendant relied heavily on Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974), in which the Fifth Circuit found no legislative intent
to extend the Act to inter-spousal communications.
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placed into evidence in any trial.78
F. Opinion
In State v. Bush 4 the North Carolina Supreme Court, in dictum,
recognized the modem criticism of the rule that "opinion evidence is
not admissible because it invades the province of the jury"' 5 and dis-
approved of dicta in two older cases advocating strict adherence to the
rule. 71 In Bush, defendant, in an attempt to rehabilitate his credibil-
ity, asked a police officer whether all the information defendant had
given him had been accurate and truthful. The trial court sustained
the State's objection to the answer. The supreme court found, notwith-
standing dicta to the contrary, that "[i]t would have been a waste of
time for the officer to testify as to how each fact in defendant's state-
ment was confirmed by his independent investigation. '7 7  The court
concluded that the "challenged answer was a shorthand statement of
fact and should not have been rejected on the ground that it invaded
the province of the jury. 78
A state highway patrolman who did not see the vehicle in motion
will not be permitted to express an opinion as to its speed based on
the tire marks and other conditions observed by him at the scene of
the accident; 79 however, a witness who briefly observed an approaching
car may express his opinion as to the speed of the car.8" North Caro-
lina's well established policy of allowing nonexpert witnesses to express
73. 290 N.C. at 382, 226 S.E.2d at 352. The court, however, limited the decision
to the facts of the case, and left open the possibility that such evidence may be available
for impeachment purposes. Id. at 382, 226 S.E.2d at 353.
74. 289 N.C. 159, 221 S.E.2d 333 (1976), vacated on other grounds mem., 97
S. Ct. 46 (1976).
75. Id. at 168, 221 S.E.2d at 339. See generally 1 D. STANSBURY, supra note
1, § 126.
76. State v. Summerlin, 232 N.C. 333, 339, 60 S.E.2d 322, 326 (1950); State v.
McLaughlin, 126 N.C. 873, 35 S.E. 1037 (1900).
77. 289 N.C. at 169, 221 S.E.2d at 339.
78. Id.; see Peterson v. Johnson, 28 N.C. App. 527, 532, 221 S.E.2d 920, 924
(1976) ("car tilted" permissible shorthand statement).
79. Johnson v. Yates, 31 N.C. App. 358, 229 S.E.2d 309 (1976) (citing Tyndall
v. Hines Co., 226 N.C. 620, 39 S.E.2d 828 (1946)).
80. State v. Gainey, 29 N.C. App. 653, 225 S.E.2d 843 (1976). Arguably, an
expert who has observed the conditions at the scene of the accident should be just as
qualified to express an opinion about the speed of a vehicle as a lay witness who had
but a brief glimpse of the car. The court, however, has not permitted expert opinion
about a vehicle's speed on the basis of observations made after the accident. See, e.g.,
Hughes v. Vestal, 264 N.C. 500, 142 S.E.2d 361 (1965). It has been suggested that
an expert is more capable of drawing conclusions about speed on the basis of post
accident observations than is the jury. 1 D. STANSBURY, supra note 1, § 131, at 422
n.56.
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an opinion as to a person's mental capacity and condition was restated
in State v. Hedrick."'
Expert Testimony
In State v. Taylor82 the supreme court declined to require a new
trial on the ground of a technical error made by the State in the formu-
lation of a hypothetical question. The State's question in Taylor
assumed a fact that had not yet been admitted into evidence.8" Subse-
quently, the State introduced sufficient evidence from which the jury
could infer the fact that had been erroneously assumed. The court
noted that it had held previously that "the incorporation into a hypo-
thetical question of an assumed finding as to a vital fact of which there
was no evidence is ground for a new trial;"84 the court concluded, how-
ever, that "the erroneous assumption . . . in the hypothetical question
was not of such vital nature as to require a new trial."85  In light of
Taylor, an erroneous assumption of a fact in a hypothetical question
will not necessarily result in a new trial, provided that the error is not
unduly prejudicial and that sufficient evidence of the erroneously
assumed fact is subsequently admitted.
8 6
The hypothetical question in Taylor was also challenged on the
ground that a hypothetical question designed to elicit an opinion as to
81. 289 N.C. 232, 221 S.E.2d 350 (1976); accord, In re Will of Wadsworth, 30
N.C. App. 593, 227 S.E.2d 632 (1976) (opinion testimony on mental condition of testa-
tor).
82. 290 N.C. 220, 226 S.E.2d 23 (1976).
83. Id. at 229, 226 S.E.2d at 28-29. The State's hypothetical erroneously assumed
a finding that defendant concealed a weapon under a coat worn for that purpose and
that defendant provided a wig to conceal the identity of an accomplice. The State
was attempting to elicit an opinion that defendant could distinguish between right and
wrong at the time the crime was committed.
84. Id. at 229, 226 S.E.2d at 28. The prior authority cited by the court is State
v. Simpson, 244 N.C. 325, 93 S.E.2d 425 (1956). In Simpson, unlike Taylor, no evi-
dence of the erroneously assumed finding was subsequently admitted.
85. 290 N.C. at 229, 226 S.E.2d at 28. The court did not explicitly explain the
reasoning behind its conclusion although one assumes that the error was alleviated by
the subsequent proof of the erroneously assumed facts.
86. Erroneous assumption of findings in a hypothetical question would still be a
ground for a new trial when no subsequent proof is made of the erroneously assumed
facts. State v. Simpson, 244 N.C. 325, 93 S.E.2d 425 (1956) (no subsequent proof
made); Keenan v. Commissioners of New Hanover County, 167 N.C. 356, 83 S.E. 556
(1914) (no subsequent proof made); see Bryant v. Russell, 266 N.C. 629, 146 S.E.2d
813 (1966), in which the court declined to express an opinion as to the issue resolved
in Taylor. In Bryant it was held proper to deny a later request to read an answer
to a hypothetical to the jury, even after proof of erroneously assumed facts had been
made, because the expert witness was not available for cross-examination. The court
reserved judgment on whether the request should have been granted had the expert been
available.
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defendant's sanity should have made reference to defendant's extensive
history of mental illness and his prior judicial commitments. The court
concluded that this omission did not present a state of facts so incom-
plete that an opinion about defendant's sanity would have been obvi-
ously unreliable.8 7  The adversary, noted the court, has a right to pre-
sent the omitted phases of evidence in a counter-hypothetical ques-
tion.
88
If an expert witness is asked in a hypothetical question for an
opinion relating to cause and effect, the expert should be asked
whether in his opinion a particular event or condition could or might
have produced the result in question; however, "if the expert has a
positive opinion on the subject, he should be allowed to express it with-
out using the 'could' or 'might' formula."8 9
In ITT-Industrial Credit Co. v. Milo Concrete Co.9" the court of
appeals found that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed
to qualify as an expert a witness who possessed extensive knowledge of
the design, assembly and operation of defendant's concrete machinery.
The fact that the witness was employed by a party to the litigation does
not disqualify him from testifying as an expert; rather, the effect of the
expert's employment upon the weight of his testimony is a matter for
the jury.9 '
Although expert testimony on differences in soil is "ostensibly new
to North Carolina," it is proper for a witness who qualifies as an expert
87. 290 N.C. at 229, 226 S.E.2d at 28. An adversary need not outline in his
hypothetical question all possible theories upon which the opinion of the expert could
be based. Counsel "may form his hypothetical question on any theory which can be
deduced from the evidence and select as a predicate therefor such facts as the evidence
reasonably tends to prove." Dean v. Carolina Coach Co., 287 N.C. 515, 518, 215
S.E.2d 89, 92 (1975) (thorough discussion by Branch, J.). See generally 1 D. STANS-
BURY, supra note 1, § 137, at 145 n. 90 (Supp. 1976).
88. 290 N.C. at 230, 226 S.E.2d at 29; accord, C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 14 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
89. Taylor v. Boger, 289 N.C. 560, 565, 223 S.E.2d 350, 353 (1976). This rule,
adopted by the court in Mann v. Virginia Dare Transp. Co., 283 N.C. 734, 198 S.E.2d
558 (1973), avoids the effect of the "could or might" rule by allowing "the expert
witness to phrase his causation testimony with such certainty as he feels." 1 D. STANS-
BURY, supra note 1, § 137, at 145 n. 97 (Supp. 1976).
90. 31 N.C. App. 450, 229 S.E.2d 814 (1976).
91. Id. at 460, 229 S.E.2d at 820; see State v. Wright, 29 N.C. App. 752, 225
S.E.2d 645 (1976) (error to exclude testimony of psychiatric evaluation by properly
qualified medical expert). In the following cases no abuse of discretion was found
in the determination of the trial judge that the witness was an expert: State v. Clark,
30 N.C. App. 253, 226 S.E.2d 398 (1976) (marijuana identification); State v. Roberson,
29 N.C. App. 152, 223 S.E.2d 551 (1976) (expert in investigation of numbers lotteries);
State v. Mayfield, 28 N.C. App. 304, 220 S.E.2d 643 (1976) (firearms expert).
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in soil mineralogy and who provides a proper foundation for his testi-
mony, to testify that soil samples taken from the victim's yard resem-




In State v. Harding94 and State v. Bowden95 the North Carolina
Supreme Court for the first time considered North Carolina's recently
enacted statute on dying declarations. G.S. 8-51.196 makes dying
declarations generally admissible in all criminal, civil and administrative
proceedings "in which the cause or circumstances of the declarant's
death may be relevant to any issue in litigation. ' 7  The new statute
represents a significant departure from previous case law, which limited
the use of dying declarations to prosecutions for the murder of the
92. State v. Carlton, 28 N.C. App. 573, 576, 221 S.E.2d 924, 927, appeal dismissed,
289 N.C. 616, 223 S.E.2d 767, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 309, 225 S.E.2d 830 (1976);
see State v. Raines, 29 N.C. App. 303, 224 S.E.2d 232, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 311,
225 S.E.2d 832 (1976) (expert testimony admissible on almost any facet of human
knowledge; paint on door matched with paint on crowbar).
93. The North Carolina appellate courts decided many cases involving the hearsay
rule and exceptions thereto in 1976: State v. Cawthorne, 290 N.C. 639, 227 S.E.2d
528 (1976) (part of res gestae: statement by taxi driver to dispatcher during course
of business); State v. Covington, 290 N.C. 313, 226 S.E.2d 629 (1976) (part of res
gestae: statement by defendant before he stabbed victim); State v. Brower, 289 N.C.
644, 224 S.E.2d 551 (1976) (hearsay competent to identify defendants); State v. Cox,
289 N.C. 414, 222 S.E.2d 246 (1976) (part of res gestae: statement by intruder upon
entering boarding house); State v. Austin, 31 N.C. App. 20, 228 S.E.2d 507 (1976)
(contents of search warrant affidavit, hearsay); State v. Greene, 30 N.C. App. 507,
227 S.E.2d 154 (1976) (hearsay competent to prove occurrence of conversation); State
v. Vanderhall, 30 N.C. App. 239, 226 S.E.2d 402 (1976) (confessions of third party,
hearsay); State v. Jackson, 30 N.C. App. 187, 226 S.E.2d 543 (1976) (testimony at
former trial admissible); Tucker v. Blackburn, 28 N.C. App. 455, 221 S.E.2d 755 (1976)
(patient's medical history, hearsay); State v. Chandler, 28 N.C. App. 441, 221 S.E.2d
723, appeal dismissed, 289 N.C. 616, 223 S.E.2d 393 (1976) (hearsay competent to
explain presence of police officer).
94. 291 N.C. 223, 230 S.E.2d 397 (1976).
95. 290 N.C. 702, 228 S.E.2d 414 (1976).
96. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-51.1 (Cum. Supp. 1975) provides:
The dying declarations of a deceased person regarding the cause or circum-
stances of his death shall be admissible in evidence in all civil and criminal
trials and other proceedings before courts, administrative agencies and other
tribunals to the same extent and for the same purposes that they might have
been admissible had the deceased survived and been sworn as a witness in the
proceedingt, subject to proof that:
(1) At the time of the making of such declaration the deceased was con-
scious of approaching death and believed there was no hope of recovery;
(2) Such declaration was voluntarily made.
97. 1 D. STANSBURY, supra note 1, § 146, at 151 (Supp. 1976).
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declarant and civil actions for wrongful death in which the death of the
declarant was at issue.98
State v. Harding0 was a successful prosecution for three counts
of first degree murder that had been consolidated for trial. The State
introduced the dying declarations made by one of the victims, Clyde
Ray Englebert. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court
erred in consolidating the cases for trial. Relying on State v. Puett,100
Harding argued that in separate prosecutions for the murder of the
other two victims the death of Englebert would not have been in issue,
and, hence, his dying declarations would have been inadmissible. The
court rejected defendant's argument, noting that the new statute rather
than prior case law conclusively resolved the issue: "The statute effec-
tively overruled this Court's holding in Puett and thus the declarations
of Englebert were admissible against the defendant on all three murder
charges, regardless of whether the cases were tried separately or
consolidated." 10'
In State v. Bowden'02 the supreme court indicated, without decid-
ing, that the statutory requisites for a dying declaration might well be
more stringent than under existing case law.10 3  The declarant in
Bowden had not directly communicated his belief in his impending
death; however, the record showed that the declarant was in extreme
pain and was aware of his substantial injury. The court found these
facts sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement that the declarant
be conscious of his approaching death and be without hope of recovery.
The court cautioned, however, that in future cases the requirement that
declarant be without hope might prove to be a problem:
It is the requirement that the declarant be aware of his impending
death that has most often concerned the courts under the case law
and now concerns us under the statute. We note, without deciding,
that the words "no hope of recovery" in the statute may make the
statutory exception to the hearsay rule more restrictive than existing
case law.' 0
4
98. Gassaway v. Gassaway & Owen Inc., 220 N.C. 694, 18 S.E.2d 120 (1942)
(wrongful death); State v. Puett, 210 N.C. 633, 188 S.E. 75 (1936) (declaration by
second murder victim not admissible in trial for the murder of the first victim); Pettiford
v. Mayo, 117 N.C. 24, 23 S.E. 252 (1895) (homicide).
99. 291 N.C. 223, 230 S.E.2d 397 (1976).
100. 210 N.C. 633, 188 S.E. 75 (1936).
101. 291 N.C. at 228, 230 S.E.2d at 400-01; accord, 1 D. STANSBURY, supra note
1, § 146, at 152 n. 12 (Supp. 1976).
102. 290 N.C. 702, 228 S.E.2d 414 (1976).
103. Under present case law "[ilt is not necessary that the declarant should have
given up all hope of survival . . . ." 1 D. STANSBURY, supra note 1, § 146, at 488.
104. 290 N.C. at 712, 228 S.E.2d at 421.
1977] 1049
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Given that "the overall purpose of the statute is to liberalize rather than
constrict admissibility,"' 5 one would hope that the court will continue
to uphold the admission of "declarations admissible under prior case
law in homicide and wrongful death cases, leaving the more stringent
statutory test to govern situations in which dying declarations were not
previously admissible."'10
2. Verified Statements of Account
In an action to recover upon an account the court of appeals held
that the verified statement of account offered by plaintiff did not com-
ply with G.S. 8-45 and thus could not be considered as prima facie evi-
dence of its own correctness.'0 7  Plaintiff failed in its burden of verifi-
cation by failing to show that the affiants who swore to the account
would have been competent to testify as to the correctness of the ac-
count.'08 Alternatively, the court found that the statement of account
offered by the plaintiff was not "itemized" as required by the statute.
Specifically, the court noted that plaintiff had not documented with
sufficient particularity the charges and debits listed in his statement of
account. In holding that the proffered account was not sufficiently
itemized the court indicated that no appellate court in North Carolina
had "attempted to interpret what is contemplated by G.S. 8-45 as an
itemized statement."' 0 9
3. Recitals in Ancient Documents
In an action to register land under the Torrens system, the
supreme court found that a 121 year old sheriff's deed, produced from
proper custody without any intimation of fraud or invalidity, was an
ancient document within the hearsay exception in favor of recitals in
ancient deeds." 0  Ordinarily, the best evidence rule would require
proof of the underlying documents of the judgment and execution sale
105. 1 D. STANSBURY, supra note 1, § 146, at 152 n.19 (Supp. 1976).
106. Id.
107. Branco Elec. Corp. v. Shell, 31 N.C. App. 717, 230 S.E.2d 576 (1976). N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 8-45 (1969) "was designed to facilitate the collection of accounts about
which there is no bona fide dispute, and the statute must be strictly construed." 31
N.C. App. at 719, 230 S.E.2d at 577 (citing Nall v. Kelly, 169 N.C. 717, 86 S.E. 627
(1915)).
108. Id. at 719, 230 S.E.2d at 577. The affiant must have personal knowledge
of the account or must be familiar with the books and records of plaintiff. Johnson
Serv. Co. v. Curry, 29 N.C. App. 166, 223 S.E.2d 565 (1976).
109. 31 N.C. App. at 719-20, 230 S.E.2d at 577-78.
110. Taylor v. Johnston, 289 N.C. 690, 224 S.E.2d 567 (1976).
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as the best evidence that a levy and sale took place; under these circum-
stances, however, the "rule requiring proof of underlying documents
must yield to the ancient document rule.""' Thus, the court held that
the recitals in the sheriff's deed "were prima facie evidence that the
sale was made pursuant to a live execution in the sheriff's hands.
' "l 2
H. Admissions
In Cogdill v. Scates,"3 a case of first impression, the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court "considered the effect of testimony by a party
which, if true, would defeat his action when the testimony of other wit-
nesses tends to establish his case.""'  The court held that a party is
conclusively bound by her testimony when she deliberately repudiates
the allegations in her pleading by testifying to facts that are fatal to her
cause of action. The court limited its holding to the facts of this case,
declining to "formulate a general rule for determining the circumstan-
ces under which [a party's] adverse testimony will defeat his action."
1 5
I. Authentication of Writings
Noting that it had never passed on the precise question, the
supreme court held that public records of the Division of Motor
Vehicles may be authenticated by the use of a mechanically reproduced
signature when the authorized officer intends to adopt the mechanical
reproduction as his signature. 1 6 The requisite intent may be presumed
when the authorized officer provides the records pursuant to his official
duties.
J. Hearings and Non-Jury Trials
In State v. Davis"7 the North Carolina Supreme Court cautioned
against loose interpretation of the well established rule "that in a 'hear-
ing before the judge on a preliminary motion, the ordinary rules as to
111. Id. at 708, 224 S.E.2d at 577.
112. Id. at 708, 224 S.E.2d at 577-78.
113. 290 N.C. 31, 224 S.E.2d 604 (1976), noted in 55 N.C.L. REv. 1155 (1977).
114. Id. at 39, 224 S.E.2d at 609.
115. Id. at 43, 224 S.E.2d at 611. See also Downey v. Downey, 29 N.C. App.
375, 224 S.E.2d 255 (1976) (admission in defendant's answer that out of state divorce
decree was entered amounted to judicial admission that decree was properly authenti-
cated); Strother v. Strother, 29 N.C. App. 223, 223 S.E.2d 838 (1976) (not improper
for trial court to consider letter from plaintiff concerning additions to plaintiff's income
in ruling on plaintiff's motion for an increase in alimony).
116. State v. Watts, 289 N.C. 445, 222 S.E.2d 389 (1976).
117. 290 N.C. 511, 227 S.E.2d 97 (1976).
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the competency of evidence applied in a trial before a jury are to some
extent relaxed . . - "118 The trial judge in Davis allowed a hearsay
statement to come in over defendant's objection during a voir dire held
to determine the competency of a witness' in-court identification of de-
fendant. The court ultimately found that there was sufficient evidence,
unaided by the hearsay, to support the trial court's conclusion that the
identification was based on the witness' independent observation at the
time and scene of the crime. The court, however, disapproved of the
admission by the trial court of clearly incompetent hearsay over defend-
ant's objection. The court warned that when the judge in a pretrial
hearing admits clearly incompetent evidence over objection, it will be
less prone to indulge in the presumption "that the judge with kmowl-
edge of the law is able to eliminate from the testimony he hears that
which is immaterial . . . ,"19 Finally, the court noted that the "re-
laxation" of the rules of evidence during a preliminary hearing is not
tantamount to suspension of the rules: "Suffice it to say that adherence
to the rudimentary rules of evidence is desirable even in preliminary




1. Requirement of Notice and Hearing
Insurance rates' can be changed in North Carolina by one of two
methods. First, a rating bureau, or office, representing all companies
118. Id. at 540, 227 S.E.2d at 115 (quoting Cameron v. Cameron, 232 N.C. 686,
690, 61 S.E.2d 913, 915 (1950)). The rule is based on a presumption that if incompe-
tent evidence is admitted, it will be disregarded by the judge.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 542, 227 S.E.2d at 116; see Stanback v. Stanback, 31 N.C. App. 174,
229 S.E.2d 693 (1976) (in nonjury trial or hearing rebuttable presumption that judge
ignored incompetent evidence).
1. North Carolina employs a "mandatory bureau" insurance system. All insurers
are required to belong to a statutory agency that makes rules and regulations concerning
ratemaking. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 242 F. Supp. 73, 81-82 (E.D.N.C.), aII'd,
361 F.2d 870 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 930 (1966). For ratemaking pur-
poses, the rating agency is treated as if it were the only insurance company doing busi-
ness in North Carolina. Id. at 73. The statutory plan contemplates a uniform premium
rate schedule for all insurance companies. North Carolina has rate agencies (also called
bureaus) for various insurance lines: for fire and allied lines, the North Carolina Fire
Insurance Rating Bureau, established by N.C. GEN. STAT, § 58-125 (1975); for auto-
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selling a particular type of insurance can file a proposed change (a "fil-
ing") with the Commissioner of Insurance for his approval. Second,
the Insurance Commissioner can issue an order effecting a change on
his own initiative after investigation to maintain profits at a fair and
reasonable level.3
An order by the Commissioner approving a reduction of extended
coverage insurance rates was evaluated under both of these methods
in State ex rel. Commissioner of Insurance v. North Carolina Fire Insur-
ance Rating Bureau,4 the major case decided in 1976 involving insur-
ance ratemaking procedures.5 The Fire Insurance Bureau filed, and
later withdrew, a proposal for a reduction of extended coverage
premiums. Despite the withdrawal of the filing, the Commissioner
issued an order putting the reduction into effect but without a prior
hearing on the merits." The North Carolina Supreme Court granted
certiorari after the court of appeals vacated the Commissioner's order.
7
The supreme court held that the rate reduction could not be sus-
tained under the first method of rate change because the Bureau had
withdrawn its filing before any action was taken on it.8 Since the Coin-
mobile liability and physical damage, the North Carolina Automobile Rate Adminstra-
tive Office, established by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-246 (1975); and for workmen's com-
pensation, the Compensation Rating and Inspection Bureau of North Carolina, estab-
lished by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-102 (1972). Insurance systems used in other states
include: state made rates, prior approval, file and use, and open competition. GOVER-
NOR'S STUDY COMMISSION ON AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE RATES, REPORT TO THE
GOVERNOR OF NORTH CAROLINA 8-9 (1971). See also In re Filing by North Carolina
Fire Ins. Rating Bureau, 275 N.C. 15, 165 S.E.2d 237 (1969). For a history of how
the North Carolina insurance system developed see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 242 F.
Supp. 73, 75-82 (E.D.N.C.), af 'd, 361 F.2d 870 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
930 (1966).
2. "No rating method, schedule, [or] classification . . . shall become effective or
be applied by the Rating Bureau until it shall have been first submitted to and approved
by the Commissioner." N.C. GEN. SrAT. § 58-131.1 (1975).
3. Id. § 58-131.2.
4. 291 N.C. 55, 229 S.E.2d 268 (1976).
5. In addition to this supreme court case, there were 10 court of appeals cases
in 1976 involving ratemaking. These cases will be discussed in the text accompanying
notes 10-40 infra.
6. 291 N.C. at 58, 229 S.E.2d at 270. A hearing was held on the Bureau's motion
to set aside the order, but no evidence was taken on the merits of the reduction. Id.
at 60, 229 S.E.2d at 271.
7. The court of appeals held that the Commissioner was statutorily required to
hold a prior hearing on the reduction after notice to the public. State ex rel. Com-
missioner of Ins. v. North Carolina Fire Ins. Rating Bureau, 29 N.C. App. 237, 224
S.E.2d 223 (1976).
8. 29N1 N.C. at 66-67, 229 S.E.2d at 274-75. The court of appeals also allowed
a similar filing to be withdrawn in State ex rel. Commissioner of Ins. v. North Carolina
Auto. Rate Administrative Office, 30 N.C. App. 477, 482, 227 S.E.2d 621, 624 (1976).
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missioner failed to hold a hearing prior to putting the change into effect
as required by statute, the court also held that the order could not be
affirmed under the second method.9
The supreme court declined to address one issue of statutory
conflict treated by the court of appeals in State ex rel. Commissioner
of Insurance v. North Carolina Fire Insurance Rating Bureau0 by find-
ing that one of the conflicting provisions had no application to the facts
of the case." The conflicting provisions are G.S. 58-27.2,2 which
mandates a hearing, and G.S. 58-131.1,13 which deems a filing ap-
proved if not disapproved by the Commissioner within sixty days. The
court of appeals in three cases in 1976, including Fire Insurance Rating
Bureau, held that the hearing requirement prevails since that section
was the most recently enacted.14  In 1977 the supreme court resolved
9. 291 N.C. at 67, 229 S.E.2d at 275. The Commissioner was required to
hold a hearing prior to ordering a rate reduction under two separate provisions. The
Insurance Advisory Board rules, promulgated pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-27.1-
2(a) (1975), provide: "Any rate adjustment or proposal involving a general revision
of an existing rating schedule which the Commissioner or Advisory Board finds upon
investigation involves a material change in the rate level shall be subject to a public
hearing prior to action thereon by the Insurance Commissioner." North Carolina In-
surance Advisory Board Rules and Regulations, Rule 1 (filed with the Secretary of State,
March 1, 1950) (emphasis added). The court held a 19% rate decrease was a "material
change" as required by the rule. 291 N.C. at 69, 229 S.E.2d at 276. In two separate
opinions in 1976 the court of appeals held that N.C. GEM. STAT. § 58-27.2(a) requires
notice and a public hearing whenever a material change in the rates is proposed by the
insurance industry. State ex rel. Commissioner of Ins. v. Compensation Rating & In-
spection Bureau, 28 N.C. App. 409, 221 S.E.2d 96 (1976); State ex rel. Commissioner
of Ins. v. North Carolina Auto. Rate Administrative Office, 29 N.C. App. 182, 223 S.E.
2d 512 (1976).
The Commissioner was also required to hold a hearing on rate changes applicable
to the Fire Insurance Rating Bureau under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-131.5 (1975), which
provides: "The Commissioner shall not make any rule, regulation or order under the
provisions of this Article without giving the Rating Bureau and insurers who may be
affected thereby reasonable notice and a hearing if hearing is requested." The court
rejected the Commissioner's contention that this statute did not apply to these facts since
the Bureau had not requested a hearing. The court stated that in order for the request
provision to apply, the Bureau would have had to have notice of the proposed order stat-
ing the subject under inquiry. 291 N.C. at 68, 229 S.E.2d at 275-76.
10. 29 N.C. App. 2-37, 246, 224 S.E.2d 223, 228, af'd, 291 N.C. 55, 229 S.E.2d
268 (1976).
11. 291 N.C. at 70-71, 229 S.E.2d at 277.
12. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-27.2 (1975).
13. Id. § 58-131.1 provides: "Every rating. . . submitted to the Commissioner for
approval shall be deemed approved, if not disapproved by him in writing within 60 days
after submission." This statute is referred to as the "deemer provision."
14. 29 N.C. App. at 246, 224 S.E.2d at 228 (1976); State ex rel. Commissioner
of Ins. v. North Carolina Fire Ins. Rating Bureau, 30 N.C. App. 487, 489, 228 S.E.2d
261, 262-63 (1976), rev'd, 292 N.C. 70, 231 S.E.2d 882 (1977); State ex rel. Com-
missioner of Ins. v. North Carolina Fire Ins. Rating Bureau, 30 N.C. App. 549, 555-
56, 228 S.E.2d 264, 269 (1976).
this conflict by finding that the deemer and hearing provisions could be
harmonized to give effect to each.' 5
2. Authority of the Commissioner To Act After a Hearing
Chapter 58 of the North Carolina General Statutes defines the
authority of the Commissioner of Insurance to approve or reject pro-
posed rate changes.' 6 In 1976 the court of appeals delineated the
scope of the Commissioner's authority under two different statutory
guidelines. The most frequently applied standard is that if the Com-
missioner found, after notice and a hearing, that the Bureau's proposal
was "unwarranted, unreasonable, improper or unfairly discriminatory,"
he lacked statutory authority to approve the change. 7 The second
standard is that the Commissioner approve only those rates that
would produce a "fair and reasonable profit."'1 8 Although the wording
of the provision seems to indicate that the "fair and reasonable profit"
test should be used when the Commissioner is proposing a rate change
on his own initiative, and the ."unwarranted, unreasonable and im-
proper" test when the Bureau applies for a rating change,'9 the court
of appeals apparently used the two tests interchangeably and with
similar results.2"
In 1976 the North Carolina courts invalidated several rate orders
issued by the Commissioner pursuant to statutes passed by the 1975
General Assembly. The North Carolina Supreme Court held an act
requiring all general liability insurers in North Carolina to sell medical
15. State ex rel. Commissioner of Ins. v. North Carolina Fire Ins. Rating Bureau,
No. 146 (N.C., filed Feb. 8, 1977). If the Commissioner neither approves nor dis-
approves a filing within 60 days, it is automatically deemed temporarily approved until
a valid final order is entered by the Commissioner after a hearing. No. 146, slip op.
at 5-7.
16. See In re Filing by North Carolina Fire Ins. Rating Bureau, 275 N.C. 15, 33,
165 S.E.2d 207, 220 (1969).
17. This standard is found in the following statutes: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-131.2
(1975) (fire insurance), § 97-104.1 (1972) (workmen's compensation insurance) and
§ 58-248.1 (1975) (automobile liability insurance). The court of appeals interpreted
this standard affirmatively to require the Commissioner to approve rates that were fair,
reasonable, adequate and not unfairly discriminatory. See, e.g., State ex rel. Commis-
sioner of Ins. v. Compensation Rating & Inspection Bureau, 30 N.C. App. 332, 335, 226
S.E.2d 822, 823 (1976).
18. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-131.2 (1975) defines this standard. The court of ap-
peals applied it in State ex rel. Commissioner of Ins. v. North Carolina Fire Ins. Rating
Bureau, 30 N.C. App. 549, 557, 228 S.E.2d 264, 270 (1976).
19. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-131.2 para. 1 (1975) with id. para. 5.
20. Compare State ex rel. Commissioner of Ins. v. North Carolina Fire Ins. Rating
Bureau, 30 N.C. App. 549, 228 S.E.2d 264 (1976), with State ex rel. Commissioner of
Ins. v. North Carolina Auto. Rate Office, 30 N.C. App. 477, 227 S.E.2d 621 (1976).
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malpractice insurance2 unconstitutional as a deprivation of substantive
due process and a denial of equal protection in Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Co. v. Ingram.22 Since the Commissioner's orders imple-
menting this act were dependent on the act's validity, the court also
held those orders to be invalid.
23
The court of appeals, in State ex rel. Commissioner v. North Caro-
lina Automobile Rate Administrative Office,24 reversed actions taken by
the Commissioner pursuant to a statute abolishing age discrimination
in automobile insurance. 25  The Commissioner had rejected filings by
the Rate Office abolishing age discrimination in motorcycle insurance
and implemented his own rate changes. The court limited the blanket
authority given to the Commissioner in this act 20 by holding that as long
as the Rate Office was faithfully performing its duties under the act
by filing rates that were fair and adequate, the Commissioner could not
encroach upon its authority by ordering rate changes on his own initia-
tive.2
7
3. Judicial Review of Ratemaking
The North Carolina Superior Courts have jurisdiction to hear
appeals of any order or decision of the Commissioner except "an order
or decision that the premium rates charged or filed on all or any class
21. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-173.34 to .51 (Supp. 1975). This Act was passed in
response to the North Carolina medical malpractice crisis. NORTH CAROLINA PROFES-
SIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE STUDY COMM'N, REPORT 6-7 (March 12, 1976). For a
general discussion of the North Carolina malpractice problem and proposed solutions see
Comment, Medical Malpractice in North Carolina, 54 N.C.L. REV. 1214 (1976).
22. 290 N.C. 457, 226 S.E.2d 498 (1976). See also this Survey, Constitutional
Law: North Carolina Constitution. The court distinguished a similar compulsory plan
for automobile liability insurance on the ground that only companies voluntarily engaged
in automobile insurance were required to participate. Id. at 470, 226 S.E.2d at 507.
The medical malpractice problem in North Carolina was subsequently alleviated by a
compromise reached between the Commissioner and the major medical malpractice in-
surer in North Carolina. NORTH CAROLINA PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY STUDY COMM'N,
REPORT, supra note 21, at 12.
23. 290 N.C. at 472, 226 S.E.2d at 508.
24. 30 N.C. App. 477, 227 S.E.2d 621 (1976).
25. "No insurer shall after September 1, 1975, base any standard or rating plan
for private passenger automobiles or motorcycles, in whole or in part, directly or indi-
rectly, upon the age or sex of the persons insured." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-30.3 (Supp.
1975). After the court of appeals interpreted the act to include motorcycles, 30 N.C,
App. at 484, 227 S.E.2d at 627, the act was amended specifically to include motorcycles.
26. "The North Carolina Rate Administrative Office shall file with the Commis-
sioner of Insurance for his approval or other actions as provided in G.S. 58-248.1 a re-
vised subclassification plan. . . ." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-30.4 (Supp. 1975).
27. 30 N.C. App. at 484-85, 227 S.E.2d at 626.
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of risks are excessive, inadequate, unreasonable, unfairly discrimina-
tory, or are otherwise not in the public interest . . -. 8 Such orders
must be appealed by an aggrieved party to the court of appeals. 29
Once the court of appeals has assumed jurisdiction over a ratemaking
order, any action by the Commissioner involving that order is stayed
until the appeal is dismissed or determined according to law.30 If the
Commissioner proposes to take action in violation of the stay, the
proper remedy is a request to the court of appeals for the issuance of
a prerogative writ of supersedeas.31
The proper scope of judicial review of an order of the Commis-
sioner by the court of appeals is whether the order is based on findings
of fact and conclusions of law supported by material and substantial evi-
dence in view of the entire record.3 2  The court of appeals in State
ex rel. Commissioner of Insurance v. North Carolina Fire Insurance
Rating Bureau33 formulated guidelines for the practical application of
this standard of review. The initial burden is on the Bureau to show
that the proposed rate schedule is fair and reasonable, not unfairly dis-
criminatory, and is otherwise supported by substantial evidence.34
Once the Bureau has met this burden, the Commissioner can disap-
prove the proposed rates only if he makes findings of fact that the pro-
posed rates (1) fail to comply with the statutory standards or (2) are
not supported by substantial evidence.35 Applying these guidelines to
the facts of this case, the court held that the Bureau had met its initial
burden by showing that the proposed reductions in automobile insurance
rates were fair and reasonable. The court reversed the Commissioner's
disapproval of the proposed rates because he failed to explain why the
evidence presented by the Bureau was not substantial or to make find-
ings, supported by substantial evidence, specifying why the proposed
rates failed to comply with the statutory standard. 6
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-9.3(a) (1975).
29. Id. § 58-9.4.
30. Id. § 58-9.5(10).
31. The court of appeals has authority to issue such a writ under id. § 7A-32(c).
In North Carolina Fire Ins. Rating Bureau v. Ingram, 29 N.C. App. 338, 224 S.E.2d
229 (1976), the court of appeals found that an order of the superior court enjoining
actions by the Commissioner on a rate order that was the subject of a previous appeal
was in error since the correct procedure was a request to the court of appeals for the
issuance of a writ.
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-9.4, -9.6 (1975).
33. 30 N.C. App. 487, 228 S.E.2d 261 (1976).
34. Id. at 489, 228 S.E.2d at 263.
35. Id. at 490, 228 S.E.2d at 263.
36. Id. at 491-92, 228 S.E.2d at 263-64.
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4. Admissible Evidence
The Commissioner is required by the Insurance Advisory Board
to "admit all evidence of any type having reasonable probative value
... .,, The Commissioner is also authorized by statute to consider
loss experience and any other reasonable and related factors.5 8 The
court of appeals in State ex rel. Commissioner of Insurance v. North
Carolina Automobile Rate Administrative Offic e made it clear that
admissible evidence is not to be equated with substantial evidence. The
Commissioner had relied on the testimony of one witness concerning the
effects of unemployment and the energy crisis on North Carolina auto-
mobile insurance losses to disapprove a premium increase requested
by the Automobile Rate Office. The court defined substantial evidence
as "more than a scintilla or permissible inference; such evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion," and
found that the evidence relied on by the Commissioner, while admis-
sible, was too tenuous to meet the substantial evidence requirement.40
B. Construction of the Terms of Insurance Policies
1. Construction of Ambiguous Terms
Ambiguous terms in insurance policies are generally construed
most strongly against the insurer, especially if the term would require
37. North Carolina Advisory Board Rules and Regulations, Rule 6 (filed with the
Secretary of State, March 1, 1950). The Board defines "reasonable probative value" as
"any evidence of the type upon which responsible persons are accustomed to rely in the
conduct of insurance affairs." Id.
38. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-131.2, -248 (1975). Traditionally, the North Caro-
lina Administrative Procedure Act (N.C. APA), N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 150A (Cum.
Supp. 1975), which sets up guidelines for admissible evidence at agency hearings, has
not been applied to insurance ratemaking. In In re Filing by Automobile Rate Office,
278 N.C. 302, 180 S.E.2d 155 (1971), the North Carolina Supreme Court held that a
predecessor to the N.C. APA was not applicable to insurance ratemaking hearings be-
cause such hearings were quasi-legislative, and the APA applied only to quasi-judicial
hearings involving specific parties. 278 N.C. at 318, 180 S.E.2d at 166. Since that case
was decided, the N.C. APA has been entirely rewritten. A new amendment to that Act,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-2(2) (Interim Supp. 1976), has deleted the "specific party"
requirement and provides that ratemaking procedures are included in the APA. A good
argument can be made that the N.C. APA should apply to situations arising today that
involve insurance ratemaking. See Daye, North Carolina's New Administrative Pro-
cedure Act: An Interpretive Analysis, 53 N.C.L. Rav. 833, 872 n.187 (1975).
39. 30 N.C. App. 427, 227 S.E.2d 603 (1976). The North Carolina Supreme
Court modified and remanded this decision in 1977, finding that the Commissioner did
base portions of his order on substantial evidence. State ex rel. Commissioner of Ins.
v. North Carolina Auto. Rate Administrative Office, No. 141 (N.C., filed Feb. 8, 1977).
40. 30 N.C. App. at 437, 227 S.E.2d at 605. In his dissent, Judge Martin ques-
tioned the procedure used by the majority to reverse the Commissioner's order instead
the insured to forfeit coverage.4 In 1976 the Fourth Circuit applied
this principle of North Carolina law in interpreting an ambiguous pro-
vision in an insurance policy issued by the Federal Crop Insurance Cor-
poration.42 The FCIC issued a policy to plaintiff that contained a pro-
vision requiring an inspection by the insurer before any damaged crops
could be destroyed. The court found the provision was ambiguous be-
cause it was labeled as both a condition precedent and a promise. Both
parties agreed that if the requirement were a condition precedent, its
violation caused a forfeiture of plaintiff's coverage, but that if it were
merely a promise or a covenant, its breach would only create a cause of
action for damages.4 "  Construing the ambiguity against the insurer,
the court determined that the provision was a promise rather than a
condition, and remanded the case for a trial on damages for the breach
of the promise by the insured.44
2. Construction of Standard Policy Terms
Most modem insurance policies are standardized, either by
statutory mandate or industry cooperation." The "Use of Other Auto-
mobiles" provision is a clause found in most standardized liability
insurance policies.46 In 1976 the North Carolina Supreme Court inter-
preted such a clause in Security Insurance Group v. Parker.4 7 Security
Insurance sued for contribution on two liability insurance policies
owned by the defendant providing coverage for any non-owned auto-
mobile used by the insured with the exception of any vehicle other than
a private passenger automobile used in a business or occupation of the
insured.48  Testimony of the insured indicated she was using a non-
of remanding it and said that substantial evidence could be found to support the order
if the entire record were considered. Id. at 439-40, 227 S.E.2d at 609-10.
41. See, e.g., Barker v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 241 N.C. 397, 85 S.E.2d 305 (1954).
This principle is an outgrowth of the rule of contract construction that ambiguity in a
written contract is to be interpreted against the party who prepares the writing. See
Jones v. Palace Realty Co., 226 N.C. 303, 37 S.E.2d 906 (1946).
42. Howard v. Federal Crop Ins. Corp., 540 F.2d 695 (4th Cir. 1976).
43. Id. at 696.
44. Id. at 698-99. The court applied the RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 261
(1932): "Where it is doubtful whether words create a promise or an express condition,
they are interpreted as creating a promise .... "
45. R. KEETON, BASiC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW §§ 2.10(a)-(c) (1971).
46. See id. § 4.9(b).
47. 289 N.C. 391, 222 S.E.2d 437 (1976). Defendant Parker had been driving
a car owned by a third person when she negligently caused an accident. Plaintiff, an
insurer of the car in which the injured person was a passenger, was forced to pay dam-
ages in an earlier suit, Yelton v. Dobbins, 6 N.C. App. 483, 170 S.E.2d 552 (1969).
48. 289 N.C. at 396-97, 222 S.E.2d at 441.
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owned truck for farming purposes at the time of the accident. The
court held that this use of the vehicle came within the business or occu-
pation exception to the policy even though farming was not the in-
sured's primary business or occupation.49
The omnibus clause, a mandatory provision in every North Caro-
lina automobile liability insurance policy, extends coverage to persons
other than the named insured while they are driving the insured's
vehicle.5" Prior to 1967 the North Carolina statutory omnibus clause
required that persons driving with the "express or implied permission"
of the named insured be covered by the liability policy.5 A 1967
amendment to the statute extended coverage to "any other persons in
lawful possession."5 The court of appeals construed this amendment
in Packer v. Travelers Insurance Co.5" Evidence presented in Packer
showed that the insured lent his truck to an employee for business use
only. The employee disobeyed these instructions and had an accident
while driving the truck for personal reasons. 4 The court listed the
three following rules used to interpret the omnibus clause: (1) the
strict rule requiring permission for the particular use being made of the
vehicle, (2) the liberal rule requiring only initial permission to use the
vehicle, and (3) the moderate, or minor deviation, rule allowing the
driver to deviate slightly from the scope of permission." The court
of appeals, reaffirming several previous cases,56 found that the present
49. The court went on to hold that the truck being driven at the time of the ac-
cident was not a "private passenger automibile" and found the insurer not liable even
assuming the insurance company had the burden to prove the non-existence of the ex-
ception to the exclusion. Id. at 401, 222 S.E.2d at 444.
50. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(2) (1975). The objective of such a clause
is protection of innocent victims and insurance purchasers who wish to allow others to
drive their automobiles. See Note, Automobile Liability Insurance-Construing the
Omnibus Clause-Round One, 52 N.C.L. Rv. 809 (1974).
51. Motor Vehicle Safety and Responsibility Act of 1953, ch. 1300, § 21(b)(2),
[1953] N.C. Sess. Laws 1262 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(2)
(1975)).
52. The present omnibus clause provides that liability insurance policies "[s]hall in-
sure the person named therein and any other person, as insured, using any such motor
vehicle . . . with the express or implied permission of such named insured, or any other
persons in lawful possession .... " N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b) (2) (1975) (em-
phasis added).
53. 28 N.C. App. 365, 221 S.E.2d 707 (1976).
54. Id. at 366-67, 221 S.E.2d at 708.
55. Id. at 369, 221 S.E.2d at 709-10; Annot., 5 A.L.R.2d 600, 622 (1949).
56. See, e.g., Jernigan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 16 N.C. App. 46, 52,
190 S.E.2d 866, 871 (1972). See also Note, Insurance-Liability of Insurers under the
Omnibus Clause to Protect Emergency Drivers-The North Carolina Situation, 48 N.C.
L. REV. 984, 990 (1970).
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North Carolina statute follows the "liberal rule. ' 57 The court held de-
fendant liable because, although the employee did not have permission
to use the vehicle for pleasure, he was in "lawful possession" at the
time of the accident.
58
3. Waiver of Standard Policy Terms
In North Carolina waiver of a term in an insurance policy can be
established by (1) express agreement, (2) conduct or course of deal-
ing or (3) ratification.5" In Bynum v. North Carolina Blue Cross &
Blue Shield, Inc.6" the insured alleged that the insurance company
waived a ninety day discharge requirement in a hospitalization policy
by both express agreement and conduct."' The court of appeals re-
jected the insured's contention that the ninety day requirement was
waived by a statement of the insurer's employee.62  The court found
that the terms of the policy itself precluded modification by the em-
ployee once the policy had taken effect.63 The court also held that
there was no waiver of the requirement in the company's failure to
assert it initially as a basis for denial of the claim, because at the time
of the initial denial the insurance company was not in possession of all
the material facts.64  In order for a denial of a claim on a specified
ground to work a waiver of other grounds, the company must have
knowledge of all the relevant facts.65
57. 28 N.C. App. at 370, 221 S.E.2d at 710. The court overruled a statement in
Jernigan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 16 N.C. App. 46, 190 S.E.2d 886 (1972),
that permission, express or implied, is an essential element of lawful possession, but left
the holding of that case intact. 28 N.C. App. at 371, 221 S.E.2d at 710-11. Under
the Packer interpretation anyone with permission would clearly be in lawful possession,
but Packer leaves conflicting cases on the "permittee's permittee" unresolved. Compare
Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Broughton, 283 N.C. 309, 196 S.E.2d 243 (1973), with Na-
tionwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chantos, 25 N.C. App. 482, 214 S.E.2d 438 (1975). See also
R. KFETON, supra note 45, at § 4.7(b) (2).
58. 28 N.C. App. at 371, 221 S.E.2d at 711.
59. Foscue v. Greensboro Mut. Life Ins. Co., 196 N.C. 139, 141, 144 S.E. 689,
690 (1928).
60. 28 N.C. App. 515, 222 S.E.2d 263 (1976).
61. The policy denied benefits to persons confined in hospitals on the date the plan
became effective and provided that successive hospital confinements were deemed contin-
uous unless separated by 90 days. Id. at 516, 222 S.E.2d at 264.
62. An employee of defendant had assured plaintiff that coverage could be ob-
tained under the policy if the insured were discharged one day and re-admitted the next.
Id. at 517, 222 S.E.2d at 264.
63. Id. at 519, 222 S.E.2d at 265-66.
64. The company had initially denied liability on the ground that the claim was
made for a type of treatment not covered by the policy. Id. at 516, 222 S.E.2d at 264.
65. Id. at 520, 222 S.E.2d at 266. The court of appeals also rejected a claim of
waiver in Self v. Life Assurance Co., 30 N.C. App. 558, 227 S.E.2d 636 (1976). The
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C. Proof of Loss
For many years, North Carolina courts have held that the insur-
ance policy terms "death by accidental means" and "accidental death"
are not synonymous. 66 "Accidental means" requires proof that the
cause of death and not merely the result flowed from actions of the
deceased that were extraordinary and unexpected. "Accidental death,"
on the other hand, only requires proof that the result was unexpected.
0 7
The facts of Mozingo v. Mid-South Insurance Co.68 illustrate the dis-
tinction North Carolina makes between these two terms. Plaintiff was
suing to collect the proceeds of an insurance policy that required death
by "accidental means." The immediate cause of death was an automo-
bile accident, but defendant's evidence showed that at the time of the
accident the deceased was drinking and driving at a high rate of speed.
Defendant contended that the death was not by "accidental means" be-
cause the accident flowed naurally from the deceased's voluntary ac-
tions.69 The court of appeals granted defendant's request for a new
trial because the trial judge had not told the jury how the legal definition
of "accidental means" related to the evidence.70
Another case decided in 1976 by the court of appeals, Hicks v.
Old Republic Life Insurance Co.,71 involved a policy that required
death as a result of accidental bodily injury. In Hicks, the court did
not decide which of the two types of proof this term required, but held
that plaintiff had not met his burden of proof.72  Evidence indicated
court held that an employee voluntarily working only two days per week could not be
covered under a group health and disability insurance policy that had an eligibility re-
quirement of employment "on a full-time basis." Id. at 562, 227 S.E.2d at 639. The
court rejected plaintiff's contention that the employer had the authority to waive the full
time requirement by keeping the employee enrolled and paying premiums for his cover-
age. Id. at 563-64, 227 S.E.2d at 639-40.
66. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Security Life & Trust Co., 220 N.C. 148, 150, 16 S.E.2d
687, 688 (1941). This strict rule has been justified on the grounds of freedom of con-
tract and limitation of liability. It has been criticized by the North Carolina commenta-
tors. See Clifford, Survey of North Carolina Case Law-Insurance, 45 N.C.L. Rv.
955, 963-64 (1967); Note, Insurance-Accidental Means v. Accidental Death or
Tweedledum v. Tweedledee, 46 N.C.L. REV. 178, 187-88 (1967).
67. See, e.g., Henderson v. Hartford Accident & Indemn. Co., 268 N.C. 129, 132-
33, 150 S.E.2d 17, 19-20 (1966).
68. 29 N.C. App. 352, 224 S.E.2d 208 (1976).
69. Id. at 353, 224 S.E.2d at 209.
70. The court held that this was required by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-180 (1969). 29
N.C. App. at 354-55, 224 S.E.2d 210. This section was amended by [1967] N.C. Sess.
Laws ch. 954 § 3 (now codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-180 (1969)) to apply only
to criminal cases.
71. 29 N.C. App. 561, 225 S.E.2d 164 (1976).
72. Id. at 564, 225 S.E.2d at 166. The court did base its holding on Horn v. Pro-
tective Life Ins. Co., 265 N.C. 157, 143 S.E.2d 70 (1965), which involved a policy that
required death by "accidental means."
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that the ultimate cause of death was a heart attack possibly precipitated
by a fall. The court based its denial of recovery on the rule that
"[w]here death is caused by a pre-existing diseased condition in
cooperation with an accident it is not an accidental bodily injury
"73
The suicide exception to life insurance policies creates another
frequently litigated problem of proof.74  In North Carolina the insurer
has the burden of establishing suicide by a "preponderance" of the evi-
dence. 5 The court of appeals redefined this requirement in a case
decided in 1976.76 Evidence showed the deceased had died from a
self-inflicted gunshot wound, but the court held that the insurer had
not established suicide by a preponderance of the evidence because
"suicide was not the only logical or possible manner of death.177
D. Premium Payments
The court of appeals interpreted G.S. 58-56.1 (c) 78 and 24-
11(a)7 1 in 1976 in holding that an insurance agent extending customer
credit on an open account could impose a finance charge of up to eight-
een percent per year on premiums that have been overdue for thirty
days. 0 A prior express agreement between the parties concerning the
finance charge is not required, but the insurance agent must notify the
73. 29 N.C. App. at 564, 225 S.E.2d at 166.
74. See, e.g., Starkey Paint Co. v. Springfield Life Ins. Co., 24 N.C. App. 507, 211
S.E.2d 298 (1975).
75. When the policy is a general one, the insurance company has the burden of
proving the exception. But if the policy only covers a specific type of death (such as
accidental), the beneficiary must prove the death is covered. 2 D. STANSBURY, NORTH
CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 224 (H. Brandis rev. 1973).
76. Adcock v. Life Assurance Co., 31 N.C. App. 97, 228 S.E.2d 654 (1976).
77. 31 N.C. App. at 100-01, 228 S.E.2d at 656. In another recent proof of loss
case the court of appeals applied the well established rule that "where the evidence relied
on to show that lightning was the cause of loss is of a speculative nature, the court will
decide that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff has failed to prove that the loss was so
caused." Potter v. Reliance Ins. Co. 29 N.C. App. 138, 140, 223 S.E.2d 578, 579
(1976). The court in Potter held that plaintiff's testimony that he saw lightning strike
nearby immediately before finding a crack in his basement wall was of the quantum re-
quired to get to the jury. Id. at 140, 223 S.E.2d at 579-80.
78. "[An agent] who extends credit to and only to his own policy-holders may
charge and collect finance charges or other fees at a periodic (monthly) rate provided
in G.S. 24-11(a), after said amount has been outstanding for 30 days. . . ." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 58-56.1(c) (1975).
79. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-11(a) (Cum. Supp. 197-5) allows open-ended credit in-
terest rates of up to 18% per year.
80. Hyde Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Noland, 30 N.C. App. 503, 505-06, 227 S.E.2d 169,
171 (1976).
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insured at the time credit is extended of all the details pertaining to
the imposition of the finance charge.81
North Carolina insurance regulations prescribe a short term
premium rate that is in the nature of a penalty when the insured volun-
tarily cancels coverage before expiration of the term.82 Defendant in
Hyde Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Dixie Leasing Corp.83 asserted that it
was not liable for the higher short term rate when it cancelled before
the expiration of the term because the parties had modified the
contract to provide for proration of the premiums in the event of early
cancellation.8 4  Although the burden was on the insured to establish
the existence of the modification, the court found the evidence showed
that the insurance agent had said the cost would be figured at a "pro-
rata" basis if the insured decided to cancel early. The court held that
because the agent had knowingly used the ambiguous term "pro-rata,"
the meaning attributed to it by the insured must be the one given to
it.8 5
E. Liability of Insurer Beyond Policy Limits
An insurance agent in North Carolina is not required to assume
the duty of procuring a policy for a customer, but, if he does so, he
has a duty to use reasonable diligence. 86  This duty also requires him
to give timely notice to the customer if he is unable to procure the insur-
ance.87 The court of appeals applied this rule in 1976 in a case involv-
ing an agent who failed to give a customer notice of a two week delay
81. Id. at 505-06, 227 S.E.2d at 171.
82. Hyde Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Dixie Leasing Corp., 31 N.C. App. 490, 491, 229
S.E.2d 697, 698 (1976).
83. 31 N.C. App. 490, 229 S.E.2d 697 (1976).
84. Id. at 491, 229 S.E.2d at 699. In a prior appeal of this case, the court of ap-
peals held that the alleged pro-rata modification was not void as an illegal rebate under
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-44.5 (1975) because the insured did not knowingly accept a re-
bate. The court remanded for a trial on the issue whether the parties had modified the
payment requirements of the original contract. Hyde Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Dixie Leasing
Corp., 26 N.C. App. 138, 215 S.E.2d 162 (1975).
85. 31 N.C. App. at 494, 229 S.E.2d at 700. The court relied on RESTATEMENT
OF CoNRgcr s § 233(b) (1932). Consideration for the modification was found in the
fact that the insured gave the agent a requested opportunity to meet a lower bid before
cancellation. 31 N.C. App. at 494, 229 S.E.2d at 700.
86. See, e.g., Mayo v. American Fire & Cas. Co., 282 N.C. 346, 353, 192 S.E.2d
828, 832 (1972). North Carolina follows what is considered the majority view. R.
KEETON, supra note 45, § 2.4(a).
87. Under this rule, an agent may be held liable for failing to give the insured
notice of delay even if he has acted with reasonable diligence in trying to procure the




in forwarding his application for fire insurance.8 8  The court held that
this two week delay was sufficient to prove the agent failed to exercise
reasonable diligence under a theory of either breach of contract or
tort.89
The North Carolina Supreme Court recently indicated that puni-
tive damages may be available against insurance companies that, in
certain situations, fail to pay claims promptly.90 Following the tradi-
tional rule that there can be no punitive damages for breach of con-
tract,91 the court in Newton v. Standard Fire Insurance Co.92 held that
the insured could not collect punitive damages for the company's failure
to pay even though the company had knowledge of the insured's pre-
carious financial position.93 The court, however, did state that punitive
damages may have been allowed had the insured been able to prove
that the breach of contract was accomplished by bad faith 4 or an iden-
tifiable tort such as fraud.95 While conceding that insurance companies
may be exposed to liability beyond that specified in the insurance con-
tract, the court recognized that the availability of punitive damages
would have a deterrent effect on insurers who refuse to pay justified
claims.98
88. Leggett v. Cotton, 29 N.C. App. 331, 224 S.E.2d 235 (1976).
89. Id. at 333-34, 224 S.E.2d at 236. Four principal theories are used by various
states to impose liability on an insurance agent for delay: (1) estoppel to deny accept-
ance of application; (2) implied agreement to act promptly; (3) contract; and (4) tort.
A tort theory is used by a majority of the states. R. KEETON, supra note 45, § 2.4(a).
90. Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 115-16, 229 S.E.2d 297, 303
(1976). The case is also discussed in this Survey, Torts: Fraud, and in Comment,
Remedies-"Extra-Contractual" Remedies for Breach of Contract in North Carolina, 55
N.C.L. REV. 1125 (1977).
91. See, e.g., Oestreicher v. American Nat'l Stores, 290 N.C. 118, 133, 225 S.E.2d
797, 807 (1976); King v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 273 N.C. 396, 398 159 S.E.2d
891, 893 (1968).
92. 291 N.C. 105, 229 S.E.2d 297 (1976).
93. Id. at 116, 229 S.E.2d at 304.
94. Id. at 115-16, 229 S.E.2d at 303. The court listed the following as essential
elements of bad faith: (1) refusal to pay by the defendant after investigation and deter-
mination that the claim is valid or after no investigation and (2) bad faith on the part
of defendant with an intent to cause further damage to plaintiff. Id.
95. 291 N.C. at 111, 229 S.E.2d at 301. The court overruled Swinton v. Savoy
Realty Co., 236 N.C. 723, 73 S.E.2d 785 (1953), which required a finding of an element
of aggravation before punitive damages could be allowed for fraud. 291 N.C. at 113-14,
229 S.E.2d at 301-02.
96. Id. at 116, 229 S.E.2d at 303. See also Note, The Expanding Availability of
Punitive Damages in Contract Actions, 8 IND. L. REv. 668 (1975).
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X. PRISONERS' RIGHTS
A. Prisoners' Unions
In North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union v. Jones,1 the Federal
District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina refused to
decide whether prison inmates have a constitutional right to join a
union of inmates;' nevertheless, the court's decision is significant: after
having permitted prisoners to join the Union, defendants could not for-
bid solicitation of membership, and unless security is endangered, the
Union must receive the same privileges as other inmate organizations.3
In this case, plaintiff Union filed suit4 against David Jones as Sec-
retary of the North Carolina Department of Correction and Ralph
Edwards as Commissioner of the Department, alleging that defendants,
acting in their official capacities under color of state law, deprived
Union members of their constitutional rights., The evidence" revealed
that although defendants did not forbid Union membership, the solic-
itation of membership, whether by inmates, outsiders or publications,
was prohibited. Furthermore, Union meetings were banned, and re-
ceipt of bulk mail for redistribution was not permitted, even though
other inmate groups had these privileges. The court also noted that
denials of the sixth amendment right to legal representation had oc-
curred when "lower echelon prison administrators" refused to allow
paralegals to enter the prison because the paralegals were suspected
of soliciting Union membership."
The question of first amendment rights of prisoners was addressed
in Procunier v. Martinez,' in which the United States Supreme Court
invalidated prison regulations dealing with the censorship of inmates'
correspondence. The Court set out criteria that, if met, would justify
such restrictions. First, the regulation must further "one or more of
the substantial governmental interests of security, order, and rehabili-
1. 409 F. Supp. 937 (E.D.N.C. 1976).
2. Id. at 940-41.
3. Id. at 946. The "stated purposes [of the Union] are to work legally and
peacefully to alter or eliminate practices of the Department of Correction which are
thought to be in conflict with the just, constitutional and social interests of all persons."
Id. at 940.
4. Suit was filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
5. 409 F. Supp. at 940.
6. Id. at 941-42.
7. Id. at 942.
8. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
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tation. Second, the limitation of First Amendment freedoms must be
no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the parti-
cular governmental interest involved."9 Similarly, Pell v. Procunier,10
which upheld a prison regulation that prohibited media interviews with
specific inmates, set forth the principle that "a prison inmate retains
those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status
as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the correc-
tions system.""
With these standards in mind, the court in Jones held that defend-
ants, having permitted membership in the Union, may not forbid-
solicitation of membership :12 "To permit an inmate to join a union
and forbid his inviting others to join borders on the irrational."' 3
The same considerations, the court reasoned, apply to literature that
encourages union membership.' 4 As in other areas, however, freedom
of speech in the prison context is not unlimited, for the administration
may lawfully ban expressions that constitute a breach of security. 15
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment served
as the basis for the court's consideration of the denial of certain privi-
leges to the Union. "[Glovernment," the court observed, "may not
pick and choose depending upon its approval or disapproval of the
message or purpose of the group."" The court extended this principle
to the prison context, on condition that the activity in question does
not present a present danger to security and order in the prison.'"
Finding no evidence that the Union presented such a danger, the court
held that "defendants must accord to the Union and the inmate
9. Id. at 413.
10. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
11. Id. at 822.
12. 409 F. Supp. at 944. The court found no evidence to suggest that solicitation
would disrupt security and order in the prisons. Id. Plaintiff had asked for damages
and attorney's fees, but these claims were denied. Since any recovery would be paid
out of the state treasury, the court held that the eleventh amendment bars such an award.
Under the authority of Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240
(1975), the court ruled that an award of attorneys' fees is not authorized. 409 F. Supp.
at 940. Because defendants did allow inmates to join the Union, the court felt that de-
ciding whether inmates have a constitutional right to join a union would be an advisory
opinion. Id. at 941. After reviewing several conflicting expert opinions, the court also
declined to characterize inmate associations as necessarily good or bad. Id. at 943.
13. 409 F. Supp. at 943 (footnote omitted).
14. Id. at 944.
15. id.
16. Id. (citing United States v. Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972)).
17. Id. at 944-45.
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members the same privileges accorded to other organizations of
inmates-neither more nor less."'18
Finally, in dealing with the matter of inmates being denied their
rights to legal representation, the court noted that the trouble was
caused by the no-solicitation rule. 19 Since defendants had abolished
the rule, the court held that they may not forbid such solicitation by
attorneys, paralegals or others. 20  Solicitation of membership may oc-
cur, however, only as an incident to legal representation, for prison ad-
ministrators may control access to prisoners as a matter of security.
21
Attorneys and paralegals must be allowed access to inmates when the
dominant purpose is to serve a protected sixth amendment right.22
If the purpose is legitimate and protected by the sixth amendment
right to counsel, . . . the first amendment forbids attempts to con-
trol the subject matter of discussion. . . . [T]he inmate's right
of representation does not vanish when in the course of the inter-
view the lawyer remarks that he favors the Union and hopes the
prisoner will join it.
23
The court's decision in this case represents progress, because recog-
nition of the fact that inmates are entitled to certain basic rights may
reduce the dehumanization that so often accompanies incarceration.
Equally important, the decision will allow the Union to expand its ef-
forts to improve prison conditions. Whatever the source, such im-
provements should be welcomed.
B. Judicial Review of Administrative Matters
Defendant in In re Stevens24 was charged with assault while he
was an honor grade inmate recommended for conditional release. The
district court found no probable cause; nevertheless, a disciplinary
hearing committee of the Department of Correction punished defen-
dant by reducing his honor grade status, with the result that he was
denied further consideration for conditional release. Pursuant to a writ
18. Id. at 945. The court also recognized a series of limitations: inmates have
no right to join a labor union for the purpose of forcing demands on prison administra-
tors; it is unlawful for inmates to join together to resist prison discipline; it is lawful
for prison officials to refuse to negotiate with any group of prisoners; any contract be-
tween administrators and prisoner groups is void under North Carolina law; and reason-
able restrictions may be placed on inmate gatherings. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 945-46.
22. Id. at 946.
23. Id.
24. 28 N.C. App. 471, 221 S.E.2d 839 (1976).
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of habeas corpus, the superior court ordered that the disciplinary pro-
ceedings be stricken from prison records and not be considered with
respect to the recommendation for conditional release. The court of
appeals reversed this decision, holding that the writ of habeas corpus
was improperly utilized to contest a strictly administrative matter.2 5
In re Stevens is distinguishable from the cases relied upon by the
court of appeals in its reversal.26  Here, the district court found no pro-
bable cause for the assault charge prior to the committee's "conviction"
of defendant for the same incident. In contrast, the administrative de-
cisions made in the other cases were unrelated to court proceedings.
It seems entirely beyond the power of an administrative committee
to overturn, in effect, the decision of a court, yet the court of
appeals has apparently approved the practice. Court review of an ad-
ministrative decision for the purpose of considering a possible abuse
of discretion would not infringe upon decisions that are purely adminis-
trative in nature. Instead, review could, in cases like the one at hand,
maintain the purely administrative nature by preventing encroachments
upon judicially decided matters.
XI. PROPERTY
A. Adverse Possession
In Taylor v. Johnson' the North Carolina Supreme Court consid-
ered an attempt to have certain lands in Pamlico County registered
under the Torrens system. 2 Petitioner claimed a fee title in the
property involved, relying on a chain of mesne conveyances to a grant
from the state.' The North Carolina Wildlife Resources Commission
contested the proceeding and asserted ownership to a portion of the
property that petitioner was attempting to register.4 The Commission's
25. Id. at 473-74, 221 S.E.2d at 840-41; see Goble v. Bounds, 281 N.C. 307, 188
S.E.2d 347 (1972); Jernigan v. State, 279 N.C. 556, 184 S.E.2d 259 (1971); State v.
Garris, 265 N.C. 711, 144 S.E.2d 901 (1965).
26. See cases cited note 25 supra.
1. 289 N.C. 690, 224 S.E.2d 567 (1976).
2. Id. at 692, 224 S.E.2d at 569. The Torrens Law is set forth in ch. 43 of
the North Carolina General Statutes (1976). The principle of the system is that con-
veyances are to be made by registration and certificate rather than by deed. See Cape
Lookout Co. v. Gold, 167 N.C. 63, 83 S.E. 3 (1914).
3. 289 N.C. at 693, 224 S.E.2d at 569.
4. Id. Since this was a contested Torrens proceeding, the petitioner was bound
by the rules for establishing title that apply in ejectment and other actions involving
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claim was based on a deed from the state and the State Board of Edu-
cation to the Board of Conservation and Development and, alterna-
tively, on the doctrine of adverse possession.'
One of the links in petitioner's chain of title was an 1835 report
by the commissioners who had been appointed to divide the lands of
decedent John Blount.0 This document allocated to Thomas Blount,
one of petitioner's predecessors in title, the land that petitioner was now
attempting to register. The court found that an equitable decree that
confirmed the report had ordered that deeds be executed as directed in
the document. 7 The record before the court, however, contained no evi-
dence that tended to show that the deeds were ever executed or that
the court of equity entered an order of attachment to enforce its
decree." Consequently, the court held that the 1835 equitable pro-
ceedings failed to transfer legal title from decedent John Blount to
Thomas Blount." The court's holding was based on the common law
principle that an equitable decree "'cannot per se divest a title at law,
but only obliges a person who has title and who is mentioned in the
decree to convey as therein directed.' "10
The court's holding that legal title was never transferred by the
1835 proceedings did not ipso facto sever petitioner's chain of title. 1
By virtue of the intestate laws in effect at that time, Thomas Blount
was an intestate heir to a one-fifth undivided interest in the properties
of John Blount. Thus, upon tracing title to himself from Thomas
Blount, petitioner would be entitled to a one-fifth undivided interest
in the lands in controversy.' 2
proof of title. West Va. Pulp & Paper Co. v. Richmond Cedar Works, 239 N.C. 627,
632, 80 S.E.2d 665, 669 (1954).
5. 289 N.C. at 693, 224 S.E.2d at 569. Properties owned by the Board of Con-
servation and Development were transferred to the Wildlife Resources Commission by
Law of March 11, 1947, ch. 263, § 12, [1947] N.C. Sess. Laws 301 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 143-248 (1974)).
6. 289 N.C. at 701, 224 S.E.2d at 574.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 702, 224 S.E.2d at 574.
9. Id. at 704, 224 S.E.2d at 575.
10. Id. at 703, 224 S.E.2d at 574 (quoting Proctor v. Ferebee, 36 N.C. 143,
146, 1 Ired. Eq. 180, 184 (1840)); see Gay v. Parpart, 106 U.S. 679 (1882). The
court rejected the argument that a court of law and a court of equity have equal power
with respect to judgments and decrees affecting land titles. 289 N.C. at 703, 224 S.E.2d
at 574. The court also held inapplicable statutory provisions permitting the transfer
of legal title by equitable decree since the court of equity had not expressly declared
that its decree was to operate as a conveyance. Id. at 704, 224 S.E.2d at 575.
11. 289 N.C. at 704, 224 S.E.2d at 575.
12. Id. The contention by the Wildlife Commission that a sheriff's deed consti-
tuted a hiatus in petitioner's chain of title was not accepted by the court. The Con-
[Vol. 551070
1977] PROPERTY 1071
In its consideration of petitioner's potential right to one-fifth
interest in the property, the court encountered the Wildlife Commis-
sion's claim of adverse possession for seven years under color of title. 3
The only evidence offered by the Commission was that it had posted
signs designating the area as a "Wildlife Game Management Area."'"
Relying on well established principles of adverse possession15 as well
as North Carolina precedent,' 6 the court held that this evidence was
insufficient to sustain the claim.' 7
The court also rejected a claim by the petitioner that the Real
Property Marketable Title Act 8 cured any technical defects in his
record title and vested him with a fee simple.' 9 The Act did not oper-
ate, according to the court, because recent activities of the Wildlife
Commission constituted an actual and open possession of the land 20 and
the Act specifically did not extinguish claims of persons "in present,
actual and open possession of real property so long as such person is
in such possession.21 The court also noted that the Marketable Title
Act has no effect on G.S. 146-7922 which, in any proceeding in which
the State is a party, creates a presumption of title in the State until the
other party proves a valid title in himself.23 Therefore, since the court
found that petitioner could only trace title to a one-fifth interest in the
mission argued that petitioner had failed to establish the existence of the judgment on
which the execution was issued and that petitioner had not proven, except by recitals
in the sheriff's deed, that the sheriff was in possession of an execution at the time
of sale. The court, relying on the ancient document rule, held that since the deed
was admitted without objection, the recitals in the deed were prima facie evidence of
a "live" execution at the time of sale. Id. at 704-08, 224 S.E.2d at 575-78.
13. Id. at 708, 224 S.E.2d at 578. The court restricted its opinion to the adverse
nature of the Commission's possession, assuming arguendo that the Commission had
proven color of title. Id.
14. Id. at 709, 224 S.E.2d at 578.
15. The key language in a definition of adverse possession quoted by the court
states that the acts of dominion over the land must "be so repeated as to show that
they are done in the character of owner." Locklear v. Savage, 159 N.C. 236, 237,
74 S.E. 347, 348 (1912), quoted in 289 N.C. at 709, 224 S.E.2d at 578.
16. Berry v. Richmond Cedar Works, 184 N.C. 187, 113 S.E. 772 (1922).
17. 289 N.C. at 710, 224 S.E.2d at 579.
18. The Real Property Marketable Title Act is set forth in ch. 47B of the
North Carolina General Statutes (1976).
19. 289 N.C. at 710, 224 S.E.2d at 579.
20. Id. at 711, 224 S.E.2d at 579-80. The Commission's activities included con-
struction of dikes, pumping stations, equipment sheds and other structures. Id. at 711,
224 S.E.2d at 579.
21. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47B-3(3) (1976).
22. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-79 (1974).
23. 289 N.C. at 712, 224 S.E.2d at 580. A challenge to the constitutionality of
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-79 (1974) was recently rejected by the court of appeals in
State v. Chadwick, 31 N.C. App. 398, 229 S.E.2d 255 (1976).
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property in controversy, the Wildlife Resources Commission was
declared owner of a four-fifths undivided interest in fee. 24
In considering an adverse possession claim,25 the court of appeals
reaffirmed the principle that a permissive entry into possession of land
does not become adverse until the occupant disclaims the permission
in such manner as to put the owner on notice that the occupant is claim-
ing the land as absolute owner.26
B. Deeds
In Whetsell v. Jernigan27 the supreme court held invalid a reverter
clause in a deed that appeared only in the description of the property.2"
The court grounded its opinion on a well settled North Carolina rule
of construction. 29  The court noted, however, that had the conveyance
been executed after January 1, 1968, G.S. 39-1.13o would have allowed
the effect of the inconsistent clauses to be determined by looking to
the intent of the parties as it appeared from all the provisions of the
deed.l
In Overton v. Boyce3 2 the supreme court stated that a patent
ambiguity in a deed description exists "[w]hen it is apparent from the
face of the deed, itself, that there is uncertainty as to the land intended
to be conveyed and the deed, itself, refers to nothing extrinsic by which
such uncertainty can be resolved . . . . 3 Using this definition, the
24. 289 N.C. at 712, 224 S.E.2d at 580.
25. Lea v. Dudley, 28 N.C. App. 281, 220 S.E.2d 828 (1976).
26. Id. at 285, 220 S.E.2d at 830. In Wiggins v. Taylor, 31 N.C. App. 79, 228
S.E.2d 476 (1976), another adverse possession claim was sustained by the court of ap-
peals, the case turning on the sufficiency of known and visible boundaries and continu-
ous possession for more than 20 years.
27. 291 N.C. 128, 229 S.E.2d 183 (1976).
28. Id. at 130, 229 S.E.2d at 185. The granting clause in the deed in question
conveyed a fee simple absolute, the habendum contained no language limiting the fee
and the covenants of title also warranted a fee simple. Id. at 129, 229 S.E.2d at 184.
29. The rule applied by the court states that when the granting clause, the haben-
dum and the warranty clauses all indicate the conveyance of fee simple title, other
clauses in the deed that attempt to limit the interest conveyed will be rejected. See,
e.g., Oxendine v. Lewis, 252 N.C. 669, 114 S.E.2d 706 (1960); Jeffries v. Parker, 236
N.C. 756, 73 S.E.2d 783 (1953); Artis v. Artis, 228 N.C. 754, 47 S.E.2d 228 (1948).
The court acknowledged that the habendum clause may enlarge or restrict the estate
conveyed in the granting clause. 291 N.C. at 131-32, 229 S.E.2d at 186.
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-1.1 (1976).
31. 291 N.C. at 132-33, 229 S.E.2d at 187. Justice Copeland dissented in Whet-
sell, arguing that "[t]o place the grantor in a straightjacket and say that he must put
his reverter clause at a particular place in the deed is to make a sham of the law."
Id. at 136, 229 S.E.2d at 188.
32. 289 N.C. 291, 221 S.E.2d 347 (1976).
33. Id. at 294, 221 S.E.2d at 349; see 2 J. STRON, NoaT CAROLINA INDEX
Boundaries § 10, at 611-12 (3cred. 1976).
court held that the description involved in Overton was patently am-
biguous and the deed therefore void. 4 The North Carolina courts
have long held that parol evidence is inadmissable to remove a patent
ambiguity.
35
The state supreme court faced the latent-patent ambiguity prob-
lem again in Kidd v. Early.3 6 Plaintiff sought specific performance of
an option contrac 7 that described a tract of land as "a certain tract
or parcel of land located in Monroe Township, Guilford County, North
Carolina, and described as follows: 200 acres more or less of The C.
F. Early farm. To be determined by a new survey furnished by
sellers."38  Defendant moved for summary judgment, alleging, inter
alia, that the description of the property did not meet the requirements
of the Statute of Frauds. 9
In its opinion the court acknowledged the existence of a split of
authority as to the sufficiency under the Statute of Frauds of a descrip-
tion that gives one of the contracting parties the right to select the ex-
act property to be conveyed.40 After reviewing authority from other
jurisdictions, 41 the court aligned itself with those courts that hold that
contracts with such descriptions are enforceable.
42
After finding that the Kidd option was potentially enforceable, the
court held that the larger tract from which the conveyance was to be
made was sufficiently identified as the "C. F. Early Farm. 43  Certain
34. 289 N.C. at 294-95, 221 S.E.2d at 349. The deed described the land that
it purported to convey as follows: "A certain tract of Pocosin Land adjoining the lands
of the late Henderson Luton & others, containing, by estimation, Three Hundred and
Nineteen Acres." Id. at 292, 221 S.E.2d at 348.
35. See, e.g., Cummings v. Dosam, Inc., 273 N.C. 28, 159 S.E.2d 513 (1968);
Lane v. Coe, 262 N.C. 8, 136 S.E.2d 269 (1964). See 2 J. STRONG, supra note 33,
Boundaries § 10, at 612 for additional citations.
36. 289 N.C. 343, 222 S.E.2d 392 (1976). For a comprehensive discussion of
the procedural aspects of Kidd v. Early see Note, Kidd v. Early: Summary Judgment
on Testimonial Evidence in North Carolina, 55 N.C.L. REV. 232 (1976). See also
this Survey, Commercial Law; Civil Procedure.
37. The court held that for plaintiff's option to be specifically enforceable it was
necessary that the contract comply with the Statute of Frauds, N.C. GEN. STrAT. § 22-2
(1976). 289 N.C. at 353, 222 S.E.2d at 399.
38. Id. at 347, 222 S.E.2d at 396.
39. Id. at 352, 222 S.E.2d at 399.
40. Id. at 354, 222 S.E.2d at 401.
41. Peckham v. Lane, 81 Kan. 489, 106 P. 464 (1910); Delaney v. Shellabarger,
76 Nev. 341, 353 P.2d 903 (1960); Calder v. Third Judicial Circuit, 2 Utah 2d 309,
273 P.2d 168 (1954).
42. 289 N.C. at 356, 222 S.E.2d at 401-02.
43. Id. This finding is an affirmation of the principle that when a commonly
recognized name is used to describe property in a deed, extrinsic evidence will be ad-
mitted to show that the property claimed under the deed is the property named in the
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earlier cases in which similar descriptions were held insufficient were
distinguished because those descriptions did not specify a method (such
as the survey required in the Early farm description) for obtaining an
exact description of the land to be conveyed." Since both parties to
the option had received copies of the survey that showed the precise
land to be retained by the seller, the court held that the ambiguity in
the contract, which was classified as latent, had been removed, and
therefore the description was sufficient to satisfy the Statute of
Frauds.45
Scott v. Moser46 presented the court of appeals with the issue of
whether cross deeds of partition between tenants in common could
operate to convey remainder interests. The court, relying on principles
announced in the 1891 case of Harrison v. Ray,47 held that the cross
deeds of partition operated only to sever the unity of possession and
that no title was conveyed by virtue of the deeds.48 Hence, the named
remaindermen had no interest in the property involved.
49
In Brice v. Moore50 the court of appeals recognized that a pre-
sumption of intent to make a gift arises when a husband furnishes the
consideration for property and has the deed made to himself and his
wife as tenants by the entirety.5 Application of the presumption re-
sulted in the court allowing the wife's petition for partition to proceed
since the husband-respondent had failed to come forward with evidence
sufficiently "clear, strong, and convincing" to rebut the presumption of
gift.
5 2
In Skinner v. Skinner53 the court refused to impose a resulting
trust in favor of the wife in property she had purchased prior to her
marriage and thereafter conveyed to herself and her husband as tenants
deed. Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Waters, 260 N.C. 667, 133 S.E.2d 450 (1963);
Dill-Cramer-Truitt Corp. v. Jacksonville Lumber Co., 183 N.C. 660, 112 S.E. 740
(1922).
44. 289 N.C. at 356, 222 S.E.2d at 402; see State v. Brooks, 279 N.C. 45, 181
S.E.2d 553 (1971); Carlton v. Anderson, 276 N.C. 564, 173 S.E.2d 783 (1970).
45. 289 N.C. at 356-57, 222 S.E.2d at 402.
46. 31 N.C. App. 268, 229 S.E.2d 222 (1976).
47. 108 N.C. 215, 12 S.E. 993 (1891).
48. 31 N.C. App. at 276, 229 S.E.2d at 227.
49. Id. The court noted that the principles of Harrison v. Ray have been con-
sistently followed since that case was decided. Id. at 275, 229 S.E.2d at 226.
50. 30 N.C. App. 365, 226 S.E.2d 882 (1976).
51. Id. at 367, 226 S.E.2d at 883. The court stated that the presumption continues
after the tenancy by the entirety is destroyed.
52. Id.
53. 28 N.C. App. 412, 222 S.E.2d 258 (1976).
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by the entirety. 54 The court distinguished the Skinner type of convey-
ance from the situation in which property is conveyed to the husband
and wife for consideration furnished by the wife, noting that in such
a situation a resulting trust in favor of the wife would arise.55 Since
the wife in Skinner was attempting to engraft a trust upon her own con-
veyance, the court held that absent evidence of fraud, mistake or undue
influence a resulting trust did not arise.
In a case involving certain restrictive covenants in a deed to a sub-
division lot, the court of appeals in Sleepy Creek Club, Inc. v.
Lawrence5 7 held that the restrictive covenants could not be enforced
by owners of other lots in the subdivision when the covenants were not
part of a uniform plan of development by the original developer and
the deed contained no provision that other property owners should have
the right to enforce the restrictions.58 The opinion distinguished
Lamica v. Gerdes,5" a case in which the state supreme court allowed
other property owners in a subdivision to enforce the restrictive cove-
nants in a neighbor's deed. Lamica was distinguishable, according to
the court, since the developer in that case had expressly provided in
his deeds that the restrictive covenants were enforceable inter se.60
C. Betterments
Claims for compensation for betterments61 under G.S. 1-3401
confronted the court of appeals in Sweeten v. King6 and Hackett v.
Hackett.64  In Sweeten the court followed the general North Carolina
rule, which holds that constructive notice from the record of a para-
mount title or interest does not prevent the ejected claimant or those
claiming under him from recovering for betterments.65 In allowing
54. Id. at 416-17, 222 S.E.2d at 262.
55. Id. at 416, 222 S.E.2d at 262.
56. id. at 417, 222 S.E.2d at 262.
57. 29 N.C. App. 547, 225 S.E.2d 167 (1976).
58. Id. at 553, 225 S.E.2d at 170.
59. 270 N.C. 85, 153 S.E.2d 814 (1967).
60. 29 N.C. App. at 553, 225 S.E.2d at 170.
61. The classic betterments claim arises when someone holding property under
color of title that he believes to be good makes permanent improvements on the prop-
erty and is subsequently ejected by the holder of a paramount title or interest. See
Rogers v. Timberlake, 223 N.C. 59, 29 S.E.2d 167 (1943).
62. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-340 (1969).
63. 29 N.C. App. 672, 225 S.E.2d 599 (1976).
64. 31 N.C. App. 217, 228 S.E.2d 758 (1976).
65. 29 N.C. App. at 677, 228 S.E.2d at 601; accord, Pritchard v. Williams, 176
N.C. 108, 96 S.E. 733 (1918).
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compensation to the devisee of a life tenant who had permanently im-
proved certain property the court stated: "The good faith which will
entitle a claimant to compensation for betterments means simply an
honest belief of the occupant in his right or title. . . [T]hat dili-
gence might have shown him that he had no title does not necessarily
negative good faith . ... -"6 In Hackett a betterments claim was de-
nied since any improvements made on the property were not made
under color of title but were made while the claimant was a tenant."7
D. Landlord-Tenant
In 1938 the North Carolina Supreme Court in Jenkins v. Rose's
Stores68 held that in the absence of any specific provision requiring him
to do so, a lessee is under no obligation to occupy the leased premises
or to occupy a store thereon during the life of the lease.09 The holding
prevented the lessor in that case from recovering on a percentage of
sales lease provision when the lessee had continued to operate his busi-
ness at another location in the same city after moving out of the leased
premises prior to the expiration of the lease.70 The lessee's liability was
limited to the minimum rental specified in the lease.
71
The Jenkins rule was followed in the 1976 cases of Oestreicher
v. American National Stores, Inc."2 and Lowe's of Shelby v. Hunt.7" In
Oestreicher, the Jenkins rule operated to defeat a claim by the lessor
on an anticipatory breach of contract theory. 74 In concluding that there
was no implied covenant to occupy the premises or to do business under
the terms of the lease, the court found that the parties did not intend
66. 29 N.C. App. at 678, 228 S.E.2d at 601.
67. 31 N.C. App. at 220, 228 S.E.2d at 760.
68. 213 N.C. 606, 197 S.E. 174 (1938).
69. Id. at 609, 197 S.E. at 175.
70. Id. at 608-09, 197 S.E. at 175.
71. Id. at 609, 197 S.E. at 175.
72. 290 N.C. 118, 225 S.E.2d 797 (1976), noted in 55 N.C.L. Ruv. 1125 (1977).
73. 30 N.C. App. 84, 226 S.E.2d 232 (1976).
74. In his complaint plaintiff alleged "that defendants are anticipatorily about to
breach the lease contract agreement by vacating the premises prior to the expiration
of the said lease contract agreement option .... " 290 N.C. at 137, 225 S.E.2d at
809.
Plaintiff in Oestreicher also sought punitive damages for breach of the lease con-
tract, alleging that "defendant willfully, fraudulently and inaccurately reported net sales"
so as to substantially reduce the rental to which plaintiff was entitled under the per-
centage rental provisions of the lease. id. at 136, 225 S.E.2d at 808. The supreme
court reversed the summary judgment that had been granted for defendant on this issue,
noting that "the better rule would require that defendant be punished by permitting
plaintiff to recover punitive damages." Id. at 136, 225 S.E.2d at 809.
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to impose such a duty for two reasons: first, the lease did not restrict
the lessee to a high sales volume business that would activate the per-
centage rental provisions; and second, the lessee was free to sublet so
long as the new tenant's business did not compete with that of the
lessor.75  In Lowe's of Shelby the Jenkins rule prevailed over the
lessor's claim that sales at the lessee's new location should be included
in the rent computation since the percentage rental provision specifi-
cally covered all sales in excess of $900,000.76 It should be noted,
however, that Oestreicher and Lowe's of Shelby both indicate that situa-
tions can exist in which the Jenkins rule would not be controlling. 7
In Nybor Corp. v. Ray's Restaurants, Inc.78 the court of appeals
followed the general rule that a sublessee can have no greater rights
against the lessor than were granted to the lessee in the original lease.
79
Although the original lessee had conveyed the property "subject to
leases of record,"80 the court held that this language imposed on the
purchaser only the burden of recognizing valid rights existing under the
lease and sublease."' Consequently, sublease terms that purported to
grant a renewal option and the right to use the property to a depth of
150 feet (only 125 feet had been granted in the original lease) were
unenforceable against the purchaser from the original lessor.82
E. Eminent Domain
In Guyton v. North Carolina Board of Transportation83 the court
of appeals reaffirmed the principle that the owner of land that abuts
a highway has a "special right of easement in the highway for access
purposes . . . [that] . . . is a property right which cannot be taken
from him without just compensation." 4  The court, however, denied
75. Id. at 139-40, 225 S.E.2d at 810-11.
76. 30 N.C. App. at 86-87, 226 S.E.2d at 234.
77. In Oestreicher the supreme court noted that an implied covenant to do business
might be found by looking at the contract "from its four corners." 290 N.C. at 139,
225 S.E.2d at 810. In Lowe's of Shelby the court of appeals found that percentage
rental provisions should be considered concurrently with other sections of the lease to
determine whether sales at a new location should be included in the rent computation.
30 N.C. App. at 87, 226 S.E.2d at 234.
78. 29 N.C. App. 642, 225 S.E.2d 609 (1976).
79. 51C C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant § 48(1) (1968).
80. 29 N.C. App. at 646-47, 225 S.E.2d at 612.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 643, 646, 225 S.E.2d at 610, 612.
83. 30 N.C. App. 87, 226 S.E.2d 175 (1976).
84. Id. at 89, 226 S.E.2d at 177; see Abdalla v. State Highway Comm'n, 261 N.C.
114, 118, 134 S.E.2d 81, 84 (1964).
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plaintiff's request that the Board of Transportation be enjoined from
excavating or removing portions of a North Carolina highway abutting
his property."' The opinion noted that the Board's discretionary
authority to control the state highway system is not subject to judicial
review absent evidence that the authority has been abused.8 13 Since
such evidence did not appear in the record, the court limited plaintiffs
to their remedy at law to recover just compensation for the taking of
their property.s
7
In State Highway Commission v. Rose,88 the court of appeals
considered whether the defendant in a condemnation action was en-
titled to compensation for interference with access to his property. The
State Highway Commission had constructed traffic islands on the Com-
mission's property at the point where it intersected with that of defend-
ant. Since the evidence supported the trial court's finding that defend-
ants had retained reasonable means of ingress and egress, the court,
following established precedent in North Carolina, 0 held that no com-
pensation was required. 90
F. Zoning
Plaintiffs in Taylor v. City of Raleigh"' sought a declaratory judg-
ment invalidating two acts by the city of Raleigh: a 1972 ordinance
that annexed certain noncontiguous property to the city, and a 1970
ordinance that had rezoned the property from a Residential 4 District
85. 30 N.C. App. at 90, 226 S.E.2d at 178.
86. Id. at 90, 226 S.E.2d at 177; see State Highway Comm'n v. Greensboro City
Bd. of Educ., 265 N.C. 35, 48, 143 S.E.2d 87, 97 (1965).
87. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-111 (1974) prescribes the remedy at law for any taking
of property.
88. 31 N.C. App. 28, 228 S.E.2d 664 (1976).
89. Id. at 32, 228 S.E.2d at 667. The court quoted the following language from
an earlier case:
If the interference is not substantial and if reasonable means of ingress and
egress remains or is provided, there has been a legitimate exercise of the police
power. If the interference is substantial and no reasonable means of ingress
or egress remains or is provided, there has been a taking of a property right
under the power of eminent domain.
State Highway Comm'n v. Yarborough, 6 N.C. App. 294, 302, 170 S.E.2d 159, 165
(1969).
90. 31 N.C. App. at 32, 228 S.E.2d at 667. Other eminent domain cases decided
by the court of appeals include Board of Transp. v. Harvey, 28 N.C. App. 327, 220
S.E.2d 815 (1976), which sustained a jury instruction based on N.C. GEN. STAT. §
136-112 (1974) (measure of damages when only part of a tract is taken) and City
of High Point v. Farlow, 28 N.C. App. 343, 220 S.E.2d 841 (1976), which resulted
in a remand for determination of whether an ambiguous condemnation resolution au-
thorized the taking of a fee or an easement.
91. 290 N.C. 608, 227 S.E.2d 576 (1976). See also this Survey, Civil Procedure:
Limitations of Actions.
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to a Residential 6 District. a2 Addressing itself first to the challenge
to the annexation ordinance, the state supreme court, in an opinion by
Chief Justice Sharp, found that plaintiffs, whose property was located
between the city and the noncontiguous area that had been annexed,
were unable to utilize any of the statutory provisions93 that granted
standing to contest the ordinance. 94  The court refused to allow plain-
tiffs to attack the ordinance, noting the
general rule that unless an annexation ordinance be absolutely void
(e.g. on the ground of lack of legislative authority for its enactment),
in the absence of specific statutory authority to do so, private in-
dividuals may not attack, collaterally or directly, the validity of pro-
ceedings extending the corporate limits of a municipality.95
In its consideration of plaintiffs' challenge to the rezoning ordi-
nance, the court ruled that the standing issue had to be determined with
reference to whether the rezoning ordinance itself directly and ad-
versely affected plaintiffs.9 6 Since plaintiffs, through the declaratory
judgment action, were attempting to resist condemnation by the city of
easements over their property for the installation of water and sewer
lines to the annexed tract, the court, on the record before it,9 7 held that
92. This reclassification would permit one of the defendants in the action to con-
struct a 200 unit apartment project on the 39.89 acre tract involved. Plaintiff's prop-
erty, which was improved with single family dwellings, was in the same zoning area
as the tract in issue. Plaintiffs property remained in an R-4 category. Id. at 610-
11, 227 S.E.2d at 577-78.
93. The annexation by the city of Raleigh was made pursuant to authority con-
ferred by Law of June 28, 1967, ch. 989, [1967] N.C. Sess. Laws 1419. This act pro-
vides the only means of contesting the annexation of noncontiguous property. Section
5 of ch. 989 requires that such a challenge be initiated by a petition filed by at
least 10% of the qualified voters of the city of Raleigh, a condition not met in the
present action.
Satellite annexations, pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-58 to -58.6 (1976),
may be contested under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.2 (1976). One of the requirements
therein provided for contesting an annexation is that the contestant be "any person
residing in or owning property in the area proposed for annexation [or] any resident
of the annexing city." Id. Since plaintiffs were neither residents of Raleigh nor owners
of property within the annexed 39.89 acre tract, they could not contest the annexation
by virtue of the standing granted under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.2 (1976).
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-38 and 160A-50 authorize judicial review of annexations
of adjacent or contiguous areas, a grant of standing of no benefit to plaintiffs in this
action.
94. 290 N.C. at 618, 227 S.E.2d at 582.
95. Id. at 617, 227 S.E.2d at 581-82.
96. Id. at 621, 227 S.E.2d at 584.
97. The court considered the effect of the rezoning ordinance on plaintiffs as mini-
mal. Id. at 620, 227 S.E.2d at 583. The court noted that the original proposal was
to rezone an 85 acre tract but that the City Council had restricted the rezoning to
39.89 acres, creating a 45 acre buffer zone, classified R-4, between plaintiffs and the
rezoned area. Also, the court referred to the fact that although there had been protests
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plaintiffs had failed to establish that they were "persons aggrieved by
the rezoning ordinance." 98 The court indicated that plaintiffs had not
demonstrated "a specific personal and legal interest in the subject
matter affected by the zoning ordinance and [that they were] directly and
and adversely affected thereby.""9 As an additional ground for ruling
against plaintiffs, the court held that their claim was barred by the
equitable doctrine of laches since they had delayed over two years
before instituting the challenge to the ordinance. 00
In Stutts v. Swain' the court of appeals sustained a challenge to
a rezoning ordinance on the ground that the action of the defendant
city in adopting the ordinance constituted an illegal exercise in spot
zoning.102 The ordinance in question rezoned approximately four
acres of land from R-1 Residential to a classification that permitted
mobile homes on the property.10 3  The parties who successfully chal-
lenged the ordinance were owners of approximately 500 acres of land
in the same area that remained in the R-1 category. 0 4  The court re-
jected a laches plea by defendant landowner, noting that plaintiffs had
filed their action within several months after they discovered that de-
fendant planned to develop a mobile home park.105
Other zoning cases considered by the court of appeals in 1976 in-
volved permitted use clauses' 06 and a building permit revocation issue. 1 7
against the initial proposal to rezone the entire 85 acres, there had been no protest
of the ultimate rezoning until plaintiffs instituted this declaratory judgment action-
more than two years after the rezoning ordinance was adopted. Id. at 620-21, 227
S.E.2d at 583-84.
98. Id. at 621, 227 S.E.2d at 584.
99. Id. at 620, 227 S.E.2d at 583.
100. Id. at 626, 227 S.E.2d at 586.
101. 30 N.C. App. 611, 228 S.E.2d 750 (1976).
102. Id. at 615, 228 S.E.2d at 752. The state supreme court has defined spot zoning
as
[a] zoning ordinance, or amendment, which singles out and reclassifies a rela-
tively small tract owned by a single person and surrounded by a much larger
area uniformly zoned, so as to impose upon the small tract greater restric-
tions than those imposed upon the larger area, or so as to relieve the small
tract from restrictions to which the rest of the area is subjected ....
Blades v. City of Raleigh, 280 N.C. 531, 549, 187 S.E.2d 35, 45 (1972).
103. 30 N.C. App. at 613-15, 228 S.E.2d at 751-52.
104. Id. at 615, 228 S.E.2d at 752.
105. Id. at 619, 228 S.E.2d at 755.
106. Town of Southern Pines v. Mohr, 30 N.C. App. 342, 226 S.E.2d 865 (1976)
(defendants allowed to operate a home for children with emotional difficulties pursuant
to a permitted use clause when the overwhelming evidence indicated they were perform.
ing the requisite governmental function); Freewood Assocs., Ltd. v. Davie County Zon-
ing Bd. of Adjustment, 28 N.C. App. 717, 222 S.E.2d 910 (1976) (designation of pro-
posed nudist camp as a "family campground" in conditional use and nonconforming use
applications was so inaccurate as to -prevent a grant of either permit).
107. In re Greene, 29 N.C. App. 749, 225 S.E.2d 647 (1976) (Zoning Board of
G. Mortgages and Deeds of Trust'0 8
One of the most significant cases decided by the North Carolina
Supreme Court in 1976 was Crockett v. First Federal Savings & Loan
Association.109 Confronted with the claim that a due-on-sale clause is
an unlawful restraint on alienation, the court held that "in the absence
of allegations and proof that the lender acted fraudulently, inequitably,
oppressively or unconscionably, in its demand for increased interest
rates in return for the lender's consent to the sale, then exercise of the
due-on-sale clause is reasonable and not invalid as a restraint on
alienation." 110  Justice Lake dissented, arguing that a due-on-sale
clause should be valid only "when the mortgagee shows a reasonable
basis for belief that the proposed transfer will adversely affect his
security interest in the mortgaged property in a way which the covenant
to keep in repair will not remedy.""
11
In Furst v. Loftin" 2 plaintiffs brought an action to set aside power
of sale foreclosures under a deed of trust and chattel mortgage and to
receive money damages." 3  The foreclosures in question took place
after an alleged default under terms of the instruments that required
continuous insurance coverage on the property involved." 4
In reversing a grant of summary judgment against the trustee and
cestuis que trust,"' the court of appeals held that even though prior
to the foreclosure the cestuis had assigned their interests in the note,
deed of trust and chattel mortgage, they still had the right (1) to re-
quire compliance with the deed of trust provisions requiring insurance
coverage on the property, (2) to declare the indebtedness in default
and (3) to direct a foreclosure."" The court acknowledged the North
Carolina rule that "where the owner of a mortgage has pledged it as
collateral security for a debt less than the face of the mortgage, he has
an interest in it which entitles him to take proper steps to foreclose the
Adjustment did not err as a matter of law in failing to revoke a building permit after
the construction authorized by the permit had been completed).
108. See also this Survey, Commercial Law: Real Estate Transactions.
109. 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580 (1976). For a thorough discussion of Crockett
see Note, Mortgages-Use of Due on Sale Clause by a Lender Is Not a Restraint on
Alienation in North Carolina, 55 N.C.L. Rnv. 310 (1976).
110. 289 N.C. at 630-31, 224 S.E.2d at 587.
111. Id. at 644, 224 S.E.2d at 595 (dissenting opinion).
112. 29 N.C. App. 248, 224 S.E.2d 641 (1976).
113. Id. at 250, 224 S.E.2d at 642.
114. The somewhat complicated fact situation in Furst v. Loftin is set out in id.
at 250-52, 224 S.E.2d at 642-43.
115. Id. at 252, 256, 224 S.E.2d at 644, 645.
116. Id. at 253-54, 224 S.E.2d at 644.
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mortgage."'117 The court noted that on remand it would be necessary




The court of appeals also determined that the trial court erred in
its conclusion that the foreclosure of the deed of trust under the power
of sale provision was a proceeding subject to the North Carolina Rules
of Civil Procedure." 9  The court held that the trustee and cestuis que
trust had acted properly in complying with provisions in the deed of
trust that allowed the institution of foreclosure proceedings if, after
being mailed notice of default, the debtor continued in default for
twenty days.
20
The court held that denial of a summary judgment motion by the
trustee of the foreclosed deed of trust was proper.' 21 Even though his
powers were mandatory, the court noted that certain duties were owed
by the trustee to the debtor as well as the creditor. 22  Consequently,
an issue remained for trial-whether the trustee had acted reasonably
and in good faith in determining that there had been a default under
the deed of trust.
123
117. Id. at 253, 224 S.E.2d at 644; see Sineath v. Katzis, 219 N.C. 434, 14 S.E.2d
418 (1941); Ball-Thrash & Co. v. McCormick, 162 N.C. 471, 78 S.E. 303 (1913).
118. 29 N.C. App. at 255, 224 S.E.2d at 645.
119. Id.
120. Id. If the proceeding had been subject to the North Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure, rule 6(e) would have required that three days be added to the 20 day period
in which plaintiff could cure his default since he had received notice of default by
mail. Thus, the foreclosures at issue would have taken place one day prior to the expira-
tion of the 23 day period rather than two days after the 20 day period specified in
the deed of trust. See Plaintiff Appellee's Brief at 27.
The court noted that the foreclosures in Furst v. Loftin took place prior to the
Laws of June 6, 1975, ch. 492 [1975] N.C. Sess. Laws 515 (amending N.C. GEN.
STAT. ch. 45, art. 2A, pt. 2). These amendments, which provide for notice and hearing
prior to foreclosure sales, were precipitated by Turner v. Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. 1250
(W.D.N.C. 1975), which held the then existing foreclosure and sale provisions, as ap-
plied, unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment.
121. 29 N.C. App. at 256, 224 S.E.2d at 646.
122. Id.




A. Personal Property Taxation
In In re Appeal of Bosley,' the court of appeals dealt with the
issue whether a personal property valuation formula' based on rental
was unconstitutional because it was an improper delegation to the
county of the classification power of the legislature.3 The court held
that the percentage method of appraising household property was not
a classification of property, but merely a formula for determining the
"true value in money." 4  Petitioner also challenged the formula on the
grounds that it did not reflect the "true value in money" 5 and did not
incorporate certain appraisal factors. 6 In rejecting both of these claims,
the court held that the formula is a dependable method of property ap-
praisal that recognizes the various factors that influence market value.
7
B. Business and Commercial Taxation
In In re Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc.8 the court of appeals addressed
the applicability of the new Tax Machinery Act of 19711 to back taxes
owed by defendant carrier. During the tax years of 1965, 1966, 1967
and 1968 defendant had listed its interstate equipment in Vienna town-
ship instead of Winston-Salem. The city attempted to collect taxes on
all four years. 10 The State Commission ruled that assessments would be
1. 29 N.C. App. 468, 224 S.E.2d 686, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 551, 226 S.E.2d
509 (1976).
2. In Pitt County the household personal property is appraised in one of two
ways. The homeowning taxpayer may pay 10% of his residence tax value, while the
leasing taxpayer pays 120% of his annual rental paid. If a taxpayer refuses to use
this formula, an "on the spot" appraisal will be made of his personal property. Id.
at 469, 224 S.E.2d at 687.
3. N.C. CONsT. art. V, § 2(2). The North Carolina Constitution provides that
no class of property shall be taxed except by a uniform rule and that the General
Assembly's power to classify the property by uniform rule shall not be delegated. See
Hajoca Corp. v. Clayton, 277 N.C. 560, 178 S.E.2d 481 (1971).
4. 29 N.C. App. at 471, 224 S.E.2d at 688.
5. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-283 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
6. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-317.1 (1972).
7. 29 N.C. App. at 472, 224 S.E.2d at 688. See In re Carolina Quality Block
Co., 270 N.C. 765, 155 S.E.2d 263 (1967).
In In re Appeal of Matthews, 30 N.C. App. 401, 226 S.E.2d 850 (1976), the
court of appeals reiterated the authority of the county to list, appraise and assess
property for taxes that are not listed by the taxpayer. This authority is based on the
county proceeding under the "discovery" statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-312 (1972).
8. 28 N.C. App. 400, 221 S.E.2d 378 (1976).
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-395(a) (1972). The effective date of the Machinery
Act was July 1, 1971 and applied to all taxes due and uncollected as of that date.
10. 28 N.C. App. at 401, 221 S.E.2d at 379. After the decision in In re McLean
Trucking Co., 281 N.C. 375, 189 S.E.2d 194 (1972), the city of Winston-Salem had
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valid for 1967 and 1968.11 Both parties appealed and the court of ap-
peals affirmed by holding that the city, pursuant to the new "discovery"
statute, could discover any property not listed for the five previous
years. 12 In applying the statute, the court held that "current tax year"
referred to 1972 and the city would be able to discover property back
to 1967.1"
In Institutional Food House, Inc. v. Coble,14 the North Carolina
Supreme Court determined that the scope of the soft drink tax' does
not encompass frozen concentrated orange juice. The lower court had
concluded that concentrated orange juice was a "base product" and
therefore subject to taxation. 6 The supreme court reversed by holding
that "base products" are taxable as such only when used to complete
a soft drink that when bottled is subject to the tax.17 Since the natural
orange juice is expressly exempt from taxation when sold, the frozen
concentrated orange juice as an ingredient is also exempt. 8
In Fieldcrest Mills, Inc. v. Coble,19 the North Carolina Supreme
Court announced that it would again follow the state's outdated eco-
nomic loss carryover statute. 20 Plaintiff was a manufacturer of house-
hold textiles including bedding and bath products. Foremost Screen, Inc.
(Foremost), a wholly owned subsidiary of plaintiff, printed designs on
plaintiff's products. Foremost incurred a large economic loss in 1969
and reported this loss on the North Carolina income tax return. At the
end of that taxable year, Foremost merged into plaintiff corporation.
Each plant continued operation the following year and plaintiff claimed
a deduction for the carryover losses of Foremost for the preceding
authority to levy taxes on the interstate truckers who kept most of their equipment
in the surrounding county outside the city limits. Machinery Act of 1939, ch. 310,
§ 1200, [1939] N.C. Sess. Laws 641 (repealed 1969), however, the statute upon which
the City Attorney was relying, had been repealed by the Tax Machinery Act and no
savings clause was attached. 28 N.C. App. at 402, 221 S.E.2d at 380.
11. 28 N.C. App. at 401, 221 S.E.2d at 379-80.
12. Id. at 403, 221 S.E.2d at 380; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-312 (Cum. Supp.
1975).
13. 28 N.C. App. at 403, 221 S.E.2d at 380.
14. 289 N.C. 123, 221 S.E.2d 297 (1976).
15. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-113.41 to .67 (1972).
16. 289 N.C. at 129, 221 S.E.2d at 301. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-113.44(1)
(1972) defines base product as "hot chocolate flavored drink mix, flavored milk shake
bases, concentrate products to which milk or other liquid is added to complete a soft
drink, and all like items or products as herein defined which will be taxed as syrups."
17. 289 N.C. at 137, 221 S.E.2d at 306.
18. Id. at 138, 221 S.E.2d at 306; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-113.47(a) (1972).
19. 290 N.C. 586, 227 S.E.2d 562 (1976).
20. N.C. GEN. SrAT. § 105-130.8 (1972) is based on Int. Rev. Code of 1939.
ch. 1, § 122(b), 53 Stat. 867.
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year.21 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court and held that
plaintiff could not take the loss deduction because there was no conti-
nuity of business enterprise and a different business entity was claiming
the loss carryover.
22
The North Carolina Supreme Court, in construing the statute,
looked to analogous federal decisions under the 1939 Internal Revenue
Code.23  One of these decisions was Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler,24
in which the United States Supreme Court construed the carryover loss
provisions to mean that losses can only be offset by income derived
from essentially the same business. 25  The North Carolina Supreme
Court also reviewed Revenue Ruling 59-395,28 which provides that
losses after a merger will be allowed to be carried over only when they
are attributable to the assets of the absorbed company. In a later case,
Good Will Distributors, Inc. v. Currie,27 the North Carolina Supreme
Court had adopted the same continuity of business test relied on in
Libson Shops.2"
After reviewing all of these cases, the court held that the "conti-
nuity of business enterprise theory" will be applied by looking at the
bundle of assets.29 In applying the test to this case, the court noted
that all premerger losses were generated by the assets of Foremost.
After merger these assets produced no income and therefore no post-
merger income existed with which to balance off the premerger
losses.30 Foremost's assets were different from those of Fieldcrest and
thus no carryover loss would be permitted. In conclusion, the court
noted that the carryover provisions of the Internal Revenue Code as
amended in 1954 give "taxpayers fairer treatment and better comport
with market realities." 31  Despite these facts, the court held that the
legislative intent should be followed and the carryover losses denied.32
21. 290 N.C. at 588-89, 227 S.E.2d at 564.
22. Id. at 589, 227 S.E.2d at 564.
23. Id. at 590, 227 S.E.2d at 565.
24. 353 U.S. 382 (1957).
25. Id. at 386.
26. 290 N.C. at 596, 227 S.E.2d at 568-69; see Rev. Rul. 395, 1959-2 C.B. 475.
27. 251 N.C. 120, 110 S.E.2d 880 (1959).
28. See 353 U.S. at 386.
29. 290 N.C. at 605-06, 227 S.E.2d at 574.
30. Id. at 606, 227 S.E.2d at 574.
31. Id. at 608, 227 S.E.2d at 575. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 1, § 381, 68A
Stat. 124 was enacted to supersede Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 122(b), 53 Stat. 867.
The court seemed to invite the legislature to change the law. See 290 N.C. at 608, 227
S.E.2d at 575.
32. 290 N.C. at 608, 227 S.E.2d at 575.
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In NCNB Mortgage Corp. v. Coble,38 the court of appeals
addressed the issue of the amount of interest deduction a subsidiary
corporation could take on interest payments to its parent. The court
held that there was an absolute prohibition against deduction of over
six percent interest paid to a parent corporation.34
In Broadwell Realty Corp. v. Coble,"8 the court of appeals held
that when a corporation employs the installment method of accounting,
generally accepted accounting principles require that with respect to
computation of state franchise taxes the corporation is entitled to have
deferred income tax on installment sales deducted from deferred gross
profit on those sales.8 6
C. Administration of Taxes
In Cedar Creek Enterprises, Inc. v. North Carolina Department of
Motor Vehicles,37 the North Carolina Supreme Court addressed the issue
whether injunctive relief could be sought to restrain enforcement of a
state tax statute. Plaintiff had been assessed a license tax and penalty
for driving an overweight vehicle. 8 The lower court granted a pre-
liminary injunction in favor of plaintiff, but the injunction was dissolved
by the court of appeals.
The supreme court held that the penalty for overloading was a tax,
and therefore enforcement could not be denied by injunctive relief.89
The court reiterated the principle that there shall be no injunctive or
declaratory relief to prevent the collection of a tax.40  The taxpayer
must pay the tax and bring suit for a refund. In reliance on a statute 41
with similar provisions, the court held the anti-injunctive statute dealing
33. 31 N.C. App. 243, 228 S.E.2d 776 (1976).
34. Id. at 245, 228 S.E.2d at 777; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-130.6 (1972).
35. 30 N.C. App. 261, 226 S.E.2d 869, cert. granted, 290 N.C. 777, 229 S.E.2d 31
(1976).
36. Id. at 271-72, 226 S.E.2d at 876; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-122 (Cum.
Supp. 1975).
37. 290 N.C. 450, 226 S.E.2d 336 (1976).
38. Id. at 450-51, 226 S.E.2d at 336; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-118 (Cum.
Supp. 1975).
39. 290 N.C. at 454, 226 S.E.2d at 338-39; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-96 (1975).
The court held that by labeling the required payment for overloading an "additional
tax," N.C. GEM. STAT. § 20-96 (1975) effectively defines the penalties prescribed by
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-118 (Cum. Supp. 1975) for violating N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-96
(1975) as a tax. Id. at 453, 223 S.E.2d at 338.
40. Id. at 455, 226 S.E.2d at 339; see Housing Auth. v. Johnson, 261 N.C. 76, 134
S.E.2d 121 (1964).
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-267 (1972).
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with motor vehicle taxation was constitutional. 42  In conclusion, the
court noted that its decision would be the same whether the overweight
charge was a tax or a penalty.43
In Henderson County v. Osteen,44 the court of appeals dealt with
the problem of the type of notice required in an execution sale for
delinquent county taxes. The taxpayer died before the execution sale
took place. A sale was conducted several days after his death and the
property was conveyed to plaintiff. No notice was given to either the
heirs of the taxpayer or his administrator. The trial court concluded
on the basis of Flynn v. Rumley 45 that notice should have been given
and that the sale would have to be set aside.
The court of appeals reversed by holding that the rule in Flynn
v. Rumley, which precludes the execution of an in personam money
judgment after the death of the judgment debtor, does not apply to the
in rem method of foreclosure provided by the tax statute."' The court
distinguished the two judgments by saying
the tax judgment is strictly in rem or a specific judgment against the
property of the listed taxpayer, and tantamount to a judgment di-
recting the sale of the property to satisfy the tax lien. In contrast,
the in personam judgment does not embody an order directing the
sale of particular property of the debtor to satisfy the judgement.
47
In dealing with the notice issue, the court held that notice was conclu-
sively presumed as required by statute.4" The court held that notice
to the listing taxpayer was sufficient to meet due process requirements
and that the county should not shoulder the burden of directly notifying
the heirs of the deceased taxpayer.49
42. 290 N.C. at 454-56, 226 S.E.2d at 339-40. The statute dealing with motor
vehicle taxation is N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-91.1 (1975). The court relied on the decision
in Kirkpatrick v. Currie, 250 N.C. 213, 108 S.E.2d 209 (1959), which held that the
procedure of requiring the taxpayer to pay the tax and bring suit for a refund rather
than allowing him injunctive relief before paying the tax affords the taxpayer due proc-
ess. 290 N.C. at 455-56, 226 S.E.2d at 339.
43. 290 N.C. at 457, 226 S.E.2d at 340; see Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S.
725, 740 (1974).
44. 28 N.C. App. 542, 221 S.E.2d 903, cert. granted, 289 N.C. 614, 223 S.E.2d 392
(1976).
45. 212 N.C. 25, 192 S.E. 868 (1937).
46. 28 N.C. App. at 549, 221 S.E.2d at 907; see Law of April 3, 1939, ch. 310, §
1720, [1939) N.C. Sess. Laws 619 (formerly codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 105-392 (1965)). This statute has been rewritten and recodified as N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 105-375 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
47. 28 N.C. App. at 548, 221 S.E.2d at 907.
48. Id. at 550, 221 S.E.2d at 908; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-348 (1972).
49. 28 N.C. App. at 551, 221 S.E.2d at 908-09.
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In Stanback v. Stanback,50 the court of appeals granted defend-
ant's motion for a preliminary mandatory injunction that required
plaintiff to file a claim for a federal income tax refund. The court held
the immediate and irreparable injury required for a mandatory injunc-
tion was present because plaintiffs failure to file for a refund as pre-
scribed by the separation agreement would result in the income tax
deduction being irretrievably lost.5 1
D. Estate and Inheritance Taxation
In Stanback v. Coble,52 the court of appeals construed the uniform
valuation statute53 for purposes of the state inheritance tax. The plain-
tiff executor bought United States Treasury bonds at par value to use
as a credit for the federal estate tax. Under the alternate valuation
date chosen by the executor, the bonds were assessed at fair market
value. 4 The Income Tax Commission viewed the basis of the bonds
to be the lower fair market value figure. The Commission taxed the
estate for the gain resulting from the ultimate disposition of the bonds
to pay the federal estate tax. In holding for plaintiff, the court con-
strued the statute as requiring the Secretary of Revenue to value the
assets of the estate at the same amount as valued for federal estate tax
purposes. 5  Uniform valuation resulted in the bonds having the federal
basis, and no gain resulted from their disposition.
XIII. TORTS
A. Defamation
In Appleyard v. Transamerican Press, Inc.,' the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals considered the effect of the most recent major defama-
tion decision of the United States Supreme Court, Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.' on the availability of punitive damages in cases involving
50. 30 N.C. App. 322, 227 S.E.2d 289, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 778, 229 S.E.2d 33
(1976).
51. Id. at 327, 227 S.E.2d at 292; see Huggins v. Wake County Bd. of Educ., 272
N.C. 33, 157 S.E.2d 703 (1967).
52. 30 N.C. App. 533, 227 S.E.2d 175, cert. denied, 291 N.C. 177, 229 S.E.2d 690
(1976).
53. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-29 (1972).
54. 30 N.C. App. at 533, 227 S.E.2d at 175-76. The par value was $570,000 and
the fair market value of the bonds on the alternate valuation date was $454,746.
55. Id. at 534, 227 S.E.2d at 176.
1. 539 F.2d 1026 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 740 (1977).
2. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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the defamation of public figures. In New York Times v. Sullivan,'
the Supreme Court had held that a public official could not recover in
a defamation action unless he showed that the defamatory statements
were made with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard
for their truth.4 In Gertz, the Court defined the constitutional limita-
tions on state defamation law in actions brought by private individuals
involving public issues. A state may define for itself the appropriate
standard of liability in such cases so long as it does not impose liability
without fault.0 The recovery of presumed or punitive damages will
not be sanctioned unless liability is based, at least, on a showing of
New York Times malice-knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard
for truth.'
Although Gertz itself did not deal with a public figure, and
despite the fact that punitive damages had been available to public
figures who showed New York Times malice in defamation actions
up until that time,7 a United States District Court in California, in
Maheu v. Hughes Tool Co.,' concluded that Gertz presaged the demise
of punitive damages in all public figure cases.' In Appleyard, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that proof of New
3. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
4. Id. at 279-80. Subsequently, the necessity of proving knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard for truth was extended to plaintiffs who, while not public officials,
were "public figures." Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). "Public
figures" were defined in Gertz to include two types of individuals: (1) those who attain
such "pervasive fame or notoriety" that they become a public figure for all purposes
and in all contexts; and (2) those who interject themselves or are drawn into particular
public controversies and become public figures for those limited issues. 418 U.S. at
351.
5. 418 U.S. at 347. In North Carolina such a plaintiff may recover upon show-
ing at least negligence on the part of the defendant in publishing the false and defama-
tory statement. Walters v. Sanford Herald, Inc., 31 N.C. App. 233, 235, 228 S.E.2d
766, 767 (1976); see this Survey, Constitutional Law: First Amendment.
6. 418 U.S. at 349. Recovery is limited, absent such proof, to compensation
for "actual injury," which includes impairment of reputation, humiliation, mental an-
guish and suffering as well as out-of-pocket expenses. Id. at 350.
7. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 161 (1967).
8. 384 F. Supp. 166 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
9. Drawing primarily on comments in Gertz and Justice Marshall's dissent in
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 78-87 (1971), to the effect that juries
could use the weapon of punitive damages to punish unpopular views, the court found
that the mere threat of being held liable for such damages would chill the exercise
of free speech. Therefore, such damages could be sanctioned only if they narrowly
and necessarily furthered important state interests. Id. at 169-70. The possible state
interests of protecting reputation and privacy, as well as that of punishing the speaker
of "highly motivated tortious defamation," were found to be either too insubstantial,
too easily abused, or adequately served by the mere award of compensatory damages.
Id. at 170-73.
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York Times malice will satisfy any constitutional objections to the
recovery of punitive damages by public figures.' 0 Moreover, the court
felt that an award of punitive damages might further the valid state goal
of deterring false attacks on public figures."
In another defamation decision, Mazzucco v. North Carolina Board
of Medical Examiners,2 the North Carolina Court of Appeals finally
extended the judicial proceeding privilege to proceedings of a quasi-
judicial nature before an administrative agency. The privilege extends
absolute protection to communications made in the course of judicial
proceedings so that judges, lawyers and witnesses will not labor under
the constant threat of civil liability.'3 Although the North Carolina
Supreme Court indicated more than twenty years ago that the privilege
would apply to statements made during the proceedings of quasi-judicial
administrative bodies,' 4 Mazzucco seems to be the first decision so to
hold.
B. Fraud
Punitive damages are not available in breach of contract actions,
with the exception of contracts to marry,' 5 unless the breach also
happens to constitute a tort.16  Under the rule announced in 1953 in
10. 539 F.2d at 1030. The court reasoned that the purpose of the constitutional
limitations on state defamation law is not to protect false statements of fact, but rather
to prevent the need for self-censorship by would-be critics. If the plaintiff can prove
New York Times malice there has been no good faith attempt to point out abuses to
the public and the rationale behind the constitutional limitations is therefore not applica-
ble. Accord, Fopay v. Noveroske, 31 Ill. App. 3d 182, 334 N.E.2d 79 (1975).
11. 539 F.2d at 1030. The court in Maheu relied heavily on the greater ability
of the public figure to respond to false attacks and on the fact that by thrusting himself
into the limelight he had, at least partially, released his reputational and privacy inter-
ests. 384 F. Supp. at 170-72. The Fourth Circuit rejected these arguments, taking
the position that while the public figure did have a greater than normal ability to re-
spond to his critics, he was also more likely to suffer attacks due to his position in
the public eye. 539 F.2d at 1030.
12. 31 N.C. App. 47, 228 S.E.2d 529, appeal dismissed, 291 N.C. 323, 230 S.E.2d
676 (1976). The case involved allegedly defamatory charges made against a medical
doctor and two of his employees. The court of appeals first held that the Board itself
was protected by sovereign immunity since the Tort Claims Act only waived that de-
fense as to negligent acts of state employees. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 (1974).
The members, however, could be liable in their individual capacities. 31 N.C. App.
at 49-50, 228 S.E.2d at 531-32.
13. 31 N.C. App. at 50, 228 S.E.2d at 532.
14. Jarman v. Offutt, 239 N.C. 468, 472, 80 S.E.2d 248, 251 (1954) (dictum).
15. King v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 273 N.C. 396, 398, 159 S.E.2d 891, 893
(1968).
16. See Oestreicher v. American Nat'l Stores, Inc., 290 N.C. 118, 225 S.E.2d 797
(1976).
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Swinton v. Savoy Realty Co., 7 simple fraud alone is not sufficient
to warrant recovery of such damages in what would otherwise be a
contract action. Rather, the fraud must be accompanied by conduct
of an aggravated nature. 8 In two decisions last year, the supreme
court first construed the Swinton rule and then abolished it.'9
In Oestreicher v. American National Stores, Inc.,20 the contract
in question was a commercial lease that provided for rent of a fixed
sum plus a designated percentage of the tenant's net sales. The tenant
allegedly understated his net sales so as to reduce his rental charge.
The supreme court, in a four to three decision, held that this conduct
was sufficiently aggravated to come within the Swinton rule.
21
In Newton v. Standard Fire Insurance Co.,22 the alleged fraud
was the insurance company's failure to pay a claim when it knew
that the insured needed the funds. The court overruled Swinton insofar
as it held that conduct in excess of intentional fraud is required before
punitive damages will be available.2" The court then found, however,
that the insurance company's conduct did not constitute fraud, but
rather consisted merely of a simple breach of contract; 24 therefore, puni-
tive damages were not available. 5
17. 236 N.C. 723, 73 S.E.2d 785 (1953).
18. Id. at 725, 73 S.E.2d at 787.
19. For a more in depth treatment of this development see Comment, Damages-
"Extra-Contractual" Damages for Breach of Contract in North Carolina, 55 N.C.L.
REv. 1125 (1977). See also this Survey, Insurance: Liability of Insurer Beyond Policy
Limits.
20. 290 N.C. 118, 225 S.E.2d 797 (1976).
21. Id. at 136, 225 S.E.2d at 809. Justices Branch and Moore joined Chief Justice
Sharp's partial dissent. They found the Swinton situation distinguishable from that fac-
ing the court. Id. at 147-48, 225 S.E.2d at 815. In Swinton the fraud had consisted
of misrepresenting the boundaries of realty conveyed to the plaintiffs. Unlike the Swin-
ton situation, where the fraud went essentially to the formation of the contract, the
instant case dealt with fraud in the performance of the contract-in effect, the Oestrei-
cher action was one for breach of contract and punitive damages are not available in
such actions. See id.
22. 291 N.C. 105, 229 S.E.2d 297 (1976).
23. Id. at 113-14, 229 S.E.2d at 302.
24. Id. at 114, 229 S.E.2d at 302.
25. The three dissenters from Oestreicher concurred only in the result in Newton.
They stated that to overrule Swinton would not clarify the law in this area and would
cast doubt on a number of propositions that are sound law. ld. at 116-17, 229 S.E.2d
at 304.
Other decisions dealing with the subject of fraud included Parsons v. Bailey, 30
N.C. App. 497, 227 S.E.2d 166, cert. denied, 291 N.C. 176, 229 S.E.2d 689 (1976)
(liability of principal for fraud perpetrated by agent); Moore v. Wachovia Bank & Trust
Co., 30 N.C. App. 390, 226 S.E.2d 833 (1976) (deeds); Gunther v. Parker, 29 N.C.
App. 264, 224 S.E.2d 239 (1976) (representations of house vendor); Griffin v. Canada,
29 N.C. App. 226, 223 S.E.2d 911 (1976) (reliance).
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C. Immunity
In Henry v. Henry,26 the North Carolina Supreme Court adhered
to its traditional approach of deferring to the legislature any changes
in the policy of North Carolina interspousal immunity law.2 7  Begin-
ning with Crowell v. Crowell'8 and Roberts v. Roberts,29 the supreme
court recognized that the legislative abolition of the common law unity
of husband and wife had abolished the wife's inability to sue her husband
in tort.31 Since the statute was framed in terms of the wife's rights, how-
ever, the same privilege was not extended to the husband tortiously in-
jured by his wife31 until the legislature rectified that deficiency in
1951.32 The abolition of the common law immunity was limited, how-
ever, by the court's refusal to extend it to causes of action arising in juris-
dictions that still retained interspousal immunity. While all nonresidents
injured by the negligence of their spouse in North Carolina were given
free access to the courts, 33 North Carolina domiciliaries who were so un-
fortunate as to be similarly injured in a state still retaining interspousal
immunity were without a remedy. 34  This rule was partially reversed
in 1967 when the enactment of G.S. 52-5.1 gave North Carolina domi-
ciliaries a cause of action against their spouse without regard to where
the injury was inflicted.35
26. 291 N.C. 156, 229 S.E.2d 158, aff'g 29 N.C. App. 174, 223 S.E.2d 564 (1976).
27. A similar policy seems to be followed on the question of parent-child immu-
nity. See, e.g., Redding v. Redding, 235 N.C. 638, 639, 70 S.E.2d 676, 677 (1952)
(common law has not been abrogated or changed by statute).
28. 180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E 206 (1920) (assault, transmission of venereal disease
to wife).
29. 185 N.C. 566, 118 S.E. 9 (1923) (negligence).
30. The court in both cases relied essentially on Law of Feb. 8, 1913, ch. 13,
§ 1, [1913] N.C. Sess. Laws 45 (codified, as amended, at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-4
(1976)). In its original form the statute provided:
[T]he earnings of a married women by virtue of any contract for her personal
service, and any damages for personal injuries, or other tort sustained by her,
can be recovered by her suing alone, and such earnings or recovery shall be
her sole and separate property as fully as if she had remained unmarried.
31. Scholtens v. Scholtens, 230 N.C. 149, 52 S.E.2d 350 (1949).
32. "A husband and wife have a cause of action against each other to recover
damages sustained to their person or property as if they were unmarried." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 52-5 (1976).
33. E.g., Bogen v. Bogen, 219 N.C. 51, 12 S.E.2d 649 (1941) (Ohio domiciliaries);
Alberts v. Alberts, 217 N.C. 443, 8 S.E.2d 523 (1940) (Massachusetts domiciliaries).
34. E.g., Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963) (injured in Virginia);
Howard v. Howard, 200 N.C. 574, 158 S.E. 101 (1931) (injured in New Jersey).
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-5.1 (1976) reads:
A husband and wife shall have a cause of action against each other to
recover damages for personal injury, property damage or wrongful death aris-
ing out of acts occurring outside of North Carolina, and such action may be
brought in this State when both are domiciled in North Carolina at the time
of such acts.
In Henty, the parties were from Pennsylvania, a jurisdiction still
recognizing interspousal immunity. The wife suffered severe injuries
in an automobile accident in North Carolina due to her husband's
negligent operation of the vehicle in which they were riding. The
defendant-husband contended that the policy behind G.S. 52-5.1-
that the law of the domiciliary should control rather than that of the
state where the injury occurred-required a reversal of the traditional
North Carolina conflicts rule. The court answered that G.S. 52-5.1
had changed the traditional rule only for North Carolina domiciliaries,
a group in which the defendant and his wife could not claim member-
ship. 6  Therefore, until the legislature acts,37 the doctrine of inter-
spousal immunity will bar access to the North Carolina courts only
when the alleged tort occurs in an immunity jurisdiction at a time
when either the husband or wife is not a North Carolina domiciliary.
Several other decisions examined the abolished doctrine of chari-
table immunity, 38 the immunity of unincorporated associations vis-h-vis
their own members,39 and the remaining vestiges of sovereign immunity
in the case of wilful torts.40
D. Medical Malpractice
In Bullard v. North Carolina National Bank,4' the court of appeals
clarified the present status of the "similar locality rule" as it applies
to injuries that lend themselves to uniform treatment without regard
to locality. Plaintiff suffered a compound fracture of the arm and
defendant's testate put it into a cast. A gangrene infection de-
veloped and the arm had to be amputated. At trial the defense asked
its expert witness whether the treatment conformed with approved
medical practices "in [this] community and similar communities."4"
See generally Whitman, Conflict of Spousal Immunity Laws: The Legislature Takes a
Hand, 46 N.C.L. REv. 506 (1968).
36. 291 N.C. at 162, 229 S.E.2d at 162.
37. Id. at 164, 229 S.E.2d at 163.
38. Starnes v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., 28 N.C. App. 418, 221 S.E.2d
733 (1976). The doctrine of charitable immunity was abolished prospectively as to
causes of action arising after September 1, 1967. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.9 (1969).
39. Williamson v. Wallace, 29 N.C. App. 370, 224 S.E.2d 253, cert. denied, 290
N.C. 555, 226 S.E.2d 514 (1976) (no liability on church for injuries sustained by mem-
ber during joint enterprise of worship absent more formal hierarchical structure or in-
corporation).
40. Mazzucco v. North Carolina Bd. of Medical Examiners, 31 N.C. App. 47,
228 S.E.2d 529, appeal dismissed, 291 N.C. 323, 230 S.E.2d 676 (1976); see this
Survey, Administrative Law: Sovereign Immunity.
41. 31 N.C. App. 312, 229 S.E.2d 245 (1976).
42. Id. at 315, 29 S.E.2d at 248.
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Plaintiff objected, contending that the supreme court in Rucker v. High
Point Memorial Hospital, Inc.4" had abolished the similar locality rule
in situations in which the proper treatment is uniform around the
country."
In Rucker, the supreme court ruled that it was error to exclude
testimony about the proper treatment of a shotgun wound by an expert
who was familiar with hospitals in areas larger and smaller than High
Point, but who was not familiar with the staff or facilities of High Point
Memorial. 45  The court distinguished a duly accredited hospital from
the local country doctor for whose benefit the "same locality" and
"similar locality" rules were originally developed 4 and found that the
treatment of gunshot wounds was essentially uniform across the
country.47
According to the court of appeals in Bullard, the Rucker decision
did not abolish the similar locality rule in cases involving uniform treat-
ment. Rather, it qualified anyone familiar with the uniform treatment
as an expert.48 Thus, it is not improper to frame questions in terms
of the "same or similar" locality.
40
Bullard may represent a slight extension of the "uniform treat-
ment" rule. In Rucker both the negligent physician and the hospital
that employed him were defendants. The court emphasized that the
case involved a duly accredited hospital, not a local country doctor. 0
In Bullard the negligent course of treatment was initiated in a hospi-
tal, but not all of it occurred there. Moreover, the hospital was not
a defendant. 51 Arguably, Bullard therefore implies that a physician
who practices in a hospital will hereafter be held to a national standard
of care when dealing with injuries that are subject to uniform treat-
ment.51
While Bullard clearly was the most important decision in the
malpractice field during the past year, another case dealing with the
43. 285 N.C. 519, 206 S.E.2d 196 (1974).
44. 31 N.C. App. at 315, 229 S.E.2d at 248.
45. 285 N.C. at 528, 206 S.E.2d at 202.
46. See Wiggins v. Piver, 276 N.C. 134, 139-41, 171 S.E.2d 393, 396-97 (1970).
47. 285 N.C. at 527, 206 S.E.2d at 201.
48. 31 N.C. App. at 315, 229 S.E.2d at 248.
49. Id.
50. 285 N.C. at 527, 206 S.E.2d at 201.
51. See 31 N.C. App. at 314, 229 S.E.2d at 247.
52. So far only gunshot wounds and broken arms have been so classified.
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doctrine of charitable immunity and the liability of a surgeon for the
negligent acts of a nurse in the operating room was also decided.5 3  A
series of decisions construing that section of the statute of limitations to
which the new malpractice limits were appended may also be of interest
to the reader.54  Finally, the supreme court invalidated the Health Care
Liability Reinsurance Exchange Act.55
E. Negligence
Numerous decisions were announced defining various aspects of
the law of negligence. The North Carolina appellate courts examined
various factual situations in terms of negligence,-" negligence per
se5 7 or wilful and wanton conduct. 58  The courts also addressed the
53. Starnes v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., 28 N.C. App. 418, 221 S.E.2d
733 (1976).
54. See text accompanying notes 117-30 infra.
55. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Ingram, 290 N.C. 457, 226 S.E.2d 498
(1976) (holding unconstitutional Law of May 28, 1975, ch. 427, § 1, [1975] N.C. Sess.
Laws 398-406 (formerly codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-173.29 to 173.46 (Cum. Supp.
1975)). See this Survey, Constitutional Law: North Carolina Constitution; Insurance:
Rate Making Procedures.
56. Moore v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 537 F.2d 1252 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
97 S. Ct. 532 (1976) (low power line over roof); Whitaker v. Earnhardt, 289 N.C.
260, 221 S.E.2d 316 (1976) (animals escaping through fence); Moore v. Archie, 31
N.C. App. 209, 228 S.E.2d 778 (1976) (collision at intersection); Haddock v. Smithson,
30 N.C. App. 228, 226 S.E.2d 411, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 776, 229 S.E.2d 32 (1976)
(telling 14 year old who was known to be retarded to cross highway on bicycle); Coffer
v. Standard Brands, Inc., 30 N.C. App. 134, 26 S.E.2d 534 (1976) (liability of food
packager); Patterson v. Weatherspoon, 29 N.C. App. 711, 225 S.E.2d 634, cert. denied,
290 N.C. 662, 228 S.E.2d 453 (1976) (parent not liable for injuries inflicted by child
with golf club as golf club is not dangerous instrumentality -and thus injury was not
foreseeable); Evans v. Carney, 29 N.C. App. 611, 225 S.E.2d 157 (1976) (darting
child); Farmer v. Chaney, 29 N.C. App. 544, 225 S.E.2d 159 (1976) (car skidding
on wet road); Anderson v. Smith, 29 N.C. App. 72, 223 S.E.2d 402 (1976) (darting
child); Vernon v. Crist, 28 N.C. App. 631, 222 S.E.2d 445 (1976), aff'd, 291 N.C.
646, 231 S.E.2d 591 (1977) (starting car with person sitting on trunk); Starnes v. Char-
lotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., 28 N.C. App. 418, 221 S.E.2d 733 (1976) (overheating
warming bottle used to maintain infant's body temperature during surgery). See text
accompanying notes 98-110 infra (liability of auto manufacturer for defects causing
enhanced injuries during collision).
57. Penland v. Green, 289 N.C. 281, 221 S.E.2d 365 (1976) (motorist entering
highway from private drive in violation of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-156(a) (1975) not
negligent per se); Clark v. Bodycombe, 289 N.C. 246, 221 S.E.2d 506 (1976) (pedes-
trian walking on right side of road in violation of safety statute not negligent per se);
Pierce v. Jones, 29 N.C. App. 334, 224 S.E.2d 195 (1976) (rules of navigation).
58. Siders v. Gibbs, 31 N.C. App. 481, 229 S.E.2d 811 (1976) (pleading); Johnson
v. Yates, 31 N.C. App. 358, 229 S.E.2d 309 (1976) (can be inferred from extensive
skid marks and severe damage to auto).
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duties and liabilities of landowners, 9 municipal corporations 0 and
insurance agents.61  In addition, the court interpreted the rules of
imputed negligence,62 proximate cause 3 and last clear chance. 4
Evidentiary matters such as proof of damages65 and res ipsa loquitor"0
were also discussed as well as the difference between active and passive
59. Moore v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 537 F.2d 1252 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
97 S. Ct. 532 (1976) (duty to warn business invitees of latent dangers); Stafford v.
Food World, Inc., 31 N.C. App. 213, 228 S.E.2d 756, cert. denied, 291 N.C. 324, 230
S.E.2d 677 (1976) (wet floor in grocery store); Hargrove v. Plumbing & Heating Serv.,
Inc., 31 N.C. App. 1, 228 S.E.2d 461, cert. denied, 291 N.C. 448, 230 S.E.2d 765 (1976)
(hole of boiling water); Manganello v. Permastone, Inc., 30 N.C. App. 696, 228 S.E.2d
627 (1976), rev'd, 291 N.C. 666, 231 S.E.2d 678 (1977) (swimming area; duty to pro-
vide lifeguards and remedy hazardous situations); Keith v. S.S. Kresge Co., 29 N.C.
App. 579, 225 S.E.2d 135 (1976) (falling merchandise).
60. Mitchell v. City of High Point, 31 N.C. App. 71, 228 S.E.2d 634 (1976)
(sewer system); Joyce v. City of High Point, 30 N.C. App. 346, 226 S.E.2d 856 (1976)
(sidewalks); Dize Awning & Tent Co. v. City of Winston Salem, 29 N.C. App. 297,
224 S.E.2d 257, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 667, 228 S.E.2d 451 (1976) (sewer system).
61. Leggett v. Cotton, 29 N.C. App. 331, 224 S.E.2d 235 (1976) (agent who
agrees to procure insurance and then negligently fails to send notice that it has not
been procured is liable for any damage that would have been ameliorated by the insur-
ance under alternative theories of tort or contract); see this Survey, Insurance: Lia-
bility of Insurer Beyond Policy Limits.
62. Siders v. Gibbs, 29 N.C. App. 540, 225 S.E.2d 133, rev'd on rehearing on
other grounds, 31 N.C. App. 481, 229 S.E.2d 811 (1976) (owner of auto riding with
negligent operator).
63. Moore v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 537 F.2d 1252 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
97 S. Ct. 532 (1976) (power company's negligence in maintaining wire four feet above
roof proximate cause of electrocution); Moore v. Archie, 31 N.C. App. 209, 228 S.E.2d
778 (1976) (auto accident); Barrett v. Phillips, 29 N.C. App. 220, 223 S.E.2d 918
(1976) (failure of school to comply with High School Athletic Association rules is
not proximate cause of injuries inflicted by ineligible football player).
64. Artis v. Wolfe, 31 N.C. App. 227, 228 S.E.2d 781, cert. denied, 291 N.C.
448, 230 S.E.2d 765 (1976) (pedestrian walking across highway); Williamson v.
Basinger, 30 N.C. App. 50, 226 S.E.2d 213 (1976) (car parked in middle of road at
night without lights); Vernon v. Crist, 28 N.C. App. 631, 222 S.E.2d 445 (1976), aff'd,
291 N.C. 646, 231 S.E.2d 591 (1977) (starting car while defendant was sitting on
trunk).
65. Taylor v. Boger, 289 N.C. 560, 223 S.E.2d 350 (1976) (proof required to
show medical treatment was reasonably necessary); Evans v. Stiles, 30 N.C. App. 317,
226 S.E.2d 843 (1976) (proof required to show medical treatment was reasonably neces-
sary); Ponder v. Budweiser of Asheville, Inc., 30 N.C. App. 200, 226 S.E.2d 539, cert.
denied, 291 N.C. 176, 229 S.E.2d 690 (1976) (loss of business income not compensable
when dependent on variable factors).
66. Stafford v. Food World, Inc., 31 N.C. App. 213, 228 S.E.2d 756, cert. denied,
291 N.C. 324, 230 S.E.2d 677 (1976) (not applicable when customer falls on floor
of store); Lentz v. Gardin, 30 N.C. App. 379, 226 S.E.2d 827, cert. granted, 290 N.C.
777, 229 S.E.2d 33 (1976) (car driven off road); Coffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 30
N.C. App. 134, 226 S.E.2d 534 (1976) (not applicable to injury caused by harmful
substance in food or drink resold in original container); Farmer v. Chancy, 29 N.C.
App. 544, 225 S.E.2d 159 (1976) (only applicable when car leaves road without appar-
ent cause).
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negligence. 67  A number of decisons dealt with the defense of contri-
butory negligence 8 and the situation of the sudden emergency." °
In Townsend v. Frye,70 the court of appeals aligned North Carolina
with the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions that hold that a minor's
contributory negligence will bar his parent's claims for the medical ex-
penses and loss of the minor's services. Plaintiff was injured when
he rode his bicycle through a red light into oncoming traffic and was
struck by defendant's automobile. Plaintiff, through his mother as
guardian ad litem, sued to recover for his injuries. His mother also
sued for the loss of her son's services and for incidental expenses she
incurred due to the collision. The jury found that both defendant and
plaintiff had been negligent. The court of appeals held that plaintiffs
67. Moore v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 537 F.2d 1252, 1255 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 97 S. Ct. 532 (1976) (passive negligence is defense only if active negligence
is the "real, efficient" cause of injury).
68. Id. (electrocution due to contact with live power line); Penland v. Green, 289
N.C. 281, 221 S.E.2d 365 (1976) (entering highway from private drive); Clark v. Body-
combe, 289 N.C. 246, 221 S.E.2d 506 (1976) (walking on right side of highway);
Hargrove v. Plumbing & Heating Serv., Inc., 31 N.C. App. 1, 228 S.E.2d 461, cert.
denied, 291 N.C. 448, 230 S.E.2d 765 (1976) (no duty to foresee abnormal hazards
such as pit of boiling water); Thornton v. Cartwright, 30 N.C. App. 674, 228 S.E.2d
50 (1976) (pedestrian crossing highway at night outside of crosswalk); Foy v. Bremson,
30 N.C. App. 662, 228 S.E.2d 88 (1976) (pedestrian standing on highway); Joyce v.
City of High Point, 30 N.C. App. 346, 226 S.E.2d 856 (1976) (tripping on uneven
sidewalk in broad daylight); Evans v. Stiles, 30 N.C. App. 317, 226 S.E.2d 843 (1976)
(failure to keep lookout while crossing one-way access road in parking lot); Haddock
v. Smithson, 30 N.C. App. 228, 226 S.E.2d 411, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 776, 229 S.E.2d
32 (1976) (mentally retarded 14 year old); Williamson v. Basinger, 30 N.C. App. 50,
226 S.E.2d 213 (1976) (failure to see car stopped in middle of road without lights
at night); Bullard v. Elon Dickens Constr. Co., 29 N.C. App. 483, 224 S.E.2d 708
(1976) (repairing improperly secured scaffold without getting off); Pierce v. Jones, 29
N.C. App. 334, 224 S.E.2d 195 (1976) (failure to maintain speed of motorboat while
being followed); Gwaltney v. Keaton, 29 N.C. App. 91, 223 S.E.2d 506 (1976) (riding
with intoxicated driver who was speeding); Maness v. Ingram, 29 N.C. App. 26, 222
S.E.2d 737 (1976) (crossing highway outside of crosswalk); Vernon v. Crist, 28 N.C.
App. 631, 222 S.E.2d 445 (1976), afj'd, 291 N.C. 646, 231 S.E.2d 591 (1977) (remain-
ing on auto trunk after car was started); Moore v. Public Serv. Gas Co., 28 N.C. App.
333, 220 S.E.2d 817, cert. denied, 289 N.C. 451, 223 S.E.2d 159 (1976) (mother's
contributory negligence bars so much of award for wrongful death of child as would
enure to her benefit).
69. Foy v. Bremson, 30 N.C. App. 662, 228 S.E.2d 88 (1976) (not applicable
when the contributory negligence consists of indifference to one's peril); Davis v. Booth,
29 N.C. App. 742, 225 S.E.2d 588 (1976) (driver assaulted by passenger sitting in
back seat).
70. 30 N.C. App. 634, 228 S.E.2d 56, cert. denied, 291 N.C. 178, 229 S.E.2d
689 (1976). The supreme court, despite dicta in accord with the rule adopted in Town-
send in Kleibor v. Rogers, 265 N.C. 304, 306, 144 S.E.2d 27, 29 (1965), explicitly
left the question open in Clary v. Alexander County Bd. of Educ., 285 N.C. 188, 193,
203 S.E.2d 820, 824 (1974).
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contributory negligence barred not only his own action but also his
mother's.7
1
A number of theories have been advanced to support the majority
rule.72 These include: (1) the parent's cause of action is derivative; (2)
it is analogous to an assignment so that the assignee must stand in the
shoes of the assignor; (3) the contributory negligence is imputed to the
parent; and (4) the rule is well settled. The court of appeals ap-
parently adopted the last reason. 73  None of these theories can with-
stand historical analysis nor be justified by logic. 74 Despite the extensive
criticism of the rule, every court that has resolved the issue has apparently
followed it,"5 with only two exceptions.76
In Williams v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co.,77 the court of appeals
considered the application of the "family purpose doctrine" in the con-
text of a motorbike operated solely on private property. The doctrine
imposes vicarious liability for the negligent operation of an automobile
71. 30 N.C. App. at 640, 228 S.E.2d at 60.
72. Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 469, 471-75 (1968). The same rule applies so that the
contributory negligence of one spouse will bar the other's claim for loss of consortium
and medical expenses. The Townsend decision will have no applicability in this situa-
tion in North Carolina since actions for loss of consortium and medical expenses due
to injury to one's spouse have long been abolished by what is now N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 52-4 (1976). See Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N.C. 821, 32 S.E.2d 611
(1945).
73. The court gave no indication of the basis of its reasoning other than to note
that its holding "is consistent with that of most of the courts in other jurisdictions
that have decided the question." 30 N.C. App. at 640, 228 S.E.2d at 60.
74. Historical analysis indicates that the claim for loss of services has always be-
longed to the parent, never to the injured child, so it could not be assigned by him
to the parent nor could the action be considered derivative as a derivative action is
one brought to redress a wrong done to another. See James, Ineputed Contributory
Negligence, 14 LA. L. REv. 340, 354-60 (1954); Note, Torts-Contributory Negligence
of Minor Child Does Not Bar Parent's Independent Claim Against Defendant for Loss
of the Child's Services, Companionship and Society, and for Medical Expenses, 24 U.
KAN. L. REV. 432 (1976); Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 469, 471-75 (1968).
The absurdity of the rule is easily exposed when one considers the minor child
injured due to the combined negligence of himself and the defendant while wearing
his father's suit. While his father can recover from the defendant for the damage to
the suit, he is barred from recovering for the injuries to his son. See James, supra,
at 354-55.
75. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 494 (1965) adopts the following
majority rule:
Negligence of Person for Whose Death or Loss of Services Action is Brought
The plaintiff is barred from recovery for an invasion of his legally pro-
tected interest in the health or life of a third person which results from the
harm or death of such third person, if the negligence of such third person
would have barred his own recovery.
76. Handeland v. Brown, - Iowa -, 216 N.W.2d 574 (1974); Wasney v.
Jurazsky, [1933] 1 D.L.R. 616 (Man.).
77. 30 N.C. App. 18, 226 S.E.2d 210, cert. granted, 290 N.C. 667, 228 S.E.2d
459 (1976).
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on the person with the right of ultimate possession or control of the
automobile, provided certain conditions are satisfied. 8 Relying on
Grindstaff v. Watts,7 9 a 1961 decision of the supreme court that refused
to extend the doctrine to motorboats, the court of appeals reasoned
that the legislature should be the one to extend the doctrine to "instru-
mentalities other than motor vehicles used in public vehicular areas.180
This seems to be in accord with the general rule nationwide. Among the
minority of jurisdictions that even recognize the family purpose doc-
trine, apparently only Georgia has extended it beyond the automobile.8 1
The supplier of dangerous products such as gas is held to a high
standard of care to ensure that the product does not cause harm.82 In
Moore v. Public Service Gas Co.,83 plaintiff had repeatedly notified
the gas company that she could smell leaking gas. Although it twice
dispatched repairmen to inspect plaintiffs home, defendant's most
frequent response was that the smell was due to plaintiff's imagination.
A fire ensued that partially consumed plaintiff's house and resulted in
the death of her two year old child. The court of appeals upheld plain-
tiffs cause of action under a rule first stated a quarter century ago in
Graham v. North Carolina Butane Gas Co. 4 Upon being notified
that gas is leaking, the supplier has a duty to shut off the gas supply until
78. Requirements of the family purpose doctrine are: (1) the operator must be
a member of the family or household of the owner or person with the right of control
of the vehicle; (2) the vehicle must be a family vehicle provided and maintained for
the general use, pleasure and convenience of the family; (3) the vehicle must be in
use at the time of the accident with the consent, knowledge and approval of the owner
or person with the right to control it. Lynn v. Clark, 252 N.C. 289, 292, 113 S.E.2d
427, 430 (1960).
79. 254 N.C. 568, 119 S.E.2d 784 (1961).
80. 30 N.C. App. at 24, 226 S.E.2d at 213.
81. Georgia has extended the doctrine to apply to motorboats, Stewart v. Stephens,
225 Ga. 185, 166 S.E.2d 890 (1969), and to airplanes, Kimbell v. DuBose, 139 Ga.
App. 224, 228 S.E.2d 205 (1976). Apparently, the Georgia courts view GA. CODE
ANN. § 105-108 (1968), which provides "[elvery person shall be liable for torts com-
mitted by his wife, his child, or his servant, by his command or in the prosecution
and within the scope of his business," as the basis for the doctrine in that state. See
id. § 105-108, Editor's Note.
Decisions in most jurisdictions have generally refused to extend the doctrine to
instrumentalities other than the automobile. E.g., Calhoun v. Pair, 197 Ga. 703, 30
S.E.2d 180 (1944) (per curiam) (bicycle); Felcyn v. Gamble, 185 Minn. 357, 241 N.W.
37 (1932) (motorboat); Pflugmacher v. Thomas, 34 Wash. 2d 687, 209 P.2d 443 (1949)
(bicycle). But see Meinhardt v. Vaughn, 159 Tenn. 272, 17 S.W.2d 5 (1929) (dictum)
(motorcycle).
82. Graham v. North Carolina Butane Gas Co., 231 N.C. 680, 685, 58 S.E.2d
757, 761 (1950).
83. 28 N.C. App. 333, 220 S.E.2d 817, cert. denied, 289 N.C. 451, 223 S.E.2d
159 (1976).
84. 231 N.C. 680, 58 S.E.2d 757 (1950).
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the leak can be repaired. Should it continue to supply gas after it
learns of the leak, the supplier does so at its own risk and will be
liable for any damage proximately caused thereby., Moore appears
to be the first application of the rule since its original adoption. 0
In Lanier v. North Carolina State Highway Commission, 7 the
court of appeals held that the "attractive nuisance doctrine" was not
applicable to the drowning of a thirteen or fourteen year old girl of
at least average intelligence. Plaintiff's intestate drowned when she
walked off a sandbar into deep water while wading in a sand and
gravel pit leased by defendant."" Under ordinary circumstances a
landowner owes trespassers, such as the decedent, only a duty to refrain
from wilfully and wantonly injuring them.89 However, as an ameliora-
tion of this rule, the courts have developed the "attractive nuisance doc-
trine" to impose greater responsibilities on landowners toward young
children who are unable to watch out for their own safety. When
the conditions of the doctrine are met, 9° the landowner has a duty to use
ordinary care to see that the trespassing children do not meet with
harm.
91
85. Id. at 685, 58 S.E.2d at 761-62.
86. In Ashley v. Jones, 246 N.C. 442, 98 S.E.2d 667 (1957), the court held that
a jury question was presented under the Graham rule when the owner of a propane
truck failed to notify the garage that was storing the truck that gas was leaking from it.
In Shepard v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 251 N.C. 746, 112 S.E.2d 377 (1960), the supreme
court purported to apply the rule but there was no evidence of any notice to the gas
supplier that gas was leaking. Rather, the fact that gas company employees had twice
entered the small utility room that housed the gas heater and had failed to warn of
the danger presented by inadequate ventilation was held sufficient to state a claim for
relief. Id. at 750, 112 S.E.2d at 379.
87. 31 N.C. App. 304, 229 S.E.2d 321 (1976).
88. Id. at 311-12, 229 S.E.2d at 325.
89. Dean v. Wilson Constr. Co., 251 N.C. 581, 587, 111 S.E.2d 827, 832 (1960).
90. "Generally, the attractive nuisance doctrine is applicable when, and only
when, the following elements are present: (1) The instrumentality or condition
must be dangerous in itself, that is, it must be an agency which is likely to, or
probably will, result in injury to those attracted by, and coming into contact
with, it. (2) It must be attractive and alluring, or enticing, to young children.
(3) The children must be incapable, by reason of their youth, of compre-
hending the danger involved. (4) The instrumentality or condition must have
been left unguarded and exposed at a place where children of tender years are
accustomed to resort, or where it is reasonably to be expected that they will
resort for play or amusement, or for the gratification of youthful curiosity.
(5) It must have been reasonably practicable and feasible either to prevent ac-
cess to the instrumentality or condition, or else to render it innocuous, without
obstructing any reasonable purpose or use for which it was intended".
31 N.C. App. at 310-11, 229 S.E.2d at 324 (1976) (quoting McCombs v. City of Ashe-
boro, 6 N.C. App. 234, 242-43, 170 S.E.2d 169, 175 (1969)).
91. See W. PRossEm., HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 59, at 366 (4th ed.
1971),
In Lanier, the court first reiterated the traditional rule that water
per se is not an attractive nuisance. 2 Then, noting that the doctrine
is intended to protect young children from dangers that they should not
be expected to anticipate, the court concluded it should have no appli-
cation to a thirteen or fourteen year old who was capable of guarding
her own safety. 3
In Whitaker v. Earnhardt,94 the supreme court announced that
the proper measure of damages for injury to, or destruction of, growing
crops, absent specific testimony as to their value in the field at the
time of destruction, is the market value of the lost portion less the cost
the farmer would have incurred in harvesting and marketing that por-
tion. 5 While the value of the lost portion at the time and place of
injury is the preferable measure, and the one with which a number of
early North Carolina cases were found to be "generally" consistent, 96
it is often impractical to calculate since ordinary crops frequently have
no ascertainable market value in the field.97
F. Products Liability
In a case involving North Carolina law, 98 the highest court of
the state of Maryland considered whether an automobile manufacturer
would be held liable for defects in his product that, while not directly
causing an accident, were responsible for causing personal injuries to
the user after an accident occurred. This issue, variously described
as the "secondary impact" or "crashworthiness" problem, has never
been considered by the North Carolina Supreme Court.99
92. 31 N.C. App. at 311, 229 S.E.2d at 325.
93. Id. at 311-12, 229 S.E.2d at 325.
94. 289 N.C. 260, 221 S.E.2d 316 (1976).
95. Id. at 267, 221 S.E.2d at 321. The formula came from D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 5.2, at 325 (1973) and 21 AM. JUR. 2d Crops § 76,
at 663 (1965).
96. 289 N.C. at 266, 221 S.E.2d at 320-21. The court canvassed four old North
Carolina cases: Denby v. Hariston, 8 N.C. i61, 162, 1 Hawks 315, 317 (1821) (full
value); Sanderlin v. Shaw, 51 N.C. 228, 6 Jones 225 (1858) (admitting testimony as
to market value at maturity); Roberts v. Cole, 82 N.C. 292, 295 (1879) (such sum
as would cover the injury until the time plaintiff knew of the irruption of the hogs
and had time to drive them out); Dixon v. District Grand Lodge of Odd Fellows, 174
N.C. 139, 140, 93 S.E. 461, 462 (1917) (reasonable value of the crops).
97. 289 N.C. at 267, 221 S.E.2d at 321. The measure adopted in Whitaker is
essentially the same as that adopted in 1975 by the court of appeals in Simpson v.
Lee, 26 N.C. App. 712, 715, 217 S.E.2d 80, 81-82 (1975), but the supreme court took
no notice of that decision, noting only that "[tihere is a paucity of North Carolina
authority on this question .... ." 289 N.C. at 266, 221 S.E.2d at 320.
98. Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 304, 363 A.2d 460 (1976).
99. Id. at -, 363 A.2d at 466.
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The two leading decisions on the question are Evans v. General
Motors Corp.100 and Larsen v. General Motors Corp.'0' In Evans
the Seventh Circuit, applying Indiana law, concluded that although the
manufacturer of an automobile has a duty to design it so that it will
be reasonably fit for its intended purpose, that purpose does not include
being involved in an accident. 102 Two years later, in Larsen, the Eighth
Circuit, applying Michigan law, disagreed. The court announced that
while automobiles are not made for the purpose of colliding with each
other, collisions are an inevitable and forseeable consequence of normal
use. Therefore, the function of an automobile is not merely to provide
a means of transportation, but rather to provide as safe a means of
transportation as is reasonably possible under existing technology.101
In Frericks v. General Motors Corp.,0 4 the Maryland Court of
Appeals held that North Carolina would follow Larsen.06, This decision
marks a stark contrast to two 1971 North Carolina federal district court
decisions that reached the opposite conclusion. The Western District
in Alexander v. Seaboard Air Line Railroad0 0 and the Eastern District
in Bulliner v. General Motors Corp.'07 both felt North Carolina law was
more in accord with the Evans approach.
100. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966).
101. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
102. 359 F.2d at 825.
103. 391 F.2d at 502.
104. 278 Md. 304, 363 A.2d 460 (1976).
105. Id. at -, 229 S.E.2d at 467.
106. 346 F. Supp. 320 (W.D.N.C. 1971), aff'd on other grounds, [1970-1973] PROD.
LiAB. REP. (CCH) 6748 (4th Cir. 1972) (per curiam). The Western District rea-
soned that Evans represented the view adopted by most courts that had looked at the
issue at that time; that a North Carolina products liability decision, Kientz v. Carlton,
245 N.C. 236, 241-42, 96 S.E.2d 14, 18 (1957), had relied on Campo v. Scofield, 301
N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950), a decision which had figured heavily in the Seventh
Circuit's reasoning in Evans; that to adopt the Larsen position would pose a flood of
questions to be resolved; and that North Carolina did not impose a duty on manufac-
turers to foresee abnormal use of their product such as collisions with 114 ton locomo-
tives. 346 F. Supp. at 324-27. The last ground mentioned was the basis for the Fourth
Circuit's decision to affirm the result. Even if North Carolina would have adopted
the Larsen view, the Fourth Circuit felt that the car had been crushed under the locomo-
tive by such pressure that any gas tank would have ruptured. [1970-1973] PROD. LIA1.
REP. (CCH) 6748, at 11,260.
107. 54 F.R.D. 479 (E.D.N.C. 1971). Relying on Coakley v. Ford Motor Co., 11
N.C. App. 636, 182 S.E.2d 260, cert. denied, 279 N.C. 393, 183 S.E.2d 244 (1971),
the Eastern District concluded that North Carolina law required the establishment of
a causal connection between the alleged negligence and the accident. 54 F.R.D. at
482. The "secondary impact!' problem was not in issue in Coakley, so naturally the
court had insisted that the negligence be the proximate cause of the accident before
imposing liability. The argument that the requirement of a causal link between negli-
gence and accident precludes the imposition of liability for injuries received in a "secon-
dary collision" was rejected by the Eighth Circuit in Larsen. 391 F.2d at 502,
In declining to follow these decisions, the Maryland court looked
to the decisions of the North Carolina Supreme Court outlining a
manufacturer's duty to provide a safe product. Since those decisions
reflected general negligence principles, as did Larsen, the court in
Frericks ruled that the North Carolina Supreme Court would probably
follow Larsen and impose liability on the manufacturer. 08 The court
also relied on an as yet unreported 1976 decision of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina that reached
the same conclusion. 10 9 Finally, it noted that while in 1971 Evans
had represented the more popular view, the recent trend was definitely
toward Larsen."10
In another product liability decision, Coffer v. Standard Brands,
Inc.,' 1 I a North Carolina court for the first time in a majority opinion"
x2
discussed the doctrine of strict tort liability.113  The court of appeals
did not, however, adopt or reject the doctrine, finding simply that plain-
tiff had failed to bring himself within its parameters. Plaintiff had
injured his teeth biting down on an unshelled filbert contained in a
jar of mixed nuts sold by the defendant manufacturer. After rejecting
plaintiff's theories of negligence and express and implied Uniform
Commercial Code warranties, the court addressed his claim in strict
liability "assuming, arguendo, the viability of strict liability in tort in
North Carolina . . . ."'I Noting that a product has to be not only
defective but also unreasonably dangerous for the doctrine to apply,
1 5
108. 278 Md. at -, 363 A.2d at 467.
109. Id. at -, 363 A.2d at 467. The decision is Isaacson v. Toyota Motor Sales,
U.S.A., Inc., No. 74-18-Civ. 4 (E.D.N.C., filed June 28, 1976), appeal denied (4th Cir.
Aug. 10, 1976).
110. 278 Md. at -, 363 A.2d at 467-68. See generally Comment, Automobile
Manufacturer's Liability: Evans Takes a Back Seat, 21 VILL. L. REv. 72, 78-90 (1975).
111. 30 N.C. App. 134, 226 S.E.2d 534 (1976).
112. Chief Justice Sharp discussed the theory in her concurring opinion in Terry
v. Double Cola Bottling Co., 263 N.C. 1, 3, 138 S.E.2d 753, 754 (1964).
113. As of mid-1976 some 30 jurisdictions had adopted strict products liability. See
cases collected in West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 87 n.1 (Fla. 1976).
114. 30 N.C. App. at 142, 226 S.E.2d at 539.
115. This is the formulation of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
(1965) which provides:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substan-
tial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
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the court of appeals concluded that "certain commodities such as food
and drugs cannot be manufactured without some element of risk due
to their very nature."" 6
G. Statute of Limitations
A question that stirred considerable controversy was the proper
construction of the statute of limitations dealing with injuries to person
or property that are not readily apparent when inflicted. As enacted
in 1971, G.S. 1-15(b) provides that causes of action, except for those
for wrongful death, having as an essential element an injury to the
person or damage to, or defect in, property that is not readily apparent
when inflicted shall accrue when the injury, damage or defect is dis-
covered or reasonably should have been discovered. In no event, how-
ever, may the action be brought more than ten years "from the last
act of the defendant giving rise to the claim for relief." 117
(b) the user or consumer has not brought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
A number of jurisdictions, while recognizing the theory of strict liability, do not require
proof of both def. -iveness and unreasonable danger. See, e.g., Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson
Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 133, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442 (1972) (need
only prove product is defective); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145,
154, 542 P.2d 774, 779 (1975) (need only prove product is unreasonably dangerous).
116. 30 N.C. App. at 142, 226 S.E.2d at 539. The court relied on RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comments i, k (1965) for this proposition. Comment
i addresses the fact that certain food products can be harmful if used in excess or by
the wrong person, for example, sugar by a diabetic. It makes clear that in such cir-
cumstances the product should not be deemed "unreasonably dangerous." Comment
k, on the other hand, addresses a totally different problem and one that "should" have
no relevance to the Coffer facts. Comment k deals with products such as the vaccine
for the Pasteur treatment of rabies-products that cannot be made reasonably safe but
whose social utility so outweighs the risk of harm that strict liability should not be
applied to them. If the court of appeals was seriously contending that a jar of mixed
nuts comes within the rule contained in comment k, perhaps it is just as well that
they did not adopt strict liability in tort for products cases.
117. As enacted in 1971, and as it read at the time of the litigation construing
it, Law of July 21, 1971, ch. 1157, § 1, [1971] N.C. Sess. Laws 1157 (formerly codified
as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(b) (Cum. Supp. 1975)) read:
Except where otherwise provided by statute, a cause of action, other than
one for wrongful death, having as an essential element bodily injury to the per-
son or a defect in or damage to property which originated under circumstances
making the injury, defect or damage not readily apparent to the claimant at
the time of its origin, is deemed to have accrued at the time the injury was
discovered by the claimant, or ought reasonably to have been discovered by
him, whichever event first occurs; provided that in such cases the period shall
not exceed 10 years from the last act of the defendant giving rise to the claim
for relief.
The proper construction of § 1-15 takes on added importance in light of the 1975
amendments to that section, effective January 1, 1977. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-15(a)-
(c) (Interim Supp. 1976). Those amendments except from the operation of subsection
(b) malpractice actions and add subsection (c) to deal with that exception. Like sub-
In Raftery v. Win. C. Vick Construction Co.,"" the supreme court
was called upon to construe G.S.1-15(b) for the first time. The case
involved a wrongful death claim alleging a latent defect in a crane
owned by the decedent's employer and manufactured by the predecessor
corporation of defendant more than nineteen years before the fatal
accident.
The North Carolina wrongful death statute requires that as a
condition precedent to the maintenance of a wrongful death action
the decedent, had he lived, must have been able to maintain an action
for his personal injuries." 9 While traditionally the condition precedent
for the wrongful death action has not included the requirement that the
hypothetical personal injury action not be barred by the statute of
limitations, 20 defendant in Raftery contended that (1) the precondi-
tion did include the bar of the statute of limitations, and (2) that the
decedent could not have maintained an action for his personal injuries
due to G.S. 1-15(b) because the last act of the defendant had occurred
more than ten years before the action was brought.' 2'
The court answered that G.S. 1-15(b) had no application to
the case at all. First, it recognized that the statute specifically ex-
cepted wrongful death actions.' 22 Second, the court added that even
if the condition precedent did include the statute of limitations, G.S.
1-15 (b) would not bar the hypothetical personal injury action because
the decedent's injury was immediately apparent.
123
The clause excepting wrongful death actions from the operation of
G.S. 1-15(b) was designed to preserve the two-year statute of limita-
tions in those actions.' 24  Without the exception, wrongful death actions
section (b), the new subsection (c) specifies the time within which a claim may be
brought from the "last act" of the defendant.
118. 291 N.C. 180, 230 S.E.2d 405, affg 29 N.C. App. 495, 224 S.E.2d 706 (1976).
119. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (1976) provides:
Death by wrongful act of another; recovery not assets.-
(a) When the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect or de-
fault of another, such as would, if the injured person had lived, have entitled
him to an action for damages therefor, the person or corporation that would
have been so liable, and his or their personal representatives or collectors, shall
be liable to an action for damages, to be brought by the personal representative
or collector of the decedent ....
120. Causey v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 166 N.C. 5, 13-14, 81 S.E. 917, 919-20
(1914). While Causey may be somewhat inconsistent with later decisions, it has never
been expressly overruled. See Chief Justice Sharp's dissent in Raftery, 291 N.C. at
198-200, 230 S.E.2d at 415-16.
121. 291 N.C. at 185-87, 230 S.E.2d at 408-09.
122. Id. at 189, 230 S.E.2d at 410.
123. Id.
124. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-53(4) (1969), in conjunction with id. 1 1-46, provides
that a wrongful death action must be brought within two years of death.
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could be commenced up to ten years after death rather than within the
present two-year limit. Section 1-15(b) was intended to change the
result in cases in which the initial injury started the statute of limitations
running but was not itself detectible for perhaps years.12r Thus the
purchaser of a defective furnace 20 or the patient who underwent an
unauthorized operation' found themselves without a remedy when the
furnace exploded or the operation was discovered years later. Unlike
these situations, death, the event at which a wrongful death action
accrues, is immediately detectible. The administrator knows immediately
that he may sue, although perhaps the identity of the defendant may
not yet be apparent.
28
The court's second ground of decision, that the decedent's injury
was immediately apparent and thus not within the situation G.S. 1-15 (b)
was intended to obviate, has important implications for the way the
statute may be construed when applied to personal injury or property
damage actions. As clarified in the concurring opinions of Justices
Branch and Exum, one may not maintain an action until a wrong
occurs. 12 9 In the ordinary product defect case this occurs when the
product is purchased. If the defect is not apparent, and the purchaser
therefore does not know he can sue, G.S. 1-15(b) gives him ten years
within which to discover the defect and bring his action.
The decedent in Raftery, however, did not purchase the product
and therefore was not injured at that time. He was injured only when
the defect caused his death. The only injury to him, both with reference
to the wrongful death action and to the hypothetical personal injury suit,
occurred at that time. As far as he is concerned the injury was readily
apparent and GS. 1-15(b) is not applicable. As Justice Exum ex-
plained, the clause "bodily injury to the person or defect in or damage
to property" refers to bodily injury to the claimant or defect in or damage
to his property. 30 Section 1-15(b) requires that the action be com-
menced within "ten years of the last act of the defendant giving rise to
125. 291 N.C. at 187-89, 230 S.E.2d at 409-10.
126. See Jewell v. Price, 264 N.C. 459, 142 S.E.2d 1 (1965).
127. See Shearin v. Lloyd, 246 N.C. 363, 98 S.E.2d 508 (1957).
128. The legislature cannot be presumed to have considered the effect of § 1-15(b)
on the hypothetical personal injury action that is a prerequisite to the maintenance of
the wrongful death action since the condition precedent has not been thought to include
the statute of limitations. See note 120 and accompanying text supra.
129. 291 N.C. at 193, 230 S.E.2d at 412 (Branch, J., concurring); cf. id. at 195,
230 S.E.2d at 413 (Exum, J., concurring) (by implication).
130. Id. at 195, 230 S.E.2d at 413 (concurring opinion).
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the cause of action." This provision must be read with the emphasis on
"the cause of action", not on "last act of the defendant."
While the majority opinion, due to its construction of the statute,
found it unnecessary to resolve the question whether the condition
precedent to a wrongful death action that the decedent have been able
to maintain an action for his personal injuries had he lived includes the
statute of limitations, five members of the court indicated that they
believed it did. 3' However, Justices Branch and Huskins did not believe
the question was before the court and declined to join the three dissent-
ers in overruling the traditional position. 3 ' Nevertheless, it seems safe
to say that given the proper circumstances the court will so hold in
the future.' 33
H. Wrongful Death
In Mosely v. United States,'34 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
discussed the proper calculation of "pecuniary loss" under the old wrong-
ful death statute, formerly G.S. 28-174.11' While the new statute, G.S.
28A-18-2(b), enacted in 1973, has more liberal provisions as to the
elements of recovery, 36 the decision remains relevant insofar as part of
131. Id. at 192, 230 S.E.2d at 412 (Branch & Huskins, JJ., concurring); id. at 200,
230 S.E.2d at 416 (Sharp, C.J. & Copeland, J., dissenting); id. at 207, 230 S.E.2d at
420 (Moore, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 193, 230 S.E.2d at 412.
133. Three other decisions construed § 1-15(b) during 1976, all prior to the su-
preme court's decision in Raftery. Williams v. General Motors Corp., [1975-1977
Transfer Binder] PROD. LiAB. REP. (CCH) 7735 (4th Cir. 1976) (per curiam), affg
393 F. Supp. 387 (M.D.N.C. 1975); Arrowood v. General Motors Corp., 539 F.2d 1321
(4th Cir. 1976); Pinkston v. Baldwin, Lima, Hamilton Co., 29 N.C. App. 604, 225
S.E.2d 147, cert. granted, 290 N.C. 663, 228 S.E.2d 454 (1976). All involved the
situation, with minor factual variations, of a wrongful death action due to a latent prod-
uct defect.
134. 538 F.2d 555 (4th Cir. 1976).
135. Law of April 6, 1869, ch. 113, § 71, [1868-69] N.C. Sess. Laws 276 (formerly
codified as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-174) provided: "Measure of damages.-The plaintiff,
in such action may recover such damages as are a fair and just compensation for the
pecuniary injury resulting from such death."
136. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(b) (1976) provides:
Damages recoverable for death by wrongful act include:
(1) Expenses for care, treatment and hospitalization incident to the injury
resulting in death;
(2) Compensation for pain and suffering of the decedent;
(3) The reasonable funeral expenses of the decedent;
(4) The present monetary value of the decedent to the persons entitled
to receive the damages recovered, including but not limited to compensation
for the loss of the reasonably expected:
(a) Net income of the decedent,
(b) Services, protection, care and assistance of the decedent, whether
voluntary or obligatory, to the persons entitled to the damages recovered,
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the recovery under the new statute is still for "pecuniary loss."'1 7
Mosely involved a railroad employee who died because of the neg-
ligence of Veterans Administration hospital employees. The trial judge,
sitting as the trier of fact, concluded that at the time of his final hospi-
talization the decedent had six years to live, during only four of which
could he be reasonably expected to work.
After calculating his anticipated gross earnings and deducting his
personal living expenses, the court deducted the amount the decedent
would have had to pay in state and federal income taxes.'x8 No North
Carolina decision apparently has ever considered this issue in a death
action, but there are essentially three positions taken by various courts.
Most refuse to make the deduction.' 39 A few allow the deduction, rea-
soning that the purpose is compensation and to not deduct the income
tax would be to more than compensate for the death.' 40 Finally, a few
courts adopt a variable approach depending on the probable size of the
reduction, the presence of a jury and the certainty of calculation. 4' A
leading authority suggests that if the complexity of the calculations can
be obviated the taxes should be deducted.' 42 Since the Mosely court
sat without a jury and the parties had agreed to the appropriate rate of
taxation, this condition was satisfied. Mosely, however, should perhaps
not be read as endorsing a reduction of the award in all circumstances.
(c) Society, companionship, comfort, guidance, kindly offices and ad-
vice of the decedent to the persons entitled to the damages recovered;
(5) Such punitive damages as the decedent could have recovered had he
survived, and punitive damages for wrongfully causing the death of the de-
cedent through maliciousness, wilful or wanton injury, or gross negligence;
(6) Nominal damages when the jury so finds.
137. This certainly would be true of recovery under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-
2(b) (4) (a) (1976).
138. 538 F.2d at 555, 561. The issue involved here should be distinguished from
that of whether the award itself is taxable. The recovery is being allowed for what
the decedent would have earned. Those earnings would have been taxable whether or
not the damage award will be.
139. D. DOBBS, supra note 95, § 8.8, at 576 & n.4.
140. Id. at 576 & n.5.
141. Id. at 576 & nn. 7-8.
142. "If this complexity [of calculating the tax] could be resolved ... perhaps
taxes ought to be deducted. In the absence of such [resolution], however, perhaps it
is best to compute the award without a deduction for tax savings." Id. at 577-78.
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XIV. WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES
A. Construction of Wills
In White v. Alexander,' the North Carolina Supreme Court
addressed the problems involved in the application of the Rule in
Shelley's Case2 and of a limitation on the failure of issue. The testatrix
left property to her son "to use and enjoy during his lifetime and if
he shall die without heirs of his body," the ultimate remainder to her
heirs.' When the son died intestate without children a declaratory
action was brought to construe the will.4 The supreme court held that
the proper construction of the will created a life estate in the son and
a remainder in the son's children.5 By construing the words "heirs of
his body" to mean children, the court prevented the Rule in Shelley's
Case from enlarging the son's interest into a fee simple estate.6
In dealing with the limitation over on the death of the life tenant
without heirs of his body, the court held that the limitation would take
effect at the death of the life tenant.7 An issue related to the construc-
tion of the limitation was whether the testatrix meant to include the life
tenant in the remainder class "my heirs." The supreme court held that
the devise to "my heirs" was intended to mean legal heirs in the tech-
nical sense with the exception of the life tenant.8 The construction
1. 290 N.C. 75, 224 S.E.2d 617 (1976).
2. The rule operates when a devise is to a person for life with the remainder
to his heirs or heirs of his body. Nothing else appearing, the devisee becomes seized
of a fee simple estate upon the death of the testator. See, e.g., Hammer v. Brantly,
244 N.C. 71, 72, 92 S.E.2d 424, 425 (1956).
3. 290 N.C. at 76-77, 224 S.E.2d at 618-19.
4. Defendant was the nephew of the deceased life tenant. Plaintiffs, grandchil-
dren of the testarix, brought the declaratory action to construe the will. They alleged
that each of them should receive a one-fourth interest in the remainder. The court
of appeals held that a one-third interest was to be given to defendant with the remaining
interest to be divided among plaintiffs. Id. at 77, 224 S.E.2d at 619.
5. Id. at 78, 224 S.E.2d at 619.
6. Id.; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-1 (1976).
7. 290 N.C. at 80, 224 S.E.2d at 620-21; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-4 (1976).
Before enactment of the statute, gifts over upon the condition of someone dying without
issue or without heirs were void for remoteness. See Patterson v. McCormick, 177 N.C.
448, 451, 99 S.E. 401, 402 (1919).
8. The court distinguished both cases discussed by the court of appeals.
Baugham v. Trust Co., 181 N.C. 406, 107 S.E. 431 (1921), was relied on by defendants
for the proposition that heirs meant the testators legal heirs at death including the
life tenant. Burden v. Lipsitz, 166 N.C. 523, 82 S.E. 863 (1914), was relied on by
plaintiffs for the proposition that heirs of the testator should be determined after the
death of the life tenant. The court distinguished Baugham by saying that all of the
testator's children were initially given an interest and that no question arose over class
exclusion. 290 N.C. at 83-84, 224 S.E.2d at 623. Burden was distinguished on the
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excluding the holder of a precedent estate who was an heir from a re-
mainder class designation of heirs is consistent with other jurisdictions.'
In Crumpton v. Crumpton,10 the supreme court addressed the
issue of what effect a court ordered private sale would have on contin-
gent remaindermen. Land had been conveyed to petitioner for life
with remainder to her living issue per stirpes. The supreme court held
that the proceeds from the sale were to be held on the same contingen-
cies as the original property. 1 The court noted that several issues,
such as whether the contingent remaindermen would survive the life
tenant and whether children adopted out of a family take as issue, 12
would have to be resolved before an ultimate disposition of the fund
could be made.'"
In In re Will of Wadsworth,'4 the court of appeals considered the
evidentiary problems of an interested witness testifying on the mental
capacity of a testator. In construing the dead man's statute,'" the court
held that statements of the witness directed toward the propounder's case
and not to the capacity of the testator are excludable. 10 In several
other cases during the survey period, the North Carolina Court of
ground that the precedent estate was a defeasible fee and not a life estate. Id. at 85,
224 S.E.2d at 623.
9. See, e.g., Mills v. Nicol, 205 S.C. 112, 30 S.E.2d 817 (1944). See also L.
SIMES & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 735 (2d ed. 1956).
In Atkins v. Burden, 31 N.C. App. 660, 230 S.E.2d 594 (1976), the court of appeals
faced an issue similar to that addressed in White v. Alexander. The testator left a
life estate to his son with the remainder over to the son's living children or their issue.
In construing the will after the life tenant died without children, the court held that
the interest of the heirs was an "alienable reversionary interest." Id. at 665, 230 S.E.2d
at 598. The deceased life tenant was an heir of the testator and the question arose
whether his heirs would share in the reversion. The court of appeals relied on White
v. Alexander in holding that the precedent estate of the son coupled with remainder
over to his issue showed an intent to exclude the son from an interest in the reversion.
Id. at 665-66, 230 S.E.2d at 598.
10. 290 N.C. 651, 227 S.E.2d 587 (1976).
11. Id. at 655, 227 S.E.2d at 591. This result is consistent with the approach
taken earlier by the North Carolina Supreme Court on statutes analogous to N.C. GnN.
STAT. § 41-11 (1976). See Poole & Blue Inc. v. Thompson, 183 N.C. 588, 112 S.E.
323 (1922); Dawson v. Wood, 177 N.C. 158, 98 S.E. 459 (1919).
12. The supreme court noted that the court of appeals held that an adoption order
removed the children, who could take as contingent remaindermen, from the bloodline
of the petitioner. 290 N.C. at 653, 227 S.E.2d at 591. In reversing, the supreme court
held that the lower court had misconstrued N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-11 (1976). 290
N.C. at 656, 227 S.E.2d at 591.
13. 290 N.C. at 656, 227 S.E.2d at 592.
14. 30 N.C. App. 593, 227 S.E.2d 632, cert. denied, 291 N.C. 175, 229 S.E.2d
692 (1976).
15. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-51 (1969).
16. 30 N.C. App. at 595-96, 227 S.E.2d at 633; see Whitley v. Redden, 276 N.C.
263, 171 S.E.2d 894 (1970).
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Appeals reaffirmed certain construction practices concerning the Rule
Against Perpetuities, 17 adoption,18 and nearest of kin class designa-
tions.' 9
B. Abatement and Lapse
In Combs v. Eller,2" the court of appeals addressed the issue of
what estate assets are subject to liability for administration debts. The
testator had set up a trust for his sons containing stock in two companies
and had expressly provided that the trustee was not to use the trust
res to pay any of the estate obligations.2' In addition to the stock, the
testator possessed certain property22 that passed to his wife outside the
will. The assets were insufficient to satisfy the debts of the estate and
the trustee brought a declaratory action to determine whether the stock
should be sold. 23  The court, affirming the trial judge's ruling,24 held
that "the direction from the testator that certain property in the estate
not be applied to payment of estate liabilities cannot operate to prevent
payment of debts, taxes, and costs of administration which are justly
owed."2 5
In Forrester v. Marhler26 the North Carolina Court of Appeals
construed the North Carolina lapse statute. The statute provides that
when a legacy or devise lapses, it shall pass under the applicable residu-
17. In Palmer v. Ketner, 29 N.C. App. 187, 223 S.E.2d 913 (1976), the testator
set up a trust that was to continue for at least 25 years or until all children of the
youngest sister had reached the age of majority. The court held that the remainder
provisions of the trust violated the Rule Against Perpetuities and were void. See Mc-
Queen v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 234 N.C. 737, 68 S.E.2d 831 (1952).
18. In Simpson v. Simpson, 29 N.C. App. 14, 222 S.E.2d 747 (1976), the court
held that under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-23 (1976) adopted children would take under
a remainder class designation of "children." See Peele v. Finch, 284 N.C. 375, 200
S.E.2d 635 (1973).
19. In Pritchett v. Thompson, 28 N.C. App. 458, 221 S.E.2d 757 (1976), the court
held that the usage of the term "nearest of kin" without some qualifying language would
not permit a representation.
20. 30 N.C. App. 30, 226 S.E.2d 197 (1976).
21. Id. at 31, 226 S.E.2d at 198.
22. A life insurance policy, savings account, savings certificate and tenancy by
the entirety real property. Id. at 32-33, 226 S.E.2d at 199-200.
23. Id. at 31, 226 S.E.2d at 198.
24. Id. at 33-34, 226 S.E.2d at 199. The trial court held the savings account and
savings certificate were valid transfers in contemplation of death and not available to
pay estate liabilities. The life insurance proceeds and tenancy by the entirety property
passed outside the estate. See Issach v. Clayton, 270 N.C. 424, 154 S.E.2d 532 (1967).
25. 30 N.C. App. at 33, 226 S.E.2d at 199-200.
26. 31 N.C. App. 84, 228 S.E.2d 646 (1976).
27. N.C. GEN. STAT, § 31-42 (1976).
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ary clause. 8 If no residuary clause is provided for, the devise will go
by intestacy unless a contrary intent appears in the will.20 Testator de-
vised all of his estate "'absolutely and in fee simple forever' ,0 to his
brother, but the brother predeceased the testator. The court held the
terms "absolutely and forever" were used in their technical sense to
define the quantum of estate devised to the brother and not to express
the intention that the property was to remain in the family of the
brother in the event he predeceased the testator.3' Since the testator's
language did not provide the contrary intent as described by the statute,
the court held that the property should devolve by intestacy to the
testator's mother rather than to the issue of the deceased brother.8 2
C. Guardians
In In re Lancaster,3" the North Carolina Supreme Court
broadened the concept of standing to challenge the propriety of actions
taken by a general guardian. The guardian had filed a petition with
the court to have a public sale of the incompetent's 285 acre tract of
land. A local attorney, however, challenged the propriety of both the
sale and the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the incompetent.
The clerk concluded that the local attorney did not have standing and
that all of his pleadings should be stricken from the record.3 4  The
court of appeals dismissed the appeal by the local attorney.";
On certiorari, the supreme court reversed. The court noted that
standing was usually accorded to the guardian or trustee acting on be-
half of the incompetent, 8 but that when the challenge attacks the
actions of the guardian himself, the normal concepts of standing must
yield to the overall duty of the court itself to represent the incompe-
tent.37 The supreme court held this broader concept of standing would
allow the courts to receive pertinent information from any source.38
28. Id. § 31-42(c).
29. Id.
30. 31 N.C. App. at 85, 228 S.E.2d at 647.
31. Id. at 86, 228 S.E.2d at 648.
32. Id. at 87-88, 228 S.E.2d at 648-49. By virtue of the Intestate Succession Act,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-15(3) (1976), the mother was entitled to the property as the sole
heir.
33. 290 N.C. 410, 226 S.E.2d 371 (1976).
34. Id. at 417, 226 S.E.2d at 376.
35. 28 N.C. App. 295, 299, 220 S.E.2d 838, 840 (1976).
36. 290 N.C. at 424, 226 S.E.2d at 380.
37. Id. at 424-25, 226 S.E.2d at 380; see In re Probst, 144 N.C. 562, 57 S.E.
342 (1907).
38. 290 N.C. at 425, 226 S.E.2d at 380.
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This information could concern a number of issues:39 1) whether the
sales will promote the interest of the incompetent; 2) what the federal
and state income tax impact of the sale would be; 3) what size tract
should be sold; and 4) on what statutes or particular statute the guardian
bases his authority for the sale.40
D. Trusts and Trustees
In First National City Bank v. McManus,41 the court of appeals
addressed the issue whether a trustee can recover money he has paid
a beneficiary by mistake. Normally a trustee can recover a payment
made by mistake provided the payee has not detrimentally changed
his position.42  The court held that increased tax liability and invest-
ment of the fund proceeds would not constitute a detrimental change
of position by the payee.43  To prevent unjust enrichment, the payee
had to return the funds to the trustee.
In 1976 the court of appeals reaffirmed the rule that to create
an express oral trust there must be the intention to create a trust and
a declaration showing this intent with reasonable certainty. 44  If plain-
tiff is unable to show a definite and explicit declaration of trust,
a directed verdict will be granted in favor of defendant.45 The court
of appeals also reiterated the principle that oral agreements after the
transfer of legal title will not be sufficient to establish a parol trust.46
E. Executors and Administrators
In In re Moore47 the North Carolina Court of Appeals stated
expressly for the first time that court expenses and attorneys' fees ex-
pended by an executor in seeking letters testamentary are not proper
39. Id. at 426, 226 S.E.2d at 381.
40. Id. at 427, 226 S.E.2d at 381. A guardian may sell the assets of his ward
under N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 33-31, -33, 35-10, -11 (1976).
41. 29 N.C. App. 65, 223 S.E.2d 554 (1976).
42. Id. at 70, 223 S.E.2d at 557 (quoting United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.
Reagan, 256 N.C. 1, 9, 122 S.E.2d 744, 780 (1961)); see Dean v. Mattox, 250 N.C.
246, 108 S.E.2d 541 (1959).
43. 29 N.C. App. at 71-72, 223 S.E.2d at 558.
44. Williams v. Mullen, 31 N.C. App. 41, 228 S.E.2d 512 (1976).
45. Id. at 45-46, 228 S.E.2d at 515.
46. Wall v. Sneed, 30 N.C. App. 680, 228 S.E.2d 81 (1976); see Beasley v. Wilson,
267 N.C. 95, 147 S.E.2d 577 (1966).
47. 29 N.C. App. 589, 225 S.E.2d 125, cert. granted, 290 N.C. 661, 228 S.E.2d
453 (1976). The executor was denied the letters testamentary in an earlier appeal
on the ground that there was a conflict of interest. 25 N.C. App. 36, 212 S.E.2d 184,
cert, denied, 287 N.C. 259, 214 S.E.2d 430 (1975).
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costs to be taxed to the estate. The North Carolina statute8 provides
that costs may be taxed in matters involving caveats to wills, construc-
tions of wills or trusts, and proceedings to fix the rights and duties of
parties to the instrument. The court held that application for letters
testamentary was clearly not a "caveat proceeding" nor a "construction of
any will."'49 The court also rejected the executor'i contention that the
costs were incurred in a "proceeding to fix the rights and duties of the
parties thereunder,"50 and followed the majority approach, which denies
these costs on the ground that they do not affect the interests of the
estate but only the personal interest of the executor.8' Following the
policy of taxing costs solely on the basis of statutory authority, the court
of appeals denied the executor's request for expenses. 2
In In re Estate of Adamee13 the North Carolina Supreme Court
addressed the issue whether a separated spouse could qualify as
administratrix of her husband's estate. The widow's application for the
letter of administration had been challenged on the ground that she and
the decedent had entered into a separation agreement. 4  The trial
judge ordered a jury trial on the question whether the decedent and
his wife became reconciled when she returned to the marital home.
After losing at trial, the widow appealed, and the court of appeals af-
firmed the trial court decision. 5 In reversing, the supreme court held
that when parties resume marital cohabitation their separation agree-
ment will be rescinded as a matter of law and that, therefore, the
widow's application should have been granted. 56
F. Probate Jurisdiction
In In re Estate of Adamee5 7 the supreme court also dealt with
the allocation of probate jurisdiction between the clerk and judges of
the North Carolina Superior Court Division. The court overturned the
48. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-21(2) (1969).
49. 29 N.C. App. at 591, 225 S.E.2d at 126.
50. Id. at 591-92, 225 S.E.2d at 126-27; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-21(2) (1969).
51. See, e.g., In re Estate of Morinini, 252 Cal. App. 2d 805, 60 Cal. Rptr. 813
(1967); In re Estate of Baumgartner, 274 Minn. 337, 144 N.W.2d 574 (1966).
52. 29 N.C. App. at 592, 225 S.E.2d at 127; see City of Charlotte v. McNeely,
281 N.C. 684, 190 S.E.2d 179 (1972).
53. 291 N.C. 386, 230 S.E.2d 541 (1976).
54. Id. at 388, 230 S.E.2d at 543.
55. 28 N.C. App. 229, 221 S.E.2d 370 (1976).
56. 291 N.C. at 392-93, 230 S.E.2d at 546; see Tilley v. Tilley, 268 N.C. 630,
151 S.E.2d 592 (1966).
57. 291 N.C. 386, 230 S.E.2d 541 (1976).
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lower court's interpretation of the new probate statute58 dealing with
the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the clerk. The court of ap-
peals had held that the effect of the new probate statute was to
take from the Clerk exclusive original jurisdiction of probate
matters, to vest in the Clerk and the Superior Court concurrent
jurisdiction of probate matters, and to provide for appeals from the
Clerk directly to the judges of superior court, bypassing the district
courts, on all such matters heard originally before the Clerks.5 9
After reviewing the statute, the supreme court reversed the court of
appeals60 and held that under G.S. 28A-2-161 the clerk is given "ex-
clusive original jurisdiction of the 'administration, settlement, and distri-
bution of estates of decedents' except in cases where the clerk is dis-
qualified to act."'62  As a result of this decision, the superior court
judge's probate jurisdiction will be that of an appellate court except in
cases in which the clerk is disqualified to act.63
G. Release and Renunciation
In In re Will of Edgerton4 the court of appeals held that a con-
testant who had signed a release and renunciation65 has no standing
to contest the will. The court reaffirmed the principle that a release
by an heir of an expectant share is binding if the release is given for
a valuable consideration and not procured by undue influence.66 Proof
of dominance by the father over the son who released his share was
not sufficient to establish undue influence."7
58. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-240, -241 (1969).
59. 28 N.C. App. at 234, 221 S.E.2d at 373-74. The supreme court noted that
the clerks of the superior court will retain their preexisting judicial powers under the
new statute. 291 N.C. at 395, 230 S.E.2d at 548; see 1 A. MCINTosH, NoRTH CAROLINA
PRACTxCE AND PROCEDURE § 196 (Supp. 1970).
60. 291 N.C. at 398, 230 S.E.2d at 549.
61. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-2-1 (1976).
62. 291 N.C. at 398, 230 S.E.2d at 549 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-2-3
(1976)).
63. Id. at 398, 230 S.E.2d at 549.
64. 29 N.C. App. 60, 223 S.E.2d 524, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 308, 225 S.E.2d
832 (1976).
65. Renunciation, sometimes called disclaimer, is a refusal to accept a testamentary
transfer. See T. ATKNSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw oF WILLs § 139 (2d ed. 1953).
66. 29 N.C. App. at 63, 223 S.E.2d at 526; accord, Price v. Davis, 224 N.C.
229, 232, 93 S.E.2d 93, 97 (1956).
67. 29 N.C. App. at 64, 223 S.E.2d at 527.
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XV. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW
A. Application of Compensation Act
1. Employee Within the Meaning of the Act
As defined by the Workmen's Compensation Act' the term
"employee" includes "every person engaged in an employment under
any appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or im-
plied, oral or written .... 2 In Wright v. Wilson Memorial Hospital,
Inc.,3 the North Carolina Court of Appeals considered the coverage of
the "apprenticeship" provision of the statute.
Plaintiff Wright, a student at Holding Technical Institute, 4 worked
as a laboratory assistant at Wilson Memorial Hospital for forty hours
per week in satisfaction of the Institute's curriculum requirement of on-
the-job training.5 Under the terms of a contract between the Institute
and the hospital plaintiff received no salary from the hospital, but was
provided free room and board, free laundry service for her uniforms,
and full access to laboratory facilities and equipment for conducting
necessary tests and analyses. 6
While using a piece of equipment that dispensed highly caustic
acid to conduct a blood evaluation, plaintiff was seriously injured by
the explosion of the acid container. She brought a civil action against
the hospital, alleging negligence and seeking $115,000 in damages.7
The court, affirming the trial court's grant of defendant's motion
for summary judgment, held that despite the fact a lab technician
trainee could be considered primarily a student for some purposes,8
plaintiff, for the purpose of workmen's compensation, was an "appren-
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to -100 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
2. Id. § 97-2(2).
3. 30 N.C. App. 91, 226 S.E.2d 225 (1976), cert. denied, 290 N.C. 668, 228
S.E.2d 459 (1977).
4. Now Wake Technical Institute.
5. 30 N.C. App. at 91, 226 S.E.2d at 226.
6. Id. at 91-92, 226 S.E.2d at 226. Although the hospital played no part in
the initial selection of participants in the training program it could limit the number
of students enrolled and could require their compliance with hospital rules and regula-
tions. Id. at 92, 226 S.E.2d at 226.
7. Id. at 91, 226 S.E.2d at 225.
8. The court distinguished the recent decision in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center
and Cedar-Sinai Housestaff Ass'n, 223 N.L.R.B. 57 (1976), which held that other ap-
prentice medical-related personnel (interns, residents and clinical fellows) were pri-
marily students and not employees subject to collective bargaining provisions. The court
did so in light of the unique history and purpose of the Labor Act's collective bargaining
provisions and the fully accredited status of the on-the-job training involved. 30 N.C.
App. at 93, 226 S.E.2d at 226-27.
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ticeship employee." Given plaintiff's status as an apprentice engaged in
learning the practical, technical skills required for her specialty pri-
marily through work in the affiliated hospital,9 the sole remedy against
her employer for on-the-job injury lay within the provisions of the
Act.' 0
North Carolina courts have consistently held that the existence of
the employer-employee relationship is a prerequisite to recovery under
the Act, and is to be determined by application of ordinary common
law principles." Thus, there can be no recovery of compensation for
injury or death that occurs on the business premises after the severance
of the employer-employee relationship.' 2 Neither can an independent
contractor, "who contracts to do certain work, and has the right to con-
trol the manner or method of doing it,"' 3 qualify as an "employee"
within the meaning of the Act.'4
In Alford v. Victory Cab Co.'5 claimant worked under an arrange-
ment whereby he leased his cab for a flat fee per day, kept all his
fares and tips as compensation, controlled his own work schedule,
and was free to disregard dispatcher instructions if he chose.' 6 After
9. 30 N.C. App. at 93, 226 S.E.2d at 226-27.
10. Id. at 92, 226 S.E.2d at 226; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.1 (Cum. Supp.
1975).
11. See, e.g., Hicks v. Guilford County, 267 N.C. 364, 148 S.E.2d 240 (1966);
Scott v. Waccamaw Lumber Co., 232 N.C. 162, 59 S.E.2d 425 (1950); Hayes v. Elon
College, 224 N.C. 11, 29 S.E.2d 137 (1944); Hollowell v. North Carolina Dep't of
Conservation, 206 N.C. 206, 173 S.E. 603 (1934).
12. Lucas v. L'il Gen. Stores, 289 N.C. 212, 221 S.E.2d 257 (1976) (no recovery
for the death of a discharged employee who was killed while performing services on
the business premises of his former employer at the request of another employee he
knew lacked authority to rehire him).
13. Scott v. Waccamaw Lumber Co., 232 N.C. 162, 164-65, 59 S.E.2d 425, 426
(1950).
The test to be applied in determining whether the relationship of the parties
under a contract for the performance of work is that of employer and em-
ployee, or that of employer and independent contractor is whether the party
for whom the work is being done has the right to control the worker with
respect to the manner or method of doing the work, as distinguished from the
right merely to require certain definite results conforming to the contract. If
the employer has the right of control, it is immaterial whether he actually exer-
cises it.
id. at 165, 59 S.E.2d at 426-27.
14. See, e.g., Millard v. Hoffman, Butler & Assoc., 29 N.C. App. 327, 224 S.E.2d
237, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 551, 226 S.E.2d 510 (1976) (claimant who contracted to
be paid a fixed fee for a completed survey job, who could decide how to run the lines
within the area designated to be surveyed and from whose pay no income tax or social
security were withheld by employer held to be an independent contractor ineligible for
compensation).
15. 30 N.C. App. 657, 228 S.E.2d 43 (1976).
16. Id. at 658-59, 228 S.E.2d at 44-45.
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he was shot by a company dispatcher and suffered permanent paralysis
as a result of his injuries, claimant sought to recover compensation, al-
leging that Victory exercised enough control over his activities to
qualify him as an employee. 17
A majority of the jurisdictions that have considered the question
have looked to the nature of the claimant's work in relation to the busi-
ness for which the work is being done18 and have found such. drivers
to be employees. 19 Yet the North Carolina court, in denying the claim,
aligned itself with the minority position and held that under the "con-
trol" test2" claimant was an independent contractor. 2'
2. Carrier as Suable Third Party
In Smith v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,22 a federal district court
was called upon to decide (as a matter of first impression in North
Carolina) whether under the provisions of the Act a workmen's com-
pensation insurance carrier 23 is to be considered an "employer" 24 or a
"third party" 25 suable for negligence under common law.20
17. Id. at 658, 228 S.E.2d at 44. Victory kept a list of drivers and assigned the
cabs they drove, required the drivers to wear uniforms, to be physically fit, and to
comply with the city code. Id. at 659-60, 228 S.E.2d at 45.
18. See IA A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW §§ 43.42-.54 (1973).
19. See, e.g., Golosh v. Cherokee Cab Co., 226 Ga. 636, 176 S.E.2d 925 (1970);
Morgan Cab Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 60 Ill. 2d 92, 324 N.E.2d 425 (1975).
20. Larson argues that the control test is not the most relevant factor to consider
in the compensation context:
The extent to which the employer had a right to control [the) detailed activities
[of the employee] was . . . highly relevant to the question whether the em-
ployer ought to be legally liable for them ....
By contrast, compensation law is concerned not with injuries by the em-
ployee in his detailed activities, but with injuries to him . . . . To this issue,
the right of control of details of his work has no such direct relation as it has
to the issue of vicarious tort liability.
A. LARSON, supra note 18, § 43.42.
21. 30 N.C. App. at 661, 228 S.E.2d at 46.
22. 409 F. Supp. 1211 (M.D.N.C. 1976).
23. "The term 'carrier' or 'insurer' means any person or fund authorized under
G.S. 97-93 to insure under this Article, and includes self-insurers." N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 97-2(7) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
24. See Id. § 97-2(3). Once an employer and employee are subject to and comply
with the Act, the employee has no right of action against the employer "at common
law or otherwise" on account of on-the-job injury or death. Id. § 97-10.1.
25. Under id. § 97-10.2, an employee's common law right to sue persons other
than the employer is still in effect.
26. 409 F. Supp. at 1212. The legal issue is this:
Under a statute that does not plainly identify the carrier with the employer in
its third-party or exclusive-remedy passages, or use language unmistakably
showing intent that the carrier should not be treated as a third party, can the
carrier be sued for negligence in the performance of such functions as making
safety inspections ... ?
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Plaintiff, a textile worker, was seriously injured when her hair was
caught in the uncovered drive shaft of a loom in which she was work-
ing. She brought a civil action for damages against her employer's in-
surance carrier, Liberty Mutual, alleging defendant's negligence in
making safety inspections of the plant by failing to discover and correct
the unsafe condition that caused her injury."
Defendant moved for summary judgment, maintaining that plain-
tiff was barred from recovery under the third party liability provision
as a matter of law since the insurance carrier is equivalent to the em-
ployer for purposes of the Act.2" The court, while professing adher-
ence to a "policy of judicial restraint,"29 held that plaintiff could main-
tain her common law negligence action:3" "Had it been the design of the
General Assembly . . . to exempt insurance carriers from third party
common law liability, it [would] have done so expressly or by un-
mistakable inference." 31
Larson, Workmen's Compensation Insurer as Suable Third Party, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1117,
1117-18.
27. 409 F. Supp. at 1212.
28. Id. Courts of several states with statutes similar to North Carolina's have
read in a proscription against common law liability of carriers despite seeming legislative
silence on the point. Id. at 1218; see, e.g., Bartolotta v. United States, 276 F, Supp.
66 (D. Conn. 1967).
In support of its motion defendant urged that to allow common law recovery against
a carrier would create an anomalous result the legislature could not have intended:
under a comparable fact situation plaintiff could recover against an employer acting
as self-insurer only to the extent allowed by the Act. 409 F. Supp. at 1216; see N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 97-93 & -94 (Cum. Supp. 1976). Defendant further asserted that to
allow recovery would run counter to the subrogation provision in id. § 97-10.2(g). 409
F. Supp. at 1217. Defendant's argument is essentially this: 'The carrier is subrogated
to the injured employee's cause of action against a third party tortfeasor; if the carrier
can be a third-party tortfeasor, the carrier will end by suing itself, and the legislature
could not have intended such a 'ludicrously incongruous' result." Larson, supra note
26, at 1129.
29. 409 F. Supp. at 1218.
30. Id. at 1219.
3 1. Id. The court rebutted defendant's contention that a finding of carrier liability
would produce anomalous results with Larson's argument:
"Mhe carrier would, of course, be entitled to set off in a judgment against it-
self as tort feasor in the amount of compensation paid by it as insurance carrier
... . By now the law is becoming quite accustomed to apparent incongruities
of this kind, what with corporations, insurers, and even individuals 'wearing
different hats.' Increasingly common is the spectacle of an insurance carrier
acting as a compensation subrogation plaintiff and as defendant insurer on a
third party's automobile liability risk. . . . The present issue is not essen-
tially different once it is recognized that the compensation carrier is being sued
not as compensation carrier, but as. . . safety inspection service, in which role
it is just as differentiable as the automobile liability insurer."
Id. at 1217 (quoting Larson, supra note 26, at 1130-31). To hold otherwise, in the
court's view, would constitute an invasion of the legislative province. Id. at 1219; see,
e.g., Beasley v. McDonald Eng'r Co., 287 Ala. 189, 249 So. 2d 844 (1971); Fabricus
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Despite the court's heavy reliance on the avowed policy of liberal
construction of the Act, the question remains whether North Carolina
courts, when confronted with the issue of carrier liability, will acquiesce
in the district court's interpretation of state law.2 Legislative action
(in the form of amendments specifically exempting carriers from liabil-
ity as third parties) has followed similar judicial interpretation of
neutral statutes in other jurisdictions, 3 and could possibly be the
response to the General Assembly.
B. Compensable Injuries
1. By Accident, Arising Out of and in the Course
of Employment
North Carolina courts have consistently held that the "threefold
conditions antecedent to the right to compensation"3 4 under the Act are
that claimant suffer a personal injury "by accident," and that such injury
arise both "out of' and "in the course of' his employment.3 5
The term "accident" has been defined as "'an unlooked for and
untoward event which is not expected or designed by the injured em-
ployee' ,,s6 or " 'a result produced by a fortuitous cause.' 7 Absent acci-
dent, injury to an employee performing his regular duties in the usual
manner is not compensable.3 A wilful criminal assault by a third party
that results in injury or death to an employee is, as the court recon-
v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 254 Iowa 13.19, 121 N.E.2d 361 (1963); Corson v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 110 N.H. 210, 264 A.2d 315 (1970).
32. Defendant maintained, relying on Long v. Coble, 11 N.C. App. 624, 182
S.E.2d 234 (1971), that although carriers are not specifically exempted by statute, this
is the position long taken by the courts. 409 F. Supp. at 1215.
33. The Illinois, New Hampshire and Michigan legislatures have added provisions
exempting carriers in the wake of court decisions that held the carriers liable as third
parties. Id. at 1218 n.4.
34. Withers v. Black, 230 N.C. 428, 432, 53 S.E.2d 668, 671 (1949); see, e.g.,
Robbins v. Nicholson, 281 N.C. 234, 188 S.E.2d 350 (1972); Bryan v. First Free Will
Baptist Church, 267 N.C. 111, 147 S.E.2d 633 (1966); Hardin v. Thomasville Furniture
Co., 199 N.C. 733, 155 S.E. 728 (1930).
35. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(6) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
36. O'Mary v. Land Clearing Corp., 261 N.C. 508, 510, 135 S.E.2d 193, 194
(1964) (quoting Harding v. Thomas & Howard Co., 256 N.C. 427, 428, 124 S.E.2d
109, 110-11 (1962)).
37. Id.
38. Id.; see, e.g., Hewett v. Constructor's Supply Co., 29 N.C. App. 395, 224 S.E.2d
297 (1976) (no accident when a painter suffered back injury by moving from a squat-
ting to a standing position); Pulley v. Migrant & Seasonal Farm-Workers Assoc., 30
N.C. App. 94, 226 S.E.2d 227 (1976) (no recovery for back injury suffered while claim-
ant was performing his usual work of moving a refrigerator of average weight from
truck into house since not accident within the meaning of statute).
1977] WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 1121
firmed in Gallimore v. Marilyn's Shoes, 9 an accident for purposes of
compensation. 40  Although intentionally caused by another, the assault
is still unexpected and without design on the part of the employee.4'
As stated by the North Carolina Supreme Court, an injury arises
out of the employment "when it is a natural and probable consequence
or incident of the employment and a natural result of one of its risks,
so that there is some causal relation between the injury and the perform-
ance of some service of the employment. 42
Claimant in Watkins v. City of Wilmington 1 was severely burned
when the gasoline he was using to help a fellow employee clean parts
of his car ignited and exploded. At the time of the accident claimant
was on the lunch hour of his twenty-four hour tour of duty at the fire
station where he was regularly employed." In an expansive reading
of the Acta" the court affirmed the Commission's award of compensation
and held that claimant's injuries-despite the personal nature of his
activity-arose out of his employment.4
39. 30 N.C. App. 628, 228 S.E.2d 39 (1976) (employee kidnapped and subse-
quently killed by robber who knew she often carried large sums of money to bank
for employer held to have died as a result of an accident that arose out of and in
the course of her employment).
40. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Bright, 202 N.C. 481, 163 S.E. 576 (1932); West v.
East Coast Fertilizer Co., 201 N.C. 556, 160 S.E. 765 (1931); Conrad v. Cook-Lewis
Foundry Co., 198 N.C. 723, 153 S.E. 266 (1930).
41. Withers v. Black, 230 N.C. 428, 432, 53 S.E.2d 668, 673 (1949).
42. Robbins v. Nicholson, 281 N.C. 234, 238-39, 188 S.E.2d 350, 354 (1972) (cit-
ing Perry v. American Bakeries Co., 262 N.C. 272, 274, 136 S.E.2d 643, 645 (1964)).
In Smith v. Dacotah Cotton Mills, Inc., 31 N.C. App. 687, 230 S.E.2d 772 (1976),
claimant, while walking on a public street during her fatigue break from work, stumbled
over a concrete block at an excavation site, fell and was injured. Recovery was denied
on the ground that her injury did not arise out of her employment, despite the fact the
excavation work was being done for the defendant-employer. The risk to which plaintiff
was exposed was not a natural incident of her employment at the mill, but a hazard
to which the public generally was exposed.
43. 290 N.C. 276, 225 S.E.2d 577 (1976).
44. Id. at 277-78, 225 S.E.2d at 579. Although Department rules required a fire-
man on duty to obtain permission to repair his personal automobile, the evidence tended
to show that the employees often worked on their cars during lunch hour, and that
their superiors knew of and acquiesced in the practice. Id. at 278-79, 225 S.E.2d at
579.
45. At one point in its opinion the court pointed out that claimant's injury unques-
tionably occurred in the course of his employment, and then proceeded to quote from
Larson:
"In practice, the 'course of employment' and 'arising out of employment'
tests are not, and should not be, applied entirely independently; they are both
parts of a single test of work-connection, and therefore deficiencies in the
strength of one factor are sometimes allowed to be made up by strength in
the other."
Id. at 281, 225 S.E.2d at 581 (quoting 1 A. LARsoN, supra note 18, § 29.00).
46. Id. at 285, 225 S.E.2d at 583. The court reasoned that since the employee
was required to be at the station on 24-hour call, and since minor repair work on per-
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The phrase "in the course of" the employment refers to the time,
place and circumstances of an accident.47 Thus an injury sustained by
an employee while performing a duty he is authorized or directed to
undertake is a compensable injury.48 The North Carolina courts con-
tinued to follow the general rule that injuries that occur while on the
way to or from the place of employment are not compensable unless





The court of appeals in Inscoe v. DeRose Industries, Inc.5 0 estab-
lished new law by holding that under the intoxication forfeiture provi-
sion of the Workmen's Compensation Act,5 intoxication precluding
recovery must be the sole proximate cause of an employee's accident
resulting in injuries. 2
Plaintiff was seriously injured while en route to a job site when
the company-owned van he was driving collided with another vehicle.
The evidence tended to show that at the time of the collision both plain-
tiff and the other driver were intoxicated. 3  The employer appealed
from the Commission's order awarding compensation on the ground
sonal cars was a reasonable activity, both allowed by and of benefit to the department,
the risk incident to such activity was a risk of the employment. id.; see Davis v. News-
week Mag., 305 N.Y. 20, 110 N.E.2d 406 (1953); Lee v. F.M. Henderson & Assoc.,
284 N.C. 126, 200 S.E.2d 32 (1973) (cited by court).
47. See, e.g., Taylor v. Twin City Club, 260 N.C. 435, 132 S.E.2d 865 (1963);
Plemmons v. White's Serv., Inc., 213 N.C. 148, 195 S.E. 370 (1938).
48. See, e.g., Stewart v. North Carolina Dep't of Corrections, 29 N.C. App. 735,
225 S.E.2d 336 (1976) (claimant allowed to recover for injuries sustained while helping
tear down a shed at the request of his superior though the activity took place during
his off hours and was not normally within the regular duties of his employment).
49. See, e.g., Harris v. Jack 0. Farrell, Inc., 31 N.C. App. 204, 229 S.E.2d 45
(1976) (employee death due to fatal car accident that occurred on way home from
work in truck owned and operated by fellow employee not compensable when operation
was employer-subsidized but employees paid for their rides); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Curry,
28 N.C. App. 286, 221 S.E.2d 75 (1976) (employer who gratuitously, and not incident
to contracts of employment, provided employees transportation to and from work not
liable for injuries they sustained in accident on way to work).
50. 30 N.C. App. 1, 226 S.E.2d 201, cert. granted, 290 N.C. 777, 229 S.E.2d 32
(1976).
51. "No compensation shall be payable if the injury or death was occasioned by
the intoxication of the employee . . . ." Act of March 11, 1929, ch. 120, § 13, [1929]
N.C. Sess. Laws 123 (formerly N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-12 (1972)) (emphasis added).
A 1975 amendment re-wrote the first sentence to read: "No compensation shall be
payable if the injury or death of the employee was proximately caused by: . . . [h]is
intoxication . . . " N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-12 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
52. 30 N.C. App. at 8, 226 S.E.2d at 205.
53. Id. at 1-3, 226 S.E.2d at 201-02.
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that the "occasioned by" language of the statute compels forfeiture of
compensation if an employee's intoxication is a contributing proximate
cause of his injury. 4
Relying on case law interpretations of similarly worded statutes
from other jurisdictions, 5 the court for the first time clearly defined
the phrase "occasioned by" in terms of proximate cause, and held that
intoxication barring recovery must, in consistency with the purposes of
the Act, be the sole cause of an employee's injury. To hold otherwise,
in the court's view, would be to read back into the Act a defense
analogous to common law contributory negligence.5 6
C. Amount and Items of Recovery
In cases of admitted liability an injured employee and his
employer may reach an agreement as to compensation under the Act.
7
Such an agreement, once properly executed, filed, and approved by the
Commission, is as binding on the parties as an unappealed order of the
Commission or an award affirmed on appeal.5 8 A party may later seek
to have the agreement set aside only by making it "appear to the satis-
faction of the Commission that there has been error due to fraud, mis-
representation, undue influence or mutual mistake . . ... " A mere
allegation, unsubstantiated by evidence, that the agreement should be
disapproved will not constitute a ground for a rehearing by the Commis-
sion.60
54. Id. at 4, 226 S.E.2d at 203.
55. South Carolina and New Mexico have forfeiture provisions similar to North
Carolina's. Id. at 10, 226 S.E.2d at 206. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-10-8 (1974);
S.C. CODE § 72-156 (1962).
56. 30 N.C. App. at 9, 226 S.E.2d at 206. The court explained:
To illustrate this point, we simply note that in the usual negligence case in
which contributory negligence prevails as a defense, if plaintiff's negligence
was a proximate cause of the mishap and not necessarily the only proximate
cause, defendant is relieved of liability. It was this very result that Workmen's
Compensation was designed to eliminate.
Id.
57. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-82 (1972).
58. See, e.g., Biddix v. Rex Mills, Inc., 237 N.C. 660, 75 S.E.2d 777 (1953).
59. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-17 (1972); see Neal v. Clary, 259 N.C. 163, 130 S.E.2d
39 (1963).
60. Pruitt v. Knight Publishing Co., 289 N.C. 254, 221 S.E.2d 355 (1976). In
Pruitt, claimant executed an agreement with his employer whereby he accepted compen-
sation for the 10% permanent partial disability of his back caused by a compensable
injury that aggravated a preexisting back condition. (Claimant's total disability was
,,35%, of which 25% was attributable to an earlier noncompensable injury.)
Claimant later filed with the Commission for review of the settlement award on
grounds that the examining physician's medical reports had been misread, and that he
was actually entitled to recover for 35% permanent partial disability. The supreme
court held that claimant was bound by the agreement unless he was able to substantiate
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One element of an injured employee's recovery under the Act is
compensation for temporary disability during the "healing period" of
his injury."' In Crawley v. Southern Devices, Inc.,02 defendant-
employer appealed the Commission's award on the ground that the
healing period, within the meaning of the statute, was limited to the
period of maximum recovery from an operation. 8 The court held that
since claimant's was an injury case 4 the healing period "extended be-
yond the period of maximum recovery from his operation to the time
when there was such stabilization of his impaired bodily condition that
it was established to be permanent."65 A change in the examining
physician's estimation of degree of disability could not, however, as
claimant urged, extend the healing period absent any change in
claimant's physical condition.6
If an employee is to recover compensation over and above the
amount of the Industrial Commission's original award he must adhere
to prescribed statutory procedures in making his claim. Thus the court
in Shuler v. Talon Division of Textron67 denied a claim for additional
medical expenses because claimant failed to comply with the provisions
of G.S. 97-47.68 Despite the fact that claimant was seeking only con-
tinued payment of medical expenses, he had originally been awarded
both a lump sum payment of compensation for diminution of earning
capacity and compensation to cover medical expenses. Under the terms
of the statute he was therefore required to give timely notice and to show
a change of condition warranting further recovery.9
his allegation that error had been made due to one of the statutory grounds, Id. at
259-60, 221 S.E.2d at 359.
61. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-31 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
62. 31 N.C. App. 284, 229 S.E.2d 325 (1976).
63. Id. at 288, 229 S.E.2d at 328.
64. Claimant sustained an injury to his lower left rib cage on September 10, 1971.
Due to continuing pain and discomfort caused by the injury, he underwent a laminec-
tomy on June 28, 1972. Id. at 286, 229 S.E.2d at 327.
65. Id. at 289, 229 S.E.2d at 329.
66. Id.
67. 30 N.C. App. 570, 227 S.E.2d 627 (1976).
68. Id. at 577, 227 S.E.2d at 631; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-47 (Cum. Supp.
1975).
69. 30 N.C. App. at 576-77, 227 S.E.2d at 631. Claimant maintained that the
statute was inapplicable and that because he sought only additional medical expenses
(not additional compensation) he was not required to show a change of condition. Id.
at 576, 227 S.E.2d at 631. The court held that a mere change of the doctor's opinion
concerning the duration of claimant's condition did not constitute the actual change
of condition required. Id. at .577, 227 S.E.2d at 631; see Pratt v. Central Upholstery
Co., 252 N.C. 716, 115 S.E.2d 27 (1960). Claimant's doctor originally testified that
medical treatment would be necessary for no more than six months or a year, but later
diagnosed claimant's condition as chronic. 30 N.C. App. at 573, 227 S.E.2d at 629.
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